Was_Nietsche_a_Pessimist

Was Nietzsche a Pessimist' The composition of Germany in the 19th century was experiencing fundamental changes. "The Year of Revolutions," 1848, witnessed the uprising of popular democratic ideas, which began in France spread to many nations in Europe, resulting in the fall of several thrones. In 1870 Napoleon III made war on Prussia allegedly to avenge a pretended insult from the Prussian monarch. The injustice of Napoleon's cause and Bismarck's guile united all the German states (except Austria) in a war against a common enemy. In less than a year the French were beaten. Napoleon was captured and compelled to abdicate the throne. Alsace and Lorraine were taken from France and added to Germany. Germany united to form the German Empire, with King William of Prussia as the first emperor. Sutton highlights that what ensured for philosophers such as Schopenhauer was a period of ‘cultural pessimism.’ A crisis in religiosity in 19th century Germany arose; works of the likes of Darwin was at the forefront of pious debate en masse juxtaposed with the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment. Riessen points to how it was ‘cultural pessimism’ which leant itself as the biggest problem faced by Nietzsche.[1] Cultural pessimism, defined by Schopenhauer was the acceptance worthlessness of life. False beliefs about happiness cover the reality of disillusionment. It would be better, Schopenhauer argued, to seek nothing positive from a world which owes nothing to.[2] The basis of this thesis, writes Laing, influenced Nietzsche and helped him develop an interest on the issue.[3] However, the acknowledgment of cultural pessimism did not necessitate acceptance from Nietzsche. Indeed, Nietzsche’s own theories were in stark contrast to Schopenhauerism by embracing an ideal of ‘nihilism’ in order to counter the problem of cultural pessimism. Nihilism sought the acceptance of a ‘culturally pessimist’ society but advocated a means to form new ends. Nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and meaning: “Nihilism is . . . not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one’s shoulder to the plough; one destroys.”[4] Nietzsche’s portrayal of Dionysian nihilism and the Übermensch were also principal differences from cultural pessimism, aiming at faith in the possibilities of renewal and cultural honesty. This essay aims to explore that whilst Nietzsche was influenced and acknowledged a culturally pessimist environment he ultimately advocated a means to an ends which cultural pessimism didn’t provide. The difference in the nature of cultural pessimism and nihilism resulted in a philosophy which advocated a solution of change and progression to the problem merely adhered to by Schopenhauer. Philosophically, the emergence of pessimism may be dated to 1750 and the appearance of Rousseau’s Discource on the Arts and Sciences, with its characterization of modern man as a moral degenerate. However, it (pessimism) achieved its period of genuine popularity through the work of Schopenhauer. "Through four generations almost," says Braasch in Die Religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart, "he remained the most popular philosopher, and he was able to bask for a generation in the splendour of his fame.” After the disappointment of the hopes of 1848, under the weight of the reaction an embittered mood prevailed. This mood rediscovered itself in Schopenhauer's philosophy. All sceptical and depressed spirits, all pessimistic hearts eagerly snatched his works such as, Parra and Prolegomena.[5] For Grillaert, Schopenhauer becomes the embodiment and culmination of Western degenerate mentality and lifestyle.[6] Europe was a place with a rapidly changing social and cultural reality. Sutton notes that there seemed an ‘imminent’ peril of European civilization of an already depraved European society contaminated towards evil. [7] In short, it seems apparent that Nietzsche had been brought into a popular culture of pessimism. Schopenhauer was unique in his influence on Nietzsche's intellectual development. Nietzsche regards him as both a protagonist and an antagonist. Nietzsche's understanding of will, knowledge and morality are not as comprehensible as they could be without an understanding of these ideas as they appear in Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation. Even Nietzsche's critique of pessimism and his understanding of nihilism require an understanding of Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer everything in ordinary life is characterized by ‘Nichtigket’, or nothingness, which suggests the thought that life is meaningless.[8] Christopher Janaway highlights Schopenhauer’s theories on cultural pessimism. He argues his philosophy incorporated an extremely negative evaluation of ordinary human life from the start, ‘nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence expert the knowledge that it would be better for us to not exist.’[9] Janaway describes his thesis of ‘the negativity of satisfaction’ – satisfaction as merely a temporary absence of suffering, which soon yields to more suffering again. Schopenhauer wrote that ‘all satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always negative and never positive…Nothing can ever be gained but deliverance from some suffering or desire; consequently, we are only in the same position as were before this suffering or desire appeared.’[10] In short, he renounces hope, and advocates triviality of aspiration. He adds, ‘it is quite superfluous to dispute whether there is more good or evil in the world; for the mere existence of evil decides the matter, since evil can never be wiped off, and consequently can never be balanced, by the good that exists along with or after it…we have not to be pleased but rather sorry about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence.’[11] Janaway highlights further Schopenhauer’s stance, one which was evidently pessimist. Schopenhauer’s influence guided Nietzsche into the realms of cultural pessimism. Nietzsche saw an attitude in Germany where people were content with the status quo; there was mass conformity to State ideals. Nietzsche saw this cultural pessimism as major fault within the system claims Laing.