Sfa_F103

Security force assistance (SFA) is a broad framework that spans the full spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1) and is focused on assisting foreign security forces (FSF) in support of U.S. and coalition interests in a given operating environment (OE). In accordance with FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, it is defined as, "a unified action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community to generate, employ, sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." Brigade combat teams (BCTs) deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan with an emphasis on SFA are commonly referred to by a myriad of names such as a modular brigade augmented for security force assistance (MB-SFA), security force assistance brigade (SFAB), brigade combat team-augmented (BCT-A), or advise and assist brigade (AAB). For this article, we'll refer to the BCT as a SFAB.  The SFA mission has very unique characteristics that impact not only the BCT but the battalions and companies as well. There's the old saying "a BCT is a BCT," but when deploying under the SFA umbrella, the mission focus is drastically different and the BCT--or the SFAB in this case--must change its task organization and structure accordingly in order to conduct SFA. A major development in the SFAB concept is the addition of approximately 48 personnel in the rank of sergeant first class to colonel to assist in the advising effort, which will be addressed in this article.  The findings in this article are based on interviews and discussions with 10 deployed or previously deployed SFABs, more than 60 stability and external transition teams, more than 20 Iraqi general officers, two U.S. general officers, select U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) staff, and a myriad of battalion and companies executing the SFAB concept. In addition, staff of both U.S. and Iraqi institutional training centers in Baghdad, were interviewed.  [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]  The first of September 2010 marked the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and signaled the start of the U.S. forces' "new mission" to advise and assist Iraqi security forces--Operation New Dawn. While the date symbolically marked the change in mission, U.S. forces actually began restructuring its forces to advise and assist the Iraqi security forces during the 18 months prior to that transition. Beginning with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division's deployment to Iraq as the "proof of principle" SFAB on 1 May 2009, a significant number of lessons have been learned by several SFABs since. This article will present a consolidated list of considerations recommended by deployed SFAB commanders, staff officers, augmented advisors, stability transition teams (STTs), direct support company commanders, and host nation security forces (HNSF) staff and commanders.  For Afghanistan, BCTs began deploying with the additional augmented advisor packages from the U.S. Army Human Resource Command in the fall of 2010. The 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division could be seen as the SFAB "proof of principle" for Afghan-bound brigades, but as with the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the BCT deployed with little to no augmentation to assist with the advising effort. However, they did apply SFA principles and concepts to assist future deploying brigades with the lessons learned.  The Security Force Assistance Brigade  The dynamics of an SFAB and SFA can be quite intricate and complex. With provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Civil Affairs, State Department officials, and an additional 48 field grades (Iraq augmentation: four colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels, and 24 majors), the synchronization of unity of effort and unity of purpose can be extremely challenging. The same can be said about the Afghanistan advisor augmentation of two colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors, and 24 senior NCOs. Regardless of the augmentation package or theater of operation (TOO), the fundamental principles of advising and assisting are the same. In the application of those principles, here are some recommendations to consider:  [FIGURE 2 OMITTED]  First, when deploying as an SFAB, a brigade must understand that this deployment will not be like its last. It must have the proper mindset to be successful under the SFAB construct. Advising and assisting other nations' military forces requires a set of unique attributes far different from the last time the brigade deployed as a BCT. It is imperative that SFAB leaders recognize the distinction between the two different sets of skills required and focus on instilling a patient, persistent, and flexible mindset.  Second, an SFAB needs to understand that its mission revolves around relationships. It is essential for the SFAB to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among its own elements. By its very nature the SFAB construct forces its members out of their traditional roles. The augmentation of additional advisors to the brigade can create some degree of confusion and distrust. An SFAB must purposefully look to build relationships between the advisors, commanders, and staffs.  