Prospect_Theory_and_Democracy_in_Haiti

I. The Introduction: On September 30, 1991 a military coup in Haiti overthrew the newly elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The United States had just agreed to a policy of upholding democracy when the military junta and General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide. The U.S. was unable to accept the new heads of power and both the Bush and Clinton Administrations attempted to force these illegitimate leaders out of office so that Aristide could be reinstalled (Robyn, 1). Several attempts were made by both administrations before finally succeeding in an agreement to get Cedras out of power and Aristide back in. This is the second Case Study on the United States reaction to the 1994 crisis in Haiti. This paper will use the Prospect Theory to examine how the United States decision to invade Haiti in 1994 and restore democracy among the Haitians. It will define Prospect Theory, make two possible hypotheses concerning the United States and their position on invading Haiti, and then it will further examine these two hypotheses and determine whether or not the Prospect Theory is an accurate theory where this case is concerned. II. The Theory: Prospect Theory was originally developed as an alternative to the Rational Choice Theory. Rational Choice Theory uses the expected utility in linear equations to make decisions based on what would provide them with the most satisfaction no matter how little that satisfaction might be. Prospect Theory argues that the choice has to provide a large amount of satisfaction for an actor to select the new decision. The theory further analyzes risky decisions based on the gains and losses. “In its original form, it is concerned with behavior of decision makers who face a choice between two alternatives” (Goldberg and VonNitzsch, 12). There are two ways to look at a decision based on the Prospect Theory and that is by using a domain of gain or a domain of loss. A domain of gain is when an actor is risk adverse. It is unlikely that the actor will make a risky decision, everything is working well and any change would be considered a risk the actor is not willing to make. The actor would already be making good decisions and he is satisfied with the choices being made. However, when an actor is risk acceptance this is not the case. Risk acceptance is when an actor is in a domain of loss. He is in a position where he does not require a whole lot to persuade him to move forward with new choices. “Prospect theory predicts that preferences will depend on how a problem is framed. If the reference point is defined such that an outcome is viewed as a gain, then the resulting value function will be concave and decision makers will tend to be risk averse. On the other hand, if the reference point is defined such that an outcome is viewed as a loss, then the value function will be convex and decision makers will be risk seeking” (Plous, 97). The variable defined, also known as the dependent variable, in Prospect Theory is choice. This theory is trying to explain how choices are made and what influences an actor’s decision. The actors’ decisions can be explained by the independent variables: the domain of gain, domain of loss, and the expected utility, the probability times the given utility. Here the expected utility has to be big enough to sway an actor to change his position, where in Rational Choice Theory the expected utility would only need to be an increase, no matter how small, and change would occur. It is important to explain the idea of Prospect Theory before it is looked at in relation to the United States and the 1994 involvement in Haiti. The rest of this paper will explore the idea of Prospect Theory and how it might have been incorporated into the U.S.’s decision making towards the problems occurring in Haiti. The theory will look at how and why power was exercised among the U.S. over this period of time. III. The Hypotheses: Given the Prospect Theory we will expect to see two hypotheses used by the United States in relation to its decision to invade Haiti in 1994. Both hypotheses are made while only taking the theory into account, before even looking at the United Sates and what processes it used to decide whether or not it would invade Haiti. The first hypothesis we will look at relates to the Prospect Theory and a domain of loss. This means that the Unite States would have been accepting to making a risky decision in invading Haiti. The U.S. would have been looking for a reason to change what they were doing and to make a decision that might benefit or harm them, as long as change occurred. In this scenario the U.S. would have been more than open to new choices and decisions and that would have included an invasion on Haiti. The second hypothesis recognizes a domain of gain. The United States would have been risk adverse, it would have been in a position where it would not want to invade Haiti. It would expect a lot more satisfaction out of helping the Haitians before it made any drastic decisions. The U.S. would have been defensive and come up with reasons for why an invasion would only harm it. IV. The Background: The beginning of the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994 started in 1991 when Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras lead a military coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide made a mistake by replacing Lieutenant General Abraham with Raul Cedras. Aristide wanted to have a weaker man in the position of Lieutenant General, but that plan backfired when Cedras became one of the leaders behind the coup to overthrow him. “When soldiers rebelled against Aristide in September 1991, the General Staff pushed Cedras in front of the movement, and after Aristide went into exile, Cedras became general and commander in chief,” wrote Pastor (128). During the first few years of the military coup George H.W. Bush was president, however, most of the U.S. involvement took place when Bill Clinton entered office. The Clinton Administration had several failed attempts with its involvement in Haiti but it eventually came up with a plan that scared Cedras enough to finally agree to step aside. The first step the Clinton Administration made at restoring democracy in Haiti was coming up with a top-secret plan to use force to remove the Haitian military from power. Clinton did not want to be seen as a weak candidate towards foreign policy so he “began hinting of the possibility of military intervention,” however, when he began to unfold his plan to the Haitian government “the threat was not in the form of a clear ultimatum and did not spell out when an invasion would occur and exactly what actions were necessary to avoid it” so Clinton’s threat was not taken seriously with Cedras (Bermeo). When it became clear that the Haitian military was not going to step down Clinton realized a new plan would have to be put together. He went back to the idea of imposing sanctions and using a harsher embargo policy. However, “the