Sympathy,_Principle_and_Moral_Worth

WMB December 16th 2009 Sympathy, Principle and Moral Worth In this paper I will be presenting an account of moral worth. I will be discussing feelings of sympathy and principled morality as two competing factors (in certain kinds of cases) in determining ones action. This, in turn, will suggest a view of moral worth taken from Bennett's paper The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn. I will be using the literary case of Huckleberry Finn and historical figures such as Heinrich Himmler and Jonathan Edwards that are used in Bennett's paper to draw this distinction of adhering to one of these two competing factors. This will lead to how the outcome or moral judgment of action ultimately depends on the underlying factors implicit within the motives of feelings of sympathy and principled morality which will be drawn from Montague's paper Re-examining Huck Finns' Conscience and posit a position apart from judgment of action. After such distinctions can be made, I will further escalate the decision of moral judgment to terms of praise- and blame-worthiness from Arpaly's paper Moral Worth to give account of moral worth based off of the judgment of action. In Bennett's paper, he gives example of the main theme of his paper; how sympathy and morality can conflict in determining the actions one should take in a given circumstance. Bennett defines sympathy as " cover[ing] every sort of fellowfeeling, as when one feels pity over someone's loneliness, or horrified compassion over his pain, or when one feels a shrinking reluctance to act in a way which will bring misfortune to someone else."1 He also defines morality as "set of principles of action which [one] sincerely assents to." His basic notion of these two concepts is apparent within the example: A small child, sick and miserable, clings tightly to his mother and screams in terror when she tries to pass him over to the doctor to be examined. If the mother gave way to her sympathy, that is, to her feeling for the child's misery and fright, she would hold it close and not let the doctor come near...2 Surely though one would find it best that the mother not adhere to her feelings of sympathy but should give her sick child to the doctor. Here, the principle of health, exemplifying the giving of the child to the doctor because the child is sick and needs help, trumps the feelings of the mother holding the baby tight in lieu of her feeling. Adhering to the principle in this case is the best thing to do, although a simple look at events seem to say otherwise by suggesting that the baby crying is a bad thing and should be prevented. This example is a picture given of sympathy versus a good morality or good principle, whereas the main aim of Bennett is to show the controversy of sympathy and bad morality as is explicated with the examples that both Bennett and I shall use. What one should keep in mind is that we will be acknowledging that an agent 1. Jonathan Bennett, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn', Philosophy 49 (I974), 123-I34. 2. ibid. 124 has accepted a bad morality and is therefore trying to follow the same inclinations one would have if they were to be following a genuinely good morality, assuming they have the disposition to find their morality to be good and they believe such. In the main example of his paper, Bennett gives account of Huckleberry Finn from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. In said account, Huck is challenged with the scenario of helping or not helping his friend Jim, a slave to a woman Huck is acquainted with. Huck helps Jim to get to a point where Jim is almost a free man, but Huck reaches a state of mind that is similar to the sick baby and child example. What has happened is that Huck has reached a point where he can actually think of what is happening; he was raised in the south and has construed morals concerning slaves and ownership. On the other hand, he has a friend that he can save but doing so would go right against his known principles. In this case, Huck is forced to take action either based on his principles which in turn would force him to turn Jim in by pulling to the banks of the river, or, adhere to his feelings of sympathy and allow Jim to attain freedom. For this example, what is important to note is that Huck is a child. We cannot hold his account to be that of a rational adult who should have responsibility for contemplating one's own action for we are given Huck who does not seem to be eduacated in the manner to appreciate the full force of principle. Because of his adolescent tendencies Huck gives in to his feelings of sympathy and allows for Jim's freedom. To conclude the example it must be said that Huck has a bad morality or a bad set of principles; adhering to slave practice. He (luckily) however, does not have a strong enough moral sense to adhere to this principle and ends up adhering to his natural inclination of feelings; seeing Jim as a friend as opposed to a piece of property and acts according to Jim being a friend and not a slave of an acquaintance. The peculiar thing is that Huck finds himself to be weak for not being able to uphold his known principle (however bad in actuality