Third, it is vital that an SFAB nest itself with its agency counterparts. It is understood that the SFAB is the force provider in the area of operations (AO) and proprietor of a plethora of assets. However, in order to be successful, it must understand that the mission gets accomplished with a unified effort among itself and its agency counterparts. Continuous communication with PRTs, Civil Affairs, and State Department officials in the battlespace will ensure a collectively synchronized approach in the building of civil capacity. In many cases the PRT and associated agents control the funding allocated for a given HNSF or a local government in the AAB's respective AO. It's beneficial for the SFAB to conduct coordination with its agency counterparts to see if a much-needed project is already funded by the PRT or like agency to prevent the duplication of effort.  Building Civil Capacity  Fourth, success begins with the immediate task organization and integration of augmented advisors into training. An SFAB should attempt to task organize advisors to the battalions they will fall under for command and control as soon as possible. It is extremely beneficial for an SFAB to do this prior to its combat training center (CTC) rotation. Early task organization allows augmented advisors and battalion staffs to build habitual rapport and exercise their systems and processes during the CTC rotation. Similarly, it is enormously beneficial to have advisors train alongside the direct support company that will support them during their deployment. In addition to building a relationship, it provides the opportunity for both entities to develop a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities.  [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]  Fifth, an SFAB should require that all staffs participate in SFA training and utilize their expertise. Some ineffectiveness of the SFAB construct can be attributed to a staff's lack of understanding of the augmented advisory mission and SFA. Participation in SFA training will provide a vital conceptual understanding of the advisory mission for brigade and battalion staffs. As the SFAB's augmented advisors assist and assess the HNSF, they will look to secure SFAB assets to address HNSF deficiencies. Brigade and battalion staffs are more likely to allocate and assist with enablers if they have a workable knowledge of the advisor mission and its complexities. In addition, the SFAB stands to benefit greatly if it leverages the staffs talents to assist in SFA/HNSF development. A reality for augmented advisors is that they often have to work with an untrained HNSF staff that lacks the knowledge and experience. Staff-on-staff training can be mutually beneficial. It educates the HNSF staff and subsequently provides an educated HNSF staff in which to work with.  Sixth, it is imperative that SFABs conduct an augmented advisor skills assessment. An SFAB should assess its 48 augmented advisors upon reception and expect a uniquely diverse set of advisors. The set of advisors that an SFAB will receive will come from all across the force. Some will have previously commanded Soldiers in combat and have difficulty understanding the diplomatic nature of the SFAB concept, while others will have a cognitive and in-depth understanding of advisement from their prior experience on a military transition team (MiTT). An SFAB should recognize that not all augmented advisors are fit for the mission and that some may adversely affect its efforts. The SFAB may need to revisit its task organization and adjust accordingly. The removal of an advisor for the betterment of the unit may be necessary.  Seventh, augmented advisors need to be educated in an assortment of supplementary skills. The contemporary operating environment (COE) compels advisors to be trained as diplomats, economists, civic planners, and social scientists in addition to SFA coaches and mentors. While the SFAB receives advisors with significant military education and experience, the SFAB mission will require unique skill sets outside of the normal military construct. In order to acquire these unique skills, an SFAB should consider sending its augmented advisors, and in some cases battalion and brigade staffs and leadership, to specific developmental courses to gain a basic understanding of how our systems work so during deployment the SFAB can assist the HNSF and HN government in developing their own functioning systems and processes. Examples of courses available to augmented advisors include:  * A five-day class with the Department of Homeland Security's Border Patrol in El Paso. Texas, to assist with border and port of entry operations;  * A city manager's course from the surrounding community of the SFAB's post to gain a basic understanding of local governance;  * A civics course from a local university or college to assist in understanding higher level government operations;  * A Civil Affairs course possibly from the 93rd Civil Affairs Detachment out of Fort Bragg to assist in understanding how to build civil capacity and stability; and  * A police trainer/mentor course from Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., in order to gain much needed police mentor training and basic policing functions skills.  