Operation_in_Afghanistan

Joint Publication 3-16 Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations 5 April 2000 Throughout our nation’s history, our Armed Forces have participated in alliances and coalitions in support of freedom in all parts of the world. From the birth of this great nation and our own struggle for freedom to the epic battles of two world wars in the twentieth century and the ensuing Cold War, the strength of our partnership has always exceeded the sum of its parts. Our liberty, and the liberty of so many people in other democracies, is owed to the selfless dedication of our comrades who had the vision to set common goals and the will and capability to fight together to achieve greatness. “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations” will help to guide you through the challenging and sometimes complex nature of operating as a part of a multinational force. It takes us beyond the hardware of force interoperability and types of operations to the software of command relationships, considerations for the planning and execution of multinational operations, and divergent cultures working together toward a common end. While we will always prepare to operate unilaterally if necessary, we must also be prepared to operate in multinational alliances and coalitions when practical. This doctrine will assist you in the latter endeavor. HENRY H. SHELTON Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides guidance and principles for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force. This publication describes multinational operations that the United States may participate in as a part of an alliance, coalition, or other ad hoc arrangement. It describes joint organizational structures essential to coordinate land, maritime, air, space, and special operations in a multinational environment. It addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should contemplate during the planning and execution of multinational operations. appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. 3. Application a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most i Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3-16 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS • • • • • • Multinational Operations Defined ............................................................................. I-1 Strategic Context....................................................................................................... I-1 Types of Multinational Operations ............................................................................ I-3 Peacetime Engagement ............................................................................................. I-8 Tenets of Multinational Cooperation ......................................................................... I-9 Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability.............................................. I-10 CHAPTER II COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS • • • • • • • • National Security Structure ...................................................................................... II-1 Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations ............................ II-3 Multinational Force Commander .............................................................................. II-6 Overview of Multinational Command Structures ..................................................... II-7 Alliance Command Structures .................................................................................. II-8 Coalition Command Structures .............................................................................. II-10 Control of Multinational Operations ....................................................................... II-11 Civil-Military Coordination ................................................................................... II-14 CHAPTER III CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks ............................................................ III-1 Political and Military Considerations ..................................................................... III-1 Intelligence and Information .................................................................................. III-3 Logistics and Host-Nation Support......................................................................... III-6 Language, Culture, and Sovereignty ...................................................................... III-13 Health Service Support ......................................................................................... III-14 Termination and Transition ................................................................................... III-15 Communications ................................................................................................... III-16 Force Protection .................................................................................................... III-16 International Law and the Law of War .................................................................. III-17 The Law of the Sea ............................................................................................... III-18 Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................ III-19 Doctrine, Training, and Resources ....................................................................... III-19 Media .................................................................................................................. III-20 iii Table of Contents • Religious Ministry Support .................................................................................. III-21 • Meteorology and Oceanography .......................................................................... III-21 • Environmental Considerations ............................................................................ III-21 CHAPTER IV OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SECTION A. GENERAL-UNIFIED ACTION ........................................................ IV-1 • General .................................................................................................................. IV-1 SECTION B. LAND OPERATIONS ........................................................................ IV-1 • General .................................................................................................................. IV-1 SECTION C. MARITIME OPERATIONS ............................................................... IV-5 • General .................................................................................................................. IV-5 SECTION D. AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS ..................................................... IV-7 • Air Operations ....................................................................................................... IV-7 • Space Operations ................................................................................................. IV-10 SECTION E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS ................................................................. IV-11 • General ................................................................................................................ IV-11 SECTION F. GENERAL ........................................................................................ IV-13 • Information Operations ........................................................................................ IV-13 • Search and Rescue ............................................................................................... IV-13 APPENDIX A B C D Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations ....................................... A Representative List of US Participation in Multinational Operations .............. References ......................................................................................................... Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... A-1 B-1 C-1 D-1 GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4 FIGURE II-1 II-2 II-3 II-4 II-5 II-6 II-7 The National Security Structure ..................................................................... II-2 Key Players in the Department of State ......................................................... II-3 Notional Multinational Command Structure .................................................. II-8 Alliance Integrated Command Structure ........................................................ II-9 Lead Nation Command Structure ................................................................ II-10 Coalition Parallel Command Structure (With Coordination Center) ............. II-11 Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM ........... II-12 iv JP 3-16 Table of Contents III-1 III-2 IV-1 IV-2 IV-3 IV-4 Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations ................................ III-2 The Intelligence Cycle ................................................................................ III-3 Capabilities of Land Forces ......................................................................... IV-2 Characteristics of Maritime Forces ............................................................. IV-6 Key Aspects of Air Operations .................................................................... IV-8 US Special Operations Command Capabilities ......................................... IV-11 v Table of Contents Intentionally Blank vi JP 3-16 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW • • • Describes the Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Reviews Multinational Command Relationships Discusses the Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations Covers Operational Considerations Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. The United States has often shared common security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Typically, multinational operations are performed within the structure of a coalition or alliance. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. An alliance is the result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. Normally each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action. Multinational operations may include combat and are conducted both during war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). War is the extreme case for conducting multinational operations; the goal is to achieve the multinational objectives as quickly as possible and with as little cost as possible. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and stability, and supporting civil authorities. Peacetime engagement activities are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. These activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. During multinational operations, respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience must be practiced during all activities to ensure unity of effort. Steps to achieve rationalization, standardization, and interoperability will significantly enhance the probability of success in multinational operations. When providing alliance or coalition leadership, the geographic combatant • vii Executive Summary commander ensures that unified action integrates US joint operations, in conjunction with multinational, interagency, and international organizations, into a strategic unity of effort to achieve the strategic end state. Command Relationships Several key individuals and organizations determine the level of US military involvement in multinational operations. The National Security Council is the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decisions. Its membership includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The National Command Authorities (NCA) consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense and may employ military power and personnel to respond to situations affecting US interests. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor and the Department of State administers US Embassies abroad and supports the Secretary of State in pursuing US foreign policy goals. The President retains command authority over US forces, yet sometimes it is prudent to place appropriate US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. Foreign operational control, tactical control, and support relationships may all be advantageous to multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. Coalition command relationships often are a parallel command structure, a lead nation command structure, or a combination of the two. Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations One of the most important tasks when planning multinational operations is to conduct a detailed mission analysis. A mission analysis for a multinational operation should include assessments of the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of each of the national contingents. This analysis should result in a mission statement for the multinational force as a whole and a restated mission for the US contingent of the force. Once the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives have been approved, the multinational force commander (MNFC) assigns specific tasks to the contingent most capable of completing those tasks. Every phase of the intelligence cycle, including planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback, viii JP 3-16 Executive Summary is substantively adjusted to support multinational operations. Effective logistic support in a multinational operation will pose particular problems for the MNFC and will require detailed planning and flexible execution, taking into account the logistic capabilities, demands, and limitations of each national contingent. During the commander’s assessment, the overall objectives also need to include criteria for termination and transition, communications, force protection, international law considerations, rules of engagement, doctrine, education and training, media relations, health service support, religious ministry support, meteorology, and oceanography as well as many cultural and linguistic needs. Operational Considerations Operational considerations include land, maritime, air and space, special operations, information operations, and search and rescue operations. Land operations occur across the range of military operations, during war and MOOTW. Land forces possess the capability to hold or occupy land areas. Capabilities to land forces include operational mobility, interoperability, sustainability, and versatility. Maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken, in peacetime or in war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. The qualities that characterize maritime forces include readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Air operations gain and maintain control of the air and exploit its use to achieve the MNFC’s objectives. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. Space operations include force enhancement, space control, space support including spacelift and on-orbit operations, and force application. Special operations forces enable the commander to develop and exercise unconventional military options in multinational operations independently or in support of other components. They are trained to provide liaison to multinational maneuver units, taking advantage of their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with foreign military and paramilitary forces. Information operations (IO) are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Additionally, information assurance (IA) is an element of IO that is concerned with the protection and defense of information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, ix Executive Summary authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Both IO and IA must be factored into every operation conducted by any task force. The Joint Staff coordinates US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Search and rescue (SAR) operations are those efforts undertaken to find and recover downed and/ or missing personnel. Normally each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own SAR missions. CONCLUSION Multinational operations include alliances or coalitions between two or more nations in order to best achieve their common interests. The NCA will retain ultimate command authority over US military forces and personnel, but often will employ the aid of foreign command and additional support relationships in order to achieve specified military objectives. Detailed mission analysis and organized objectives help provide a successful multinational operation through the coordinated employment of forces. x JP 3-16 CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS “Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its people.” Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) forces and commanders, they can also be described as “allied,” “alliance,” “bilateral,” “combined,” “multilateral,” or “coalition,” as “Multinational operations” is a collective appropriate. term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such Sovereignty issues will be one of the most operations are usually undertaken within the difficult issues for the multinational force structure of a coalition or alliance, although commander (MNFC) to deal with, both in other possible arrangements include regard to forces contributed by nations and supervision by an international organization by host country nations. Often, the MNFC (such as the United Nations (UN) or will be required to accomplish the mission Organization for Security and Cooperation in through coordination, communication, and Europe). A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement consensus in addition to traditional command between two or more nations for common concepts. Political sensitivities must be action. An alliance is the result of formal acknowledged and often the MNFC (and agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more subordinates) must depend on their diplomatic nations for broad, long-term objectives which as well as warrior skills. further the common interests of the members. Coalitions are formed by different nations 2. Strategic Context with different objectives than long standing alliances, usually for a single occasion or for a. General longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Although the description • The United States has often shared of “multinational” will always apply to such common or mutually-compatible 1. Multinational Operations Defined Flags of participants in Operation COOPERATIVE OSPREY 1996. I-1 Chapter I F-16 participating in Bright Star exercise in Egypt. security interests and participated in operations with other nations. Contemporary threats to collective security objectives have become more ambiguous and regionally focused since the end of the Cold War. Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Resultant instabilities can cause increased levels of activity outside commonly accepted standards of law, order, and fairness, in the form of employing intimidation, drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgencies, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, and information systems exploitation or disruption. It is difficult to predict when or where such threats may emerge. • Where commonality or compatibility of interest exists, nations may enter into political, economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests; ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats; and conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and peace operations (PO). Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact on multinational operations. Many operation plans (OPLANs) to deter or counter threats are prepared within the context of a treaty or alliance framework. Sometimes they are developed in a less structured coalition framework, based on temporary agreements or arrangements. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in allied laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language must be taken into account. Normally each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and contingency plans to guide multinational action. • The United States employs a national security strategy committed to protecting its own national security interests and achieving strategic objectives by directing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, information, military) toward the strategic end state. The National Security I-2 JP 3-16 Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Strategy states that, while US forces retain unilateral capability, whenever possible they will seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths, to promote regional stability throughout the world. Therefore, US commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). US forces may participate in these multinational efforts across a range of military and civil operations in concert with a variety of US governmental agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, and international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). b. The Military Commander’s Role • In responding to crises, US military commanders must understand that military operations are one part of an overall strategy to focus all elements of national power. Though the military application of power may not in itself achieve US strategic objectives, failure to apply that power properly could preclude attaining those objectives. • When assessing the theater strategic environment, combatant commanders should consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies or coalition partners, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. United Nations Security Council resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military force. • In multinational operations, planners and participants should be sensitive to the demands of consensus-driven decision making. 3. Types of Multinational Operations Multinational operations may be conducted during periods of both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation, perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili inspects a map of the Bosnian area during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. I-3 Chapter I a. War. When diplomatic, economic, and informational means are unable or inappropriate to achieve objectives, the alliance or coalition may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations, thereby placing the alliance or coalition in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieve alliance or coalition objectives, and conclude hostilities on terms favorable to all multinational partners. War may be of a limited or general nature. Limited war is armed conflict short of general war, as was conducted during Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. General war, such as World Wars I and II, involves armed conflict among major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed and survival is at stake. In either instance decisive force is applied to fight and win. • MNFCs may employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations to attack the enemy’s physical capabilities, morale, and will to fight. When required to employ force, MNFCs can seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in applying maximum combat capability at the decisive time and place. This is accomplished by arranging symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be symmetrical (if the US force and the enemy force are similar), or asymmetric if forces are dissimilar. MNFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. National contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can not be viewed in isolation. Each may be critical to the success, and may have certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other resources. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. Synergy is achieved by synchronizing the contributions of alliance or coalition partners in multinational operations to enable MNFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy for exploitation. • Multinational force operations will be characterized by the following. •• Simultaneity and Depth. The intent of simultaneity and depth is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist. “Simultaneity” refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, MNFCs cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon. To be effective, MNFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. This is accomplished by conducting operations across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, thereby overwhelming the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions. •• Anticipation. Anticipation is key to effective planning. MNFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. I-4 JP 3-16 Fundamentals of Multinational Operations MNFCs should consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. Surprise can be avoided by monitoring operations as they unfold and signaling to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. MNFCs should realize the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces. Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners in order to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) can assist MNFCs in defining likely or potential enemy courses of action (COAs), as well as the indicators that suggest the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. Anticipation is not without risk. MNFCs and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider the information upon which decisions are being based. •• Balance. Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the MNF as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. MNFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. dimensions among the forces available to MNFCs. Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). A principal MNFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the MNF. Support relationships afford an effective means to weigh (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations. MNFCs can gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage, which can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit MNF strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides joint force commanders (JFCs) with decisive advantage. Leverage allows MNFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative. •• Timing and Tempo. Multinational forces should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, MNFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react. MNFCs may vary the tempo of operations during selected phases of a campaign. They may elect to reduce the pace of operations or conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities. “Timing” refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. •• Leverage. Achieving leverage entails b. Military Operations Other Than gaining, maintaining, and exploiting War. MOOTW are operations that advantages in combat power across all encompass the use of military capabilities I-5 Chapter I across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peace, crisis, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat (such as some peace enforcement operations) may have many of the same characteristics as war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. The following list of MOOTW categories that may be conducted in a multinational setting are presented in alphabetical order. Multinational participation in any MOOTW category will present unique and regionally specific challenges which will require consideration of the tenets of multinational cooperation to be discussed later in this chapter. See JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” or other appropriate publications in the JP 3-07 series for further detail. • Combating Terrorism. Combating terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat exists. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). • Department of Defense (DOD) Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations. DOD support to the national drug control strategy includes support to US law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments by providing intelligence analysts and logistic support personnel; support to detection and monitoring of the movement of air and sea traffic; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; training of foreign CD organizations in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can be applied to their CD operations; and research and development. Special operations forces enhances multinational force capabilities through interaction with host nations during peacetime engagement operations. I-6 JP 3-16 Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Canadian and Hungarian troops train in an urban environment. • Enforcement of Sanctions and Maritime Intercept Operations. These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. • Enforcing Exclusion Zones. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), at sea (maritime), or on land (zones of separation or interentity boundary lines). The measures are usually imposed by the UN or other international bodies. • Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. • Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or than can result in great damage to or loss of property in regions outside the United States. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. US civil affairs (CA) forces are trained to assist the commander in coordinating with NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international organizations, and local civilian agencies through the civilmilitary operations center (CMOC) in situations involving FHA which may also be in coordination with UN relief efforts. • Nation Assistance and Support to Counterinsurgency. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peace, crisis, emergency, or war, based on agreements concluded between the United States and that nation. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to security assistance; foreign internal defense (FID); and humanitarian and I-7 Chapter I civic assistance (HCA). Unlike FHA, HCA is support provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include selective evacuation, contingent on space availability, of citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. of the flag state, and the approval of the National Command Authorities (NCA), this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. • Show of Force Operations. These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or MNFs. • Arms Control. Arms control, though • Peace Operations. PO are operations not a military operation, is a means to conducted in support of diplomatic reduce the risk of war by limiting or efforts to establish and maintain peace; reducing the threat from potential they include peace enforcement adversaries (e.g., through a cap on, operations and peacekeeping operations. reduction or elimination of particular PO are conducted in conjunction with the weapons) and through confidence various diplomatic activities necessary to building measures rather than relying secure a negotiated truce and resolve the solely on military responses to conflict. Additional types of MOOTW perceived or anticipated changes in the (e.g., FHA and NEO) may complement military threat. It may manifest itself peace operations. PO are tailored to each through several conventions (i.e., situation and may be conducted in treaties, agreements, or unilateral support of diplomatic activities before, action). Arms control complements during, and after conflict. US CA forces military preparedness to enhance national and security assistance officers (SAOs) and regional security. Combatant provide a significant capability to the commanders and their staffs must be commander in the planning and conduct aware of applicable arms control of PO. These forces can provide the conventions and those negotiations in liaison between the military force and the progress that affect their AOR. local populace, local government, and NGOs, PVOs, and international 4. Peacetime Engagement organizations. Peacetime engagement is defined as all • Protection of Shipping. When military activities involving other nations necessary, US forces provide protection intended to shape the security environment of US flagged vessels, US citizens in peacetime. These activities demonstrate (whether embarked in US or foreign US commitment, lend credibility to its vessels), and their property against alliances, enhance regional stability, and unlawful violence on and over provide a crisis response capability while international waters. With the consent promoting US influence and access. In I-8 JP 3-16 Fundamentals of Multinational Operations MULTINATIONAL ENDEAVORS There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual interests established by our nation around the world. Here again the role of the combatant commanders in conducting the broad sweep of unified operations within their theaters is crucial and requires acute political sensitivity (the supporting joint and component commanders within combatant commands also play key roles in this regard). SOURCE: JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States” addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, peacetime engagement activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, freedom of navigation exercises, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-military contacts including SAOs and military assistance advisory groups. Given their location and knowledge of the region, peacetime engagement forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to multinational operations. Space forces enhance peacetime engagement by providing a continuous worldwide presence that allows monitoring and quick reaction at all levels throughout the range of military operations. national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing MNF as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas often lead to solidification of the partnership. This includes respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values. Seemingly junior officers in command of small contingents are the senior representatives of their government within the MNFs and, as such, should be treated with special consideration beyond their USequivalent rank. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist. b. Rapport. US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the MNFC (who may or may not be from the United States). This is a personal, direct relationship that only they can develop. The result of good rapport between leaders will be successful teamwork by their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort. It is essential that each member of the MNF understand their partners’ national views and work to minimize friction within the MNF. 5. Tenets of Multinational Cooperation After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” This mutual confidence stems from several intangible considerations which must guide the actions of every participant. While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. c. Knowledge of Partners. US a. Respect. In assigning missions to commanders and their staffs should know MNFs, the commander must consider that each member of the MNF. Much time and I-9 Chapter I effort is expended in learning about the enemy and a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner. Additional guidance on RSI may be found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly d. Patience. Effective partnerships take Nations.” time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial a. Rationalization. This is any action that relationship with multinational partners increases the effectiveness of allied and/or requires untiring, even-handed patience. coalition forces through more efficient or This is easier to accomplish within alliances effective use of defense resources committed but is equally necessary regarding prospective to the alliance and/or coalition. coalition partners. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, 6. Rationalization, mutual support or improved interoperability, Standardization, and and greater cooperation. Rationalization Interoperability applies to both weapons and materiel I n t e r n a t i o n a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , resources and non-weapons military matters. standardization, and interoperability (RSI) b. Standardization. Unity of effort is with allies, coalition partners, and other greatly enhanced through standardization. friendly nations is important for achieving: the closest practical cooperation among The basic purpose of standardization their military forces; the most efficient programs is to achieve the closest practical use of research, development, procurement, cooperation among MNFs through the support, and production resources; and the efficient use of resources and the reduction most effective multinational warfighting of operational, logistic, technical, and capability. International military RSI applies procedural obstacles in multinational military operations. to both materiel and non-materiel matters. A US Marine assists a Slovakian soldier with camouflage makeup. I-10 JP 3-16 Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Equipment waits to be loaded at a Bosnian airport. • Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts for compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality (see glossary definitions). The Department of Defense is actively involved in several international standardization programs, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) many standardization forums, the five-nation (United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Air Standardization Coordinating Committee, and the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program (ABCA). The United States also participates in the Combined Communications-Electronics Board and Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Naval command, control, and communications (C3) organizations to achieve standardization and interoperability in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). • Alliances provide a forum to work towards standardization of national equipment, doctrine, and TTP. Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a framework that planners utilize as much as possible in all multinational operations. Coalitions, however, are by definition created for a single purpose and usually (but not always) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They do not provide military planners with the same political resolve, commonality of aim, or degree of organizational maturity as alliances. • Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard to administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. The mechanisms for this standardization are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materiel or non-materiel in nature. Non-materiel related ISAs should already be incorporated into US joint and Service doctrine and TTP. The five paragraph operations order is one common example. Materiel ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or adaptation processes to facilitate standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as standardization agreements (STANAGs) and are instruments that must be used to establish commonality I-11 Chapter I in procedures and equipment. The quadripartite standing agreements (QSTAGs) agreed to within the ABCA are another type of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean that they will be automatically used during an alliance’s multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring resources. See the discussion on use of acquisition cross-Service agreements (ACSAs) in Chapter III, “Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations.” • Standardization agreements like the STANAGs and QSTAGs provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC must disseminate ISAs among the MNF or rely on existing standing operating procedures (SOP) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force; in communications, logistics, or administration, for example. This is more difficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated together prior to the particular contingency. The limitations apply when non-alliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize procedures and processes. c. Interoperability. Historically, the problems of interoperability have been solved — when they have been solved at all — primarily through trial and error during actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. Interoperability is an essential RSI requirement for multinational operations. Nations cannot operate effectively together unless their forces are interoperable. The most important areas for interoperability include language, communications, doctrine, and exchanges of information. • Factors which enhance achieving interoperability start with adherence to the tenets of multinational operations in paragraph 5. Additional factors include planning for interoperability; the personalities of the commander and staff; visits to assess allied capabilities; a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism; liaison teams; multinational training exercises; and a constant effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such standards should already be established for alliance members. • Factors that inhibit achieving interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information infrastructure systems for C4I; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; the degree of differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities. I-12 JP 3-16 CHAPTER II COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS “Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations.” General Robert W. RisCassi, USA "Principles for Coalition Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly Summer 1993 1. National Security Structure chain of command by transmitting communications to the commanders of the Several key individuals and combatant commands from the NCA; organizations determine the level of US however, the Chairman does not exercise military involvement in multinational command over any of the combatant forces. operations. The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum to consider c. Combatant Commander. The national security issues that require combatant commander is a commander in presidential decisions. Its membership chief (CINC) of one of the unified or includes four statutory members: the specified combatant commands established President, the Vice President, the Secretary by the President. Combatant commanders of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The exercise combatant command (command Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. Director of Central Intelligence serve as This broad authority allows the combatant commanders to perform a variety of functions, statutory advisors (see Figure II-1). including organizing and employing a. National Command Authorities. The commands and forces; assigning tasks and NCA consist of the President and the designating objectives; and directing military Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized operations, joint training, and logistics as alternates or successors. The NCA may necessary to accomplish assigned missions. employ military power to respond to situations COCOM is exercised only by the combatant affecting vital US interests. The Secretary has commander, and cannot be delegated. statutory authority, direction, and control over the Military Departments. By law, only the d. Department of State. The NCA has the authority to direct both the Department of State (DOS) is organized to movement of personnel and the initiation of provide foreign policy advice to the military action. President, nation-to-nation representation throughout the world, US interagency b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. coordination in the various nations with The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whom the United States has relations, and is the principal military advisor to the worldwide information services. Key President and statutory advisor to the NSC. players within the DOS are shown in Figure The Chairman may seek advice from, and II-2 and include the following. consult with, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman may also seek • Secretary of State. The Secretary of advice from the Joint Staff and the combatant State is the principal foreign policy advisor to the President and is responsible commanders. When directed by the President, for the overall direction, coordination, the Chairman facilitates actions within the II-1 Chapter II THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE National Security Council National Command Authorities President Vice President Secretary of State Diplomatic Missions Secretary of Defense NSC Statutory Advisors Director of Central Intelligence Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander Unified Command (CINC) Commander Joint Task Force Commander Subunified Command Command/Direction Coordination Commander Component Command Figure II-1. The National Security Structure and supervision of US foreign relations and for the interagency activities of the US Government (USG) both outside the United States and with US missions to international organizations. • Ambassador or Chief of Mission. The Ambassador, or Chief of Mission (COM), is the senior US official, military or civilian, at the embassy. The ambassador usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in a host country. This authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. A crisis may arise in a nation or an area in which the United States has no diplomatic mission. In such a situation, the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the standard authorities and responsibilities of a COM. • Diplomatic Missions. The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes the representatives of all in-country USG departments and agencies. US missions to multinational organizations and alliances such as the Organization of II-2 JP 3-16 Command Relationships KEY PLAYERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE coordination among the key members of the US diplomatic mission. The Country Team works together under the Ambassador’s COM direction to identify their problems and pool their skills and resources to best serve US national interests. The Country Team has no legal standing or formal structure; it is, essentially, what the COM makes it. It is made up of the COM, the deputy COM, senior foreign service councilors assigned to the embassy, and senior representatives of USG agencies assigned to the country. If there is a SAO, its chief is also a member. When appropriate, the geographic CINC and US military area commander may send representatives to the Country Team meetings, or may choose to work through the United States Defense Representative to coordinate CINC related issues. The CINC also coordinates directly with the COM on policy and strategy issues. Through the Country Team, the COM ensures that all USG activities in the country are coordinated and in harmony with each other. Secretary of State Ambassador Diplomatic Missions Political Advisor Country Team Political Representatives Figure II-2. Key Players in the Department of State American States (OAS), NATO, and the UN include representatives of USG departments and agencies routinely engaged in activities with those organizations. • Political Advisor. The political advisor (POLAD) uses knowledge of US alliance, coalition, and regional matters • Other Political Representatives. There to assist the commander in translating are other political representatives that political objectives into military strategy. military commanders will have to deal Each geographic combatant commander with, cooperate with, or support. These is assigned a foreign service officer political representatives include special by the Department of State to act as the envoys, ambassadors-at-large, or UN POLAD. By exception, the DOS may high commissioners. assign a POLAD to component or subordinate command levels. Those not assigned a foreign service officer may 2. Command and Control of be assigned a civil service POLAD. The US Forces in Multinational POLAD coordinates with, and ensures Operations cooperation between, the primary political and military personnel (either The President retains command US or MNF as appropriate). authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively • Country Team. The Country Team is a using available resources and for planning council of the senior officers representing employment, organizing, directing, each USG agency or activity operating coordinating, controlling, and protecting in a host country. It is the informal title military forces for the accomplishment of of the in-country interagency assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent II-3 Chapter II or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Additional command and control (C2) considerations include the following. a. Operational Control. OPCON is a type of command authority. Within the US command structure, OPCON is transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. On a case by case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral PO under UN auspices under the OPCON of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall OPCON over US forces. Any large scale participation of US forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and OPCON or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions. OPCON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the AOR agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization. b. Foreign OPCON. The MNFC must be aware that many different interpretations of OPCON and tactical control (TACON) exist among alliance and coalition partners and must ensure complete understanding of the terms early in the planning of the operation. The fundamental elements of US command apply when US forces are placed under the OPCON of a foreign commander. US commanders will maintain the capability to Swedish units patrol near Sarajevo. II-4 JP 3-16 Command Relationships Large scale participation of US forces will likely be conducted under US command, or through competent regional security organizations. report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commanders. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders will refer the matters to higher US authorities. Concerns relating to legality, mission mandate, and prudence must be addressed early in the planning process. These same considerations apply to foreign forces placed under the OPCON of US MNFCs. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. US commanders must be prepared to deal with these issues as they arise during an operation. This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. In multinational operations, consensus through compromise is often essential to success. The United States will continue to work with MNFs to streamline C2 procedures and maximize effective coordination. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the President will agree to have a foreign commander exercise overall OPCON over US forces. Any large scale participation of US forces will likely be conducted under US command, or through competent regional security organizations such as NATO. c. Tactical Control. TACON is another form of command authority exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON (when so authorized) and administrative control over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. d. Support. Supporting relationships will be established among participating forces in multinational operations. The establishing authority is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted, the responsibilities of the supporting commander, and the opportunities for establishing mutual support arrangements among participating forces. US force commanders must be apprised of the opportunities, limitations, and/ or conditions under which logistic support may be provided to forces of other nations. II-5 Chapter II e. Coordinating Authority. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which C2 may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. For this reason, its use during operations should be limited. Since NGOs and PVOs are not within the chain of command, coordination is the only mechanism available for working with those agencies. f. Chain of Command. The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate. There is no intention for the conditions specified earlier in this paragraph to subvert command links. While unity of command is certainly an important criterion in any command structure, the emphasis may change in operations when coordination and consensus building become the key elements and the means to achieve unity of effort. g. Termination and Self Protection. The President has the right to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time. Additionally, US forces are authorized and obligated to take all necessary actions for self protection while participating in multinational operations. 3. Multinational Force Commander “MNFC” is a general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations. This authority could range in degree from command, to directing support relationships, to being the coordinating authority between the various nations, as discussed in paragraph 2 above. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. MNFCs unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives. Gaining consensus is an important aspect of decision making in multinational operations. Multinational flight of aircraft participating in Operation DENY FLIGHT. II-6 JP 3-16 Command Relationships 4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of t h e participating nations. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in an alliance or coalition. a. Alliances. In alliances, national political objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Generally, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus. Doctrine, standardization, and political consensus characterize alliances. However, these command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially when alliance operations may include nonalliance members. However, use of alliances for purposes other than those for which their integrated structures were designed, or in operations for which they have not had the lead time necessary to develop integrated plans and structures, may result in behavior that more closely approximates that of a coalition. b. Coalitions. Within a coalition formed to meet a specific crisis, the political views of the participants may have much greater influence over the ultimate command relationships. National pride and prestige of member nations can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Coalition missions and objectives tend to evolve over time. Likewise, force capabilities may vary over time. This variation will, in turn, affect the overall command capability to react to a changing mission. Political objectives and limitations will also change over time, further complicating the task of the MNFC. The commander should be attuned to these changes and make adjustments to the command structure and training program to mitigate negative impacts where possible. c. Organizational Structure. As in the case of unified action and joint operations, basic organizational options are area or functional orientation and single-Service or joint organization, to which are added national or multinational formations. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its forces. Its functions are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. (The US military structure to conduct multinational operations is normally the joint task force.) The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the National Support Element. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. As in the case of a joint headquarters (HQ), a multinational HQ should reflect the general composition of the MNFs as a whole. The national element will be the vehicle for execution of Title 10, US Code (USC) responsibilities for US forces. (See Figure II-3 for a notional multinational command structure.) II-7 Chapter II NOTIONAL MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT LEGITIMIZING AUTHORITY* COMBATANT COMMANDERS MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER US NATIONAL FORCE NATIONAL FORCE NATIONAL FORCE NATIONAL COMMAND COMMAND AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER BY PARTICIPATING NATIONS * EXAMPLES INCLUDE UN, ALLIANCES, TREATIES, OR COALITION AGREEMENT Figure II-3. Notional Multinational Command Structure See JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic often led by senior military officers from Support of Multinational Operations.” member nations. Effective operations within an alliance require that the senior political and military authorities be in agreement on 5. Alliance Command the type of command relationships that will Structures govern the operations of the forces. Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and See Appendix A, “Commander’s Checklist for standardized procedures. In alliance Multinational Operations,” for a discussion of operations, such structures should be used to other alliance command terminology. It may the maximum practical extent. Alliance help the MNFC and the national leaders identify command and force structures often and agree on a command relationship definition mirror the degree of alliance member that satisfies unity of effort while protecting their participation. Subordinate commands are national autonomy. II-8 JP 3-16 Command Relationships Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships within an alliance, it should be recognized that because of the political sensitivities of an actual multinational operation, a considerable “learning curve” will be experienced regarding command relationships and operating procedures. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. a. Integrated Command Structure. An alliance organized under an integrated command structure provides unity of effort in a multinational setting (see Figure II-4). A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key ingredients in an integrated alliance command are that a single commander be designated, that the staff be composed of representatives from all member nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs be integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. b. Lead Nation Command Structure • This structure exists in an alliance when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-5). A current example in NATO is the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, the makeup of whose HQ staff and subordinate commands depends largely on the lead nation. The command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. • It is also possible for a lead nation command in an alliance to be characterized by an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE ALLIANCE COMMANDER INTEGRATED STAFF ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMPONENT ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMPONENT ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMPONENT MULTINATIONAL FORCES MULTINATIONAL FORCES MULTINATIONAL FORCES Figure II-4. Alliance Integrated Command Structure II-9 Chapter II LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE LEAD NATION HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL FORCES COMMANDER US FORCES COMMANDER NATIONAL FORCES COMMANDER NATIONAL FORCES US FORCES NATIONAL FORCES Figure II-5. Lead Nation Command Structure commander to draw upon the expertise relationships usually evolve as a coalition of alliance partners in areas where the develops. Coalitions are most often lead nation may have less experience. characterized by one of three basic structures: parallel, lead nation, or a • Rotational command, a variation of lead combination of the two. In coalition nation command, allows each operations, member nations may desire to participating nation to be the lead nation retain even more control of their own national in turn. To be effective, command tour forces than is generally associated with lengths should be adjusted so that other alliance operations. nations may have the opportunity to be a. Parallel Command Structures. Under the lead nation. However, command a parallel command, no single force tours should not be so short to be operationally meaningless. Examples commander is designated (see Figure II-6). include the NATO Standing Naval Forces The coalition leadership must develop a means Atlantic and Mediterranean, which have for coordination among the participants to 12 month command tours that rotate attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination between the participants. centers (See paragraph 7b). Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, 6. Coalition Command the use of a parallel command structure should Structures be avoided if at all possible. Many coalitions are formed in rapid b. Lead Nation Command Structure. response to unforeseen crises which usually Another common command structure in a occur outside the area or scope of an alliance or when the response requires more than an coalition is the lead nation command (see alliance to handle it. The command Figure II-5). A coalition of this makeup sees II-10 JP 3-16 Command Relationships COALITION PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE (WITH COORDINATION CENTER) COALITION HEADQUARTERS WEST COALITION HEADQUARTERS EAST COORDINATION CENTER FORCES FROM COALITION NATIONS #1, #2, & #3 FORCES FROM COALITION NATIONS #4, #5, & #6 COORDINATION COMMAND OR CONTROL Figure II-6. Coalition Parallel Command Structure (With Coordination Center) all coalition members subordinating their forces to a single partner. However, nations are generally reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead nation’s interests. One means of ensuring that the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides the coalition commander with representative leadership, a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members, and facilitates the planning process. c. Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-7). 7. Control of Multinational Operations There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the control of MNFs: a liaison network and coordination centers. a. Liaison. The need for effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool between the MNFC and lower levels of different nationalities, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational operations, joint forces establish liaison early with forces of each nation, fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, and developing an increased level of teamwork. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications II-11 Chapter II COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM NATIONAL LDRS OF UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL LDRS OF FRANCE NATIONAL LDRS OF ARAB/ISLAMIC NATIONS BRITISH FORCE COMMANDER UNITED STATES FORCE COMMANDER (CINCCENT) FRENCH FORCE COMMANDER JOINT FORCE/THEATER OF OPS COMMANDER (SAUDI) F2C2 GROUND COMMANDER ARMY COMMANDER (ARCENT) MARINE COMMANDER (MARCENT) GROUND COMMANDER JOINT FORCE GROUND COMMANDER (SAUDI) JOINT FORCE AIR COMMANDER (SAUDI) AIR COMMANDER AIR FORCE COMMANDER (CENTAF) (JFACC) NAVY COMMANDER (NAVCENT) AIR COMMANDER SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES COMMANDER (SOCCENT) KEY (terms used during DESERT STORM) ARCENT CENTAF CINCCENT F2C2 JFACC MARCENT NAVCENT SOCCENT US Army Forces, US Central Command US Central Command Air Forces Commander in Chief, US Central Command friendly forces coordinating council joint force air component commander US Marine Component, US Central Command US Navy Forces, US Central Command Special Operations Component, US Central Command NATIONAL OPERATIONAL COMMAND TACTICAL CONTROL COORDINATION Figure II-7. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM systems, doctrine, procedures. and operating • Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams must be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, C4I systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or normally staffed. Personnel liaison requirements must be identified early during the planning process and staffed accordingly. Team members should be language qualified or provided interpreter support. II-12 JP 3-16 Command Relationships Understanding language and culture are key factors to successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important and influential. • Once liaison is established, liaison teams become the direct representatives of their respective commanders. Their use enhances understanding of any situation that may have been distorted by the filters of other national agencies and levels. • Special operations forces (SOF) have proven particularly effective in integrating MNFs. Their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries allows them to improve coordination, minimize misunderstanding, and save lives during MNF operations. SOF can also provide the MNFC with accurate assessments of MNF readiness, training, and other factors. Multinational operations may require interaction with a variety of agencies, both military and b. Coordination Centers. Another means nonmilitary. of controlling an MNF is the use of a friendly coordination center can be expanded to forces coordination center. US commanders include command activities. should routinely advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any coalition • When a coordination center is activated, effort, especially one that is operating under member nations provide a staff element a parallel command structure. It is a proven to the center that is comprised of action means of enhancing stability and interaction officers who are familiar with support within the coalition as capabilities develop activities such as those listed above. within the operating area. Not only can a Coalition nations should be encouraged coordination center be used for C2 purposes, to augment this staff with linguists and but variations can be used to organize and requisite communications capabilities to control a variety of functional areas, including maintain contact with their parent HQ. logistics and civil-military operations (CMO). Apart from the central coalition • Initially, a coordination center can be the coordination center mentioned above, a focal point for support issues such as number of functional coordination centers force sustainment, alert and warning, may be established within an overall host-nation support (HNS), movement combined logistics coordination or support control, and training. However, as a command for either an alliance or coalition coalition matures, the role of the operation. Activities centrally coordinated II-13 Chapter II or controlled by such centers would include movement control, centralized contracting, theater-level logistic support operations, overall medical support, and infrastructure engineering. Key to the success of such centers is the early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate control of designated activities. be clearly defined with respect to military support before commencement of operations other than war. Other agencies may be lead agent for operations other than war, with military forces providing support. In some cases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the agencies involved. (US NCA should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and US governmental agencies.) • In order to achieve the greatest unity of effort, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources, and integrated into the selected concept of operations. In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations operating within the operational area. Because many of these organizations do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy, the relationship between an MNFC and PVOs and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting. An associate or partnership may more accurately describe the relationship that exists between them. In some cases, NGOs and PVOs may provide management and direction. Typically, this relationship would occur during MOOTW. Operations of NGOs and PVOs will vary based upon the nature of the MOOTW (i.e., they may be much more heavily involved in FHA operations than peace enforcement). Communicating clearly, recognizing each other’s limitations, and building consensus and cooperation are critical stepping stones to achieving a unified effort. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing to 8. Civil-Military Coordination In many operating environments, the MNF interacts with a variety of entities requiring unified actions by the geographic combatant commander, including nonmilitary governmental agencies (like US Agency for International Development), NGOs (such as religious relief agencies), corporations, PVOs (such as the American Red Cross), and international organizations (such as the UN). These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. a. Relationships. The MNFC’s relationship with these organizations will vary depending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved. • Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and those of other nations) and supranational agencies (UN and alliance structures) will be marked by a degree of formality that may duplicate or at least resemble a supported and/or supporting command relationship. In war, nonmilitary objectives will usually be subordinated to military ones and any interagency structures should support military action. During MOOTW, nonmilitary objectives can either be superior, equal to, or subordinate to the military objectives. It is imperative that any interagency structure relationships II-14 JP 3-16 Command Relationships PVOs, NGOs, and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations. During war, the relationship with most NGOs and PVOs will be subordinated to the military tasks at hand. of understanding or terms of reference. When appropriate, heads of agencies and military commanders negotiate and co-sign plans. Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces or agencies. Also, there are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US governmental and nongovernmental agencies. A Judge Advocate should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside the Department of Defense. (Normally, the DOS will take the lead in US negotiations with supranational and other nations’ agencies.) The greatest success will be achieved if these negotiations are concluded prior to the commencement of an operation. b. Coordination Centers. MNFCs can achieve significant positive results in accomplishing their missions and shaping better conditions by finding positive ways to interact with these organizations. One means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs and PVOs when there is no command relationship is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in paragraph 7b. While the MNFC cannot always exert command influence over these entities, it is possible to operate through a process of communication, consensus, cooperation, and coordination. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During The CMOC can be useful in deconflicting and Joint Operations,” provides more detail on coordinating operations among these groups. interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved. See JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for CivilMilitary Operations.” Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Interagency Management of Complex c. Agreements. The interagency Contingency Operations,” signed 20 May, environment does not preclude establishing 1997, provides additional guidance for formal agreements between the military and interagency planning, coordinating and civilian government agencies. Such executing MOOTW, both at the USG policy agreements can take the form of memoranda level and the operational and/or field level. II-15 Chapter II Intentionally Blank II-16 JP 3-16 CHAPTER III CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS “Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. Man is the measure of all things... This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the hearts and minds of men.” Hanson W. Baldwin 1. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks The conditions that could generate a multinational operation are varied and may result from manmade causes, such as armed aggression by one nation against another, or natural disasters. Likewise, the sources for the strategic guidance in responding to such emergencies are numerous and may come from such organizations as the UN, NATO, other existing alliances or coalitions, or an individual nation. Regardless of the source of that strategic guidance, a detailed mission analysis must be accomplished and is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations. This analysis should result in a mission statement and campaign plan for the MNF as a whole and a restated mission for the US element of the force. Before assigning tasks to various elements of the MNF, a commander, with the assistance of the staff, should conduct an estimate of the situation. This will allow the MNFC to analyze, in an organized manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This analysis should include the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the MNF components. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from alliance or likely coalition participants. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines what its contribution to the operation will be. National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC should assign a specific task to the element of the MNF most capable of completing that task. If there are several elements that can complete the task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that ensures that all elements can make meaningful contributions to the desired end state. 