it may be). In a sense, he knows of the moral and emotive system that is in play, but was given the wrong variable (morality/principle), and given his lack of adhering to principle, he ends up doing the right thing. In the second example, Heinrich Himmler is analyzed and is seen as the man who everyone takes him to be; a man with a bad set of principles/bad morality. Himmler served as "Chief of the German Police and Minister of the Interior" but was also given the job "as overseer of the concentration camps, extermination camps and Einsatzgruppen (literally: task forces, often used as killing squads), Himmler coordinated the killing of some six million Jews."3 In this example used by Bennett, Himmler goes through a case of ignorance of his own feeling in order to fulfill his set goals or principles that constitute his bad morality. Himmler acknowledges the presence of these 'feelings' which is apparent within a part of a speech he addressed to his troops, ... I also want to talk to you quite frankly on a very grave matter ... I mean ... the extermination of the Jewish race .... Most of you must know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500, or 1,000. To have 3. Taken from website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinrich_Himmler stuck it out and at the same time-apart from exceptions caused by human weakness-to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard.4 Here it seems as though Himmler understands his actions as bad because he accepts the suggested consequences that his doctor had warned him of, ailments both physical and mental . The doctor looking back on it: He knew that it would mean much suffering for the Jews.... 'It is the curse of greatness that it must step over dead bodies to create new life. Yet we must ... cleanse the soil or it will never bear fruit. It will be a great burden for me to bear.'" It is as though Himmler knows what he is doing is bad, but he can justify it based on higher principles whereas his subordinate principles, his duties based on title, are to be carried out with or without the attached feelings of sympathy or conscience. Further it would seem correct to say that it is implied that the subordinate principles should have these attached feelings because they are subordinate and subject to such force, but the higher principles, that of the ultimate goal of the Third Reich, would not even be subject to those feelings. Himmler must think his subordinate principle of exterminating the Jews is wrong independently and would have attached 'pulls' of sympathy. When considered to be dependent on 4. Bennett 128 the higher principle, one would assume such a higher principle would not be affected by feelings of sympathy as it so far from reality to which these actual feelings are based on. Himmler and his members are in the field, executing actual people which is wrong to do. Himmler and his members therefore feel bad but because they have a higher principle that is not only higher but a different kind of principle (ideal rather than practical), one not so in-line with reality for they can just fall back on that higher principle which, in turn, fuels the subordinate principle to be stronger than the feeling that are associated with that subordinate principle, hence Himmler and his members choose their bad morality. They try to justify it by setting an ideal for carrying out their task itself by doing their task but acknowledging the feelings yet not giving in to them which supposedly would allow them to retain their status as 'decent men'. Unfortunately this seems contradictory and most would either "extinguish their sympathies, becoming' heartless ruffians' rather than 'decent fellows'; but not Himmler himself."5 Surely Himmlers men actually carrying out the executions and tasks would be forced, psychologically if anything, to extinguish their sympathies or go insane. Himmler, although not considered mentally insane, suffered many mental and physical ailments probably due to being stuck in the middle of the two opposing forces of principle and feelings. The third example being introduced is that of the 18th century philosopher Jonathan Edwards. Edwards was a Calvinist Theologian and carried the weight of 5. Ibid 129 such beliefs. "According to Edwards, God condemns some men to an eternity of unimaginably awful pain, though he arbitrarily spares others, 'arbitrarily' because none deserve to be spared."What is interesting is that Edwards adheres to a certain theology of Christian thought to allow for his conception of an 'eternity of unimaginably awful pain'. Bennett claims that "his position isn't that this is right because God wants it, but rather that God wants it because it is right. For him, moral standards exist independently of God, and God can be assessed in the light of them (and of course found to be perfect)." This right away seems to be contrary to a normal/modern line of Christian thought or any sort of decent moral system. Bennett also posits that Edwards' case is the worst of three example he uses. Edwards is different than the other two in that he does not have these feelings of sympathy both Huck and Himmler expressed. This, however, can be explained by my assertion (from earlier) that a