The_United_States_and_Two_World_Wars

The United States and the Two World Wars Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945 American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War Combined Annotated Bibliography MacDonald, Charles B. “The United States and the Two World Wars” in A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History, John E. Jessup, Jr. & Robert W. Coakley. Pgs. 225-250 Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2004. Matloff, Maurice, “Allied Strategy in Europe” in The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. Pgs. 677-702 Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1986. James. D. Clayton, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War” in The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. Pgs. 703-732 Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1986. America, for such a young country, had seen its fair share of wars prior to the beginning of World War I and was reluctant to join in the fray. As author Charles MacDonald points out in The United States and the Two World Wars, America began its role in international affairs from an unenthusiastic position. Many scholars have adopted President Wilson’s position that the United States had no choice but to join the war effort once Germany resorted to submarine warfare. Others argue that the Germans had no choice but to resort to submarine warfare. Historians may disagree on the reasons why the United States joined the war effort and why Germany began the use of unrestricted submarine warfare; however, they can agree that both occurred. MacDonald provides and recommends numerous resources which provide insight to the student of history with regard to American participation, strategy, battles, and logistics as well as the perspectives contained in the memoirs of major American military personnel and notable accounts by those of lesser rank. MacDonald provides the same basic information to the reader with regard to American involvement in World War II. As noted, there are as many theories on the America’s decision to become involved in this war as there were in World War I. Most historians agree that the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor was an act of aggression which left the United States little choice but to join the war effort; however, MacDonald offers sources which provide information with regard to American foreign policy which may contributed to Japan’s decision to provoke the United States. Numerous sources are provided which offer historical perspectives on virtually every aspect of U.S. involvement in World War II. The sheer number of resources provided by MacDonald leaves little doubt that a student of history can gain valuable perspective from the suggested material regardless of the focus. While MacDonald provides a comprehensive list of resources on American involvement in the two world wars, the essay written by Maurice Matloff on the strategy of the Allies in Europe from 1939-1945, provides an in depth perspective on the evolvement of strategy of the main members of the allied forces in Europe during World War II. Matloff notes that there has been much criticism from historians on the way that the war was waged especially on the part of the Americans. Two distinct pictures of British and American strategy emerged regarding their respective roles in WWII strategy. The British have been credited with a more politically oriented strategy while the United States has been relegated to a narrow, abstract theory of strategy. Matloff takes a look at these assigned stereotypes in an attempt to discern whether they were accurately applied. There is little dissension regarding the primary objective of the allied forces in World War II, the defeat of Germany. The three main players in the alliance, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union each developed different strategies for accomplishing this objective which often placed the allies on different sides of the table. Great Britain felt that the appropriate strategy to apply was one of an “indirect approach”. This strategy was a direct result of the lessons learned from Britain’s involvement in World War I. The United States also developed strategy based upon their involvement in World War I but as they had come late to the dance, the perspective was different. The United States felt that direct conflict with a large show of force would be the best avenue for a quick and decisive end to the war. The Soviet Union and its ideas on strategy, at least initially, were more focused simply on survival. The three countries often disagreed on the way the war should be waged and the level of involvement of each of the particular countries at the beginning played as much a role in how the form of military strategy was shaped in the beginning as its shift as the war continued did toward the end. Great Britain had been involved in the war long before the United States and the Soviet Union joined the fight and as a result had the larger bulk of resources committed to battle in the beginning. This, coupled with the diplomacy of Winston Churchill, led to British strategy being largely adopted by the allies much to the dismay of the Soviets. The United States and Britain didn’t agree on how the objective would best be pursued and in the beginning it seems little notice was given to the opinion of the Soviet Union. In initial talks termed the ABC conference, British and American planners agreed that the defeat of Germany would be the main objective. The possibility of Japan entering the war was discussed and it was decided that a defensive position would be taken in that regard until such time as Germany was defeated. It was on how this objective was to be achieved which the two powers disagreed. The British advocated a peripheral strategy which was more suited to their interests and resources. The American school of thought was one of head to head collision with Germany. The British skill at military diplomacy was greater than that of the United States and thus Britain’s strategy was adopted. The Allied forces would begin their focus on battle in North Africa and the Mediterranean. While this decision signified a compromise of sorts between the U.S. and Great Britain, the Soviets felt this strategy