The_Balkans__a_Historical_Drama_in_Progress,_a_Discussion_on_the_Impact_of_History_in_the_Formation_of_Eastern_European_States

Alice Naphtali Dr. James Payton History 107 14 April 2010 The Balkans: A Historical Drama in Progress A Discussion on the Impact of History in the Formation of Eastern European States Decades following the demise of Communism, its discarded iron veil, which had once engulfed Eastern Europe, managed to expose the simmering rivalries and concealed wounds festering beneath said disfigured states. As evident through Yugoslavia’s political turmoil in the 90s, recent outbreaks of violence in Bosnia, as well as genocides committed by all nations alike, the Balkans remain a region of impenetrable grievances not yet resolved over the past millennia. For too long a time, Westerners have neglected the past’s destructive nature, seeking to provide temporary aid sans desirable consequences due to ignorance, bias or desire for self-preservation. History performs a more significant role in forming present disputes than previously assumed. It successfully drove apart what was once a united Slavic populace, severing ties between Bulgarians, Serbians, Croatians, etc., in light of their conflicting religious fervencies, devastating political circumstances, relentless foreign invasion, and territorial rapacity. Croatia has been acknowledged for its deep and intimate association with Roman Catholicism, even as Yugoslavia crumbled under their very eyes. They were one of the few Slavic states to sequester themselves from the Orthodox teachings of Cyril and Methodius, and fall under Hungary’s Western influence as a safety net against potential invaders. Croatia’s religious confusion thus spanned through the centuries, beginning first with fear against Turkish and Byzantine occupations, and gradually moulding their distaste for Greek Orthodox Serbs who were accused of supporting Communist Russia in preceding war-related decisions. Further aggravating ethnic hostilities, while under Habsburg rule, Serbian minorities were offered special treatment to preoccupy Croatian discontent elsewhere, other than its monarchical flaws. Hence, Croatia’s self-righteous ‘cultural superiority’ and resentment against all those who were non-Croats, specifically Serbians, erupted at Jesenovac; the Ustache ultimately slaughtered thousands of fellow Slavs after their forced conversions to Catholicism. Bosnia became an extended battleground for religious gain, while Croatia’s Cardinal Stepinac is placed on a pedestal as an exemplary martyr against Communist, political pressures, regardless of his harmful nationalist tendencies. In view of historical analysis, the underlying hatred Serbians harboured against Croatia, and likewise their opponents’ prejudiced sentiments, could only lead to future armed conflicts should their histories remain without reconciliation. Ethnic controversies continue to plague the circumstances revolving around Kosovo and neighbouring Albanians – the 1389 desecration of the cultural centre of Christian Serbia by Muslim Turks is still perceived as unforgivable and defeatist, even after six centuries of accumulated history. It is worthwhile noting that the invested hatred against Muslims sparked, on numerous occasions such as the Balkan Wars, the Serbian desire to annex the small autonomous state by right of past conquest and ‘true’ religion. Tito took cunning advantage of this underlying historical claim by issuing the massacre of ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo to establish a “new Prishtina” worthy of Serbian nationalist pride, no matter the cost of human lives. Milsovic adopted a similar stance for Serbian approval by essaying to strip Kosovo’s autonomous position to equalize the position shared between both nations – not expecting them to organize violent protests as a response. It is without doubt that Albanians are now extremely suspicious of others’ motives, preferring to avoid potential death threats from ambitious nations hanging over their heads. Future discrimination against Albanian Muslims by Serbian resentment will also fail in resolving matters of territory, as both have much to suffer already without sheer, albeit legitimate, distrust of each other’s intentions. Considered a “power vacuum” of sorts, Macedonia earned its title aptly over years of absent governments, perpetual warfare, and mass cleansings of innocents. Their historical roots are intermingled with the Bulgarians since the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877, though by all means, Serbians and Turks vie for its strategic location over the course of WWI and WWII as well. The