2. Political and Military Considerations a. Capabilities. As shown in Figure III-1, military capabilities of nations differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. The MNFC must be aware of the differences in the political constraints and capabilities of the forces of various nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. The MNFC commander may be required to spend considerable time working political issues. The commander’s role as diplomat should not be underestimated. Commanders will III-1 Chapter III FACTORS AFFECTING THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS NATIONAL INTERESTS OBJECTIVES ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION TRAINING LEADER DEVELOPMENT EQUIPMENT HISTORY DEFENSE BUDGET DOMESTIC POLITICS Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. Even within their own command, political limitations and constraints on the employment of the forces will greatly influence daily operations. b. Integration. The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and employment of all assets provided toward the achievement of a common objective. This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior to the deployment of forces to the operational area. This process relies heavily upon detailed coordination between prospective forces and the MNFC. The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be a purely political decision, and the commander must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual units. It may be necessary to employ the force according to national and political considerations. c. Employment. The national interest of countries varies in most contingencies and results in differing degrees of commitment by alliance and coalition members. Those most committed will authorize the full range of employment. Other countries may limit their country’s forces to defensive or combat service support roles. III-2 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations 3. Intelligence and Information Every phase of the intelligence cycle — planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback — is substantively affected in multinational operations (see Figure III-2). In addition, the type of operations, be they war or MOOTW, imposes further unique considerations that significantly alter standard joint intelligence operations. Consequently, each coalition or alliance must develop its own intelligence procedures, utilizing available assets, that are tailored to the mission. In every case, however, the procedures developed must be responsive to the MNFC’s requirements, and the delivered intelligence products timely and accurate. The release of classified information to MNFs is governed by national disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain of command in accordance with National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations” and NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority where appropriate (e.g., combined force protection purposes). However, the senior US officer needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing and releasing of information early in the process in order to ensure that the commander’s requirements have been clearly stated and understood; that THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE DISSEMINATION AND INTEGRATION PLANNING AND DIRECTION EV UATI AL ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION MISSION O N CK Figure III-2. The Intelligence Cycle AN D F EEDBA COLLECTION PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION III-3 Chapter III Multinational operations provide unique challenges in developing intelligence procedures among the participating nations. the guidance issued is supportive of those economic, and military factors in an requirements; and that the procedures to be operational area, and the likely threat courses followed are supportable by the MNFC. of action. Each nation’s ability to gather and process intelligence, through human or a. Planning. When planning or directing technical means, varies widely. The MNF’s intelligence operations, centralized control collection manager(s) must account for this is desired but frequently unattainable. As and task resources accordingly. The manager with overall command relationships, but must approach this task with an “all-source especially in intelligence, a hybrid intelligence” mentality, gathering information organization evolves that usually has some that answers intelligence requirements from national assets (and the intelligence gathered a variety of sources and fusing it, by them) placed at the coalition’s disposal, strengthening the reliability of the overall while others are retained under the direct conclusions in the process. The process of control of individual nations. Due to the gathering information, processing covert and clandestine nature of many information, and ultimately disseminating it intelligence gathering operations, nations are to a wide spectrum of users is predicated on reluctant to share all of their sources and effective communications, both vertical and methods of obtaining intelligence. It is very lateral. The usefulness of intelligence unlikely that nations will make many of their information to the MNFC is directly intelligence resources directly available for proportional to its timeliness and accuracy, tasking by a coalition. Many nations may especially in targeting and maneuver. adopt the technique of having a national intelligence cell at the MNF HQ through b. Communications and Processing which tasking and/or support will flow to and/ Architectures. Due to the perishable nature or from the nation and the MNF HQ. The of pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is basis of a collection strategy is formed by imperative that a system be devised for and weaving the intelligence requirements with by the MNF members that is capable of available assets, superimposed upon the transmitting the most important intelligence coalition’s intelligence estimate of the existing rapidly to units. Frequently this system relies geographical, political, social, cultural, on the distribution of standardized equipment III-4 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations by one country’s forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition liaison officers at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant intelligence communications channels to their parent nation, and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it. establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation in order to make this a functioning reality. Again, the MNFC’s priority intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at c. Coordination. Within alliances, it is all levels. common for intelligence procedures, practices, and standardized agreements to be See JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support established and tested prior to actual use. to Joint Operations,” for further details. Coalitions, however, are frequently ad hoc organizations, created and disbanded d. MOOTW. Operations conducted in a relatively quickly. It is therefore imperative MOOTW environment demand far greater to compensate for the lack of standardization attention from the military analyst to the through coordination. As mentioned above, political, social, economic, and cultural communications architectures are essential dynamics that exist within an AOR and/or elements to coordinate. Additional areas joint operations area (JOA) than does requiring extensive coordination include the conventional war. Such operations expand friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, IPB well past geographical and force use of space and/or space assets, geographical capability considerations. In a MOOTW location of intelligence collection assets, and environment, the centers of gravity frequently targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence are not conventional military forces or terrain. processing centers should be multinational in Sources describing these non-traditional character, serving the MNFC but also dynamics are plentiful. Within an operational recognizing intelligence that has value in area, the local media, diplomatic mission support of national missions. However, personnel (including attachés), NGOs, PVOs, Close coordination is essential when alliances are formed to ensure the smooth flow of information between nations. III-5 Chapter III and international organizations can provide significant detail which is unobtainable elsewhere. Traditional reconnaissance elements such as SOF are useful as well. However, special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that combat support soldiers have during operations in a MOOTW environment. Given that the operational area is non-traditional (i.e., non-linear), medical personnel, transportation personnel, contracting personnel, CA personnel, psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel, and soldiers performing missions involving extensive contact with the local population will provide a much better source for information than in conventional operations. These personnel will operate in the HN environment routinely and will be able to discern change within it. See JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” for further details. e. Other Considerations. It is important to consider the ramifications of labeling information about an AOR and/or JOA as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitary organizations. In many cultures, the perception of intelligence connotes information gathered on a nation’s citizenry to exploit it. Further, attempts to exchange information with many NGOs and PVOs would likely be stifled as they strive to maintain political neutrality throughout the world and would not associate in any perceived intelligence gathering attempts. Therefore, unclassified facts and/or data should be referred to as information in order to facilitate its exchange throughout the AOR and/or JOA for the purpose of fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict or providing support. f. Geospatial Information & Services (GI&S). Multinational operations require interoperable GI&S data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to work on a standard datum and ensure that all products utilize that datum. A multinational GI&S plan must coordinate all products for use by member forces, to include access approval procedures, blending their assets into a cohesive production program. See JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations,” for further details. 4. Logistics and Host-Nation Support Effective logistic support is fundamental to operational success; the MNFC must be able to logistically influence the conduct of operations. Multinational operations increase the complexity of executing logistics and reduce the degree of flexibility normally found in a national logistic support system. Although each nation is responsible for logistic support of its national forces, the execution of multinational logistics must be a collective responsibility of the nations comprising the MNF. This collective responsibility is critical and cannot be overstressed. Multinational logistics should be flexible, responsive, predictive, and should provide timely sustainment throughout the entire MNF. The multinational logistic plan should incorporate the logistic requirements and capabilities of the MNF to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. The intent is to provide the MNFC with the timely introduction and proper mix of support units and resources into the operational area. Achievement of this goal requires considerable cooperation and continuous coordination among (and between) all elements of the logistic support and operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation’s termination. III-6 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations Unloading an Air Force C-5 Galaxy in Haiti. a. Responsibility. The responsibility for providing logistic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, unless previously agreed to in accordance with alliance implementing arrangements (IAs) or coalition ISAs. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support exist in multinational operations and must be planned to complement partners’ capabilities and minimize weaknesses. To require each nation in an MNF to perform all logistic functions separately would be inefficient, expensive, and hinder the MNFC’s ability to influence operations logistically. The synergy required for successful multinational logistics is centralized control and coordination of common services and common funding for logistic services where appropriate (e.g., transportation, billeting) to reduce overall costs. automated data processing (ADP) support systems. These differences must be understood by all, harmonized where realistically possible, and accounted for during OPLAN formulation. IAs and ISAs should be clearly specified in OPLANs to ensure their use by multinational formations. Multinational logistics planning must occur simultaneously and concurrently with operation planning. Such plans should be developed in consonance with prospective participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The challenge of planning is in simultaneously supporting an ongoing operation while developing the support organization, bilateral and multilateral agreements and associated C2 mechanisms to achieve unity of effort. To the extent that concurrent planning occurs, many of these challenges may be avoided or minimized. c. Authority. MNFCs may have directive See JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic logistic authority if coordinated in plan Support of Multinational Operations.” development or when consent is provided by b. Differences. Among the participating participating national commands. Requests nations, there will be differences in logistics will be made to national commanders to doctrine, organizational capabilities, SOPs (to assume organizational missions in support of include reporting formats), terminology and MNFs. In some cases, the MNFC may definitions, methods for computing exercise control over the various national requirements, organizational policies, and logistic units. In other cases, the MNFC may III-7 Chapter III have only coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend upon existing agreements and ad hoc arrangements negotiated with participating nations and/or as identified in the campaign plan and/or OPLAN. The MNFC may delegate to component commanders (land, maritime, air) only the level of coordinating authority granted by the individual nations. The MNFC may establish a logistic coordination or control center headed by a senior logistic coordinator to control or coordinate common or theater-level logistic support within the operational area. Some of the major support issues that must be resolved by the MNFC include the following. • Ensuring that the mutual logistic support for US forces is in accordance with existing legal authorities. The Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, ACSA authority, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (as amended), the Fly America Act, and the Cargo Preference Acts all have a bearing on the degree of support that the United States can provide to or receive from other nations. In addition, specific legislative language contained in DOD authorization or appropriation acts may limit US ability to receive and/or provide logistic support from and/or to allies. • Identification of common supplies and services that might be provided by one nation or a multinational organization. • Establishing if, when, and how an MNFC will be provided authority over national logistic assets (to include authority for redistribution of national supplies under emergency conditions). This requires a national decision by participating nations. • Availability and use of common and/or up-front funding for establishing costeffective contracts, establishing multinational headquarters, and general and/or common support. • Development of policies and procedures to account and reimburse for logistic services and supplies exchanged between the United States and other nations under the ACSA authority. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — 1965 “The intervention [in the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965], was not a mission of conquest, but rather an effort to safeguard the lives of US and other nationals and to restore order in the country without taking sides in the dispute... In addition to providing security of US property and evacuating American citizens... [the] US military forces conducted urban warfare operations...participated in civil affairs and psychological warfare programs, supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement, and provided troops for the Inter-American Peace Force...The establishment of the IAPF was a historic first. [It] demonstrated that multinational forces can work together effectively...It also reaffirmed the requirement for joint doctrine..., [however several] problems were encountered...the lack of adequate strategic communications... Pertinent intelligence and availability of maps... [lack of] joint public affairs organization representing the Department of Defense, the State Department and other... agencies.” SOURCE: James B. Motley III-8 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations • Establishment of responsibility and an MNF commander will have the authority release procedures for national assets. to conclude HNS arrangements or whether prior national approval is required. • Development of the means to maintain national asset accountability (from the e. Planning. Often little planning time national sustaining base to the front line is available prior to a multinational units). operation. However, to the extent that planning time is available, logistic support • E n s u r i n g c o m p a t i b i l i t y a n d planning should be conducted concurrently interoperability of communications with operational planning. Since such networks to include ADP interfaces planning is critical, it will be frequently between national logistic organizations necessary to share partial or incomplete of the MNF and national support systems, planning data (or data not fully approved) with and how to integrate information prospective partners. Staffs should evaluate classification requirements. the level of standardization and interoperability among participating • Prioritization, C2, allocation, and use of nations and, where situations permit, come common infrastructure capabilities (e.g., to agreement on which nations will be ports, airfields, roads) to support military responsible for providing logistic support and civil operations. functions for the MNF, the task organization of the logistic units to support • Identification and distribution of those the MNF, and the procedures and methods ISAs (STANAGs, QSTAGSs) that can for how the support will be provided. At facilitate the provision of multinational the MNF HQ, the focus should be on logistic support. measuring the requirements of executing the campaign plan, providing advance estimates d. Civilians and Contractors. The use of these requirements to national units, and of civilian contractors and HNS agencies often ensuring that proper controls are in place to increases the logistic capability of the MNF. deconflict and permit movement and Non-uniformed support agencies may be processing. Frequently, planning HQ, integrated into the logistic structure of the especially logistic planning HQ, are staffed MNF to ensure their most effective with personnel temporarily assigned. To employment and use. Commanders should facilitate early planning, personnel must be be prepared to assume all essential logistic- identified and made available in a timely related responsibilities in the event this manner. There are three generally accepted support is curtailed or terminated. The methods of executing cooperative logistics in CMOC, as well as logistic coordination an MNF. These can be used singularly or in centers, may be useful in coordinating with combination. Regardless of the mutual HN infrastructure. Consideration should be support method(s) used, it is imperative that given to the centralization of HNS expertise national decisions and commitments to lead (legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and or participate in such arrangements be administrative) to ensure that the force’s total provided early during the planning cycle. requirements are known and to prevent Assuming a lead nation or role specialization competition between partners. Allocation of nation status does not grant the US forces any this support is based on command priorities additional legal authority to provide support which best support the operational objectives. to coalition partners on a non-reimbursable Additionally, nations must agree on whether basis. III-9 Chapter III • In the lead nation concept, a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more logistic functions within a specified geographic area in support of the MNF. • In a role specialization agreement, a nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNF. • Using pooled assets and resources, two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the MNF. The role specialist nation (RSN) mission in NATO can be implemented for a NATO operation that includes member and nonmember nations. Specific planning considerations should address the US military role as the RSN for a specific logistic commodity and the on-demand support level available when another nation provides a specified commodity as the RSN. During the planning process, components and defense agencies should prepare, develop, and disseminate specific policies and procedures for potential RSN applications in NATO and other multinational operations. US participation as an RSN often is constrained by legal authorities. This factor must be considered early in the planning process so that any required agreements or arrangements can be put in place prior to the operation. f. Available HNS Infrastructure. Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is critical to understanding force sustainability. MNF logistic planners should evaluate what facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel, and medical support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition forces. First, assess the ability of the HN to receive US and/or MNF personnel and equipment (e.g., ports and airfields). Second, determine the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater. Third, evaluate availability of logistic support. The impact of obtaining HNS upon the host country’s national economy must also be considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must be recognized and addressed during the planning process. In addition, specific technical agreements in many areas (e.g., environmental clean-up, levying of customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit and disposal) must be developed to augment status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) that may have been concluded with HNs. g. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Authority. Normally, USG acquisitions must be accomplished by means of a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract. Transfers of defense goods and services to foreign nations must generally be done through a foreign military sales (FMS) case. Often, in coalition operations, these methods may prove to be cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient. Under ACSA authority (10 USC 2341 and following) the Secretary of Defense can enter into agreements for the acquisition of or crossservicing of logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-inkind, or exchange for equal value basis. These agreements can be with eligible nations and international organizations of which the United States is a member. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement which is generally supplemented by an IA. The IA contains points of contact and specific details of the transaction and payment procedures and under which orders for logistic support supplies and services are placed. Neither party is obligated until the order is accepted. • Logistic support, supplies, and services is defined as food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations III-10 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations An Acquisition and Cross-Servicing agreement would provide for the logistic requirements needed to support multinational operations. support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. • Items that may not be acquired or transferred under the ACSA authority include weapons systems, major end items of equipment (except for temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other items of military equipment not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to 22 USC 2778(a)(1), guided missiles, naval mines and torpedoes, nuclear ammunition, cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components, chaff and chaff dispensers, guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition, and chemical ammunition (other than riot control agents (RCA)). h. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Title 22 US Code. The AECA FMS agreement negotiated between the United States and an allied and/or coalition country or organization is the preferred agreement for operations other than short-term emergent emergency operations. The primary instruments are: the letter of request from the country or organization requesting logistic support; and the letter of offer and letter of acceptance (LOA) from the United States. Within this agreement, the basic ordering agreement (BOA) may be included to establish an account for ordering a wide range of undefined materiel requirements, unknown at the signing of the LOA. A BOA is particularly useful for food, fuel, medical, ammunition, unscheduled repairs, and repair parts. Using this agreement, the full range of logistic support from routine through emergency requirements may be provided, including weapon systems and major end items if necessary. The LOA provides a formal contractual agreement and includes the use of established logistic systems in the FMS community. Many of the countries interface directly with US logistic systems. US logistic systems, procedures, and methods of financial accounting are institutionalized and documented by DOD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” to support eligible country’s armed forces today. For the purposes of training and standardization the emergency operation’s systems should be the same as those used for the routine peacetime III-11 Chapter III operations. Many countries are already construction in immediate support of trained and use the familiar FMS process. deployed units, either at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating • The two basic elements are a signed locations. Properly used, contracting is an LOA and funded accounts to support the effective force multiplier for deployed forces country’s requirements. The full range during a contingency. It can serve to reduce of materiel, supplies and services, dependence on the continental United Statesincluding weapon systems and major end based logistic system. Contracting can affect items, may be provided under the AECA. force structure and personnel ceiling requirements, allow more nations to • Benefits of the AECA and/or FMS participate, save funds, and enhance system include the following. infrastructure recovery. Satisfying requirements for supplies and services by local •• Use of standard logistic systems. contracting can improve response time and reduce logistic footprints. Contracting can •• Complete financial accountability. augment the existing logistic support capability, providing an additional source for •• Control of materiel in accordance with critically required supplies and services. the country and/or organization’s assigned force activity designator and the However, as indicated for HNS, the priority assigned individual requests. contractor resources available in theater are to be prioritized by the MNFC or the •• Handling of “non-standard” item designated logistic coordinator. In doing so, requisitions. Existing FMS logistic consideration must be given to the impact of systems are set up to support these local contracting upon the HN’s economy and requirements. infrastructure. These economic effects may influence attainment of the eventual end state •• May prevent an excessive drawdown within the operational area and timing of on US forces’ logistic support and/or unit withdrawal. External contractors may be organic supplies and equipment. used; however, their operation in theater must be addressed in a SOFA or other international •• Transportation of materiel to the agreement, where applicable, for such issues operational area, particularly as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees. ammunition, may be provided utilizing the country’s assets and handling system, • Contingency contracting will not replace thereby reducing the transportation HNS or the existing supply systems requirements on the Defense where these systems are available or Transportation System during a crisis operational. However, deployments situation. most likely to require employment of contingency contracting are those i. Contingency Contracting. Contracting occurring in areas of the world where is another essential tool of the logistician in there are few, if any, HNS agreements. support of the mission, and a significant enhancement to the reception, staging, onward • Most recent deployments of US forces movement, and integration of combat forces have been joint operations supporting into the operational area. Contingency contingencies in remote areas of the contracting is the process of contracting for world. The trend of world events locally available supplies, services, and suggests that such operations will III-12 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations become more probable in the future. Whether for FHA, disaster relief, peacekeeping, NEO, war, or other contingencies, such operations may require the creation of joint contracting elements, staffed by personnel from all Services operating in the theater. Services will coordinate and cooperate in development of contingency contracting procedures to enhance the ability of contracting to be an effective force multiplier. Joint contracting elements will also preclude inter-Service competition for local supplies and services and more effectively use scarce personnel resources during a contingency. • Contingency contracting warrants special treatment because of the complex nature of the acquisition process and the need to support operational forces. This necessitates that the combatant commanders formulate comprehensive implementation plans that will support this essential element of the logistic chain. This will ensure that proper legal methods are employed in the procurement of supplies and services and that military forces receive the required logistic resources to perform their mission. 