did nothing to alleviate their precarious position by opening up a second front in Europe. As the war progressed and more and more American resources were delegated to the war, the positions began to shift as did the position of the Soviet Union with their successful stance at Stalingrad. Both countries began to exert more influence on Allied strategies. Stalin threw his weight behind American military strategy in opening up a second front with Operation Overlord. As a result, preparations began for the undertaking of this major offensive. From the beginning the American strategist sought simply to get in, defeat Germany, restore order and get out. It appears the only real political objective America had during this conflict was to stop the aggression of both Germany and Japan. England’s political foresight was a bit more advanced at the time as they feared the territorial advances being gained by the Soviet Union. During the last nine months of the war, strategy developed into a battle of military tactics versus political maneuvers. America, becoming aware of the Soviet advances, was faced with bucking political pressure at home to end the conflict as quickly as possible or to draw it out to address the concerns begin raised by the political agenda of the Soviet Union. The pressure from home prevailed and the Allied military strategy was shaped to address those concerns. The British have expended most of their resources and facing economic issues at home as a result was relegated to a more minor role in developing Allied strategy than America or the Soviet Union. Both of which had a separate agenda. The Americans wanted to defeat Germany so that they could focus all efforts on Japan. The Soviets were intent on expanding their influence and territory in both Europe and Asia. The evolution of strategy in World War II was brought about by numerous factors. The progression of America’s role as well as the development of its military confidence were but two of these factors. Despite their differences the Allies were able to fashion a military strategy that was successful in its common objective, the defeat of Germany, however, it was unsuccessful in that it failed to bring the peace the Allies envisioned it would bring upon its attainment. The end of World War II would leave as many unresolved issues as World War I had left with no clear avenue of resolution. Some of which are still unresolved even today. As mentioned previously the political objectives of the United States were few in the conflict of World War II but its foreign policy with regard to China would play a role in the involvement of the Japanese. The Japanese had been intent of extending its empire for some time with little interference by any of the major powers until it turned its eyes to China. America, for its own economic reasons, did not want to see China become part of the Japanese empire but its position was only made clear by diplomatic means. When the Great Depression began in 1929, America adopted isolationist policies which were detrimental to its foreign trade partners including Japan. Japan sought to seize the raw materials needed to render its country self-sufficient in much the same way Germany sought to cement their economic position, aggression. Japan invaded China with the idea that it would be relatively easy to defeat. This was not to be the case and so they turned their eyes to other conquests and joined forces with Germany and Italy. Although the role of air power and the navy in the Japanese military had been a subordinate one, a decision was made to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor. The plan was a huge miscalculation. Although the Japanese enjoyed victories against U.S. forces in the first six months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the way in which the U.S. was drawn into World War II left little room for peace negotiations with Japan. American strategists had been preparing war plans involving numerous scenarios since the end of World War I which led to the adoption of a plan called Rainbow 5 which addressed war in the Pacific immediately upon its entry into World War II. The American plan to conduct maritime operations against Japan in the Pacific was unforeseen by Japanese strategists. The Japanese failed in adapting their strategy to meet the needs of battle throughout much of their involvement and failed to be able to exploit American weaknesses. The lack of centralized command of maritime forces which led to a lack of successful communication and intentional cooperation between land and sea forces could have been exploited by the Japanese had their leaders adapted their strategies. Inadvertently, the land and sea forces of the United States completed each other’s objectives regardless of the command and communications problems. The Americans, however, were quick to adapt strategies to exploit the weaknesses of Japanese strategy. They severed communications between Japanese forces and separated Japanese troops from supply lines. The Japanese proved successful at night fighting and introduced the successful strategy of kamikaze bombings, the impact of which James notes could have been huge had it been employed sooner. The Japanese forces, however, also experienced a lack of coordinated efforts of forces due to inner political struggles within the military itself. One key factor in the defeat of Japanese forces in the Pacific was simply, Magic. The ability of the U.S. intelligence to break the encoding used by Japan to gain information in advance regarding Japan’s battle plans, manpower, and orders. The resource proved invaluable in much the same way the breaking of the code used by the Germans and the Enigma device. Perhaps the Japanese conflict is best remembered for the introduction of the hydrogen bomb. While there are several schools of thought on why the hydrogen bomb was introduced it did effectively crush the Japanese resistance while subsequently launching the arms race of the Cold War. While the conflict with Japan resulted in a significant loss of life and precipitated the involvement of the United States in World War II, one could argue that the relationship that has developed both economically and politically between the United States and Japan was well worth the cost.