tougher embargo did not result in abdication by the Haitian military authorities. By this time several international deadlines had come and gone and the military regime was still in power” (Bermeo). The U.S. sent UN police advisors over to Haiti, on the USS Harlan, to serve as a bridge to change in the government. But “Haitian thugs” threatened the UN police advisors and they withdrew and went home. The U.S. had no further plan to go into Haiti and their bluff of intervening was called out. The next step the Clinton Administration made was Resolution 940. It “called on member states” to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership” (Pastor, 126). Jimmy Carter wanted to go over to Haiti with General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn and issue one last measure of coercive diplomacy before an invasion occurred. The U.S. had soldiers armed and ready to invade Haiti if the negotiation did not work. There had been so many bluffs from the U.S. that, at first, Cedras was not convinced that an invasion would really occur. However, when “all three said they were against an invasion, but the American people would support it, as would they, when it occurred,” and Powell then began to go into vivid detail of exactly how an invasion would happen, “any question about the willingness of Clinton to use force that remained in the mind of the Haitian generals dissolved” (Pastor, 131). An agreement was drawn up and it was decided that Aristide would be reinstated in power on October 15, 1994, Cedras would need to step down and the U.S. would return democracy to Haiti. V. The Evidence: To back up Hypothesis one we must make sure two requirements were fulfilled: first that the Clinton Administration was in a position of taking on risk and second that the U.S. was facing a domain of loss. Clinton was facing the loss of many voters if he invaded Haiti, but he was also losing votes if his presidency failed at restoring democracy in Haiti. He was not in a very secure place in his presidency and therefore would not be losing much if he took a chance at helping restore democracy in Haiti. The United States needed to prove that it believed in democracy and that it would try to help the Haitians in getting back to a state of democracy. Clinton stated that he needed to fix the situation, “to support the global march toward democracy in one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy” (Girard, 28). He tried to negotiate with Cedras to reinstate democracy and then when that did not work he began to use stronger measures like the economic embargo and threats. When that did not work Resolution 940 was created stating that the U.S. may take any measure necessary in getting Cedras out of office and democracy back in Haiti. Another example as to how the United States was risk accepting was its need to rebuild its credibility. After Clinton chose to reinstate democracy in Haiti his third attempt at doing so, sending UN police advisors over to Haiti on the USS Harlan, failed he then needed to prove his military strategies and power to everyone who now doubted his decisions. This catastrophe was an embarrassment on Clinton’s behalf and new measures were soon made to get the U.S. to be seen as a powerful nation. Also, Clinton was running into some problems at home and winning over the popularity of people by fixing the situation in Haiti became a big priority on his list of things to do. He needed to invade Haiti and bring democracy back to the Haitians to secure his spot in the presidency. “It was clear that securing every vote in Clinton’s thin majority was a necessity. A pro-Aristide Haiti policy, which New Yorkers, Floridians, and the congressional Black Caucus insisted on, could help achieve that goal” (Girard, 64). It was a small but dedicated minority and with their votes he would be able to advance his legislative agenda (Girard, 64). The crisis in Haiti led to many setbacks and domestic scandals with the Clinton Administration that they were doing everything they could to get back in good standings with their supporters. The evidence shows that the United States was in a state of a domain of loss and was accepting to risky decisions. As far as taking hypothesis two into consideration would mean we would need evidence to back up the idea that the United States concentrated on the losses that would come with invading Haiti rather than the gains. The U.S. would have been afraid of change because it would have been bad for the United States. Clinton made it evident through his speeches to the public that he was willing to make the choice to help out the Haitians in restoring democracy. He focused on the gains the U.S. would receive if they invaded Haiti to promote democracy. Clinton said, “To support the global march toward democracy is one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy- an invasion of Haiti will do just that,” (Girard, 28). It has already been proven that the United States was in a risk accepting state so therefore most of the evidence we have goes against what Hypothesis two is trying to explain. VI. The Discussion: The evidence found to relate the idea of the Prospect Theory and the United States position on an invasion of Haiti in 1994 agrees with one of the Hypotheses made in the earlier section but not the other. Hypothesis One can be backed up with information from the 1994 case because we saw that the United States was in a risk accepting state and was in a domain of loss. The United States went forward with helping restore democracy in Haiti, proving that the U.S. was willing to risk its stability for change. Clinton made a choice that he believed would help him in the long run with securing his spot in the presidency. He was willing to send troops over to invade Haiti because he needed to prove that he was capable of being a leader and making wise decisions when it came to international relations. When looking at the evidence to back up Hypothesis Two we are at a loss. The United States had more to gain with an invasion in Haiti than lose. Clinton was open to risk, he was not trying to outweigh his losses to his gains. He needed to get back in the good graces of his people and the other nations. He was in a domain of loss. We must reject Hypothesis Two but that does not mean we reject the Prospect Theory all together. VII. The Conclusion: Hypothesis One was correct, and when using Prospect Theory an actor is either in a domain of gain or a domain of loss, he is either risk acceptance or risk adverse. The two hypotheses used are contradicting hypotheses. They both come out of Prospect Theory but one would presume that an actor would either be in a state of one or the other. Prospect Theory is still a plausible theory used by the United States when it was deciding how to go about the 1994 Haiti Case. Just because Hypothesis Two was rejected does not mean we reject the theory all together. Both hypotheses are just presumptions of the position that the United States may have been in when we involve the Prospect Theory.