[12] The conditions arising in Germany after 1870 roused Nietzsche to active criticism and resolute constructive effort. Laing notes that after the victorious wars against Denmark, Austria and France a new spirit had emerged in Germany in the form of selfishness and self-glorification. Nietzsche was also struck by the growing unproductiveness of the period in really great men. He saw a growing servility, imitativeness and uniformity of character and the gradual disappearance of any desire to accept individual responsibility or a readiness to stand alone against the crows for the sake of new values. Nietzsche ascribed this change in German character to a prevailing system of values, and to the presence of a powerful public opinion, which secured the observance of the accepted standards, and against which none expect very strong natures dared rise up. Nietzsche believed that public opinion was shaped by education. This system refused to assign individual worth to the individual, aiming to out the state above the individual and this produced men serviceable to the state in the form of machines[13] Embedded in cultural pessimism was the increasingly adverse view towards the Church. Indeed, during the 19th century people were less inclined towards religion. The 19th century may be regarded as a progressive biological period. The first half witnessed practically the foundation of the science of Embryology in the researches of the eminent Russian naturalist, Karl Ernst von Baer, by the middle of the century the empirical method of investigation had succeeded in establishing itself in the region of organic life. The successful results achieved by the empirical study of organic life expelled gradually the notion of a special creation by God. The idea of evolution was gradually absorbed by biology and placed on an empirical basis. Furthermore, Darwin’s theory was becoming widely discussed in the public sphere. By the time Nietzsche started to develop his own theories on religion, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the origin of species had already been formulated and had become the centre of controversy.[14] As a result a gradual movement away from the Church was initiated. Nietzsche wrote of his anti-religious beliefs in his doctrines. He discusses Christianity, one of the major topics in his work[15], in which he depicts a negative picture. He believed Christianity consisted of sheer fictions. God, the soul, free will, Kingdom of God, eternal life - were all ‘purely imaginary.’[16] He argued that religion had been made subservient and used to cultivate, just like politics and economics. For Nietzsche religion had bore different implications for particular groups. It united the ruling classes with its subjects by manipulating the peoples in order to justify their rule. For the rising class it taught them the discipline necessary for ruling and for the subjects it taught that they exist for “service and the general advantage.” [17] Religion gives them contentment, almost glorifying their obedience. It helped make them feel that their struggle was justified. Religion had become a mere artifice with the ruling class, was the explanation for Nietzsche’s harsh condemnations. To summarize, it would seem apparent that for Nietzsche religion was a major problem for society. In a famous quote in the Gay Science Nietzsche claimed, ‘God is dead’[18] It makes reference to Nietzsche’s animosity towards the Church. Christianity for him included all types of decadence which were so prominent in cultural pessimism. He claimed Christianity was inspired by the hatred of the weak against the strong Christianity stood all true values on its head. It taught scepticism of all true values and demanded belief as a true entity. For Nietzsche it was merely an antidote against the despair of meaninglessness, the increased amount of belief a man found necessary was merely a testament to his a measure of weakness. Riessen identified the nineteenth century Christianity for Nietzsche as ‘bestial, realistic, plebeian, more honest, but weakwilled, sorrowful and fatalistic; the century of longing.’[19] With the publication of Human, All Too Human in 1878 Nietzsche's reaction against the Church and the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer became evident. The ending of their relationship followed and instigated the beginnings of a changing thought process for Nietzsche. He embarked on a more ‘realistic position’ to philosophy. It became less abstract. God was dead, Christ became the enemy of life and truth became fiction.[20] Nietzsche began to embrace the irrationality and flamboyancy of philosophy and part from the philosophy of decadence. Nietzsche began to acknowledge and comment on the problems in society of cultural pessimism and the crisis of religion. What now separated him from Schopenhauer were the consequences of this decadence. Schopenhauer saw this dissolution as part of a movement that was to be accepted and conformed to. Nietzsche on the other hand proposed a resolution. He claimed that the idea of nihilism would emerge from this period of decadence and cultural pessimism which would help overcome a state of decadence. Decadence and nihilist values appear the same wherever the will to power was lacking, what differs was their response. Schopenhauer’s cultural pessimism advocated conformity. Nihilism, on the other hand discarded compliance. It was a solution to the cultural pessimistic, decadent environment, an adversary of change and progression. The idea of Nihilism was contextually revolutionary, although one must note, points Tuck and Tuusyuori that this did not mean the idea was Nietzsche’s innovation. In Germany, the use and the meanings of the word nihilism had proliferated around the midway of the century. It was Eugène Burnouf who, in 1844, questionably but with lasting effects associated Buddhism with negativity and nihilism.