higher principle is at play. Edwards is so far down this certain rabbit hole that he cannot see any light from which he came. He has this disgusting view on how the most powerful wheels turn, which in turn allows for his view on sinners without any remorse. The only difference then from Edwards and Himmler is that Himmler is actually practicing or acting as opposed to Edwards who is just theorizing or thinking of such things. Surely Edwards whole life is impacted by this one horrible thought, but it is not so in a direct manner, like Himmlers. I still agree with Bennett that under the circumstances of just looking at adherence to principle or feelings of sympathy (what Montague calls formation of attitueds), Edwards is the worst followed by Himmler and then Huck. However, just looking at adherence to principle or feelings is only the beginning and will be discussed later with Arpaly's piece. Before that, we will look at Monatgue's re-evaluation of Bennetts position and theory of such circumstances. In Montague's paper, he further elaborates on Bennett's argument. To do so, Montague incorporates the notion of "Judgment of personal worth [which] are primarily judgments of character and conscience."6 Here Montague means to cut off the tie between attitudes and action; he is only concerned with attitudes at this point. When doing this, he agrees or accepts Bennett's scale of 'personal worth' Huck comes out best on this scale because even though his conscience is seriously flawed he has sufficient compassion in his nature (and whether this compassion is pure feeling or not really seems irrelevant here) to override the dictates of the defective parts of his conscience. Himmler comes out better than Edwards on this scale of personal worth because even though the former's sympathy is overrun by his bad morality, at least his character does contain some humanity and compassion (at least according to Bennett), while Edwards's does not (again according to Bennett). So the very fact that Himmler experienced inner conflict between sympathy and bad morality is a mark in his favour; while the complete and unopposed triumph of bad morality in Edwards's case relegates him to a lower position than Himmler's on a scale of personal worth. 6. Montague, Phillip 'Re-Examining Huck Finn's Conscience' Philosophy, Vol. 55, No. 214 (Oct., 1980), pp. 542-546 To distinguish the levels of personal worth, Montague puts forth two terms of action that express the relation between all three examples given. The first term, acting 'conscientiously' would be for "situations in which an individual acts in accordance with his 'best judgment' and with no inner conflict." This would be referencing Edwards who acts (hypothetically) on his best judgment with no expressed feelings of sympathy. The second term, acting 'continently', would be for situations "in which an individual acts according to his best judgment but perhaps in the face of an inner conflict."7 This, then, would reference Himmler who clearly expresses feelings of sympathy, feelings to which he called 'exceptions caused by human weakness'. Putting forth such references allows one to have a foundation for personal worth. I assume personal worth to be the highest place for judgment that one can take without one having to look higher for action or outcome of these beliefs. This allows for both character and outcome or action to be questioned when looking towards the moral worth; the main theme of Arpaly's paper, Moral Worth. So far, it would seem as though there has been an evolution of morality concerning moral worth. Starting from the phenomena of feelings of sympathy and one's moral preference pulling at one another in cases of bad morality, and leading up to a grounds for which one to stand on; either judging from an belief-based perspective or an action-based perspective, we can now use all pertaining notions 7. Montague 543 concerning moral worth to come to a definitive conclusion. Concerning my position thus far, when looking solely on belief in regards to moral worth, I would agree with both Bennett and Montague in their view of the three characters being analyzed; Huck being the least bad, followed by Himmler and lastly with Edwards. Again, this is when looking at the circumstance from a belief-based perspective alone. As to whether or not the perspective is correct or incorrect, from that of action-based perspective is another topic. Analyzing the circumstances under each perspective allows for a more general account for moral worth without having to choose whether belief alone is sufficient for judgment or the belief followed by implementation or action. I would argue that one could view these circumstances either from a belief-based perspective alone, or belief-based perspective along with the corresponding action to the belief. However, the action of an agent should not be judged without it's precursor, the belief. When dealing with belief alone, the agent is brought up for scrutiny concerning his character, as is predicated by his belief, whereas the belief and corresponding action require a more in-depth scrutiny as there is a difference from just believing something than that of acting on that belief. Also, it depends on who is