Taliban__Insurgency_or_Terrorism_

The war in Afghanistan is the most important front on our war against terrorism. We are facing increasing difficulty dealing with an enemy that is very complex, namely the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, even though these two groups are often in cahoots the Taliban is not a terrorist organization in the sense that al-Qaeda is. The Taliban is a new complex enemy that employs terrorist-like tactics but its strategy is that of an insurgency. To win this war, America must employ counter-insurgency versus counter-terrorism tactics. The Taliban, unlike al-Qaeda, was once the government of a state. Some argue that it was a “failed state” and thus not a legitimate government, but there legitimacy came from the simple fact that they ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban was in power from 1996 to 2001 when American and NATO forces overran the government in a military invasion. The Taliban was run out and took a safe haven in Pakistan, but has been increasingly regaining power and standing with the regional Pashtun tribal group. During their renewed offensive, which really took hold after 2005, the Taliban had been recruiting local townships. They also began to employ terrorist tactics that they had never used before. In the recent past, there have been many more reports of suicide bombings and kidnappings by the Taliban. The Taliban has also been heavily funded through the illegal opium drug trade. Afghanistan is responsible for 90% of the world’s opium production. It is a $3 billion industry in Afghanistan and is only growing. One of the problems in combating the Taliban is this flow of steady funding they receive through this trade. The new government in Kabul, and the U.S., have made it clear they want to start clamping down on this illegal industry. However, this is a livelihood for many Afghan farmers and is very profitable. The Eradication of the poppy plants has only created more poverty and anger amongst the general population, and unfortunately, the Taliban is welcoming them and their trade with open arms. This war has shifted into a multi-facet operation. Whereas before the western nations had kicked the Taliban out of Afghanistan and we’re hunting down Al-Qaeda forces and remnant fighters, the Taliban has resurged. They are now quickly consolidating power in southern Afghanistan and are winning over the local communities. This breeds more safe havens and recruiting pool for future fighters. Another problem is that the government in Kabul does not have great authority over the nation. Their power really does not extend far beyond the capitol. Afghanistan consists of a very basic tribal structure where these “war lords” of certain regions are considered to have autonomy over their area. They, for the most part, do not support the government in Kabul and there is a perception that they are out of touch and isolated from the rest of the country. While the Taliban may not necessarily win their hearts and minds, they are not undermined by these tribal leaders as the current government is. With the resurgence of the Taliban, we’re no longer simply hunting down al-Qaeda terrorists; we’re dealing with a growing insurgency. We need to develop a new comprehensive strategy; one that reflects the changing circumstances on the ground. We must first recognize that there are two enemies, and that even though they often work together, they have different agendas. The Taliban wants to kick the western powers out of their country and regain control over Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is a much more radical terrorist group that will foment violence outside of the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We must employ a mix of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism tactics. The most important thing we need to do is to win the proverbial “hearts and minds” of the Afghan people. This is a nation that has a history of occupying forces, most recently the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. It will be a hard job to convince these people of our good intentions, as most of the population has seen nothing but war for their entire lives. We need to conduct a thorough information war of educating the rural areas of Afghanistan of our intentions and what they can do for themselves and their country. The drug trade of the opium plants is another huge obstacle. With the vast majority of the Afghan economy that is driven by the opium trade, many rural Afghans depend on this for their livelihood. The terrain does not allow for much other crops to be grown and the government’s new poppy eradication policies have put many in a tough rut. We need to focus on the reconstruction of the Afghan economy, to diversify the goods and services they can produce and export to other countries. One possible plan is to try to harness the poppies for the use of making medicine versus the illicit drugs. We also need to continue the use of counter-terrorism policies. Besides the obvious continued threat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban has begun to employ many terrorist tactics such as kidnapping and suicide bombings. We need to have smaller, special forces units that move more easily and are able to tackle these groups with efficiency. We need good intelligence on the ground and a continued policy of winning the hearts and minds of the people can lead to some good intelligence about the enemy. Also need to concentrate on securing the border areas along Pakistan as many of the supplies and weapons flow easily through this unsecure border area. In conclusion, the Taliban is an insurgent guerilla movement in Afghanistan that is beginning to use terrorist like tactics. Therefore, strictly counter-terrorism strategies won’t cut it. We need to employ a mix of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist tactics that will effectively undercut their will and ability to fight. To do this, we should continue to transform our military forces to reflect the type of fighting we’re doing. A conventional military structure will not work against this enemy. We also must continue to fight for the hearts and minds, restrict and reform the illicit drug trade, and cut off the flow of arms and supplies through the unguarded borders with Pakistan. References White, Jonathan R. Terrorism and Homeland Security An Introduction. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2008. Print. Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, 2009. Print Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Volume 4, 2008. Print The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. New York: University of Chicago, 2007. Print.