Reasons_for_the_Outcome_in_Greco-Persian_Wars

The Persian Wars were a string of differences between Greek city-states and the Persian Empire. The Greek success in both the first and second invasion, during 490 BC and in 480-479 BC, was not the result of one aspect, but rather a mix of contributing factors such as unity, leadership, strategy, weapons and the superiority of the Greek soldier. Each aspect played a strong and definitive role in the various battles to ensure the victory that Greece attained. Herodotus proves to be our main source of information for the battle, however his account is not seen as altogether reliable as he writes approximately 30 years after the events and his key informants would have been only young soldiers with incomplete knowledge of the subject. The ability for the Greeks to unite against a common enemy was pivotal. The first instance of unity occurred in 481 BC at the Congress of Isthmus, where it was decided Sparta would be given command of the army and navy (Serpent Column). Herodotus also states that, “….the first thing to be done was to patch up any quarrels….going on amongst the confederacy”. Prior to this there was great quarrelling between the Greek city states, such as between Athens and Aegina. Herodotus states that one occasion where Aegina’s actions “stirred the Athenian’s to immediate action, and they prepared to use every resource they had against Aegina.” Therefore, while unity was a notion unheard of to the Greeks it was vital for their victory. It must be said that the common cause, driven by the desire of all Greeks to preserve the political autonomy of the Greek poleis, was what held the fragile alliance together. The Serpent Column reveals a total of 31 Greek nations involved in the alliance such as Athens, Sparta, Corinth and Troezen. The Greeks could unite easily in contrast with the Persians. Speaking the same language gave the Greeks an obvious advantage in contrast to the Persians who, coming from various factions, spoke a multitude of languages according to JM Cook, therefore allowing the Greek forces to be more coordinated than the Persians. The Greek’s unity also would have increased the morale of the soldiers. In contrast, the Persians were supposedly “forced to march under the whip”, which is a view held by Herodotus, Diodorus and most classical Greek writers. Herodotus claims that many Persians were forced to fight by the terms of their treaties of subjugation with the Persian Great King, i.e. fighting for the Great King but not for themselves, which would further affect morale. The variety of Persian soldiers further deteriorated unity and co-ordination, where cultural, religion and linguistic differences divided soldiers—a view supported by historian Chris Matthews. This would have been especially the case at Thermopylae in August 480 B.C., where the majority of the Persian force was launched—with Herodotus stating over 2,600,000 combatants, though the commonly accepted theory is between 70,000 and 300,000. JM Cook furthers the notion of huge numbers by stating when the Great King led conquest, all warriors meant to fight. JM Cook mentions an Egyptian revolt succeeding Darius’ death, showing how certain nationalities would not have been motivated to fight for the Persian war machine and that Greek unity and morale was superior. Another clear advantage that the Greek’s had over the Persians was arms and weapons. Herodotus states “in courage and strength they were as good as their adversaries, but they were deficient in armour...they were matched against heavily armoured infantry” It is clear from the surviving archaeological evidence that the Greeks were well-equipped for the task of repelling the invading horde. The bronze helmet, cuirass, greaves and pterges, along with the hoplon provided superior protection to the Greek hoplites, particularly effective against the Persian archers. According to Pamela Bradley, a marble relief found in Athens, dated to the fifth century BC is one of our best sources for this, as it clearly depicts each of these elements of a hoplite’s armour. Furthermore, the sarissa used by the Greek hoplite was suited perfectly to the close formation of the phalanx, allowing the hoplite to attack the enemy by either attacking over the shield or under it. There is also evidence that hoplites used slashing swords, but Anderson says that they were probably only used after the hoplite charge, after the ranks were broken. In contrast, the Persian soldiers were variously equipped, due to the number of different nationalities present in the Persian army, for instance Briant states how the Ethiopians were equipped with “stone tipped spears”. An Attican cup by dated between 480 and 470 BC shows the Persian armour and arms. The standard Persian equipment seems to have been leather armour with scales sewn onto it, no helmet and only a wicker shield. Contrasted with the Greeks, JM Cook states the Persians were armed inadequately. He goes on to say that while we cannot be completely confident about each nationality within the Persian army’s armour and weapons, it would have been insufficient and easily been pierced by the hoplite’s sarissas. Superior Greek weaponry was complemented by superior Greek tactics. The Greek forces always made use of hand to hand combat, as this was the style Greek Hoplites were focused on. The Greek use of the phalanx ensured adequate protection and strength in close combat, whereas Persian’s charged without form resulting in mass losses for the Persians. In defence, the Persians used a similar tactic to the phalanx which according to Briant “consisted of their shields rammed in the ground behind which they fired arrows and spears”. Regardless, when this tactic was used at Marathon in 490 B.C, Plataea and Mycale in 479 B.C. it proved ineffective. Herodotus supports the notion of superior Greek battle tactics by stating that at Mycale, once “the rampart of shields was downed, they had nothing but their courage with which to oppose the well oiled machine of the phalanx.” Briant notes that the inability for the Persians to adapt to a new fighting style prevented overall victory. The strength in battle tactics couldn’t have been utilised without the overall strategy used by the Greeks. Greek strategy was based on the belief that superior Persian cavalry and archers prevented victory on open ground, it was vital that the Greeks engaged in hand to hand combat—this was done by luring the Persians into contained areas such a mountain passes and narrow waterways. The passes would need no alternate entries so as to prevent routing, hence Thessaly was not defended in 480 B.C.. Thermopylae is the best example of this, where a space of about 15 metres wide was utilised. The use of such small space allowed a force of approximately 7,500 Greeks to hold the Persians for six assaults, causing them to lose approximately 25,000 men (Chris Mathews). In fact, during the battle only 100 hoplites fought at a time. The destruction of the fleet at Salamis in September 480 B.C.(and the damage done at Artemisium the preceding month) was done using the same strategy of ‘restrictive battlegrounds’ as the space was only a kilometre wide, allowing the smaller but heavier Greek ships to have an advantage over the larger force of bigger Persian ships which according to Aeschylus in Persae numbered at “One thousand ships; of more than usual speed Seven and two hundred." Herodotus states how the in the confusion the ships began to ram each other. Overall the strategy forced the Persians into hand to hand combat, and the due to their large numbers both attack and retreat was disrupted. JM Cook states that as more squadrons of the Persian fleet pressed forward to show their prowess under the King’s Eyes, the first line of attacking ships had no escape. Also, JM Cook points out that the army ‘depended’ on a complicated supply system in which the accompanying Persian fleet played a large part. Hence Greek strategy made specific point to disrupt the navy. When that organisation was disrupted after the naval defeat at Salamis, the bulk of the land forces had to be withdrawn to Asia in haste. Aeschylus claims after Salamis “never before in one day did so numerous a multitude perish”, though like Herodotus, Aeschylus’ accuracy cannot be fully trusted as he writes for dramatic effect. Historians believe that this superior strategy was thought up by Themistocles, who Bradley labels “a man who showed unmistakable natural genius.” Thus, we see the superiority of Greek leadership. Many battles demonstrate decisions which show Greek leadership to be superior to the Persians. Plutarch comments on Themistocles’ tactical genius at Salamis, complimenting his ability to predict the best time of day to play the battle. He states that Themistocles chose to fight “when there regularly blows in a fresh breeze from the open sea, and brings in with it a strong swell into the channel”. This choice would have improved the coordination and speed of the Greek ships. We further see his tactical genius by his means of lured the Persians to battle at Salamis. Aeschylus states how he tricked the Persians into believing the Greeks were fleeing, causing them not only to enter the narrow waters eliminating their advantage, but also causing them to divide their forces; as Herodotus states the Egyptian’s were sent to intercept the nonexistent fleeing Greeks. Other examples of superior Greek leadership include Leonidas’ decision to fight in relays at Thermopylae, the evacuation of Athens saving the civilian populace, and Pausanias at Thermopylae awaiting the Persian offensive before attacking. There also exist a number of non-physical factors affecting the outcome of the war, such as the freak weather destroying parts of the Persian forces such as the storm at Artemisium. Religion was a powerful factor— Herodotus says that Leonidas stayed behind because it was fate by what was said in a prophecy that either Sparta would be invaded or a king would die. Furthermore, freak occurrences such as the storms at Artemisium and at Mt. Athos in the invasion under Mardonius, as well as an Earthquake preceding the Battle of Salamis, added to the Greek belief that the Persians were cursed for attempting to invade Greece. To conclude, a number of factors led to the Persian defeat in Xerxes invasion of Greece. The attempt of such a feat was difficult in essence as it was an unknown land beyond Persian borders. While the Persians clearly outnumbered the Greeks, superior Greek strategy, tactics and arms proved victorious. The success of Greece led to a Golden era which saw the rise of Athens and the Delian League. While Briant states that the defeat was neither overwhelming nor conclusive, it proved that the Persians were not indestructible.