Eighth, as an SFAB prepares to take on the enormous task of deployment, it needs to share its pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) with its augmented advisors or if possible, it should take select advisors. It is just as important for the advisors as it is for a battalion and brigade staff to collect important information on the day-to-day functions of the HNSF and the local I IN government. Providing advisors the opportunity to acquire HNSF information such as assessments, reporting requirements, and battle rhythm will allow them to begin making general deductions and begin the task of framing a campaign plan focused on HNSF development.  [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]  Lastly, the SFAB must take into account all of its additional advisors when developing its rating scheme. This can be a point of contention if it is not done in an open and inclusive forum. The SFAB may receive field-grade advisors who have already commanded a battalion or who are command-select advisors. Based upon task organization, augmented advisors can be under dual supervision. In this case, the preferred method is to divide the rating chain positions between the two supervisory chains of command (AR 623-105, Officer Evaluations), The SFAB commander should discuss the rating scheme as soon as possible to dispel rumors that field-grade advisors will be "fodder" for a commander's profile (see Figure 4). Figure 3--Example STT Customized Training Program Day Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day Day 6 Day 7 1 5 CIV PRT Orientation Course CAP (DC) (10 PAX) Police Police Transition Training Police Local (18 (MTT) Patrol DA PAX) Ride Brief Along Ops Police Transition Training (10 (MTT) PAX) Border Customs and Border Field Travel (4 Operations Academy PAX) (El Paso, Texas) Day 8 Day 9 Day 10 Day 11 Day 12 CIV USAID Dept Treasury Travel Tour of CAP State Dept Local Oil (10 Refinery PAX) Police Local LEP MTT Division Tours (18 (EOC, (Capabilities, PM & PAX) Jail, crime 911, Forensics Scene, SGM Lab, evidence Fire Dept, And forensics) Briefs EMS) Ops Travel Battle Command Seminar Travel (10 (Fort PAX) Leavenworth) Border Local LEP MTT Division Tours (4 (EOC, (Capabilities, PM & PAX) Jail, crime 911, Forensics Scene, SGM Lab, evidence Fire Dept, And forensics) Briefs EMS) STT MAJ RATER INTERMEDIATE SENIOR RATER RATER STT LTC (Deputy Chief) STT COL (Chief) STT LTC BNCDR STT COL (Deputy Chief) (Chief) STT LTC STT COL BDE CDR (Deputy Chief) (Chief) BNCDR STT COL (Chief) BNCDR BDE CDR BNCDR STT LTC STT COL (Deputy Chief) (Chief) BNCDR STT LTC BDE CDR (Deputy Chief) STT LTC STT COL DIVCDR/DEPCDR (Chief) STT COL BDE DIVCDR/DEPCDR (Chief) CDR STT COL (Chief) BDE CDR BDE CDR STT COL (Chief) DIVCDR/DEPCDR Figure 4--Example SFAB Advisor Rating Scheme The Augmented Advisor  There was a time when being selected as an augmented advisor meant being a member of a 10 to I6-man MiTT team which was significantly overburdened and grossly under resourced. The MiTT had a somewhat strained relationship with the battlespace owner, and command and control was not always clearly defined. But over the course of the last few years, the criticality of the advisory mission has been given just attention. The Army now recognizes and prioritizes the advisory mission as one of its foremost missions. In doing so, the Army specifically stood up the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk, La., to provide augmented advisors with training that is relevant, current and applicable to the advisory effort, and focused on SFA. Additionally, the Army now codes certain advisor SFAB positions as command select, placing an emphasis on the importance of SFA. However, the principles o[ the advisor mission have remained constant through the years, and it is still geared toward the enormous and arduous tasks of teaching, coaching, and mentoring HNSF.  Relationships arc an advisor's currency. An advisor's success is directly-correlated to the relationship he has built with his HNSF counterpart and his SFAB team. A good relationship with his HNSF is necessary, but a great relationship with his own brigade, battalion, and supporting company is paramount. An advisor must spend just as much time nurturing and cultivating a relationship with his HNSF counterpart as with his own SFAB team.  Key leader engagements (KLEs) are crucial to the SFAB mission. As an advisor, it is necessary to develop engagement themes and prevent KLE fratricide. An advisor should attempt to not overly engage HNSF leaders with unnecessary meetings. When a HNSF leader is obligated to sit with a general officer followed by the brigade and battalion commanders and then the augmented advisor, there can be a mixture of messages. It is best to communicate predetermined themes and limit interaction with the key leader in order to prevent conflicting priorities and information.  