Utilitarianism_and_Justice

Module 4: Must a utilitarian defend the sacrifice of innocents whenever this maximises utility' Does this provide grounds for rejecting utilitarianism' Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory of morality that asserts that an action is only morally right if it is the one that produces the most utility. A utilitarian must therefore defend the sacrifice of innocents whenever it leads to the greatest net utility. To many of us this is morally objectionable, so to account for this attempts have been made to modify the utilitarian doctrine so that it rejects the sacrifice of innocents and aligns more closely with our pre-theoretical moral beliefs. This scenario exposes a number of issues that utilitarianism fails to address which ultimately provide grounds for rejecting utilitarianism. A possible defence for the utilitarian is to attempt to refine utilitarianism into a more acceptable doctrine that would allow one to simultaneously defend the sacrifice of innocents while maintaining utilitarian values. Some examples of this include rule utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism and Mill’s higher and lower pleasures. First suggested by Mill (1863), rule utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism that proposes that individuals follow a set of moral rules that generally lead to outcomes that produces the most utility. This means that rather than calculating the moral worth of each action as it is encountered, one would instead refer to the applicable rule that generally lead to the best outcome. This is advantageous in that it is impossible to accurately calculate the precise moral worth of any given action, as the future effects of an action cannot be precisely predicted. Rather than referring to time consuming methods such as Bentham’s hedonic calculus, rule utilitarianism would make ethical decision making quicker and simpler, in turn allowing for more time to maximise utility. Secondly, rule utilitarianism better accommodates principles of justice, as it allows for the existence of rights. In this instance an example would be ‘do not sacrifice innocents,’ as in general the sacrifice of innocents leads to a decrease in utility. However, were the rule utilitarian placed in a circumstance where the sacrifice of an innocent would definitely maximise utility, they are still forced to defend the sacrifice of an innocent. If the utilitarian chose to adhere to the rule then they would be blindly following rules without reason and violating their essential moral beliefs. To remain true to the essence of utilitarianism the rule-utilitarian must acknowledge the rule as inapplicable in this situation and choose to make an exception, however if this is the case then rule utilitarianism is identical to act utilitarianism (Smart 1956 cited in Lynch 1993:32), as each case needs to be considered on a separate basis to achieve the morally right decision. Another way a utilitarian may attempt to avoid defending the sacrifice of is to deviate from the standard definition of utility, articulated by Mills as “actions are right in proportion as they promote happiness, wrong as they produce the reverse of happiness.” (Mill 1863) Rather than purely aiming for happiness, the utilitarian may choose to alter the concept of utility. Two examples of this are Karl Popper’s negative utilitarianism and Mills’ distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Negative utilitarianism (Popper 1945) focuses on minimising suffering, rather than maximising pleasure. It is based on the argument that pain and pleasure are not ethically symmetrical, meaning that it is more right to stop one who is suffering from continuing to suffer than to make one who is already happy happier. This would allow the negative utilitarian to condemn the sacrifice of an innocent if it were for the sake of others happiness, as the suffering caused to the innocent would outweigh the increased happiness of those who would benefit. However, like rule utilitarianism, this approach does not allow the utilitarian to unconditionally condemn the sacrifice of innocents if the utility benefit were a decrease in suffering. Mill (1863) also proposed a classification of pleasures into higher pleasures and lower pleasures. Higher pleasures included cultural and intellectual activities, such as the pleasure derived from watching an opera or solving a maths problem and were lexically prior to lower pleasures from simpler activities such as children’s games. Neither Mill’s nor any other attempts to refine the notion of utility allow the utilitarian to categorically condemn the sacrifice of innocents while remaining true to the principles of utilitarianism. This is because the utilitarian stands for a net maximisation of utility in the community, and no matter what the interpretation of utility is, if the sacrificing of innocents leads to the greatest utility increase then to the utilitarian this is the only morally right act. This dilemma highlights a number of issues with utilitarianism that render it unattractive as a moral guide. Namely, it provides an inadequate account of the distribution of utility, fails to recognise the equality of persons, and does not distinguish between good and right. Utilitarianism is solely concerned with the maximisation of net happiness in the community. One issue with utilitarianism that the sacrifice of innocents exposes is that it is not only ethically important to maximise happiness, but to consider how this happiness is distributed. As Rawls (1973 cited in Lynch 1993:11) argues, while it is ethical for an individual to pursue the maximisation of happiness, it is not ethical for society to do the same. Utilitarians treat the happiness of society as though it were that of a single individual. It is perfectly reasonable for an individual to sacrifice happiness at one moment for a greater overall happiness, however for society to sacrifice the happiness of one individual for a greater net utility may be considered an injustice. One explanation of why this is an injustice, and an explanation that liberals have traditionally relied upon is social contract theory. Social contract theory proposes that in a hypothetical state of anarchy a certain set of moral laws would be agreed upon for the mutual benefit of all involved, the most essential of which include the protection of life and property. Rawls argues that, if placed behind a “veil of ignorance” during the creation of such a contract, a position in which each individual did not know their personal circumstances or position in society, each individual would observe the maximin principle – that each individual would try to maximise the worst possible outcome. From this arises the ‘difference principle,’ (Rawls 1973) which suggests that an inequality is only acceptable if it would improve the circumstances of the least advantaged. The sacrifice of an innocent for a greater net happiness would violate the essential liberties of life and property, as well as the difference principle. Using the social contract explanation, one would have grounds for rejecting utilitarianism on the basis that it does not provide a sufficiently equitable distribution of utility and violates the principles upon which society is founded. Another issue with utilitarianism is that it fails to recognise the equality of persons. While upon first inspection utilitarianism advocates that ‘each [is] to count for one and none for more than one,’ (Jeremy Bentham) on closer inspection this is not the case. Utilitarianism promotes the greatest net happiness, so those with a greater capacity or tendency toward happiness will invariably be worth more. This would mean that, for example, the liberties of a sufferer of chronic depression could be exchanged for those of one easily made happy just as those of the sacrificed innocent have been. Finally, utilitarianism, like many teleological theories, does not distinguish between good and right. While happiness is undoubtedly something every individual strives for, and therefore a good thing, it is not always morally correct to strive for happiness as utilitarianism implies. This is aptly illustrated by the situation of the sacrificed innocent, which causes a total increase in happiness, or good, but a decrease in right. Instead, a moral theory should acknowledge that there are many perceptions of good, not only happiness, and that the right is concerned with protecting ones capacity to pursue this conception. It is evident then that despite many attempts to refine utilitarianism, the utilitarian is still forced to defend the sacrifice of innocents whenever this maximises utility. This is because utilitarianism is does not acknowledge the need for distribution of utility, recognise individuals as equal, or distinguish between good and right. To many, these problems provide grounds for rejecting utilitarianism. 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