The_Way_Forward_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan

The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan Name: Ted Johnson Date: 13 April 2010 Based upon the attached “Remarks by the President in “Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, the President stated that as Commander in Chief he made the determination that it was in the vital national interest of the United States to send in an additional 30,000 U.S. Troops to Afghanistan. The President stated that the United States must deny Al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. Strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that the Afghanis could take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future. The President had three objectives to fulfill in order to meet his objectives: I. Pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum and increase Afghanistan’s capacity over 18 months. NDS-Wining our Nations wars II. Work with U.S. partners, the United Nations and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. NDS - Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships III. Act with full recognition that U.S. success in Afghanistan in inextricably linked to the U. S. Partnership with Pakistan. NDS - Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships Why and how does the 2008 National Defense Strategy counterbalance the armed forces past tendency to focus on conventional threats and conflicts' The 2008 National Defense Strategy counter balances the armed forces ‘ past tendency to focus on conventional threats and conflicts mainly because of the irregular warfare that the United States has faced OCONUS (Iraq) (Afghanistan) and CONUS (Twin Towers of New York City on 9/11) or as quoted from the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, “For the foreseeable future, this environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. Beyond this transnational struggle, we face other threats, including a variety of irregular challenges, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons, and the rising military power of other states. These are long-term challenges. Success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international power over years or decades to come” another reason why is because, “U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.” (2008 National Defense Strategy). Secretary Gates mentions the use of soft and hard powers to counteract the effects of irregular warfare. Another “How” the NDS counter balanced the armed forces past tendency to focus on congenital threats and conflicts was, ‘Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent extremism. What ends and their associated ways and means are specified for Somalia in the attached “Report on U.S. Strategy towards Somalia' The Ends (Objectives), Ways (Concepts), and Means (Resources), specified by U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to eliminate the terrorist threat and promote political stability by supporting the establishment of a functioning central government, and to address the humanitarian needs of the Somali People. Eliminate any platform for Al Qaida or other terrorist operations, to promote and support regional stability and representative governance, to provide humanitarian assistance, provide humanitarian assistance, work with governments in the region to transform their countries through investing in people and good governance and promoting economic growth. First, encourage political dialogue between the transitional Federal Institutions and other key Somali stakeholders. Second, achieve rapid deployment of an African stabilization force. Third, mobilize international assistance to help build the governance capacity of the TFI. Then through alliances and coalitions a Broad based inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation with Somalis, regional leaders the African Union and the Arab League. A couple of risks in the Strategy towards Somalia involve foreign terrorists are able to exploit the continued lack of governance and find a safe haven in Somalia, while the continued flow of arms and criminality into and out of the country threatens the security of the broader region.