judging the agent. If one takes character alone, without any action to explicate that character, to be the sole exemplar of a persons moral worth, then an account can be carried out by the one judging the agent. On the other hand, if character is to be explicated by belief followed through by action, then there is a separate, similar account to be carried out by the one judging the agent. If one is to accept this way of analyzing such examples, then if we choose the belief-based perspective, then Edwards is indeed the worst of the three examples. If we are to choose the action-based perspective, then Edwards does not play a part and Himmler comes in as the worst by default. Such distinctions clearly play a role in determining the worst of the three examples given, but it would seem that all of this is predicated upon choice of judgment. Arpaly's piece would seem to take on a hybrid of the two perspectives being given from the previous two authors. In certain examples posed in her paper, Arpaly shows the significance of distinguishing the moral worth as opposed to moral desirability. She defines moral worth as "the extent to which the agent deserves moral praise or blame for performing the action..."8 A definition for moral desirability is also given as "whether [an action] is right or wrong, or how grave a wrong it is, or whether it is the best possible action."9 Arpaly then claims that "two actions that are equal in moral desirability may be of different moral worth. To give example, two people may donate equally to Oxfam, but one of them may do so out of compassion, while the other does so purely at the urgings of her accountant." This would then bring a new view of what moral worth would be. Instead of having moral worth cover the action and belief or motive, Arpaly has moral desirability distinguishing the action alone. The moral worth then would 8. Nomy Arpaly, Moral Worth The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 99, No. 5 (May, 2002), pp. 223-245 9. Arpaly 224 include the significance in terms of moral desirability as well as the motive behind why or how the agent acted. When looking back at her example concerning Oxfam, the donation itself, if it were to be judged based on moral desirability then both would be of equal moral quality. When judging based on moral worth, I would assume that the moral desirability would be a necessary condition along with the motives for why the agent acted in the way they did. This new way of viewing a judgment shares some key features with my explication of higher principles as is expressed in regards to Himmler and Edwards. Both appeal to a higher principle (for Himmler it would be the Nazi ideal of the Third Reich myth and for Edwards it would be his religion). Could we say that although their moral desirability, when compared to ours, is unacceptable, could it possibly be viewed as acceptable given certain presuppositions or acknowledgment of those higher principles' Wouldn't they then be doing the morally desirable thing if one was to presuppose these higher principles as giving morality to the agent' This, I believe would lead us down the prim-rose path to the outhouse. The morality given would be subjective and open for interpretation, which I believe is the case for both Himmler and Edwards. The interpretation was wrong on both their accounts which lead to an assumption that they were doing the morally desirable action/belief, which, in turn, proved not to be the case, therefore negating their 'moralizing' principle as a whole, hence bad morality. What then of Huck Finn' As I had said previously, one must acknowledge the position Huck is in; he is a child. Huck would be characterize by Arpaly as being simply morally unresponsive. While she does not agree with Bennett completely about the moral worth of Huck, she takes Huck to be not so bad as one would, at first, take him to be. If we are to associate his unresponsiveness to his adolescence, then I could see where Arpaly is coming from, considering Hucks upbringing and education. On the other hand, Bennett cannot shun the fact that his conscience was ultimately positioned on treating Jim as a slave; it was just that, having Huck being a child, we cannot even seem to blame him for his responsibility concerning that which designates one's conscience because, in the end, he chose the right thing to do, amid all this haze of conscience and gut feeling. In conclusion, the determination of moral worth seems to be tricky when no set of guidelines is given as to how one is to be judged. For those concerned with belief or motive of an action, I would agree with Bennett who characterizes the three examples in accordance to a belief/motive-based perspective. However, when considering not only belief or motive but the corresponding action as well, the tables turn to further insight on how to judge an agent. Knowledge of what is true coming from the agent would make the conclusion depend on, possibly, what the agent thinks he believes on the contrary to what the agent actually believes. This dilemma is expressed most clearly in the case of Huckleberry Finn but can also be seen with Himmler and Edwards who predicate their beliefs not on themselves but on a higher principle.