5. Language, Culture, and Sovereignty a. Language. Differing languages within an MNF can present a real challenge to unity of effort. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Language content is conveyed by word choice, mannerisms, and other means, and information loss, miscommunications, and misunderstandings can have a negative effect on operations. The time required to receive information, process it, develop operational plans from it, translate the plans, and distribute them to multinational partners can adversely impact the speed and tempo of operations. Planners may lessen these difficulties by early identification of translator support and the use of multilingual liaison personnel. Contractor support for interpreters and translators should be addressed during the planning phase. HN resources may be very important and may serve an especially important role if available during the initial An Estonian soldier mans a checkpoint during a multinational exercise. III-13 Chapter III stages of the deployment. In addition, the importance of staffing HQ with qualified liaison personnel cannot be minimized. This will usually place additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical to the success of any multinational mission. b. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation. c. Linguists and Area Experts. To assist with cultural and language challenges, the JFC employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service components or from other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage. The use of such abilities should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications. Appropriate security measures should be taken to ensure that contracted linguists or area experts recruited to assist the commander are not able to jeopardize the operation through espionage or subversion. d. Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issues will be most difficult for the MNFC to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by host country nations. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish th e mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged and often the MNFC (and subordinates) must act as “diplomats” as well as “warriors.” MNFCs should address all sovereignty issues to ensure that operations are not adversely affected. MNFCs should seek advice on sovereignty issues from the DOS, Country Teams, and the Ambassador of the HN. Examples include: collecting and sharing information, basing, overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, location and access, railheads, border crossings, and operations in the territorial sea. The commander may create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. However, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed SOFAs. In many cases SAOs, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations resident in the HN will have detailed knowledge and could establish good will in these areas which may be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or establishing a congenial relationship in the HN. 6. Health Service Support Multinational delivery of health services presents numerous challenges. How health services are delivered in the field may be a factor in a particular nation’s decision to participate. Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination and planning. Exchange of blood and blood products between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated as early as possible. Blood audit trails must be established for each nation providing blood during an operation. Effective C2 of medical operations is critical to mission success. An MNF surgeon may be appointed for each III-14 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations Health services for multinational operations could pose many challenges for the multinational force commander. participating command and task force. A medical coordination center staffed with representatives from participating nations should be established. Such a center will facilitate coordination of health service support (HSS) initiatives, regionalization, standardization and interoperability, review of plans, and integration with overall operation. This coordination center will coordinate the evacuation of casualties to non-national medical facilities. Often, casualties from one nation will use the medical facilities of another nation. Casualty evacuation and use of nonnational medical facilities must be closely coordinated. The MNFCs need to assess MNF HSS requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively, and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. The senior US commander should be apprised of legal limitations concerning the use of non-US medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by US forces. The commander should also be apprised of limitations of providing medical care or supplies to non-US forces as well as the legal requirement to treat wounded enemy prisoners of war. Mutual medical support must be in accordance with existing legal authorities in the same manner as logistic and HNS. Coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or ACSA authority must be addressed during the multinational planning process. Theater medical evacuation requires careful planning and an ACSA. 7. Termination and Transition Mission analysis, an identifiable end state, and the political policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements. The commander determines the objectives that will achieve the desired end state. Objectives and conditions must be clearly defined, measurable, and attainable. In the absence of other termination criteria, nations may select an arbitrary date for withdrawal of their forces. Transferring control of an operation from or to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations requires detailed planning and execution. This is even more important during mission start-up. Planning for such transfers should occur as part of operation planning. Disposal of equipment, a task that may become a political issue, must be carefully planned. III-15 Chapter III NOTE: Environmental issues must be conduct operations with their respective HQs. addressed during initial planning. Consideration should also be given to possible degradation of communications due to the extended distances over which the MNF must 8. Communications operate and the effects of enemy exploitation Communications are fundamental to of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Planning successful multinational operations. for communications support must also include Planning considerations include frequency provisions which allow execution of required management, equipment compatibility, communications under adverse conditions. procedural compatibility, cryptographic Additionally, US law requires prior and information security, identification international and implementing agreements friend or foe, and data-link protocols. defining quid pro quo payments for allied use MNFCs should anticipate that some forces of the Defense Information Systems Network from MNF member nations will have direct and military satellite communications assets. and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their 9. Force Protection respective national political leaderships. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, a. Force protection are actions taken to but it can also be a source of frustration as prevent or mitigate hostile actions against leaderships external to the operational area DOD resources (to include family members), may be issuing guidance directly to their facilities, and critical information. These deployed national forces. Many measures, both offensive and defensive, communications issues can be resolved conserve the force’s fighting potential so that through equipment exchange and liaison it can be applied at the decisive time and teams. Communications requirements vary place. Force protection does not include with the mission, size, composition, actions to defeat the enemy or protect against geography, and location of the MNF. accidents, weather, and disease. Force Interoperability is often constrained by the protection planning considerations during least technologically proficient participant. multinational operations are similar to USEffective communications support must be only operations. There are, however, certain established which allows control over diverse, facets about force protection in a widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, and multinational environment that must be space elements. Access to both military and considered. commercial satellites should be an early planning requirement to support widely See JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” dispersed elements. The MNFC should for planning force protection. address the need for integrated b. Commanders must understand that communications among all participating other nations do not necessarily execute force forces early in the planning phase of the operation. MNF planning and technical protection in the same way as the US Military. communications systems control centers Some nation’s armed forces may or may not should be established as soon as possible to be willing or able to assume more risk than coordinate all communications and US forces. The Unified Command Plan information operations. Liaison officer designates all force protection responsibilities (LNO) teams should be sent to other MNF to the geographic combatant commander for HQs to facilitate integration of operations. all service members within their AOR. US These LNO teams should deploy with commanders, whether under US control or sufficient communications equipment to under a command relationship to a III-16 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations multinational or coalition force, must 10. International Law and the continuously assess threats and Law of War vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate force protection countermeasures US forces will comply with applicable US in accordance with published combatant and international law during the conduct of commander directives. all military operations. US forces will apply the law of war during all armed conflicts, c. Special consideration must be given to however such conflicts are characterized, and personnel who must interact with local with the principles and spirit of the law of populations, such as civil affairs, PSYOP, and war during all operations. US commanders local contract liaison. Separate assessments will ensure that the DOD Law of War Program should be conducted to determine the is implemented in accordance with DOD and appropriate protection requirement in order Service directives, and that adequate to facilitate the accomplishment of their tasks. procedures are in place to ensure that all violations of the law of war are promptly d. Throughout multinational operations, reported and thoroughly investigated in risk management should be used to reduce accordance with those directives. Legal or offset risk by systematically identifying, advisors should be immediately available at assessing, and controlling risk. The risk all appropriate levels of command and during management process helps commanders all stages of operation planning and execution make decisions that weigh risk against to provide advice concerning law of war mission accomplishment. compliance. e. Another significant problem facing the multinational force is the potential for fratricide. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference can increase this risk. Multinational force support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing and reducing the fratricide risk to the multinational force by recommending operational coordination measures or technological solutions. f. Finally, commanders must understand that US forces, as part of a multinational force, can potentially be a greater target. Because of the US policy of engagement, the US military often assumes the leadership role in multinational operations. As a result of US global leadership, adversaries may view attacks against American Service members as a higher payoff target. As such, commanders must continue security programs to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment in all locations and situations. a. Treatment of Combatants. Combatants are those persons who have the right under international law to participate directly in armed conflict and include all members of the regularly organized armed forces of a party to the conflict (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defense personnel, and members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defense status). Irregular forces who are under responsible command, carry their arms openly, distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, are also considered combatants. Although combatants are lawful targets, the right of US forces to injure combatants is limited by the law of war. b. Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs). Combatants that have surrendered or otherwise fallen into enemy hands are entitled to POW status and are protected by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. Generally, they must be treated humanely and protected against violence, intimidation, III-17 Chapter III accomplishment, US forces may detain personnel during multinational operations when the United States is not a party to an armed conflict. Although not POWs, such detainees will be accorded the minimum protections thereof and shall be treated humanely under all circumstances until c. Treatment of Noncombatants. released or turned over to appropriate HN or Noncombatants are those individuals who do international authorities. not form a part of the armed forces and who otherwise refrain from the commission of 11. The Law of the Sea hostile acts. Noncombatants also include those members of the armed forces who enjoy All waters seaward of the territorial sea special protected status, such as medical (contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, personnel and chaplains, or who have been and high seas) are international waters in rendered incapable of combat by wounds, which the high seas freedoms of navigation sickness, shipwreck, or capture. The law of and overflight are preserved to the war prohibits making noncombatant persons international community. The high seas the object of intentional attack and requires include all parts of the ocean seaward of the that they be safeguarded against injury not exclusive economic zone. The high seas are incidental to military operations directed open to all States, and no State may validly against military objectives. Noncombatants purport to subject any part of the high seas to who take a direct part in hostilities by taking its sovereignty. Nations may have up arms or otherwise trying to kill, injure, interpretations of some aspects of the law of capture, or impede the mission the sea which differ subtly or materially from accomplishment of US and/or MNF those of other partners, particularly as they personnel or destroy US and/or MNF property may relate to rights of innocent passage, lose their immunity and may be attacked. transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage, or recognition or nonrecognition of d. Treatment of Other Detainees. For certain excessive maritime claims of third reasons of force protection or mission states. The maritime component commander insult, and public curiosity. Should a question arise regarding a captive’s entitlement to POW status, that individual should be accorded POW treatment until a competent tribunal determines the status to which that individual is properly entitled. Under international law, the high seas are open to all States, and high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply to all waters seaward of the territorial sea. III-18 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations MNFCs seek to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and sharing resources, such as the loan of equipment. (MCC) must be cognizant of national differences in interpretation and the impact that may have on operations. Commanders of national forces have a particular responsibility to apprise the MCC of any national interpretations that may be pertinent. Legal support is critical for multinational operations, particularly when involved in an HN, including its territorial waters and airspace. Participating nations should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to ensure that there is a comprehensive understanding of any national differences governing operations at sea or differences in national positions with respect to the maritime claims of nations in a theater of operations. 12. Rules of Engagement Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time consuming process and should be addressed early in the planning process. An area of particular concern in multinational ROE is clarifying to what extent RCAs are authorized for use. Even though the participants may have similar 13. Doctrine, Training, and political mandates, ROE may differ among Resources the nations represented. In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may Some nations possess doctrine and training lack the authority to speak on behalf of their programs with a full treatment of strategic, nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable. The commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. In some cases, MNFCs can use the differences in national policies to their advantage. US forces assigned OPCON to an MNF will follow the ROE of the MNF unless otherwise directed by the NCA. US forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a foreign MNFC only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that MNF are consistent with US policy guidance on individual and unit self-defense as contained in the standing rules of engagement (SROE) (CJCSI 3121.01 CH1, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces”). SROE serve as the default ROE and are applicable at all times during multinational operations unless superseded by approved supplemental ROE. III-19 Chapter III operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs that support military forces much smaller than US forces. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations, while others concern themselves with insurgency or other forms of warfare. US joint doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the guidelines provided by the overall commander’s intent. Some nations’ forces may be unfamiliar with this approach and be uncertain about its implementation in the multinational operation. a. Doctrine. US multinational doctrine endeavors to be compatible with both US joint doctrine and MNF capabilities. Due to different levels of training, equipment, and technologies, commanders must carefully consider which units are best suited for particular missions. One example of this is the Multinational Maritime Operations manual which has been created as a doctrinal guide for coalition operations. b. Training and Resources. When the situation permits, MNFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and sharing resources consistent with agreements between alliance and coalition members, such as the loan of equipment (e.g., radios, vehicles, or weapons). Multinational exercises are key components of training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. Simulation can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces. Loans of equipment and sharing of logistic resources are either covered under the Arms Export Control Act or the NATO Mutual Support Act, and require a negotiated ACSA (see DOD Directive (DODD) 2010.9, “Mutual Logistic Support Between the United States and Government Eligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary Bodies,” Draft) or foreign military sale. Multinational exercises should include robust logistics play in order to exercise multinational logistic support mechanisms and identify possible constraints in providing or receiving logistic support with forces from other nations. 14. Media Today’s technological environment provides the media with greater access to military operations. Commanders should consider media impact during planning and execution of multinational operations. Planning should facilitate the interaction between the military and the national and international press organizations. Each nation has its own viewpoint on media freedom and access, and the MNFC should consider this during planning. Respect for the viewpoints of other nations must be demonstrated even if they are contrary to that of the United States. Simplicity should be the driving factor in planning for media support in a multinational environment. Commanders should plan for regular media access. Ground rules need to be established which are clear and maintain appropriate operations security. Media considerations will be channeled through a media coordination center at the MNFC level, staffed by representatives from participating nations. The MNFC’s media coordination center will work on an integrated basis with representative international organizations operating within the operational area. Media operations must be coordinated both within the US forces chain of command and through MNF channels. Predeployment media training for military and civilian personnel (media included) is essential. Ensure early and continuous coordination between public affairs, CA, and PSYOP so that their messages are not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the MNFC. Include public affairs and public information officers in the planning process. Develop a policy for releasing information on incidents, especially casualty reports. Policy should distinguish III-20 JP 3-16 Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations between situations where the victims are from 17. one nation or from several nations. Environmental Considerations See JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in a. Environmental considerations may be Joint Operations,” for additional details. an important factor in any joint multinational operation. These considerations include the 15. Religious Ministry Support following. Religious cultural differences of both participating nations and HNs must be identified and addressed during the planning stages to be properly recognized during execution. Religious considerations may seriously impact multinational operations. The primary responsibility for religious ministry support in multinational operations remains with the national component commanders. The MNFC may assign the most senior national component chaplain to the MNFC staff if this position is not already staffed. This will help ensure comprehensive ministry cooperation and respect for any religious sensitivities of the HN and the national components. • Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery. • Cleanup of base camps and other occupied areas to an appropriate level. • Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the operational area. • Environmental safety and health. • Hazardous material management. • Hazardous waste disposal. • Medical and infectious wastes management and disposal. • Natural and cultural resources protection. 