[21] Thinkers such as Feuerbach, Stirner, Schopenhauer and Proudhon were called nihilists in the course of the century. Proudhon, Strauss, Feuerbach and Stirner were commonly related to nihilism. By the time Nietzsche began his confrontation with nihilism it was already a fairly well established dogma. [22] In order to decipher a definition of nihilism distinctive to Nietzsche he wrote about the notion in two different forms, active nihilism and passive nihilism. Passive nihilism was the more traditional belief that all is meaningless, while active nihilism goes beyond judgement to deed, and destroys values where they seem apparent. Passive nihilism signified the end of an era, while active nihilism engineered something new. Nietzsche considered active nihilism not as an end, but as a means ultimately to the revaluation of values. He stresses repeatedly that nihilism is a ‘transitional stage’ clearing away outdated value systems so that something new can rise in their place.’[23] Active nihilism was the catalyst for constructing something new. This form of nihilism is characterised by Nietzsche as "a sign of strength,"[24] a wilful destruction of the old values to outdated principles and lay down one's own beliefs and interpretations, contrary to the passive nihilism that resigns itself with the decomposition of the old principles. This wilful destruction of values and the overcoming of the condition of nihilism by the constructing of new meaning, could be related to what Nietzsche elsewhere calls a 'free spirit' or the Übermensch from Thus Spoke Zarathustra.[25] Active nihilism was indicative of an increased power of the spirit. The will is strengthened and rebellious. The strength of the will is tested by whether or not it can recognise all value systems as empty and meaningless yet admit that these lies serve a purpose. This denial of a truthful world, Nietzsche says, may be a “divine way of thinking”. The active nihilist recognises that simplification and lies are necessary for life. Where rationality and reason had clearly failed, the active nihilist embraces irrationality and freedom from logic. The will now has an opportunity to assert its strength and power to deny all authority, to deny the constraints of existence. Nietzsche describes this state as both paradoxically caustic and constructive.[26] Active nihilism was not an end, however. It merely opens the stage for the beginning of a revaluation of values. It opens the stage for the will to take power and assert itself. Nihilism was the pioneer of revaluation, it did not replace values, it asked to reassess and re-examine. In short, nihilism functions as an essential transition, and must be understood as a means and not an end.  In his book The Birth of Tragedy, the notion of Dionysian principles is compared to his analysis of the Greek tragedy. Dionysian is the principle of the dark, irrationality, the collapse of order and boundaries. Dionysian is passionate, dynamic and unpredictable. Nietzsche advocated Dionysian in man and claimed that means one must realise and accept his own Dionysian nature and ‘use it appropriately.’[27] Dionysian represents the fundamental principles behind active nihilism and thus should be aspired to. He views that the highest state attainable by a man can be achieved when life is conceived in terms of the realisation of the Dionysian ideal of the Übermensch. Nietzsche's idea of Übermensch is one of the most significant concepts in his thinking, mentioned in his work Thus Spoke Zarathustr. Germany had defeated the French by the end of the 19th century but their power worried Nietzsche. The systems developed lacked individuality, freedom. The new constitution drawn up by Bismarck was a Federal system. It was hierarchical not dissimilar to the structure of the Church. Because of the conditions in Germany people were content and ascribed themselves to conformity. It was this lack of individuality and drive which inspired Nietzsche to procure the Übermensch, a man who aspired to freedom and independence by revolting against the system. Nietzsche held that all growth and progress took place and could alone take place, through the individual and that every advance necessitated opposition to the accepted values and that body of tradition consolidated in the state. Anything that prevented the individual from developing his life to its proper fullness was attacked. A system that trained the individual to be only an instrument was met with hostility by Nietzsche. [28] It was for these reasons, identifies Magnus, that explain why the idea of the Übermensch became so prominent and important for Nietzsche. Nietzsche argued that the notion of nihilism and the Übermensch was rudimentary for society. He claimed that society was scared of negativity. The modern aim of progress and morality and the Enlightenment was just to eliminate everything which frightens us. Independent will and even intelligence became ‘evil’ and fairness and obedience become good. But this meant society trapped people and made them obedient. It was this effect that had created cultural pessimism and was exactly what Nietzsche’s dogma of nihilism was proposing to solve. Society required fine individuals to show leadership, ambition and ruthlessness. Examples are Caesar, Leonardo, Alcibiades were people who challenged social ‘truths’ yet emerged under new conventions and beliefs. For Nietzsche this was proof of the value of nihilism.