The first five and the last five minutes of a KLE can be the most important. An advisor must build and improve his language skills. An advisor does not necessarily need to know how to order a drink or ask for directions to the grocery store in his host country's language. Instead, he should attempt to perfect the fundamental greetings of the host nation. Initial contact in a KLE that is well-scripted and rehearsed can have a significant effect in building long-term trust and respect. Simply put, language takes practice. Although an advisor will improve his proficiency with his linguists and counterpart once he arrives in country, he should attempt to converse as often as possible before he deploys.  An augmented advisor must exercise patience and flexibility. His effectiveness as an advisor is based on gaining the trust and confidence of his counterpart. He should advise with the understanding that he is in "their home" and that decisions made will affect them long after the advisor's one-year tour has expired. Additionally, the advisor must be flexible in his mentorinu approach. HNSF may adopt most U.S. SOPs; however, culture and traditions still play a major part in their processes. Some HNSF will simply choose not to adopt U.S. doctrinal processes, and the advisor will need to be creative in how he coaches and develops his HNSF counterpart. Depending on when the advisor deploys, he may be the fifth or sixth rotational advisor to the HNSF commander. "Advisor burnout" may be prevalent among IINSFs who have "heard it all before" from previous advisors. In this case, creativity, patience, and flexibility by the advisor are absolutely necessary.  HNSFs are often more receptive to employing and refining HNSF tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) than U.S. TTPs, so an advisor should plan on "working their system." Not all HNSF commanders and staffs will look to learn and implement U.S. methods, which could frustrate advisors. It is, therefore, imperative that an advisor learn HNSF systems and processes (logistics, maintenance, supply, etc.) before recommending changes. Often times, it is best to stick to the golden rule: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."  Patience and flexibility are also needed when attempting to acquire support. An augmented advisor must understand that their direct support company is dually tasked and that support may be significantly delayed at times. Succumbing to the realization that some systems and processes for requisitions in theater are fragmented and will take lime will aid in preserving the support relationship. Unlike CONUS support, logistical needs and other support requests may take longer than normal to obtain in theater.  Success comes with the synchronization of battle rhythms. Establishing a time frame is critical to good planning. However, an augmented advisor must understand that his schedule is not always in sync with that of his FINSF counterpart. Some HNSF take an afternoon "siesta," where they retreat to their quarters for rest and recuperation and then come back in the evening to engage in operations and planning. This battle rhythm might not lend itself to the targeting cycle of his supported battalion. An advisor should communicate, coordinate, and synch his and his counterpart's battle rhythms to achieve greater synergy in planning and execution.  An advisor should attempt to gain an understanding of HNSF social, cultural, and political dynamics. His HNSF partners' tribal, social, and political clout in some cases can be more important than his rank. An advisor should recognize that many times a HNSF member may have a title but little to no training in his particular field. Establishing governance can be difficult when HNSFs prioritize their tribes and religion before patriotism to their country. HNSFs can be very hospitable, but an advisor should not let their hospitality be a diversion from observing what is actually transpiring.  Last, an advisor should continue to be the leader he has been trained to be. The IINSF will test him early in his tour so he must hold the line. A monthly goals azimuth check should be done to see if original goals are still applicable and if the unit is still on track to achieving them. As leaders, we are always being watched, so everyone (on the team) must be professional at all times and lead by example. The advisory mission will be an enormously challenging one, so an advisor should cling tight to his sense of humor; he will need it every day.  The SFA Battalion  It is often said that relationships are pacing items. They are the pillar by which successful security force partnerships are held. While there is little doubt that relationships with HNSF are critical and fundamental to mission accomplishment, little is said of how important the relationship is between and among our own forces. If the battalion and augmented advisor relationship isn't a pacing item, it's at least a high priority. The relationship that a battalion builds and maintains with its respective augmented advisor team(s) is critical to achieving maximum results.  