U.S._Civil-Military_Relations

“Let’s see who we’ve got here tonight. General Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They still support Rumsfeld. Right, you guys aren’t retired yet, right' Right, they still support Rumsfeld. Look, by the way, I’ve got a theory about how to handle these retired generals causing all this trouble: don’t let them retire! Come on, we’ve got a stop-loss program; let’s use it on these guys.” – Comedian Stephen Colbert 2006 White House Correspondents’ Dinner The state of U.S. civil-military relations conjures up some of the most difficult and oldest problems of human governance via the subordination of the military to civilian leadership. Over the course of our nation’s existence, civil-military relations have been forced to evolve with the changing geopolitical environment. From as recent as Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s, the Powell Doctrine in the 1990s, the tragic events on September 11, 2001, and the Iraq Surge in 2007 – each experience helped shape the civil-military environment into what we have today. While it is important for senior military leaders to be knowledgeable and observant of the political process – they must also know the boundaries of the professional military ethic and support the concept of objective military control. In order for the civil-military relationship to have success in the future, it is imperative that the military institution take time to educate the military officer corps on professionalism. Admittedly, the military has failed miserably to teach its ranks the importance of military professionalism and explain the concept of objective civilian control. Even for the most senior military personnel, there seems to be a lack of general understanding of what is appropriate and professional to discuss as a member of the armed forces (retired officers are still subject to UCMJ regulations). Frequently, senior military leaders become the mouthpiece of cable news, espousing political, economic, and military rhetoric, despite the inauspicious damage it can cause to the military and political arm of the government. Instead of staying true to the professional military ethic and discussing only military security and professionalism issues, sometimes military members (active and retired) have made statements about issues that are inappropriate and out of the realm of their expertise. But the most disturbing aspect is not the mere fact that this is happening, it is the lack of understanding that these senior military leaders have regarding the political commentary that they submit to the American public. Herein lies the problem – the normal U.S. citizen does not understand that the personal perspective of “General (ret) Smith” could be different than that of the U.S. military. They recognize the military rank structure and automatically deduce that the “all for one and one for all” concept works for the military. If “General Smith” believes it, then the whole military must believe it. Nothing could be more further from the truth. Samuel Huntington and other authors on civil-military relations drive home the basic premise that “soldiers don’t make policy…they merely execute it.” Perhaps a better way to bridge this gap is through conscious decision-making and education. By offering the military more robust academic fellowship opportunities, cross-cultural exchange and internship programs, the future military and civilian leadership would have the ability to interact with each other more often and expand the general understanding of each group. Additionally, the military should invest in addressing the importance of military professionalism and objective civilian control in junior and senior professional military education (PME) venues. By taking the time to invest in this critical matter, specifically in the early and more developmental stages of officer PME, it can only help each military professional to make more informed and thoughtful decisions prior to engaging with the public. Just as making the proper acquisition decisions are important for the reliability and sustainability of the military force, it is of equal or greater importance for the military to educate their personnel on how communication, perspective, and the fundamentals of military professionalism are essential to keep uniformed leaders away from political policy discussion and decisions. The overall question for military members on the issue of public speaking becomes quite controversial at times. The Department of Defense could help the military and political process immensely if they outlined possible military public speaking courses of action (COAs). As discussed with Professor Tretler, they could include the three basic rules on when to speak out in public settings, which include: only speak on issues that are in your lane (mostly issues of military security), only in response to a specific request/never offer unsolicited commentary, and always be straightforward and honest. Of course these three rules offer a basic framework, but the overall concept is what is important. Just as the military puts emphasis and training into such things as law of armed conflict, equal opportunity training, etc – the DoD could also institute such a program that outlines military professionalism, objective civilian control, as well as “how to have personal political views while being a military professional.” This would assist military personnel in becoming more intelligent on the sensitivity of the relationship of the military with its political superiors, while tailoring it to the level of experience, rank, and seniority that a specific job or position might warrant. This would help eliminate the ambiguity of possible civil-military pitfalls in the future, while offering an umbrella of training and education for those who wear the uniform. One of the best ways for the U.S. military to help keep the lines of politics and professionalism separated is to utilize each military service’s legislative liaison (LL) office to its fullest extent. Each LL office reports directly to the service Secretary and serves as an agent of the Secretary within assigned policy and program domains. Using the Air Force LL office as an example, they utilize the Air Force Mission Directive (HAFMD) 1-22 to outline the mission, organizational relationships, responsibilities, and delegations of authority. For an office that is responsible for the development, coordination, and supervision of the AF LL