What_Should_the_Army_Do_with_the_Fcs_Program

The purpose of this paper is to address what should the Army do with the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which is now referred to as the Accelerated Technologies (AT) program. I propose, that the Army should cancel the program because of the lack of results of the sensors, the network is not preferred verses having SIPR connectivity and redirect monies to stop IED attacks. Currently the U.S. is using systems that are similar to the FCS programs that have failed to live up to their press. Sensors are one of them. The AT, formerly known as “spin out” systems, must be understood in context for both purpose and use. These AT systems are sensors, less the NIK and the Non Line of Sight – Launch System. Combined with a network, their purpose is to collect and report information that is useful and relevant to the commander. Sensors are tasked to collect specific items or actions as part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) plan to satisfy the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and other intelligence requirements. During the push to Baghdad from the 3rd ID, the sensors failed to provide data to one battalion in the defensive that would have been useful to the commander. The only report that the commander had was that a single Iraqi brigade was moving south from the airport, but the battalion sensors failed to convey the far more dangerous reality that confronted them that morning. The battalion faced not one brigade but three, between 25 and 30 tanks, plus 70 to 80 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi soldiers coming from three directions. The Iraqi deployment was just the kind of conventional massed force that is easiest to detect, and what the sensors were design to detect. Yet the battalion got nothing until they slammed into them. The keys to victory lay in better training, better tactics, better planning, and, most of all, superior leadership at all levels. Despite the Iraqis superior numbers, the U.S. battalion had the better leaders in command and that, in the end, spelled victory for the U.S. battalion. TRADOC Capabilities Managers-IBCT from Ft. Benning, GA, believes that the current capabilities of the CL 1 UAS, the SUGV and the U-UGS, which they view as sensors, outweigh the drawbacks associated with these systems. Their thought process is that with well researched and written TTPs, these systems can be fielded to the BCTs and will enhance information collection and survivability. The network is designed to move information around, but the information itself is the key to victory. Key to move the information from sensors to company and then higher is the Network Integration Kit (NIK). The technology is promising but expensive, and it displaces other capabilities. Feedback from the IBCT Commanders indicates a more desirable capability at the company level is SIPR connectivity. In this contemporary non-linear operating environment, the demand for SIPR connectivity has been deemed critical by units in both OIF and OEF. In this environment, information flows to and from small units has increased significantly. Infantry companies have limited analysis capability and are generally not co-located with the battalion headquarters. As a result, SIPR connectivity between companies and battalions has become imperative. The units have designated SIPR connectivity at the Infantry Rifle Company level through the Soldier network extension (SNE) an essential operating capability. Given the limited assets in the Infantry Company, and the SWaP challenges associated with the NIK providing the SNE capability is more logical and cost effective choice. The terrorist have learned to ride the rails of our technology to strike at us. The area that the U.S. should emphasize is the effort to deal in a technological way with the problem of the improvised explosive device (IED). The enemy has figured out a variety of systems allowing them to detonate these weapons in a way that cannot be jammed. One school of thought is about understanding the enemy as a system and trying to disassemble that system. Currently the U.S. has not demonstrated that. The U.S. is simply going for technological fix and that is one reason the U.S. has had so much trouble with IEDs. Instead of spending so much money on the FCS program, why not re-direct that money to technologies that will break the enemy communications. In World War II, there was an investment in creating a system that would break the Japanese diplomatic and military codes call Magic. How did it help, to give an idea of how important the code breaking was, during the Battle of Britain the people at Bletchley Park were able to warn bombing raids, how many airplanes the Germans had lost and so on. This let the RAF plan which German airplanes they should attack, and which they should ignore. We should look at this as an investment in creating the most effective computing or figuring out how to structure the vast ocean of data that masks the movements of Al-Qaeda on the Net and the Web. The U.S. needs a Bletchley Park, if we are going to win this war. The Army should stop investing money into a program that has failed to produce. This is evidenced during the push for Iraq in April 2003. When the sensors fail to provide information that the battalion faced not one brigade but three. Which we must remember, that the sensors where design to detect such an attack and they failed. The network that is key to moving the information from company to higher is expensive, but the Infantry community would prefer SIPR connection over the NIK. So, the U.S. should redirect that money to defeat the signal most destructed weapon on the battle field at this time, the IEDs.