16. Meteorology and Oceanography The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that • Noise abatement, including noise from knowledge to mission execution could aircraft operations. contribute significantly to the success of a multinational operation. The state of the • Pesticide management. weather and oceans can be a force multiplier or force detractor. Successful commanders • Resource and energy conservation use the environment to their advantage. In through pollution prevention practices. multinational operations, early planning is critical. Differences in language, techniques, • Solid waste management and disposal. data formats, and communications must be overcome prior to any operation. To ensure • Oil and hazardous substance spills that meteorological and oceanographic prevention and controls. (METOC) forces of all participating nations operate together, the MNFC may designate a senior METOC officer to coordinate METOC • Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations. support. This officer will ensure that all METOC forces operate from a coordinated planning forecast, and that all METOC b. To the extent practicable and consistent requirements are met. with mission accomplishment, commanders III-21 Chapter III should take these environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of a multinational operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be different from the normal practices of any of the member nations and obtain agreement from participating nations. Besides agreeing on common goals and objectives for the operation, commanders of participating multinational forces should reach some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure to accomplish this may result i n misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex for the operation. For a further discussion of environmental considerations refer to JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.” III-22 JP 3-16 CHAPTER IV OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS “Organizations created to fight the last war better are not going to win the next.” LTG James M. Gavin, USA (1908-1990) SECTION A. GENERAL-UNIFIED ACTION 1. General When providing alliance or coalition leadership, the geographic combatant commander should ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of the respective allies, to include land, maritime, air, special operations, information operations (IO), search and rescue, and space support operations. These operations, in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or UN operations, must all be integrated to achieve a strategic unity of effort and the strategic end state. SECTION B. LAND OPERATIONS 2. General Land operations occur across the range of military operations, during war and MOOTW. The operational aim of land forces during wartime, as an integral portion of a joint force, is to conduct military operations in support of the MNFC objectives. During MOOTW, the operational aim is to achieve the MNF end state constituting success. a. Capabilities of Land Forces (see Figure IV-1). • Operational Mobility. MNFCs can attain the degree of operational mobility necessary through the proper use of maneuver. At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which MNFCs set the terms of military operations by time and location, decline military operations, or exploit existing situations. The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity. There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority, thereby facilitating freedom of action, is one example. Concentration of forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum can be key to the MNFC’s campaign or major operation. The MNFC must consider the contribution of MNFs in attaining positional advantage. At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. Seamless integration of MNFs, capabilities, and systems enhances the MNFC’s ability to exploit positional advantage, maintain the degree of operational mobility desired, and provide an inherent level of force protection. • Interoperability. Failure to ensure interoperability presents a clear threat that all MNF participants recognize. There are material and non-material solutions to interoperability challenges. IV-1 Chapter IV CAPABILITIES OF LAND FORCES OPERATIONAL MOBILITY INTEROPERABILITY LAND VERSATILITY SUSTAINABILITY Figure IV-1. Capabilities of Land Forces Standardization enhances interoperability, but time and resources will probably preclude complete standardization. Achieving operations effectiveness in multinational land formations is an integral part of effective multinational operations. For further information, see CJCSI 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.” • Sustainability. Land forces logistic support includes, but is not limited to, manpower, medical, maintenance, supplies, storage facilities, and transportation, with emphasis on technology and common sourcing. The extent of in-theater logistic infrastructure, including medical support and corresponding capabilities, will relate to the force levels employed and the type of operation and will be subject to the limitations of geography, distances, and transportation. Sustainability activities compete for many of the same transportation assets as those needed for the movement of land forces. Logistic support can be centralized or decentralized. Centralized support is usually more cost effective, but can be inflexible and unresponsive. Decentralized support is often less efficient, but is generally more adaptive to the requirements of local commanders. The MNFC makes a determination on how to organize logistic support based on the situation. • Versatility. Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements. The MNFC must be involved in the initial tailoring of the force to meet mission requirements by rationalizing prospective force IV-2 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations OPERATIONAL MOBILITY The most serious consequence of the offensive (Western Front, 21 March 1918), from the German point of view, had been the institution of an allied unified command. Thus, despite its initial brilliant tactical success, the offensive was a strategic failure. There were three main reasons for this: (1) Lack of logistic mobility. Once a breakthrough had been made, the Germans found themselves advancing across land devastated by 4 years of war, particularly by their own “scorched earth” measures at the time of the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. They did not have the means of keeping up a flow of ammunition, food, and other supplies to their troops advancing through a veritable quagmire. (2) Lack of Strategic Mobility. The same problem prevented them from fully exploiting the gap with fast-moving mobile forces, or even from providing adequate reinforcements and replacements to the breakthrough troops. (3) Lack of mobile tactical fire support. Once the breakthrough was made, the front-line infantry quickly outran their artillery, which was unable to advance in any significant numbers through the roadless morass. Thus when the British were finally able to move reserves into the gap, the Germans lacked sufficient firepower to maintain the momentum of their drive or to deal adequately with the British fighter planes strafing them. SOURCE: R. Ernest Dupuy contributions during the planning phase. Versatility implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across the range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels as required by the MNFC. Trained leaders with versatile and maneuverable air and surface forces will enable the MNF to operate effectively during war and MOOTW. b. Land Component Commander (LCC) • To most effectively exploit the capabilities of multinational land forces, the MNFC normally designates an overall LCC. The LCC must shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. In the absence of an LCC, the MNFC must plan, direct, and control land operations. Due to the complexity and fluidity of land operations, designation of an LCC may provide the MNFC greater flexibility to conduct multinational operations. c. Geographical Relationships • The MNFC provides guidance to major subordinate commanders and component commanders using campaign plans, OPLANs, and operation orders. The MNFC assigns or attaches forces to subordinate commands, to the extent agreed to by the participating nations. Subordinate commanders plan and execute supporting operations. This ensures that activities are synchronized both internally and with other elements of the MNF. • Area of Operations. MNFCs may define an AO for land forces. The land AO will normally have forward, lateral, and rear boundaries. They do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the MNF, but are large enough for the LCC to accomplish assigned missions and protect the land forces. The size, shape, and positioning of the LCC’s AO will be established by the MNFC based on the concept of IV-3 Chapter IV operations and the LCC’s requirement to maneuver and protect the forces. d. Supported Relationships and Supporting accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within the land AO with operational area-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the MNFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the operational area, including within the LCC’s AO. In coordination with the LCC, those commanders designated by the MNFC to execute operational area-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these MNFC prioritized operations and attack targets within the LCC AO. e. Synchronizing MNF Land Operations • The LCC synchronizes joint multinational fires within the AO to assist land, maritime, air, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. These fires include both lethal and nonlethal effects. Successful joint multinational fires are enhanced by the establishment of common doctrine and procedures, seamless communications, system interoperability, and liaison. • In order to most effectively synchronize operations, the MNFC will establish supported and supporting relationships among forces. During such relationships, the supported commander must clearly articulate the vision of operations to those supporting commanders that apply forces within the supported commander’s boundaries. Supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. • The LCC is the supported commander within the AO designated by the MNFC. Within this designated AO, the LCC synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, the LCC has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of fires within the AO. Within the MNF operational area, all missions must contribute to the The LCC is responsible for the synchronization of operations within the AO. IV-4 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations • Maneuver and interdiction are two key components of MNF operations. Synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within the AO provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the LCC. Interdiction and maneuver are not separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve campaign objectives. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists land commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level. • The LCC is directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land maneuver supports that maneuver to enable the LCC to achieve the MNFCs objectives. a. Characteristics of Maritime Forces. As shown in Figure IV-2, the qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and/or military instruments in support of government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces may be used to reassure or assist allies and friends in times of distress, deter and respond to aggression, and influence unstable situations. • Readiness. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. As a matter of course, by maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services in support of peacetime operations. • Flexibility. Maritime forces have been employed in the resolution of many international crises since the end of World War II. The flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus and reconfigure and realign forces to handle a variety of contingencies by providing a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistic or administrative skills. In tasks ranging from forcible entry and air interdiction operations to NEOs, disaster relief, show of force, maritime interdiction, and FHA, maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or time of crisis. The strategic and tactical C3 capabilities of maritime forces provide for a controllable force to complement diplomatic efforts. In all cases, maritime forces provide both a perception and a potential for action ashore. • Self-Sustainment. Although the degree of self-sustainment achievable by an allied force will be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of SECTION C. MARITIME OPERATIONS 3. General Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities exercising sea control or projecting power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily Navy and Marine or naval infantry; however, they may also include maritime-focused air elements, expeditionary forces, or other government agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. IV-5 Chapter IV CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME FORCES MOBILITY READINESS MARITIME SELFSUSTAINABILIT FLEXIBILITY Figure IV-2. Characteristics of Maritime Forces units committed by the participants, maritime forces are capable of operating in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With the provision of replenishment-at-sea and on-station replacement of personnel and ships, maritime operations may be continued indefinitely. To support the sustainability of maritime forces, it may be necessary to establish multinational forward and/ or advanced logistic sites. A force logistic coordinator should be designated for the afloat maritime forces who will coordinate with the ashore multinational logistic coordinator. • Mobility. Maritime forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a sustained period, b. Waterspace Management. Waterspace respond to a crisis rapidly, and deploy management is complex even under ideal in combat with authority. Mobility circumstances in which all participants are enables maritime forces to respond from fully conversant with common operating over-the-horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces can be quickly withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly either from one end of the theater to another or from one theater to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces provides commanders with a tactical and operational advantage. In addition to being able to project power, maritime forces have been useful in supporting FHA and NEOs by meeting basic water, food, and medical support during such operations. IV-6 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations operations, Marine expeditionary operations provide the MNFC with an important capability. Land, sea, and air forces can conduct expeditionary operations, but Marine Corps forces are typically the most accomplished practitioners of expeditionary operations. Flexible and responsive, Marine Corps forces can make a valuable contribution to any MNF. Specially trained and equipped for multipurpose combined arms expeditionary operations, Marines combine the capabilities of land, sea, and air forces. Marines are most effective when organized to operate in combined arms teams as a Marine air-ground task force. Marine operational effectiveness is significantly diminished if Marine combined arms forces are divided among land and air component commanders. SECTION D. AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS 4. Air Operations The mobility of maritime forces is less constrained by geographic boundaries than air and ground forces. doctrine and procedures. In multinational operations, designation of an MCC may greatly assist the MNFC in coordinating and effectively exploiting multinational maritime forces. Additionally, without a formalized process for preventing mutual interference among undersea, surface, and air activities, the MNFC (or the MCC) will have to exercise precise judgment in assigning tasks to submarine forces. Geographic isolation may be the only practicable method of avoiding fratricide. The commander must get early agreement among the participating nations during the planning phase that there will be a single submarine operating authority; this will normally be provided by the nation with the most experience and best facilities for performing this service. c. Expeditionary Operations. Often conducted in connection with maritime The purpose of multinational air operations is to gain and maintain control and exploit the use of the air to achieve the MNFC’s objectives. Multinational air operations range from complex, wartime air operations to FHA. Air forces provide the MNFC with the capability to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical effects simultaneously throughout the full depth and breadth of the battlespace. In order to achieve unity of air effort, C2 is normally exercised from the highest practicable level by a designated air commander. Centralized control of air forces optimizes the use of airpower and maximizes the probability of achieving established MNFC objectives (see Figure IV-3). a. Characteristics of Air Forces • Flexibility and Versatility. Air forces can operate free from obstacles and barriers. In addition, many air elements IV-7 Chapter IV KEY ASPECTS OF AIR OPERATIONS CENTRALIZED CONTROL AIR DEFENSE AIR UNITY OF EFFORT AIRSPACE CONTROL Figure IV-3. Key Aspects of Air Operations can be adapted to more than one mission, which provides to the MNFC a wide range of flexibility and versatility needed to successfully accomplish the assigned tasks. • Inherently Strategic. The capability of air power to strike at the heart of the adversary enables MNFCs to accomplish multinational and theater strategic-level objectives. Airpower is suitable for strategic, diplomatic, and humanitarian purposes. • Suitable for Simultaneous Operations. Airpower can be employed across the range of military operations to simultaneously conduct symmetric and asymmetric operations and attack a broad spectrum of targets. • Persistent. While the intention of most modern air operations is to attain objectives through swift, simultaneous and decisive action, there may be occasions in which goals may not be attained quickly. Air operations allow air assets to visit and revisit targets over extended periods of time. b. Air Component Commander (ACC). To most effectively exploit the capabilities of multinational air power, the MNFC normally designates an overall ACC. When an ACC is not designated, the MNFC may plan, direct, and control air operations. The ACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, and controlling air missions to meet the MNFC’s objectives. In multinational operations, the authority and command relationships of the ACC are established by the MNFC. If designated, the ACC typically exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities and forces made available for tasking, with the exception of strategic air mobility forces, which will remain under the OPCON of Commander in Chief, United States Transportation IV-8 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations Command. In some instances, the MNFC multinational air operations should resemble may decide that direct support is a more those for joint air operations. appropriate command authority for certain capabilities and/or forces. See JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,” for details on the air c. Air Operations Planning. An integral planning process. part of the MNFC’s planning efforts is the concept of air operations. The ACC is d. Airspace Control. The primary responsible for air operations planning, and purpose of airspace control is to promote safe, develops the concept for air operations that effective use of airspace with minimal restraint describes how the multinational assets made imposed on the users. International available are envisioned to be employed in agreements, enemy and friendly force support of the MNFC’s overall objectives. structures, deployments and resupply Since the purpose of developing this concept operations, commanders’ concepts and is to achieve unity of effort in air operations, operations, and operating environments such the staff assigned the responsibility to develop as foreign continents, the high seas, and the plan should include appropriate amphibious objective areas will necessitate representation from all nations and Services different specific arrangements for airspace providing resources to the plan. This ensures control. adequate consideration and understanding of multinational weapon systems and force • Responsibility. The responsibility for capabilities. Air planning should also include airspace control rests with the MNFC, the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This who normally designates an airspace is especially important for the coordination control authority (ACA) to coordinate the of tactical air operations with logistic airspace control activities for operations, especially the air movement of multinational operations. The broad supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance responsibilities of the ACA include from aerial ports. In the event that no coordinating and integrating the use of established multinational guidance is the airspace control area. Subject to the available, planning considerations for authority and approval of the MNFC, Multinational air operations range from complex to routine. IV-9 Chapter IV the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among nations’ forces. The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the MNFC, integrates the MNF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply assumption of OPCON over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement shall be referred to the MNFC for resolution. If the ACC is not assigned duties of the ACA, then the ACA and staff would normally be collocated with the ACC staff. The responsibilities of ACA and ACC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. • Requirements. The system used for airspace control must integrate all airspace users and be flexible and responsive to the changing requirements of the component commanders. This system enhances the MNFC’s ability to employ forces. It is central to the concept of air operations and it should promote operational effectiveness while reducing the risk of fratricide. e. Air Defense. The successful conduct of air defense operations requires the integrated operation of available multinational air defense systems. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC may designate an area air defense commander (AADC) to ensure an integrated defensive effort by MNFs. The responsibilities of the ACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the MNFC decides not to assign the ACC, AADC, or ACA as on individual, then close coordination between all three positions is essential. 5. Space Operations Space forces provide a means to exploit and, if required, control space to assist in the successful execution of multinational operations. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. As a point of contact for military space operations, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) enables commands to have access to space capabilities and systems. USSPACECOM can deploy space support teams to assist in providing the necessary space-related capabilities. a. Space Control Operations. Space control operations are conducted to gain and maintain space superiority. They ensure that friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. To accomplish this, space forces must survey space, protect US ability to use space, prevent adversaries from interfering with that use, and negate the ability for adversaries to exploit their space forces. b. Force Enhancement Operations. Force enhancement operations consist of those operations conducted from space with the objective of enabling or supporting terrestrial forces. Navigation, communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing help reduce uncertainty and friction at all three levels of war. c. Space Support Operations. Space support operations are carried out by terrestrial elements of military space forces to sustain, surge, and reconstitute elements of a military space system or capability. These activities deploy, sustain, or augment on-orbit spacecraft, direct missions, and support other IV-10 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations government or civil organizations. Space support involves spacelift and satellite operations. d. Space Support to MNF. Allied or coalition forces will have many of the same requirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is controlled according to intelligence guidelines. Multi-spectral imagery products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is global positioning system navigation support. Of special importance is providing warning and defense against attack from theater ballistic missiles. USSPACECOM is responsible for assisting in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called “shared early warning.” US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CAPABILITIES Direct Action Special Reconnaissance Foreign Internal Defense Unconventional Warfare Combatting Terrorism Psychological Operations Civil Affairs Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Information Operations Figure IV-4. US Special Operations Command Capabilities the FID mission. SOF are trained to provide liaison to multinational surface and air units taking advantage of their language and 6. General cultural capabilities. SOF can provide training to overcome existing shortfalls identified All considerations associated with the during the assessment. conduct of unilateral special operations are applicable to multinational operations. SOF See JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special provides the MNF with a range of specialized Operations,” for details. military responses that lessen political b. Psychological Operations Support. liability or risk of escalation (Figure IV-4). PSYOP should be incorporated into all The establishment of a combined joint special operations task force offers the MNFC a C2 multinational operations. The MNFC must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless element for US or combined SOF. of national origin, are coordinated. PSYOP a. SOF can provide specific assistance in must begin early, preferably before the area of assessment, liaison, and training deployment, to prepare a population for the of non-US military forces operating with the arrival of MNFs and develop communication US force. SOF may deploy teams ahead of channels that can be used from day one of the the multinational operations to evaluate operation. PSYOP provides the commander capability of non-US units and identify with a controlled mechanism to communicate training necessary to integrate them into the with all elements of a population: civilians, overall plan. This capability is enhanced by military, or belligerent factions. PSYOP routine interaction of SOF with non-US communicates policy, provides information, military units as a regular function, such as and can persuade groups to cooperate with SECTION E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IV-11 Chapter IV MNFs. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US PSYOP will normally be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNF chain of command. See JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” for further information. enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander’s mission. As with so many other areas, CMO must be coordinated to accomplish the MNFC’s mission. The activities of multinational CA resources should be prioritized through the MNF’s CMO plan to maximize the benefit of these resources. CMO encompasses any impact of the civilian populace on military operations. Commanders should establish this liaison with civil authorities, local populace, NGOs, and PVOs. This will assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, if directed, to these organizations upon mission completion. One means by which the commander can accomplish this interface is through a CMOC. CA personnel can provide CMO support by helping to staff the CMOC and conduct liaison with the local populace. CA personnel are routinely trained in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team into which functional specialties are integrated. c. Civil Affairs Support. CA provides a bridge between the US military and the HN military and civilian authorities in support of military objectives of the operation. CA units can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations. Planners coordinating CA support must factor in the fact that the majority of CA units are in the Reserve Component. The interface between the force commander (multinational or US), local authorities and civilian populace in the operational area is called CMO. CMO is a See JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civilgeneric term used to denote the decisive and Military Operations,” for further timely application of military capabilities to information. SOF may conduct multinational operations independent of or in support of other components. IV-12 JP 3-16 Operational Considerations SECTION F. GENERAL 7. Information Operations The Joint Staff will coordinate US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational operations in a specific theater are the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. a. The Multinational IO Cell • When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners and subject matter experts from the MNF. All MNF members should be represented in the IO cell in positions to contribute, when possible, to each of the elements of IO. IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of the MNF with the goal of using all the available IO resources. Direct representation ensures that multinational IO assets are efficiently used and that the multinational IO plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the multinational operation. See JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.” more difficult because of complex security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers. • How to plan multinational IO is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level with detailed planning at the individual element level would give multinational IO planning the most consistency with US IO planning procedures. • The multinational IO plan should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy. c. Multinational Information Assurance. The appropriate US geographic combatant commander should issue clearly stated guidelines for the release of classified US information to the MNF, based on existing policy directives and any applicable approved exceptions to national disclosure policy. These guidelines should be issued to US participants only and should be specific enough to allow implementation down to the tactical level. The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent IO in support of multinational objectives. • In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy to achieve MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a See CJCSI 6510.01A, “Defensive multinational IO cell. If this is not Information Operations Implementation.” acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using IO as a 8. Search and Rescue part of military strategy within the joint The MNFC must make a careful force to support MNF objectives. assessment of each member’s search and b. Multinational IO Planning. Planning rescue (SAR) capability and procedures. IO to support multinational operations is Normally each nation and/or component is IV-13 Chapter IV Each multinational partner brings unique SAR capabilities. responsible for conducting its own SAR missions. However, not all participants may possess this capability, so the MNFC may have to establish an organization and procedures to provide this service to all participants. The commander should develop and organize a comprehensive SAR organization. A good model for this type of organization is the joint search and rescue center. See JP 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).” IV-14 JP 3-16 APPENDIX A COMMANDER’S CHECKLIST FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The checklist provided below offers the MNFC a planning tool for multinational operations. _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Has the mission been analyzed for clear and attainable objectives' How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state' How do the objectives help to ensure the desired end state' Have these objectives been translated into missions for subordinate commanders' Has the source of mission tasking been identified' If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the multinational operation, has clarification and support from the national military chain of command been requested' Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate' What process should one follow to consider and approve changes to the original mission statement' Have all US forces received the proper predeployment training' What type of predeployment training have MNFs received' Have standards regarding operational and/or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation' Have nations with deficiencies indicated method of resolution' Has adequacy in terms of mission accomplishment been assessed' Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations been assessed' Have appropriate orientation briefings from the State Department and NGOs and/or PVOs been requested' Have ROE been agreed upon' _____ _____ By military commanders' By policy makers' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-1 Appendix A _____ Do the ROE of the multinational force permit the same degree of individual selfdefense and unit self-defense as the US SROE' Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities' Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution' Have lead nations been designated where appropriate' Have strategic mobility assets been allocated' Are multinational legal representatives available to provide counsel on international law and/or legal agreements' What are the alternative courses of action to be followed by the multinational force when a national military element withdraws from the force (i.e., actions following decomposition of the force)' Do transition plans exist to move from standing start to MOOTW and/or to war or war to MOOTW' What are the courses of action to be executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of multinational forces in advance of end state achievement' Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been completed and validated' Have the non-US forces relying on US strategic mobility for deployment and/or redeployment been included in the TPFDD' Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO and/or PVO as well as contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure' Has status-of-forces been agreed to' If not, who should conduct negotiations' Who has been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs' Are forces, C4I capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity' Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force' Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the operational area been fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-2 JP 3-16 Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations value and high payoff targets' Does the plan consider these issues in a way that facilitates operations and end state' _____ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs and PVOs, to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate redundancy in operations' Are chemical weapon threats known and are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use' To what extent are RCAs authorized for use' Review plan for duplication of effort in supporting the operation. Is there an initiating directive which clearly articulates the command arrangements' Has the MNFC done a mission analysis to determine the most appropriate command authorities required from contributing nations’ political authorities to ensure that the directed mission can be accomplished' Should the necessary command authorities not be forthcoming, the MNFC should explore the following: _____ _____ _____ Feasibility of achieving unity of command and associated conditions' Feasibility of achieving unity of effort and associated conditions' Feasibility of achieving coherent federated operations wherein national forces remain under national OPCON and TACON' Assistance required from the NCA in negotiating unity of command or effort at the strategic level' Multinational command channels for the execution of military operations and national channels for reporting status and requesting support' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Have supported and supporting command relationships been established or referred to higher authority for resolution of inadequacies' Have command relationships regarding control of forces been defined' Have liaison arrangements associated with C2 of the forces been assessed' Do liaison elements on the command staff possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both national interest and multinational objectives' Have deficiencies with coalition commanders been negotiated for resolution' Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic, and office support capabilities in place' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-3 Appendix A _____ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more horizontal organization' Have 24 hour command centers been provided for if required' Have C2 arrangements been made to include the US Ambassador, the Country Team, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions' Have US as well as multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2' Is there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture' Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and maintainers to enable interaction with the commander and other multinational members' Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among same nation staff members' Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regarding communication equipment capability' Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment' Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the C4I network' Have common data bases been provided for' Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable C4I network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C4I infrastructure' Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security issues, and other planning factors been reached among all multinational components' Are compatible materials available' Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contract multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure to ADP and classified information used in daily operations' Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to that datum' Has a multinational GI&S plan been produced and disseminated which designates all GI&S products for use' Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-4 JP 3-16 Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations _____ _____ _____ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort' Has theater foreign disclosure authority been identified' Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered' Has the C4I system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate, to all participants, time-sensitive information and/or intelligence for use in targeting or rapid reaction' Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under the control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC' Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks in accordance with the MNFC’s intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinational equipment under MNF control' Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers' Has a policy and a plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information been promulgated' Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for' Does the United States have an ACSA with coalition nations' Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel' Do other US legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to coalition nations' Has the MNFC’s authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been defined and agreed to' Have reimbursement or replacement-in-kind procedures been developed and agreed to' Have contractor procedures been established to allow US participation in contracts led by non-US personnel and used by US personnel' Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force' Are there existing standardization agreements that could facilitate mutual support' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-5 Appendix A _____ Can the HN provide support and, if so, have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed' Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being complied with by all nations, Services, and units' Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support of goods and services between the United States and MNF allies and accounts for the amounts received' Has a logistic determination been made, (i.e., what countries will provide what piece of the logistics system, health services to include aeromedical evacuation and health service logistics)' Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logistic requirements' Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are there mechanisms in place to track the cost' Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission' Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations' Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance' Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets' Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures' Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations' Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training' Are medical facilities identified to support the operation' Are evacuation plans, both intra- and intertheater, in place' Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-6 JP 3-16 Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations _____ _____ _____ Has a PSYOP program(s) been developed to support the operation' Have PSYOP assets been requested' Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of PSYOP objectives, themes, programs, and products' Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander’s authority to impose them been included in the MNF plan' Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners' Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventional military options for the commander' Has a public affairs plan been promulgated that: _____ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission' States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the MNF and its mission' States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the MNF and its national components' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Is predeployment media training complete' Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations and future strategic decisions understood by all commanders' Have requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to MNFs the need for operational documentation, been arranged' Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized' Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned' End state identifies the conditions under which the multinational military operation can be terminated. Are the conditions tangible in military terms' Are they contained in the mission statement' Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander’s vision for subordinates for translation into unit objectives and sustainment of unit mission orientation' What is the exit strategy' How do US forces get out' What constitutes mission success' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-7 Appendix A _____ _____ _____ _____ What is the coalition end state criteria' What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner' Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete' What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for multinational forces' Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions' What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations' What US forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind' Has disposal of US equipment supplies been properly planned' What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure' Who will support US forces that remain behind' Have the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNF presence been identified' _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ A-8 JP 3-16 APPENDIX B A REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF US PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1900. International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. Eight nation force, led by a British general and later a German, included 2,000 US soldiers and Marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through meetings of a Council of Generals. 1918. Allied Armies in France, World War I. Some 2,000,000 Americans served alongside French and British armies under the overall coordination of a French Officer, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. A precedent was set that US soldiers should remain in large units under US command. The French and British originally argued that US soldiers should be placed in allied units as individual and small-unit replacements as soon as they arrived in theater, a concept successfully vetoed by the senior US commander, General John J. Pershing. 1918. Allied Intervention in Russia, Vicinity of Murmansk in the Far North. Three US battalions joined British, Canadian, Italian, Finnish, and Serbian units under command of a British general at the end of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution. Contemporaneous US military activities in Siberia and the Far East were not formally integrated with allies, due to disagreement on political goals. 1948. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. The longest-lived UN peace observing mission, continuing today. The United States has contributed various numbers of military observers and support personnel through time, with an early peak strength of 327—137 officers of all Services and 190 enlisted men. Some 17 nations have participated at various times and successive commanders have come from Sweden, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Norway, Finland, Ireland, and Ghana. Many precedents, agreements, and laws have derived from this experience. 1949. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. One of 14 nations participating, the United States contributed up to 28 military observers and an air crew until 1954. The group was headed successively by generals from Belgium, Canada, and Australia. 1950. Allied Operations During the Korean War. As part of the United Nations Command (UNC), US forces played an important role in repelling the attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK). Because no peace treaty ever ended that war, the UNC still stands today. A US general commands the UNC and its sister organization, the Combined Forces Command, Korea (CFC). The ground component command of the UNC and CFC, commanded by a South Korean general, consists during armistice of one US division and 23 ROK divisions. All told, there are approximately 37,000 US Service members in South Korea helping to maintain the armistice. 1942. Allied Operations in World War II. Due to the combined nature of allied operations against Axis powers, US and UK commands and staffs were often inter-layered. US units were subordinated to British commanders a number of times, for example, in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the ChinaBurma-India Theater. This experience made 1962. United Nations Security Force for the US military a proponent of coalition the UN Temporary Executive Authority in warfare and a world leader in its practice. West New Guinea. A US Air Force task B-1 Appendix B force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in- Central Command, while Arab forces were country support for operations commanded under the Saudi commander of the joint forces by a Pakistani general. theater of operations; the two entities were linked in the Coalition Coordination, 1965. Inter-American Peace Force in the Communication and Integration Center. Dominican Republic. First peacekeeping Within that structure, a US brigade from the force of the OAS. After the initial US 82d Airborne Division was placed under intervention, six Latin American nations sent OPCON of the French 6th Light Armored small forces to join some 21,500 US troops Division. — soon reduced to 12,000 — in an MNF commanded by a general from Brazil. 1992 to Present. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Multinational operations to enforce 1982. Multinational Force in Beirut. About the UN No-fly Zone over southern Iraq in 1,200 US troops joined contingents from order to protect Shia enclaves. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom to observe the withdrawal of Palestinian 1991-1996. Operation PROVIDE Liberation Organization, Syrian, and Israeli COMFORT. Establishment of a combined forces from Beirut, Lebanon. No central task force at the conclusion of the Gulf War command structure was established, although to enforce the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq coordination was effected through a Liaison and to support coalition humanitarian relief and Coordination Committee. Two separate operations for the Kurds and other displaced terrorist attacks killed 241 US Marines, Iraqi civilians. sailors, and soldiers at the US Headquarters and 58 French soldiers at the French 1992. United Nations Protection Force in Headquarters on 23 October 1983, and the Former Yugoslavia. 21 nations combined MNF withdrew in March 1984. in an effort to provide humanitarian relief and attempt to create an environment for peace 1982. Multinational Force and Observers in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. in the Sinai. A ten nation, independent force empowered by Egypt and Israel to supervise 1993. United Nations Operation in Somalia truce provisions in the Sinai Peninsula. The (UNOSOM) after US Humanitarian United States provides support troops and an Intervention of December 1992 — infantry battalion rotated every 6 months; UNOSOM II. Some 9,000 US military Congress limits participation to 1,200 personnel participated as part of a personnel. The military commander is a multinational UN force of at least 28,000 Norwegian general, and the Director General peace operations troops. The overall UN is an American operating from Rome. commander was a Turkish general, assisted by a US deputy. 1990 to Present. Maritime Interception Operations. Fourteen nations continue to 1994. Multinational Force and United enforce a UN embargo of Iraq in the northern Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The Arabian Gulf, preventing the import and American-led MNF, a coalition of (eventually) export of banned items. 37 countries, entered the country of Haiti on 19 September 1994 in order to restore the 1991. DESERT STORM Coalition in the legitimate and democratically elected Persian Gulf War. Over 23 nations joined government of Haiti. The MNF transferred to eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. US, UK, responsibility for operations in Haiti to and French forces were under the CINC, US UNMIH on 31 March 1995. B-2 JP 3-16 A Representative List of US Participation in Multinational Operations 1995. NATO Implementation and Stabilization Force. NATO led, multinational effort conducted to stabilize UN brokered peacekeeping effort by introducing forces of participating nations within the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1999. NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE. An offensive military operation led by NATO with multinational involvement, undertaken in order to prevent an outbreak of humanitarian crises in Kosovo. B-3 Appendix B Intentionally Blank B-4 JP 3-16 APPENDIX C REFERENCES The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references. 1. Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations.” 2. CJCSI 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.” 3. 4. 