An SFA battalion must be proactive in the relationship it develops with its augmented advisors. The sooner a battalion begins to establish lines of communication and a command support relationship with its advisors, the better prepared it will be for the advising mission. It is simply not enough for a battalion to build and develop rapport with its HNSF counterpart; it must also embrace its augmented advisors. Depending upon the advisory structure, the battalion will need to provide a direct support company or support element to support their advisors. Support usually comes in the form of, but is not limited to, logistics, communications, medical, intelligence through the use of a company intelligence support team (CoIST), and if a policing mission, possibly Military Police and a law enforcement professional (LEP). It is better for a battalion to develop a shared advisory vision with its augmented advisors prior to deployment than to wait until arrival in theater. Through coordination with the battalion commander and his staff, augmented advisors will count on leveraging the battalion's assets to advise and assist HNSF.  The Direct Support Company  The direct support company under the SFAB construct demands an innovative, agile, and adaptive team. This company command team must understand its battalion commander's vision and intent, while providing the necessary security and function area specialists (FAS) to support and assist its augmented advisors with their mission. The company-augmented advisor relationship is a critical one that needs to be purposefully developed.  A direct support company is the lifeline for an augmented advisor, so the advisor must communicate his needs, build rapport, and have professional restraint. An advisor should communicate his needs early on and provide some expectation of his requirements to the company commander. He should allow the company commander to command his company "by not directing mm his support but allowing him to explain what he can provide. While a field-grade advisor has "abundant knowledge" from his time in command, he must harbor professional restraint and not engage in "company business." He should limit his involvement in company operations; however, augmented advisors do have the unique opportunity to utilize their years of training and talents to advise and mentor a supporting company commander. Every company commander is at a different level of performance. While an advisor communicates his needs and vision of support, he should look for opportunities to teach and mentor. The supporting company commander may have the drive and motivation to assist a HNSF battalion commander or higher, but he does not have the needed experience or dedicated staff to mentor and advise.  This is a relatively new and different mission set for a maneuver company, so direct support company commanders should get with advisors up front regarding guidelines and requests. He should not wait for the field grades to track him down for a conference. A company commander will be working with his augmented advisors on a daily basis so establishing an early dialogue with them will provide him with an understanding of anticipated requirements. Figure 5 illustrates an example of a "contractual" agreement between an advisor team and its direct support company. Figure 5--Example DS Company and STT Defined Responsibilites Companies Will ... Advisors Will ... Provide functional area specialities Provide planning time (ops/ logistics/intel)--Battalion also for companies to available upon request for skill sets execute mission that exceed company expertise Provide security for movement Attend unit operation order briefs when applicable to STT mission Provide training, oversight and Participate in patrol supervision of dedicated platoon drills, rehearsals, backbriefs prior to and following movements IAW TACSOP Provide STT supply, personnel, and other Submit requests for needs to battalion supply and other needs through companies Facilitate growing a strong relationship Manage EML internally with partnered ISF leaders --submit DA 31 s through companies to battalion--primary and deputy deconflicted Provide ColSTs to inform STTs of current Facilitate growing a intel picture strong relationship of companies partnered with ISF Keep STTs abreast of ongoing and future Create opportunities battalion operations and events for company and battalion to maximize partnerships -- provide ideas for how CO/BN can help train partnered units Receive STT ISF assessment of training Provide feedback and needs to enable effective advising and salient information training of ISF to ColSTs to ensure a holistic intel picture Inform STTs of any company changes that Integrate advise and impact STT/CO relationship assist actions into BCT and BN-level operations and commander's intent Coordinate with CO/BN before making a commitment of BN resources to ISF Comply with BN reporting procedures Produce required advisor reports (ORA assessments, logistics estimates, etc.) to higher headquarters for tracking ISF training, manning, and equipment status [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]  A company commander should explain how he will be able to support his augmented advisors and inform them of his major constraints. He shouldn't be overly concerned about advisors interfering in company operations. If he does have concerns, he should present them early on so as to prevent any misunderstanding of the support relationship.  Building rapport with his augmented advisors is a necessity for a direct support company commander. Building rapport with HNSF in many cases is much easier than building it with advisors, usually due to the rank disparity. Ignoring or avoiding the field grades will cause friction in the long term. The company commander should choose to engage and discuss the mission with his augmented advisors as soon as possible. Early engagement will ensure that augmented advisors understand company constraints and competing requirements within the battalion.  Confidence and mission clarity under the SFAB construct comes from understanding the command and command support relationship. Under the SFAB architecture, a direct support company commander has two requirements. The first is that he will adhere to orders and guidance he receives from his battalion commander. The second is that he will also have mission essential directives from the augmented advisors he supports. Although this can be a precarious situation, he should seek to understand all requirements and be an active participant in determining what his priorities are. In gaining an understanding, this will likely result in a harmonious relationship between the advisors, the battalion, and the direct support company commander.  Summary  The SFA considerations included in this article are not all encompassing or cover the entire spectrum of the SFAB mission but are an assembly of proven methods at the brigade, battalion, and company levels that have achieved significant effectiveness and resulted in great SFAB and advisory successes.  The key to maintaining SFA proficiency is the sharing of lessons learned and TTPs from those deployed to those who will deploy. The SFAB concept will continue to gain momentum and remain at the forefront of merging doctrine. As noted by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "the advisory mission will only continue to become a staple requirement of the general purpose forces."  "Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole. The U.S. Army has established specialized Advisory and Assistance Brigades--now the main forces in Iraq--and is adjusting its promotion and assignment procedures to account for the importance of this mission ..."  -- Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense  "Helping Others Defend  Themselves: The Future of U.S.  Security Assistance," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010  The SFAB Mindset  "Conducting successful security force assistance (SFA) requires a specific mindset. This mindset focuses on working by, with, and through foreign security forces (FSF) to support the host nation's internal defense and development (which includes local security requirements) or regional organization's charter. Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success. Those conducting SFA must understand that the military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive approach. The imperatives of SFA provide the foundation for proper mindset."  -- FM 3-07.1, Paragraph 2-1  Necessary Qualities of an Advisor  Because advisors operate in very subjective environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the advisor's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include:  * Tolerance for ambiguity  * Motivation of self and others  * Open-mindedness  * Self-reliance  * Ability to withhold judgment  * Strong sense of self  * Empathy  * Tolerance for differences  * Communicativeness  * Perceptiveness  * Flexibility  * Ability to accept and learn from failure  * Curiosity  * Sense of humor  "Rapport is a relationship marked by cooperation, conformity, harmony, or affinity. When people discuss good rapport, they describe a relationship founded on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Relationships characterized by personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction often lack rapport. For the advisor, rapport describes the degree of effectiveness."  -- FM 3-07.1, Chapter 9  CPT DANIEL SANTOS  CPT Daniel Santos is a Field Artillery officer currently serving as commander of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 353rd Infantry, 162nd Infantry Brigade. Charlie Company is the lead company for training combat advisors under the Security Force Assistance Brigade curriculum out of Fort Polk. La. He deployed with the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery in 2003 as a fires platoon leader in support Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2005, he deployed with the 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery as the battalion assistant S-3. From 2008 to 2009, CPT Santos commanded Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery at Camp Casey, Korea. CPT Santos earned a bachelor's in political science from Texas Tech University. He also has a master's in criminal justice from Tarleton State University, Stephenville, Texas; a master's in public administration, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.; and a master's in leadership and management, Webster University, St. Louis, Mo.