[29] He believed we could survive the process of destroying all interpretations of the world through nihilism, and we could then perhaps discover the correct course for humankind. To conclude, the answer to the question, was Nietzsche a pessimist' A number of issues have been raised. The altering situation of Europe must be accounted for as must the interpretation of Schopenhauer in the form of cultural pessimism, these defined the problem which Nietzsche saw. Its importance is unquestionable due to its clear effect on not only society but also Nietzsche. It was Schopenhauer’s works on pessimism which were of great inspiration to Nietzsche. However, what is interesting here is the acceptance but also removal from him and Schopenhauerism. Schopenhauer claimed merely of a problem. The crisis of the Church and questions of God juxtaposed with a set of values by which one was obliged to conform to something was to be accepted by cultural pessimism. Nietzsche accepted that the decline in religiosity was a reality. However, he saw cultural pessimism as a method lacking resolution. The dogma of nihilism acknowledges that there are problems and that there were no truths or meaning. Moreover, he claimed we must deal with them and act on them. Acknowledgment of negativity was the beginning of a transitional stage to positive ends. By disproving ‘truth’ and myths and evoking a sense of meaninglessness, it should be conducive to action and invite change and progression. The Übermensch and the traits shown by Dionysian nihilism act as the catalysts which help conquer this pessimistic vision. In short, Nietzsche acknowledged the issues raised by cultural pessimism. However, what differed was the creation of a solution to the problem. Nietzsche was not a pessimist, he was a nihilist. Bibliography Books Carr, Karen. The Banalisation of Nihilism (University of New York Press, 1992) Janaway, Christopher, The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge University Press, 1999) Magnus, Bernd and Higgins, Kathleen. The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, (Cambridge University Press, 1990) Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power, Book II (Kessinger Publishing, 2007) Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power, Book I (Kessinger Publishing 2007) Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil (Wilder Publications, 2008) Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science (Cambridge University Press, 2001) Riessen, Van. Nietzsche (Presbyterian and Reformed Press, 1960) Sautet, Marc. Nietzsche for Beginners (Orient Longman Private Limited, 2004) Sutton, Jonathan. The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Towards a Reassessment (New York, 1988) Tuck, Andrew, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship. On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna. (Oxford University Press, 1990). Articles Laing, Bertram M. ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), pp. 510-527 Nel Grillaert, ‘A Short Story about the "übermensch": Vladimir Solov'ëv's Interpretation of and Response to Nietzsche's "übermensch" Vol. 55, No. 2 (2003), p.174. Tuusvuori, Jarkko S. ‘Nietzsche & Nihilism Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality Academic dissertation’ (Faculty of Arts University of Helsinki, 2000) Websites http://www.philosophyideas.com/files/other/Nietzsche%20Beyond%20Good%20&%20Evil.pdf ----------------------- [1] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press 1960) [2] Christopher Janaway, ‘The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer’ (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 325. [3] Bertram M. Laing, ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), pp. 510-527 [4] Friedrich Nietzsche, ’The Will to Power: In Science, Nature, Society and Art’ (Random House, 1973) [5] Bertram M. Laing, ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), p.514. [6] Nel Grillaert ‘A Short Story about the "übermensch": Vladimir Solov'ëv's Interpretation of and Response to Nietzsche's "übermensch" Vol. 55, No. 2 (2003), p.174. [7] Jonathan, Sutton, ‘The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Towards a Reassessment,’ St. Martin's Press, (New York, 1988), p.27. [8] Christopher Janaway, ‘The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer’ (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.318. [9] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Will to Power, Book 2,’ (Kessinger Publishing, 2007), p.605. [10] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Will to Power, Book 1 (Kessinger Publishing 2007), p.319. [11] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Will to Power, Book 2,’ (Kessinger Publishing, 2007), p.576 [12] Bertram M. Laing, ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), p.521 [13] Bertram M. Laing, ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), p.514. [14] Bertram M. Laing, ‘The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and its Solution International Journal of Ethics,’ Vol. 26, No. 4 (1916), p.514. [15] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Gay Science’ (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.71. [16] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press, 1960), p.22. [17] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Beyond Good and Evil’ (Wilder Publications, 2008) p.95. [18] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Gay Science’ (Cambridge University Press, 2001) [19] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press 1960), p.24. [20] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press 1960), p.16. [21] Andrew P Tuck, ‘Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship. On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna. (Oxford University Press, 1990), p.34. [22] Jarkko S. Tuusvuori, ‘Nietzsche & Nihilism Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality Academic dissertation’ (Faculty of Arts University of Helsinki, 2000), p.563. [23] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press 1960), p.16. [24] Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Gay Science’ (Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.35 [25] Karen Carr, ‘The Banalisation of Nihilism,’ (University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 43-50 [26] Van Riessen, ‘Nietzsche’ (Presbyterian and Reformed Press 1960), p.19. [27] Marc Sautet, ‘Nietzsche for Beginners,’( Orient Longman Private Limited, 2004) [28] Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins, ‘The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche,’ (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.318. [29] http://www.philosophyideas.com/files/other/Nietzsche%20Beyond%20Good%20&%20Evil.pdf