Weimar__the_Veneer_of_Stability

The Veneer of Stability – Weimar Germany The latter years of the Twenties saw a remarkable level of progress and stability from the ‘Weimar Republic’ in the political, economical, social and cultural arenas. They represented the ‘Golden Age’ of the republic, spearheaded by Stresemann’s ‘Great Coalition’. However, this stability was merely a thin veneer of success concealing a thoroughly compromised core of anti-republican organisations representing the traditional power-holders of Germany. Given time, and perhaps luck, this veneer could have proliferated and outlived this nihilistic core, but with the sudden onset of the Great Depression, and its direct blow at the inherently weak, temporary foundations of Weimar’s progress, collapse was inevitable. The progression of Art and Culture in Weimar reflected the equally progressive policies of Stresemann’s ‘Great Coalition’ of moderate parties and its success on the domestic and international stage, restoring German credibility and equality on the world stage and restoring social order and the middle class at home, two vital factors in forging a stable democracy. These remarkable achievements (Locarno Treaty (France and Belgium) 1925, Treat of Rapallo (USSR) 1922 and Unemployment Insurance, Provisional work hours, respectively) were successful in giving the appearance of the restore of order to a nation that would grind through 6 Governments and had hyper inflated its currency to almost one trillion times the original amount in order to pay off debt. While this state of confidence and subsequent stability was achieved with the inception of Stresemann’s policies, they relied on stopgap measures such as the ‘Rentenmark’ 1923 and the ‘Dawes Plan’1923 and it’s renewal, the ‘Young Plan’1929, failing to deal with the issues of nihilist organisations in Weimar, caused by the failures of the Treaty of Versailles, while Stresemann may have chosen to deal with that issue when it came, seeing the ‘Policy of Fulfilment’ and establishment of a stable middle class as priorities, it left several anti-republican groups to fester and grow in the blind spots of Stresemann’s policies, eager to manipulate the slightest sign of renewed instability to subvert a ‘tolerant’ society. These groups existed in the form of the right wing Judiciary, the army that the republic owed its survival to, the nationalistic society at large, angry over the penalties and hypocrisies of the ToV, and last, but certainly not least, the ultra right wing parties of the DNVP and the NSDAP. This combination proved fatal, providing motive, means and opportunity for an overthrow of the republic. The motive being the decadence and failures of the Twenties being associated with Weimar (highly unpopular), the means being the ability to impede the Republic and its moderate supporters with impunity (biased Judiciary, friendly (in later years, army)) and the depression itself. The Weimar Republic, fortunately, was able to mitigate these issues, with the introduction of Hindenburg as president (1925), the republic was given credibility and respect, weakening the Right-Wing’s motive and means, however, this would prove to be another stopgap measure, in the end being one of the reasons Hitler was able to get into power and orchestrate the final demise of the Republic, with the support of the Judiciary, public and the army, all powerful factors in the politics of Weimar Germany, to its detriment and downfall. It was this lack of permanent measures (caused by the constant change of governments, particularly the able Stresemann in 1923 and the death of Ebert in 1925) coupled with the opportunistic right wing of Germany that caused the demise of democracy in Weimar Germany. Given time, this floating economy based on heavy foreign investment would have earned popular support (presumably as the old voice of authoritarian Germany died out) and eventually become permanent, and this progression towards the future (reflected in the temporary nature of the policies of fulfilment, economy and stopgap politics) would have been realised, had all gone according to plan, had the world at large maintained the status quo, Weimar Germany’s seemingly inevitable success (time was on their side) would have been realised. The ‘Golden Age’ was not necessarily a sign of stability in Weimar Germany, it was, rather, a sign of the changing trends, a turning point from authoritarian to democratic tendencies, in fact, it was anything but a period of stability, it was the end of an era of monarchism and dictatorship, and the stopgap measures, while being viewed as failures by history, may have actually been indicative of the irrevocable successes of Weimar Germany and its intent to revolutionise, NOT stabilise Germany, and it was this inherent INSTABILITY that, paradoxically, was reliant on the status quo to succeed, and hence met its demise, perhaps inevitably, due to its very paradoxical definition, in the Great Depression. - Putting pen to paper/fleshing out ideas essay - no bibliography