amassing power struggle began its subsequent climb with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, while angered Turks surged through Macedonian streets to torture and murders its citizens as they lost Bosnia to the Habsburg Empire. In future generations, the Young Turk Movement attempted to suppress revolutionary activities by any means necessary to prolong the strength of the Ottoman Empire. In turn, Bulgarian terrorist factions emerged steadily on all sides concerned with victory; the IMRO was established, in addition to other institutions, for the sole purpose of advancing self-interests and autonomy in Macedonian territory without the shadow of Muslim presence. Following volatile confrontations between varied religions and ethnicities, it is unsurprising that the growth of “Macedonianism”, however vague, under Tito flourished amidst diverging nationalisms the nation was exposed to. It appeared that, perhaps, abused Macedonia would now be capable of determining a form of national identity unique to its own – although with the collapse of Yugoslavia and proper hold of government, a sense of foreboding linger in the air concerning the fate of their independent future. The development of Communist authority over Bulgaria persist to be an interesting point of discussion, as it involves another layer hostility laid bare against the Turks and its eventual connection with the Russians. The Bulgarians’ five hundred years spent in captivity under the Ottoman Empire was asserted to be “most completely crushed and effaced” of all other conquered nations. It is logical, then, to ascertain the importance of Russia’s liberating Bulgaria in 1877, while granting them their independence – strengthening their loyalties to the great ‘Bear’ and their confidence to attack Macedonia, only to lose both times in the respective world wars. Their consequent vulnerable state left no illusions for Soviet Russia, as they seized the opportunity to indoctrinate its citizens with Communist thought while their dignity floundered in the dust. Ensuring their loyalty, the Soviets were observant enough by offering methods of retaliation against the Turks, whether through smuggling weaponry, or prosecution of Turkish terrorists in times of social instability. Bulgarians, however, are not so easily placated under Communism’s waning influence, acknowledging that they “were divided”, with growing fear of Turkish economic and political dominance and an inability to stop their advances. As history is doomed to repeat itself, Bulgarians also live under the constant threat of becoming completely overwhelmed by an age-old enemy, without a single alliance worth standing by its side. Culturally and historically significant for Western Europe, Greece continues to be the centre for territorial conflicts, ethnic disputes, and anti-American sentiments. Collaborating with the theme running through most histories of Eastern Europe, their guarded grudge against Muslim Turks leak into their thoughts and perception of self – enabling them to focus on the assimilation of Hellenistic culture and ignore their nation’s multicultural society of Jews and other minorities. Hagia Sophia thus remains a symbol of lost regrets, the glories of the Byzantium Empire long gone, succeeding only in spurring Grecian invasions of the Ottoman Empire following WWI, and falling under the weight of their retribution against Greek Cypriots in 1964. Greece’s susceptibility to Communism increased tenfold due to their close association with Russia, sharing not only the same faith but also the same position of guarding Byzantine traditions out of cultural pride. In light of their yearning for a previous era, it explains their ensuing support for Papandreou’s Communist PASOK and his so-called “acts of national liberation” in favour of Greek patriotism. They directly confront western interferences and acknowledge a strong desire to liberate their country form dictating, nationalist movements apart from their own, while gradually adjusting to the idea of democracy in unfolding times to come. The crushing -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005), xxii. [ 2 ]. Ibid, 9. [ 3 ]. Ibid 26 [ 4 ]. Ibid, 23 [ 5 ]. Ibid, 17. [ 6 ]. Zimmermann, Warren, “The Demons of Kosovo,” The National Interest 52, no. 1 (1998), http://www.questia.com/read/5001347478'title=The%20Demons%20of%20Kosovo [ 7 ]. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: Journey Through History, 45. [ 8 ]. Ibid, 46. [ 9 ]. Ibid, 57. [ 10 ]. Ibid, 56. [ 11 ]. Ibid, 66. [ 12 ]. Ibid, 205. [ 13 ]. Ibid, 207. [ 14 ]. Ibid, 221. [ 15 ]. Ibid, 255. [ 16 ]. Ibid, 248. [ 17 ]. Ibid, 271.