program, one would think there would be a robust training program and finite detail outlined in HAFMD1-22. Unfortunately, this document is only two pages long and does a poor job addressing the level of complexities that encompass the LL scope. Additionally, there is no formal training given to the Air Force members who arrive in LL to outline the challenges of the politically charged environment they will engage in, day-to-day. In fact, after interviewing two different field grade officers in SAF/LL, they relayed that the only formal training that takes place is that of sporadic on-the-job (OJT) training they receive. In order for the Air Force to be credible and professional as a service, it must invest the time and effort to train and educate its members that tackle the daily responsibility of dealing with the political environment and demands of Washington D.C. Another looming issue faced by the military today is the notion of "proper civil-military balance.” This balance is difficult to quantify at times - when civilian control of the military is weak or non-existent, there is a tendency for military influence to overflow into other areas of public policy and social issues and vice-versa (Kohn & Myers, 2007). However, proper civil-military balance is contingent upon the respect, collaboration, cooperation, subordination, and candor of effective policy, resulting in a decision making process that culminates in a solid decision-making process. In an article written in Foreign Affairs in 2007, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers and Richard Kohn surmised that the resignation of a senior military officer could undermine the civil-military relationship more than any other single factor. Resignation over a specific topic or issue only exacerbates a problem – by resigning and taking a disagreement to the public, it directly undermines the civilian control of the military. As previously discussed, the role of the military is to advise, then carry out lawful policies and orders of the civilian policy makers. The decision-making process at the strategic level is the responsibility of the elected/appointed officials, not the military professional. Under Myers mantle of military resignation rules, to abandon or resign a military post would highlight a disagreement and in some cases assault the civilian control over the government. Kohn and Myers again reiterate the role of the military is to advise and carry out lawful policies and orders, not to make them. In other walks of life, professionals could resign, but a military leader sworn to defend the country would be abandoning it, along with the people under his or her care or command (Kohn & Myers, 2007). In 1997, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), General Ronald Fogleman requested an early retirement, one year prior to his tour of duty as CSAF was to be completed. At the time, there was a misconception that Gen. Fogleman was going to resign in protest over the SECDEF’s intention to block the promotion of Brig. Gen. Terryl Schwalier to major general. The previous year, Schwalier commanded a wing in Saudi Arabia when a terrorist bomb destroyed a barracks known as “Khobar Towers” – killing 19 airmen and wounding hundreds of others. In the aftermath of 3 DoD investigations, Fogleman determined that Schwalier was not at fault and had done all he could do to integrate force protection measures to help ensure wing-wide security, however the SECDEF did not come to the same conclusion. Because of this quagmire, Gen. Fogleman decided to retire. It is important to note the deliberate manner in which Fogleman decided to request a retirement versus immediate resignation. In this instance, Gen. Fogleman understood the gravity of the situation and the fundamental difference the term “resignation” might have in the public eye. As he explains it “was a request for retirement versus a resignation. . . . My request was very carefully worded and consistent with historical practice and precedent. . . . I wanted to take that off the table and give him [the secretary of defense] one last opportunity to act on the Schwalier case on the merit and facts of the case, rather than the issue of the secretary of defense's power vis-à-vis some service chief” (Kohn, 2001). Fogleman’s departure, while unfortunate, helped emphasize the importance of wordsmithing. His deliberate use of the term “retirement” rather than “resignation” made a significant difference because the term “resignation” would encroach on the premise of “civilian control of the military.” In his brief public statement, he stated, “My values and sense of loyalty to our soldiers, sailors, Marines and especially our Airmen led me to the conclusion that I may be out of step with the times and some of the thinking of the establishment. This puts me in an awkward position. If I were to continue to serve as chief of staff of the Air Force and speak out, I could be seen as a divisive force and not a team player. I do not want the Air Force to suffer for my judgment and convictions" (Kohn, 2001). The underlying issue, however, is the act of early retirement versus resignation. Using the example of Gen Fogleman, early retirement may be the last form of respectful disagreement that is left to a military officer. In my humble view, while it is critical for senior military leaders to do all they can to support civilian policy and direction; they must have an option to graciously step down. If there is a disagreement on fundamentals in which the military professional feels morality has been compromised and a subsequent discussion of this disagreement with the civilian superior with no avail; then, in the interest of the nation and its people, the senior military leader would be no less professional for humbly removing himself from active duty and post. In June of 2008, the Air Force again went through public and painful leadership change when Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley were forced to resign from their positions. While Secretary Gates requested their resignations based off of the specific findings of the Donald report, which uncovered a “gradual erosion of nuclear standards and lack of effective oversight by Air Force leadership,” the resignations of both men pointed to other contributing factors in addition to the deterioration of the Air Force nuclear enterprise (Wynne, 2008). In fact, General Moseley and Secretary Gates locked horns on a number of issues, privately and publicly – the most notable being the Air Force belief and substantiation of the number of F-22 Raptors that would be required to protect the United States and its allies. To illustrate the friction and difference in perspective, Secretary Wynne and Gen. Moseley were adamant that the Air Force would need at least 381 F-22s to recapitalize the fighter inventory – as the aging F-15C and F-16s were sent to the bone-yard. While Secretary Gates was publicly attempting to rally support for weapon systems relevant to the counterinsurgency taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, Wynne and Moseley advocated for more conventional forward thinking – and continued to push the increased numbers of the F-22 in public and private. Whether you agree with Gates or not, his decision to maintain U.S. predominance globally was largely tackled by addressing current and immediate issues facing the DoD. In the medium-term, the DoD surmised that with the integration of the F-35 – there would be more than sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft for the USAF to fly to ensure air supremacy in the next conflict. On April 6, 2009 – Secretary Gates reported to the American people that amongst other changes, cuts, and defense spending priorities - that the F-22 program would be shut down in 2009 after the 183 F-22s (already purchased) were supplemented by four more F-22s. The result…an end state of 187 F-22 Raptors - a reduction of almost 194 F-22s from the previous request from Gen. Moseley and Secretary Wynne. The disagreement between the Air Force team of Moseley and Wynne versus Gates and the DoD were not just about numbers or weapon systems. Rather, it was more about a fundamental difference in strategy and the lack of understanding of objective civilian control that torpedoed the Air Force leadership. Many surmise that Moseley was merely protecting the coveted brotherhood of the fighter-pilot mafia by pushing the F-22 program, but after more analysis, that excuse was merely an explanation for the fundamental disagreement in weapon system budget allocation. Gates wanted more UAVs; Moseley wanted more F-22s. It was more Moseley and Wynne’s inability to give expert advice, state their opinion, and move on that got them in trouble. Although they may have disagreed about the number of F-22s to be purchased, it was obvious that Moseley was not interested in the concept of objective military control. Again, reinforcement of the fundamentals and understanding of the military professional could make a difference – maybe not in the outcome of DoD coffers or weapon systems – but in adhering to professional boundaries. The final point of interest regarding the state of civil-military relations today is in the analysis of the DoD and its quest for corporateness between the services. As one of Huntington’s three fundamental characteristics of any profession, corporateness is defined as the members of a profession sharing a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. The DoD as a whole is undergoing significant change in the midst of the severe national economic recession. Just recently on 6 April 2009, Secretary Gates outlined his three main objectives for the military force in FY 2010 (people, strategic/conventional modernization, and acquisition/contracting reform). The service chiefs, secretaries, chairman and vice-chairman of the JCS, as well as all DoD personnel need to rally behind the decisions made by the SECDEF. Each service entity and the joint chiefs had the ability to weigh in on the 2010 budget, give expert advice, and counsel the SECDEF on the repercussions of promoting one program over another. However, pending the Congress and Commander-In-Chief’s approval – the decision-making process for 2010 has been accomplished. Although there will be disagreements with some of the detailed decisions embedded in the defense budget, professionally, it is time for every service and military member to rally behind this budget submission. However, if called upon to testify on Capitol Hill, service members should speak frankly and objectively regarding the topic in question; even if it is contrary to the administration’s views. In closing, the quote by Stephen Cobert at the beginning of the paper was significant for two reasons. Although humorous, it highlighted the lack of professionalism that senior military leadership portrayed during the tenure of the previous SECDEF (Rumsfeld). It also revealed the lack of understanding that the American public has regarding the military institution as a whole. Retired officers, although they may no longer wear the uniform on a daily basis, should not speak and act in a manner that advocates a certain political view while standing in as a professional military expert. These misconceptions and misunderstandings are the root cause for some of the missteps of the civilian and military leadership blunders in the past. They stem from a systemic lack of training and education on military professionalism and objective civilian control. The system in the United States is a good one, but if we are to maximize civil-military relations success, education and training on this subject will have to become a consistent part of professional military education. REFERENCES Gates, Robert (2009). Defense Budget Recommendation Speech. Retrieved on 6 April 2009 from http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx'speechid=1341 Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). The Soldier and the State. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Kohn, Richard H. (2001). The Early Retirement of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Retrieved on 24 March 2009 from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ICK/is_1_15/ai_75578148/ Kohn & Myers (2007). Salute and Disobey. Retrieved on 26 March 2009 from (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62843/richard-b-myers-and-richard-h-kohn-mackubin-thomas-owens-lawrenc/salute-and-disobey'page=2 Wynne, Michael (2008). Moseley and Wynne forced out. Retrieved on 18 Mar 2009 from http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/06/airforce_moseleywynne_060508w/ http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/08spring/cook.htm http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/cgsc_student_blog/archive/2009/03/24/should-retired-general-officers-participate-in-the-political-process.aspx Phone interview on 1 April with Maj. Joshua D. Bowman and Maj Jennifer Nevius of SAF/LL.