Unfinished_War

This essay will examine a significant issue in history and consider Stalin’s role and the Soviet involvement in the Korean War (1950-53) with the substantial Russian documents. In the mid-1990s, the Russian government declassified a number of important documents on the Korean War. In addition, a number of Russians and North Koreans who played military or political role in the war published their memoirs and allowed interviews on the subject. Before scholars gained access to previously top secret Soviet-era documents, they could only guess at the extent of Stalin’s involvement in the war due to lack of evidence. However, the new Russian documents made scholars able to verify the centrality and breadth of Stalin’s role in the Korean War. Moreover, it has brought a sharp change on the knowledge of the conflict in the historical literature. These recently available sources show the invasion of South Korea as a Communist initiative that demonstrated the aggressiveness of Stalin, even when no direct threat existed for his country (Leffler & Westad, 2010, pp.109). Moreover, the documents are clear that it was Stalin who made the decision about whether or not to invade South Korea, even though the invasion was planned by North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung who was firmly determined to unify the entire peninsula by military means (Keylor, 2003, pp.190). It is an important issue because the invasion created a fear in the United States of the domino effect of Soviet Communism. Americans and their allies eventually intervened in the conflict with the goal of preventing the spread of Communism. For this reason, The Korean War is seen as a confrontation between the two opposing ideologies (Millett, 2001, pp.1-2). However, although the substantial evidences have resolved the question on the Soviet responsibility for the decision to attack South Korea, the interpretations of Stalin’s rational in approving the offensive have varied widely. Therefore, this essay will particularly examine Stalin’s rationale for supporting the invasion of South Korea as a significant issue relevant to Cold War history, especially to the origins of Korean War. In his book, the Korean War in World History, Stueck contended that the combination of Stalin’s foreign policy setbacks in Europe during the period of 1947-49 and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in late 1949 kindled Stalin’s interest in promoting communism in the Korean peninsula (2004, pp. 68-69). In fact, in the Cold War confrontation in Europe, Stalin had suffered a series of embarrassing reverses. The success of the 1947 Marshall Plan, the failure of the 1948-49 Berlin Blockade, and the formation of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization which put the Soviet Union on the defensive were among the series. Then, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) achieved victory over the Nationalist Party in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. This had shown Stalin that the Nationalism became more easily aligned with Communism there than in Europe. Therefore, as Stueck pointed out, Asia now looked more promising to Stalin for Communist expansion. The question remains, though, why Korea' Around the same time, tensions between Soviet-controlled North Korea and the U.S. protected South Korea greatly increased because both Korean regimes hoped to unify the peninsula through military means. The South Korean leader, Rhee repeatedly initiated military provocations after American troops withdrew from South Korea, so that North Korean leader, Kim actively considered an attack on South Korea begging Stalin to back him (Gaddis, 2007, pp.41-42). In addition, the Soviet documents are clear that until the end of 1949, Stalin had been reluctant to take military action in Korea because he was worried about the North Korea’s lack of military superiority and the possibility of US intervention in Korea. Stueck also contended that in this sense, the CCP victory was very important to resolve Stalin’s concerns for two reasons. Firstly, China had its huge manpower resources and the Chinese troops were now available to fight in Korea, if necessary, to assist North Korea. Secondly, the Americans did nothing to prevent the spread of Communism in China. In Stalin’s view, this meant that the United States was weak. Thus, they would not fight for a smaller prize in Korea. However, Stueck concluded that the rise of Communist China had changed the international situation in East Asia in late 1949 and early 1950 and had created a new impetus for Stalin to look to the Korean peninsula. Stueck’s arguments seemed to be contemplated but have not been confirmed, yet. Indeed, he mentioned that the scholarly examination of the Soviet role in Korean War is still limited compared to the extensive literature on the U.S. involvement. Zhihua argued that Stalin’s aim in the Korean peninsula was to get a new access to Pacific warm-water ports and to prevent South Korea from becoming a springboard for future aggression against the USSR (2000, pp.55-62). As Zhihua explained in his essay, Stalin signed the new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship on 14, February, 1950 at Mao’s request. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union preserved Xinjian and Manchuria as its buffer zone, but instead, it was to yield control over the Chinese Eastern Railway with its entire huge infrastructure, to transfer to China all its property in Dalian, and to return its Port Arthur naval base without compensation. In addition, Zhihua pointed out that the return of Port Arthur would mean that the Soviet Union would lose direct control of its only warm-water port in the Far East, Stalin thus had to think about alternative arrangements in Northeast Asia. In this sense, Zhihua claimed that the new Sino-Soviet treaty forced Stalin to seek new means of maintaining Soviet interests in the area. Furthermore, Zhihua suggested that Stalin must conclude that if North Korea occupied South Korea, the Soviet Union could control the whole of the Korean peninsula, and the warm-water ports of Inchon and Pusan would replace Port Arthur. According to the Soviet document, the Soviet Union and North Korea agreed to build a railroad linking Aoji in Korea and Kraskino in the Soviet Union. This railroad was intended to replace the Chinese Eastern Railway. Zhihua also suggested that Stalin had long understood the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula for Soviet security interests. Indeed, Leffler and Westad argued that the Soviet main interest in the Korean peninsula was to prevent Japan and the United States from using the peninsula to attack Manchuria and the Soviet Far East as Japan had done in the 1930s (2010, pp.109-110). They also argue that through the military action in the Korean peninsula, Stalin wanted to make up for the Soviet retreat in Europe and enlarge the territorial springboard to threaten Japan. But as the evidences were insufficient, the argument is considered less reliable. By contrast, Zhihua’s argument on the Soviet interest in the Korean peninsula was quite convincing as his essay presents solid evidences including telegrams and reports provided by Russia and China. In one of a series of publication, Cold War International History Project, Westad argues that Stalin’s aim in the Korean War was to limit the growing Chinese Communist power, so that he could keep China under Soviet influence (2000, pp.70-73). In addition, Westad contented that Stalin forced China to take a responsibility for the defence of North Korea instead of Soviet Union if the United States intervene in the conflict. In fact, the declassified Chinese and Soviet documents reveal that Stalin was not entirely pleased with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party. On the one hand, the rise of the CCP helped spread Communist influence in Asia. But on the other hand, they had the potential to become a threat to Soviet dominance position of the international Communist movement, if the Chinese gained the military strength (Chen 1994, pp.84). However, in early 1950, Stalin was facing two potential conflicts in East Asia. North Korean leader, Kim was planning to attack South Korea to unify the peninsula and he needed Soviet permission and assistance to go ahead. The CCP leader, Mao was also planning to liberate Taiwan through military means and hoped for Soviet military aid to carry it out. As Westad pointed out in the publication, Stalin viewed if China liberated Taiwan, it would be a potential rival for Soviet influence in the Far East, whereas the unified Korea would be firmly under Soviet control. Westad also pointed out that because of these reasons, Stalin believed the outbreak of the Korean War would prevent China from attacking Taiwan and at the same time, would place China’s military to support North Korea and therefore he could unify Korean peninsula and keep China under Soviet influence at once. Furthermore, one of the most renowned Chinese historians, Chen who teaches at Cornell University explained in his essay, Stalin knew that Mao would be opposed to taking military action on the peninsula (1993, pp.34). At that time, China faced difficulties in reconstructing economy and consolidating political regime and gave its priority to liberating Taiwan. Accordingly, Stalin promised Mao to offer direct air and naval support for the Taiwan campaign and Mao agreed to take an active part along with North Korea. The Cold War International History Project is aimed to provide new findings and views on the subject basis of newly available archives and sources. So Westad’s arguments in this publication are highly reliable and convincing. In conclusion, Stalin decided to approve North Korean military plans in early 1950 to preserve Soviet strategic interests in Far East. After a series of Soviet foreign policy setbacks in Europe, Stalin looked to Asia to expand Communist influence in the area due to the victory of Chinese Communist Party in 1949. The United States did nothing to prevent the victory of CCP in the revolution and to Stalin, this meant US military was weak and they would not intervene in the smaller crisis in the Korean peninsula. The new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in February 1950 threatened Soviet privileges in the Far East. This included the Chinese Eastern Railway, Dalian, and Port Author that Stalin had secured since 1945 and provided an access to the warm water port in the Pacific. Stalin wanted new access to the Pacific warm water ports, so that the Korean peninsula was able to provide. Stalin also wanted to prevent the Korean peninsula from becoming springboard of any future aggression against the Soviet Union. Stalin feared that Chinese Communist Party could become a Soviet rival power in the international communist movement, so that he wanted to limit the growing power of CCP and keep China under Soviet influence. At that time, CCP leader, Mao sought Soviet military aid to liberate Taiwan. Stalin promised Mao to offer military aid and involved China in the Korean War in order to limit its growing power through liberating Taiwan. For all these reasons, Stalin needed to gain control over the Korean peninsula and in his calculation he could do so, if Soviet-controlled North Korea occupied South Korea. But Stalin miscalculated the situation, invited the United Nations Commanders to the conflict and eventually caused a long, painful war. Bibliography Chen, J. 1994, China’s road to the Korean War, Columbia University Press, New York. Chen, J. 1993, The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington, D.C. Gaddis, J.L. 2007, The Cold War, Penguin Books, London. As to the reliability of this book, it is highly reliable because it was written by America’s most prominent Cold War historian, Gaddis who has explored the Cold War in seven other books. But it is considered less informative as it does not provide any new sources or interpretations on the Korean War that depart from his previous books. Keylor, W.R. 2003, World of Nations: The international order since 1945, Oxford University Press, New York. Leffler, M.P., Westad, O.A. 2010, The Cambridge History of The Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Millett, A.R. 2001, The Korean War, Bison Books, Lincoln. Stueck, W. 2004, The Korean War in World History, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky. In this book, Stueck has edited a series of papers from a symposium on the Korean War. Although it is rooted in Russian documents, it is slightly less reliable as the scholarly examination of the Soviet role in Korean War is still limited. But it is very useful and informative because it provides a vivid and in-depth account of the combat. Westad, O.A. 2000, Brothers In Arms: The rise and fall of Sino-Soviet alliance 1945-1963, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington, D.C. Zhihua, S. 2000, ‘Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 2, pp.44-68. This academic article is very reliable as it was written by an academic and has been adapted or published in several historical journals. The main strength of this article is that it is written for Cold War professionals based on new studies by the fellows of Harvard College. It is also relevant and useful because it covers the topic in detail.