Raced_Based_Affrimitve_Action

What’s Wrong with Race-Based Affirmative Action' In 1996 a majority of Californians voted for Proposition 209, a measure prohibiting preferences based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public employment, education, and contracting. Many observers were surprised that a quarter of all minorities (nearly 40 percent of Asians) in one of the most diverse states in the nation voted in favor of the proposition. Likewise, 27 percent of California voters who defined themselves as liberals voted for 209, along with 31 percent of Democrats (“State Propositions. . .,” 1996). The complexity of the vote in California was not expressed in rhetoric about it. Some of the most outspoken opponents of Proposition 209 saw the outcome as a triumph of unmitigated racism. Speeches by Jesse Jackson, for example, reflected the view that California Governor Pete Wilson could be compared to George Wallace; that a vote for Proposition 209 was a vote for “ethnic cleansing” (Jackson, 1997, p. 3A); and that Ward Connerly (a black man who helped lead the campaign for the proposition) was a “house slave” (Bearak, 1997, p. 6). The willingness of otherwise thoughtful and articulate figures like Jesse Jackson to demonize opponents of affirmative action may explain why college students are rarely willing to have open and candid discussions about issues related to race. It is well established, for example, that substantial numbers of college students have reservations about affirmative action, especially if it is seen as “preferences” (“New Students. . .,” 1996, p. A33). Yet comparatively few students will discuss their opinions and concerns openly; a fact noted by Arthur Levine (1994, p. 185), who observed that “when we interviewed students on college campuses . . . we found it easier to talk with them about intimate details of their sex lives than . . . about race and gender differences.” Higher education may be engaging in a classic exercise of rigidly enforced “groupthink” when it comes to affirmative action. Aside from the obvious irony of enforcing ideological orthodoxy to protect diversity, educators may be cutting themselves off from good ideas and valid criticism—ideas and criticism that could help achieve the goals associated with affirmative action without destroying a broad consensus necessary for better race relations. An example of the risks that higher education is running can be seen in another context: the adoption in 1996 of a new welfare bill deplored by many liberals. Upset by passage of the bill, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, “For years, whenever the critics said, correctly, that the welfare system was doing more harm than good, and suggested it be rethought, its defenders screamed ‘racism’ and ‘slave fare.’ They did that until there was no public support left at all. Now they are stunned at what they are getting” (Apple, 1996, p. A16). Likewise, as long as opinion elites in higher education seek to marginalize even the most moderate critics of affirmative action, they set the stage for affirmative action’s complete undoing. Questioning Race-Based Preferences Race-based affirmative action can be supported on the ground that blacks have had a unique “experience” in America, manifested in lingering racism that is hurtful even to the substantial numbers of blacks moving into the middle class and earning incomes higher than many whites. This argument has the potential to become its own undoing if taken too far. Cornel West (1996) suggests that the essence of the experience of racism is to be viewed as “subhuman.” That experience can be shared by a number of underrepresented groups—such as women in abusive relationships, openly gay people, poor people from Appalachia, and people with accents and cultural characteristics they cannot or will not change, such as some newly arrived immigrants or even an older generation of Americans from eastern and southern Europe whose names are suggestive of peasant ancestry or who are presumed to be connected with organized crime. The same experience can also occur on college campuses when whites’ males are said to have inherent (and unpleasant) white male characteristics—as if it made no difference, in the words of one observer, that one group of white males rode the freedom buses and another group burned them. All of these experiences are variations of being treated as less than human. It may prove intellectually dishonest and politically untenable in a democratic society to try to choose among the groups affected using some subjective scale to measure the degree of pain felt or insight gained. Another problem with race-based group remedies in American society is that most Americans distrust such solutions, even if they are beneficiaries. As Seymour Martin Lipset argues in his book American Exceptionalism (1996), Americans have a long history of emphasizing equality of opportunity rather than equality of results. Accordingly, in Lipset’s view, “white opposition to various forms of special governmental assistance for blacks and other minorities is in part a function of a general antagonism to statism and a preference for personal freedom in the American value system. . . .” (p. 141). This preference is of course not limited to whites. Lipset points out that it was also expressed by black abolitionist Frederick Douglass, who (in typical American fashion) “ridiculed the idea of racial quotas, as ‘absurd as a matter of practice,’ noting that it implied blacks ‘should constitute one-eighth of the poets, statesmen, scholars, authors and philosophers’ . . . and might promote ‘an image of blacks as privileged wards of the state’ ” (p. 148). The cultural current that Lipset describes is immensely strong. It formed a good part of the power of the “old” civil rights movement and helps explain that movement’s success. Some academics may not like the American emphasis on individual freedom—and intellectual honesty requires an admission that it has been inconsistently applied. But the cultural emphasis on individualism does exist, has existed since the founding of the Republic, and is attracting new adherents daily (such as many of the latest immigrants seeking a “land of opportunity”). Any single institution—such as higher education—that directly challenges this emphasis will be blown away. The Role of Class In a September 1997 editorial questioning the rapid increase in college tuition rates, The Washington Post observed that “while university leaders continue to lay great, and proper, stress on their commitment to racial diversity—as, for example, in the tremendous hue and cry that has followed the California and Texas moves to limit affirmative action—you listen in vain for a comparably publicly expressed urgency on the need to keep the best of American higher education accessible to those (minority and otherwise) who can’t dream of paying such tuition prices” (“Tuition Hike Ritual,” 1997, p. C6). The Post has a point. While proponents of racial preferences deplore the shrinking enrollments of African Americans in Texas and California professional schools, and while opponents assert that minority enrollment will gradually be restored as more attention is paid to educating black and Hispanic