5. CJCSI 3121.01 CH1, 22 Dec 94, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.” CJCSI 6510.01A, “Defensive Information Operations Implementation.” DOD 5105.38M, “Security Assistance Management Manual.” 6. DODD 2010.9, “Mutual Logistic Support Between the United States and Government Eligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary Bodies.” 7. 8. 9. DODD 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.” DODD 5100.77, “DOD Law of War Program.” DODD 5530.3, “International Agreements.” 10. JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.” 11. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).” 12. JP 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.” 13. JP 1-01, “Joint Doctrine Development System.” 14. JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.” 15. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.” 16. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.” 17. JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.” 18. JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations.” 19. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.” C-1 Appendix C 20. JP 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.” 21. JP 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.” 22. JP 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.” 23. JP 3-05, “ Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.” 24. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.” 25. JP 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.” 26. JP 3-07.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.” 27. JP 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.” 28. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.” 29. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.” 30. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.” 31. JP 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.” 32. JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.” 33. JP 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).” 34. JP 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.” 35. JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.” 36. JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.” 37. JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.” 38. JP 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.” 39. JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.” 40. JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.” 41. JP 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.” 42. JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.” C-2 JP 3-16 References 43. JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.” 44. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.” 45. JP 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.” 46. JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.” 47. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.” 48. NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” 49. NSDM 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” 50. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 43, “Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between The United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations.” C-3 Appendix C Intentionally Blank C-4 JP 3-16 APPENDIX D ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 1. User Comments Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 2. Authorship The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 3. Change Recommendations a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD// Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000. b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. c. Record of Changes: CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ D-1 Appendix D 4. Distribution a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers. b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.” Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181 Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896 CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099 Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321 Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R. Air Force: Navy: Marine Corps: Coast Guard: D-2 JP 3-16 GLOSSARY PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AADC ABCA ACA ACC ACSA ADP AECA AO AOR BOA C2 C3 C4I CA CD CFC CINC CJCSI CMO CMOC COA COCOM COM DOD DODD DOS FHA FID FMS GI&S HCA HN HNS HQ HSS area air defense commander American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program airspace control authority air component commander acquisition cross-Service agreement automated data processing Arms Export Control Act area of operations area of responsibility basic ordering agreement command and control command, control, and communications command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence civil affairs counterdrug Combined Forces Command, Korea commander in chief Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction civil-military operations civil-military operations center course of action combatant command (command authority) Chief of Mission Department of Defense Department of Defense Directive Department of State foreign humanitarian assistance foreign internal defense foreign military sales geospatial information and services humanitarian and civic assistance host nation host-nation support headquarters health service support GL-1 Glossary IA IO IPB ISA JFC JOA LCC LNO LOA MCC METOC MNF MNFC MOOTW NATO NCA NDP NEO NGO NSC NSDM OAS OPCON OPLAN PO POLAD POW PSYOP PVO QSTAG RCA ROE ROK RSI RSN SAO SAR SOF SOFA implementing arrangement information operations intelligence preparation of the battlespace international standardization agreement joint force commander joint operations area land component commander liaison officer letter of offer and acceptance maritime component commander meteorological and oceanographic multinational force multinational force commander military operations other than war North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Command Authorities national disclosure policy noncombatant evacuation operation nongovernmental organization National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandum Organization of American States operational control operation plan peace operations political advisor prisoner of war psychological operations private voluntary organization quadripartite standing agreement riot control agents rules of engagement Republic of Korea rationalization, standardization, and interoperability role specialist nation security assistance office/officer search and rescue special operations forces status-of-forces agreement GL-2 JP 3-16 Glossary SOP SROE STANAG TACON TPFDD TTP UN UNC UNMIH UNOSOM USC USG USSPACECOM standing operating procedures standing rules of engagement standardization agreement (NATO) tactical control time-phased force and deployment data tactics, techniques, and procedures United Nations United Nations Command United Nations Mission in Haiti United Nations Operations in Somalia United States Code United States Government United States Space Command GL-3 PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS airspace control in the combat zone. A area of responsibility. 1. The geographical process used to increase combat area associated with a combatant command effectiveness by promoting the safe, within which a combatant commander has efficient, and flexible use of airspace. authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. Airspace control is provided in order to In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy prevent fratricide, enhance air defense terrain for which supporting ships are operations, and permit greater flexibility of responsible for covering by fire on known operations. Airspace control does not targets or targets of opportunity and by infringe on the authority vested in observation. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02) commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called civil affairs. The activities of a commander combat airspace control; airspace control. that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit (JP 1-02) relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nonalliance. An alliance is the result of formal governmental, and the civilian populace in agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of more nations for broad, long-term operations in order to facilitate military objectives which further the common operations and consolidate operational interests of the members. See also coalition. objectives. Civil affairs may include (JP 1-02) performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility area of influence. A geographical area wherein of local government. These activities may a commander is directly capable of occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other influencing operations by maneuver or fire military actions. They may also occur, if support systems normally under the directed, in the absence of other military commander’s command or control. (JP 1-02) operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02) area of interest. That area of concern to the civil-military operations. Group of planned commander, including the area of influence, activities in support of military operations areas adjacent thereto, and extending into that enhance the relationship between the enemy territory to the objectives of current military forces and civilian authorities and or planned operations. This area also population and which promote the includes areas occupied by enemy forces development of favorable emotions, who could jeopardize the accomplishment attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02) hostile groups. Also called CMO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term area of operations. An operational area and its definition and are approved for defined by the joint force commander for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between operational area of the joint force two or more nations for common action. commander, but should be large enough for See also alliance. (JP 1-02) component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. coalition action. Multinational action Also called AO. See also area of outside the bounds of established alliances, responsibility. (JP 1-02) usually for single occasions or longer GL-4 JP 3-16 Glossary cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations. (JP 1-02) maintained, by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training. b. having interchangeable repair parts and/or components. c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without adjustment. (JP 1-02) coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02) compatibility. Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or combatant command (command material to exist or function in the same authority). Nontransferable command system or environment without mutual authority established by title 10 (“Armed interference. See also interchangeability. Forces”), United States Code, section 164, (JP 1-02) exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless coordinating authority. A commander or otherwise directed by the President or the individual assigned responsibility for Secretary of Defense. Combatant coordinating specific functions or activities command (command authority) cannot be involving forces of two or more Military delegated and is the authority of a Departments or two or more forces of the combatant commander to perform those same Service. The commander or functions of command over assigned forces individual has the authority to require involving organizing and employing consultation between the agencies involved, commands and forces, assigning tasks, but does not have the authority to compel designating objectives, and giving agreement. In the event that essential authoritative direction over all aspects of agreement cannot be obtained, the matter military operations, joint training, and shall be referred to the appointing authority. logistics necessary to accomplish the Coordinating authority is a consultation missions assigned to the command. relationship, not an authority through which Combatant command (command authority) command may be exercised. Coordinating should be exercised through the authority is more applicable to planning and commanders of subordinate organizations. similar activities than to operations. (JP Normally this authority is exercised through 1-02) subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component force protection. Security program designed commanders. Combatant command to protect Service members, civilian (command authority) provides full employees, family members, facilities, and authority to organize and employ equipment, in all locations and situations, commands and forces as the combatant accomplished through planned and commander considers necessary to integrated application of combating accomplish assigned missions. Operational terrorism, physical security, operations control is inherent in combatant command security, personal protective services, and (command authority). Also called supported by intelligence, COCOM. (JP 1-02) counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02) commonality. A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and functional component command. A interchangeable characteristics enabling command normally, but not necessarily, each to be utilized, or operated and composed of forces of two or more Military GL-5 Glossary Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02) nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02) geospatial information and services. The information operations. Actions taken to concept for collection, information affect adversary information and extraction, storage, dissemination, and information systems while defending one’s exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, own information and information systems. imagery (both commercial and national Also called IO. (JP 1-02) source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, interchangeability. A condition which exists and toponymic data accurately referenced when two or more items possess such to a precise location on the earth’s surface. functional and physical characteristics as These data are used for military planning, to be equivalent in performance and training, and operations including durability, and are capable of being navigation, mission planning, mission exchanged one for the other without rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise alteration of the items themselves, or of targeting. Geospatial information provides adjoining items, except for adjustment, and the basic framework for battlespace without selection for fit and performance. visualization. It is information produced See also compatibility. (JP 1-02) by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be interoperability. 1. The ability of systems, presented in the form of printed maps, units or forces to provide services to and charts, and publications; in digital accept services from other systems, units, simulation and modeling data bases; in or forces and to use the services so photographic form; or in the form of exchanged to enable them to operate digitized maps and charts or attributed effectively together. 2. The condition centerline data. Geospatial services include achieved among communicationstools that enable users to access and electronics systems or items of manipulate data, and also includes communications-electronics equipment instruction, training, laboratory support, and when information or services can be guidance for the use of geospatial data. exchanged directly and satisfactorily Also called GI&S. (JP 1-02) between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined host-nation support. Civil and/or military when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02) assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, joint. Connotes activities, operations, crises or emergencies, or war based on organizations, etc., in which elements of agreements mutually concluded between two or more Military Departments nations. (JP 1-02) participate. (JP 1-02) information assurance. Information joint force commander. A general term operations that protect and defend applied to a combatant commander, information and information systems by subunified commander, or joint task force ensuring their availability, integrity, commander authorized to exercise authentication, confidentiality, and combatant command (command authority) GL-6 JP 3-16 Glossary or operational control over a joint force. multinational operations. A collective term Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP to describe military actions conducted by 1-02) forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a military capability. The ability to achieve a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; specified wartime objective (win a war or coalition; coalition action. (This term and battle, destroy a target set). It includes four its definition modify the existing term and major components: force structure, its definition and are approved for inclusion modernization, readiness, and in the next edition of JP 1-02.) sustainability. a. force structure— Numbers, size, and composition of the units National Command Authorities. The that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., President and the Secretary of Defense or divisions, ships, airwings. b. modernization their duly deputized alternates or — Technical sophistication of forces, units, successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02) weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit readiness—The ability to provide nongovernmental organizations. capabilities required by the combatant Transnational organizations of private commanders to execute their assigned citizens that maintain a consultative status missions. This is derived from the ability with the Economic and Social Council of of each unit to deliver the outputs for which the United Nations. Nongovernmental it was designed. d. sustainability—The organizations may be professional ability to maintain the necessary level and associations, foundations, multinational duration of operational activity to achieve businesses, or simply groups with a military objectives. Sustainability is a common interest in humanitarian assistance function of providing for and maintaining activities (development and relief). those levels of ready forces, materiel, and “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term consumables necessary to support military normally used by non-United States effort. (JP 1-02) organizations. Also called NGOs. See also private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02) mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to operation. A military action or the carrying be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, common usage, especially when applied to or administrative military mission; the lower military units, a duty assigned to an process of carrying on combat, including individual or unit; a task. 3. The movement, supply, attack, defense, and dispatching of one or more aircraft to maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02) any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02) multinational force commander. A general operational control. Transferable command term applied to a commander who exercises authority that may be exercised by command authority over a military force commanders at any echelon at or below the composed of elements from two or more level of combatant command. Operational nations. The extent of the multinational control is inherent in combatant command force commander’s command authority is (command authority). Operational control determined by the participating nations. may be delegated and is the authority to Also called MNFC. (This term and its perform those functions of command over definition are approved for inclusion in the subordinate forces involving organizing next edition of JP 1-02.) and employing commands and forces, GL-7 Glossary assigning tasks, designating objectives, and public affairs. Those public information, giving authoritative direction necessary to command information, and community accomplish the mission. Operational relations activities directed toward both control includes authoritative direction over internal and external publics with interests all aspects of military operations and joint in the Department of Defense. Also called training necessary to accomplish missions PA. (JP 1-02) assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the rationalization. Any action that increases the commanders of subordinate organizations. effectiveness of allied forces through more Normally this authority is exercised through efficient or effective use of defense subordinate joint force commanders and resources committed to the alliance. Service and/or functional component Rationalization includes consolidation, commanders. Operational control normally reassignment of national priorities to higher provides full authority to organize alliance needs, standardization, commands and forces and to employ those specialization, mutual support or improved forces as the commander in operational interoperability, and greater cooperation. control considers necessary to accomplish Rationalization applies to both weapons/ assigned missions. Operational control materiel resources and non-weapons does not, in and of itself, include military matters. (JP 1-02) authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, standardization. The process by which the internal organization, or unit training. Also Department of Defense achieves the closest called OPCON. (JP 1-02) practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient private voluntary organizations. Private, use of research, development, and nonprofit humanitarian assistance production resources, and agrees to adopt organizations involved in development and on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. relief activities. Private voluntary common or compatible operational, organizations are normally United Statesadministrative, and logistic procedures; b. based. “Private voluntary organization” is common or compatible technical often used synonymously with the term procedures and criteria; c. common, “nongovernmental organizations.” Also compatible, or interchangeable supplies, called PVOs. See also nongovernmental components, weapons, or equipment; and organizations. (JP 1-02) d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational Planned psychological operations. compatibility. (JP 1-02) operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to support. 1. The action of a force which aids, influence their emotions, motives, objective protects, complements, or sustains another reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of force in accordance with a directive foreign governments, organizations, requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps groups, and individuals. The purpose of another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, psychological operations is to induce or or naval gunfire may be used as a support reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held favorable to the originator’s objectives. back at the beginning of an attack as a Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02) reserve. 4. An element of a command GL-8 JP 3-16 Glossary which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02) designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02) supported commander. The commander sustainability. See military capability. (JP having primary responsibility for all aspects 1-02) of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation tactical control. Command authority over planning authority. In the context of joint assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made operation planning, this term refers to the available for tasking, that is limited to the commander who prepares operation plans detailed and, usually, local direction and or operation orders in response to control of movements or maneuvers requirements of the Chairman of the Joint necessary to accomplish missions or tasks Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02) assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may supporting commander. A commander who be delegated to, and exercised at any level provides augmentation forces or other at or below the level of combatant support to a supported commander or who command. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02) develops a supporting plan. Includes the GL-9 Glossary Intentionally Blank GL-10 JP 3-16 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JP 1 JOINT WARFARE JP 0-2 UNAAF JP 1-0 PERSONNEL JP 2-0 INTELLIGENCE JP 3-0 OPERATIONS JP 4-0 LOGISTICS JP 5-0 PLANS JP 6-0 C4 SYSTEMS All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: STEP #1 Project Proposal STEP #5 Assessments/Revision ! Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void ! J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs ! J-7 initiates Program Directive STEP #2 Program Directive ! J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs ! Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts ! J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate ! The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use ! 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions ! No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised Project Proposal Assessments/ Revision Program Directive JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY CJCS Approval Two Drafts STEP #4 CJCS Approval STEP #3 Two Drafts ! Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff ! Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs ! Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP ! Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub ! PRA develops two draft pubs ! PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff