Realism_&_the_Cuban_Missile_Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the world closer than it had ever been to nuclear war. This makes the crisis one of the most essential events in international affairs history, demonstrating a great example of the realist perspectives and other important aspects of international relations. Primarily, the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be justified by the realist perspective. In former President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s remarks to Kennedy he stated, “The failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do (Absher, 10).” However, not only was the US more alert as a result; so was Cuba. Cuba had evidence that the US would try to invade once more. Thus, Castro and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev conceived the plan to strategically place nuclear missiles in Cuba to protect themselves from the US. The realist perspective, among other things, involves the pursuit of and struggle for power and, more importantly, a balance of power. The Soviet Union felt that a successful American invasion of Cuba would be extremely detrimental to the global communist movement. From the Soviet perspective this would negatively shift the balance of power out of their favor. This presents a security dilemma between two extremely powerful nations of the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union amassed power to protect Cuba from American invasion, through placing nuclear weapons in striking range of the US, the US was in turn threatened by the unknown Soviet intentions. The United States was presented with the problem of not knowing if the expanded power of the USSR would be utilized as a defensive measure or offensive measure to gain more power. Either party could not trust the other because both were uncertain of the other’s intentions and, thus, were forced to prepare for the worst. This preparation took the form of the United States’ surveillance efforts of sending U-2 unmanned aerial vehicles over Cuba in order to investigate the construction of the missiles, which, with time, led to the mobilization of the military to the level of DEFCON 2. Kennedy expressed his discomfort in his November 6 letter to Khrushchev stating, “Not only did this action threaten the safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified… Your government repeatedly gave us assurance of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate (Kennedy, 3).” In this statement, Kennedy makes it clear that the US had no trust in the USSR and in Khrushchev’s deceitful and unreliable diplomacy. This is the basis of the security dilemma from the realist perspective. Because one party cannot fully trust its counterpart it takes action in the interest of its own security and wellbeing, which leads to the arming of the other. In the words of Henry Nau, “In this process of mutual armament, states face all the uncertainties of what exactly constitutes enough power to be safe (Nau, 31).” Through this, it is clear that the realist perspective was vital in the creation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The realist perspective also played a significant role in the Crisis’ diplomatic aspects. In Kennedy’s meeting with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council they discussed what measures to take after having confirmed surveillance photos of missile sites being constructed in Cuba. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided a full-scale invasion would be the only remedy. This opinion was promptly rebutted by Kennedy saying, “They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin (Kennedy, 14).” Kennedy knew that if the United States were to launch an attack on Cuba of tat magnitude the Soviet Union would not hesitate to attack Berlin, which would hit harder than necessary if the situation could be worked out diplomatically. This expressed the idea of reciprocity between the two states. Kennedy and his advisors found that the missiles placed in Cuba would not affect the military and “strategic balance of power,” but would affect that of the political arena. Kennedy stated, “It would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality (Kennedy, 903).” Therefore, The United States decided on a naval blockade of Cuba thinking that, although considered an act of war under international law, the USSR would not react to a mere naval quarantine. By doing this, the US avoided creating a preemptive war situation. Although they did have first-strike capabilities through their military overpowering of the Soviets, there were other factors to consider in order to keep the bipolarity of Soviet and American power from transitioning to simple Soviet hegemony. Although realism can clearly be used to explain many important aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis, other facets are better described in line with other perspectives. Most notably, the liberal perspective is more evident in the end days of the Crisis. After Kennedy decided not to invade Cuba with full-force he inevitably turned to a more diplomatic solution involving negotiation and communication more so than military action. Although the United States had clear first-strike capability, Kennedy knew that it was in both parties’ best interest to not allow the clash develop into a military and/or nuclear conflict. The series of events during US-Soviet negotiations relied heavily upon path dependence. Each of the state actors’ actions depended on the others’ and each led to an outcome that also determined future outcomes. Along these similar lines, a “shadow of the future” was created in both actors becoming aware they will be required to interact with each other in order to solve the dilemma. The identity perspective is also somewhat present in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The original alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union – and enmity between the Soviet Union and the US – stem from the underlying idea of communism. This not only explains the original invasion which caused the Cuban Missile Crisis but also the continued hostility throughout the Crisis and difficulty in reaching a compromise. Due to their ideological beliefs, they were more apt to disagree on most aspects of the Crisis. Concurrent to this idea, identities are many times the basis of many actions, conflicts and alliances in international relations. Thus, it is clear to see that, among all the other factors that weakened Soviet-American relations, identity was a major contributing factor. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as one of the most significant events in military and diplomatic history, was an ideal display of the perspective of international affairs. The realist perspective well explained the origins, outcomes and diplomatic processes, while the identity perspective can be attributed to the background of the Crisis – bringing the world inches from nuclear war. ANNEX The outside resource used for this assignment was John F. Kennedy’s letter written to Nikita Khrushchev on November 6, 1962. Many different issues are discussed in this letter namely, the discussion of the types of weapons that should be considered offensive, the failure of the Soviet Union give accurate or honest information with regard to weapons in Cuba and the need for trust and communication between the two states in future. I was interesting for me to see a primary source so vital to the situation and one that was, until recently, top secret classified. It was also intriguing for me to see the exact language used between the two leaders in order to put the situation into proper context. This impacted my argument because it should first-hand the Kennedy’s reaction from a realist perspective and proved that his actions in the diplomatic and military process with the Soviet Union were realist. BIBLIOGRAPHY Absher, Kenneth Michael. “Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Strategic Studies Institute. Penguin Books, New York. 2009. Blight, J. and Welch, D. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington. Noonday Press. 1990. English, Robert D. "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth." International Security. 4.26. 2002. Hussain, Aiyaz. “Covert Action and US Cold War Strategy in Cuba, 1961–62.” Cold War History. 5.1. 2005. Kennedy, John F. Letter to Nikita Khrushchev. November 6, 1962. The George Washington University National Security Archives. Washington, D.C. Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Philadelphia. W.W. Norton & Company. 1971. Nau, Henry R. Perspectives on International Relations. Washington. CQ Press. 2009. Tierney, Dominic. “’Pearl Harbor in Reverse’ Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 9.3. 2007.