What_Is_American_Way_of_War__How_Does_It_Differ_from_Other_Forms_of_Warfare_

What is American way of war' How does it differ from other forms of warfare' The further developments of technology, especially those of Information Technology and their increasing role in military affairs, as well as the growing risk averseness and the decreasing numbers of the ground forces eventually led to the ‘Rumsfeld’s transformation’ or the ‘new’ American way of war. The transformation of military strategy can be said to have started already in the middle of the Cold War with the so-called Eisenhower’s “New Look” in 1955- ‘a nuclear deterrence strategy where Air Force played the pre-dominant role’ (Kurth, 2005:634). The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Reagan doctrine in the 1980’s played a significant role in the transformation process as well. RMA, similar to Rumsfeld’s ‘transformation’ was focused on the developments of the ‘C4isr-command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance’ (Boot, 2003). Meanwhile, the Reagan doctrine was a national strategy that implied ‘the use of allied subconventional forces against communist conventional military forces’ (Kurth, 2005:640). The Reagan doctrine has been applied in the war in Afghanistan since 2001 using the local militia with the help of the U.S. Special Forces (SP) against Islamist fundamentalists. Yet this can be criticised a lot because it contradicts itself with the national strategy or the Bush doctrine that declares the ‘pre-emptive (or preventive) action against the enemy and the regime change’ (Kagan, 2003). Hence, because the ‘superpowers do not do windows’ (Kagan, 2003) the Bush doctrine is simply a failure because the regime change contradicts the ‘transformation’ of military strategy. ‘Transformation’ roughly consists of two cohesive ‘elements’: Network-Centric-Warfare (NCW) and ‘shock and awe’ strategy. ‘NWC translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space’ (Kagan, 2003) and ‘shock and awe’, in essence, is a military tactic where the U.S. gains outrageous information superiority, uses it against the enemy on the battle space fast and effectively, and destroys the enemy before he even can respond back. However it should be understood that one could probably win the battle thanks to the ‘transformation’, but not achieve the political aims, for example, the ‘regime change’. One step further is the Future Combat System (FCS) that combines the advancements of technology with the army. That would include ‘robot soldiers’ too, however this idea is still maybe too sensitive for both military and public to comprehend as it poses the obvious two half truths or moral dilemma. Robot-soldiers might actually help to reduce the casualties, ‘collateral damage’ and make more available soldiers since the robots would not posses the ‘human factor’- emotions, revenge, anger, etc, however will the human beings allow the machines to judge what is ethical and what is not is another issue. Besides, standoff precision is not that effective once the foe has become more aware of the weaknesses of these technologies as it has been proved in the major combat operations (MCO) in Afghanistan and Iraq. This therefore means that when fighting asymmetrical war the new American way of war is and will depend on its superior technology, but it will continue to depend on the conventional warfare methods as much. The Bibliography Coker, C. (2001) Waging War without Warriors' The Changing Culture of Military Conflict Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Boot, M. (2003) ‘The New American Way of War’, Foreign Affairs 82(4): 41-58. Kagan, F. (2003) ‘War and Aftermath’ Policy Review No. Kaplan, L. et al (2002) ‘China’s war on terrorism and ours’ The New Republic collection of articles: 20-24. Kelsay, J. (2003) ‘The New Jihad and Islamic Tradition’ Foreign Policy Research Institute Wire 11(3). Kurth, J. (2005) ‘Global Threats and American Strategies’ Foreign Policy Research Institute notes from the lecture: 631-648 Linn, B.M., Weigley, R. F. (2002) ‘The American Way of War Revisited’ The Journal of Military History 66(2): 501-533. 10.Stahel, R. A. (2004) ‘Dissymmetric warfare versus asymmetric warfare’ International Transactions in Operational Research No. 11: 435-446. 11.Yarborough, W. P (1962) ‘Unconventional Warfare: One Military View’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences Vol. 341: 1-7. 12.Dean, C. (2008, 24 November). ‘A Soldier, Taking Orders From Its Ethical Judgement Center’, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/science/25robots.html'_r=1&8dpc. Accessed 24 November 2008.