elementary and secondary students, neither side is addressing the need for greater social and economic diversity at leading public and private universities across the country. There has been one respected voice, however, calling for more social and economic diversity in higher education—a voice known for urging greater race and ethnic diversity as well. Harold Hodgkinson, director of the Center for Democratic Policy, Institute for Educational Leadership, wrote in Phi Delta Kappan (1995) that “we have more effectively segregated people by wealth than we ever did by race.” An exclusive focus on race alone, he believes, ignores the fact that “one-quarter of black households have higher incomes than the average white household.” What is needed, in his view, is an understanding that “race [has] diverted our attention from the most urgent issue: poverty reduces the quality of the lives of all children, regardless of race or ethnicity” (pp. 176, 178; emphasis added). Hodgkinson is an admired figure in higher education. His research about changing demographics in America is one reason that many colleges and universities moved faster than the corporate world to pursue racial diversity. The current attention he is paying to issues of class may presage a comparable shift on college campuses, especially as administrators look for alternatives to race-based affirmative action programs. Considering Caste Rather than Race A variation of class analysis that encompasses but is not limited by race is caste theory. Caste theory, as explained by Stanford history professor George M. Fredrickson (1996), “refers to a social arrangement rather than a fact of nature” (p. 16). It suggests that a wide variety of people (gays, many Appalachians, and most people of African ancestry) belong to groups with a history of subordination. Because numerous groups may be so identified, colleges will be driven to make personalized assessments of whether any particular individual might qualify for or benefit from a “plus” in college admissions. This approach is similar to what Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas suggested in his dissenting opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard (1973, pp. 331–332): A black law school applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fair-minded admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise . . . than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. . . . A poor Appalachian white . . . or some other American whose lineage is so diverse as to defy ethnic labels, may demonstrate similar potential. . . . Nor is there any bar to considering on an individual basis, rather than according to racial classifications, the likelihood that a particular candidate would more likely employ his legal skills to service communities that are not now adequately represented. . . . Some assert that a caste approach to affirmative action can be used to disguise the reality of racism in American society. That is a risk, not inevitability. It is also possible that educators might use caste theory to help people from many backgrounds understand the impact of racism. A good example is a speech by Mario Cuomo at a 1990 Italian-American Foundation dinner, reported by writer Mary McGory (1990, p. A2) in the Washington Post: He told tales they all could have told of ethnic slights and ‘snide condescension.’ He was first in his law school class at Fordham, but could not get a single interview on Wall Street. The dean suggested a name change. ‘Can you imagine me with white shoes, bouncing up with a tennis racket saying. . . ‘I went to Yale. I’m Mark Conrad.’ They howled . . .[then he said] ‘wouldn’t it be a shame if we, having heard those cruel epithets of ‘wop’ and ‘guinea’ and ‘dago,’ were to sit back now and talk about the ‘spics’ and the ‘niggers’' What a shame it would be if those who were the victims of racism and stupidity should project it ourselves. . . . The idea of caste is an affront to the reality and mythology of American individualism. Most Americans, however, can find some personal identification with a caste, now or in the past. This allows progressives to highlight the tension between theory and practice, and to draw on individualism as a progressive force, not an obstacle to social change. The heart of American progressivism is reflected in what Ralph Ellison wrote in a 1981 introduction to his Invisible Man (1995, p. xxii), where he observed that “revealing the human universals hidden within the plight of one who was both black and American” would challenge “strategies of division” based on “religion, class, color, and region.” If that “strategy of division” could be defeated, Ellison believed, the result would be “a more or less natural recognition of the reality of black and white fraternity” (p. xxii). Conclusion Race-based affirmative action ignores the powerful reality of class and caste distinctions. It also runs against the strong strain of individualism in American life. The time has come for honest criticism and fresh thinking, grounded in Martin Luther King Jr’s observation that “the Negro man must convince the white man that he seeks justice both for himself and the white man” (Valliant, 1977, p. 372). Until American colleges and universities return to that tradition— by honestly adhering to Justice Powell’s opinion in the Bakke decision and by designing affirmative action programs that encompass both race and class—college and university administrators will never marshal the support necessary to achieve and maintain true diversity on campus. Court Cases Cited Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). DeFunis v. Odegaard, 4l6 U.S. 312 (1973). Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). Work Cited Apple, R. W. Jr. “His Battle Now Lost, Moynihan Still Cries Out.” New York Times, Aug. 2, 1996, p. A16. Bearak, B. “Questions of Race Run Deep for Foe of Preference.” New York Times, July 27, 1997, p. 6 (electronic edition). Ellison, R. “Introduction” to Invisible Man. New York: Vintage, 1995. (“Introduction” originally published 1981.) Fredrickson, G. “Far from the Promised Land.” New York Review of Books, Apr. 18, 1996, p. 16. Hodgkinson, H. “What Shall We Call People.” Phi Delta Kappan, Oct. 1995, pp. 176–178. Jackson, J. “Jackson: King Would Be on Our Side.” USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1997 p. 3A. Kaplin, W. “William Kaplin on Key Legal Issues in 1997.” Synthesis: Law and Policy in Higher Education. Winter 1997, pp. 604–607. Levine, A. “Paying Attention to Student Culture.” Synfax Weekly Report, Jan. 31, 1994, p. 185. Lipset, S. American Exceptionalism. New York: Norton, 1996. McGory, M. “Cuomo’s Ethnic Challenge.” Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1990, p. A2. “New Students Uncertain About Racial Preferences.” Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan. 12,1996, p. A33. “State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters.” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7, 1996, p. A29. “Tuition Hike Ritual.” Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1997, p. C6. Valliant, G. Adaptation to Life. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. West, C. “Our Next Race Question.” Harper’s Magazine, Apr. 1996, p. 55.