Nuclear_Non_Proliferation

Introductory Thesis On the morning of August 6, 1945, the world was introduced and exposed to an unprecedented level of man made destruction unheard of and unmatched in the history of the world. Within two days, nuclear weapons dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the immediate death of over 120,000 people. While these new innovative weapons shook the ground for miles to come on Japanese soil, the ‘shock wave’ of the blasts woke the world, and the worlds only nuclear proliferators(the United States) over the necessity to implement effective measures to ensure that man would never bear witness and experience the horrific carnage introduced to the world on solemn day. From the ashes of the two annihilated Japanese cities was an unforeseen commitment to a system of global governance over nuclear proliferation, as a way of ensuring that atrocities on such a scale would never be repeated into the future. This paper will exemplify the measures and efforts taken as a way of structuring a world body to regulate and provide oversight to international nuclear proliferation. It will then proceed to highlight the successes and difficulties this global governing body has experienced since its inception, and will conclude by spelling out the evolving threats of today’s world and what action Nuclear Non Proliferation regime is taking to cope with the problems the 21st century has posed to it. The Opening Act of Nuclear Non Proliferation During the aftermath of the US Nuclear strikes on Japan which concluded World War II, the United States, was determined to create a world in which the use of nuclear weapons would remain a thing of the past. This commitment first began to pickup steam with the newly established UN Atomic Energy commission and its presented initiative the “Baruch Plan.”(von Weizsacker,2009) Under the plan devised by the US representative to the commission Bernard Baruch, the US would unilaterally destroy its stockpile of nuclear weapons on the condition that the world body of the United Nations would enforce and regulate satisfactory safeguards and provisions over atomic development, which would stand immune from UN Security Council veto.(Russel,1961) In addition, the US would concede all scientific data and atomic research to the UN commission, and in the process designate the world body as the protectorate and monopolist of nuclear proliferation on the international level. This in turn would give the world body sole right to mine and refine nuclear materials, and construct nuclear power plants as a way of promoting the peaceful and civilian use of nuclear energy.(Russel, 61) By relegating nuclear material and information to the oversight of a world governing body, states contemplating building their own nuclear projects would have little incentive to do as, as information is restricted, and every state would receive equal benefit through the body’s promotion and activities in producing peaceful nuclear energy for all to benefit. While the plan was greeted with much enthusiasm among the international community and was eventually passed by the commission, the newly arisen nuclear power of the Soviet Union was suspicious and paranoid of western powers having any oversight over its national sovereignty, and decided to abstain when the vote was brought up at the UN Security council.(von Weizscaker,2009) As a result, the powers failed to reach a comprehensive agreement, and the plan went dead leading world powers to ponder other initiatives and attempts at reducing global nuclear proliferation. With the failure in reaching a consensus on the Baruch Plan, two additional states joined the party of Nuclear powers, with the Soviet Union achieving the feat in the 1949, and the United Kingdom following with its own nuclear arsenal in 1952.(von Wezsacker,2009) The addition of two more nuclear-armed nations posed a grave complication to this effort, and led to a scrambling for an effective measure to ensure other nations wouldn’t follow suit. This second try attempt at halting further proliferation was manifested US President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Initiative in 1953. Under the proposal, the world’s existing nuclear states would pledge to the exclusive development of peaceful uses for atomic energy.(von Wezsacker,2009) To ensure these pledges would indeed be carried out, an International Atomic Energy Agency would be erected to oversee and inspect all nuclear related material.(Fischer,1997) To lure the Soviet Union aboard, a compromise was included in the plan, creating a provision to allow a veto vote to nations whose security interests were being threatened by the treaty, and therefore would be necessitated to terminate its pledged commitment. A general consensus was eventually met among the members of the UN Security council leading to the official establishment of the IAEA in 1957.(Fischer,1997) Although the agreement helped allay fears of global nuclear mayhem, the number of nuclear states seemingly grew none the less, leading to a call for even further more comprehensive international legislation to halt the problem dead it in its tracks. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty: A Case of Mixed Results Despite the IAEA’s efforts at providing initial safeguards to hinder and disrupt the transfer of nuclear related materials, the years following the historic indoctrination of the Atoms for Peace treaty consisted of a growing number of states joining the international list of nuclear armed countries.(FAS,1995) France would test its first atomic weapon in 1960, and was soon after followed by China in 1964. Independently it was reported that Israel was covertly working on a nuclear weapons program of its own. (FAS,1995)The quickly growing list of nuclear states was compounded by the Cuban Missile of 1962, in which the USSR positioned nuclear weapons aimed at the United States on the communist island of Cuba. The fear of a genocidal nuclear holocaust began materializing in the minds of world leaders and new calls for more concise specialized measures at combating the travel and testing of nuclear materials were brought to fruition.(von Weizsacker,2009) Three treaties were soon implemented by the world powers as a way of combating the flow of nuclear technology, and to limit the environmental fallout and impact of nuclear testing.(Winters,2005) The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, restricted nuclear testing to underground facilities, and placed a prohibition all on nuclear weapons tests and strategic positioning of nuclear arms in the atmosphere, under water, and outer space. Furthermore as a way of dealing specifically with the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Treaty of Tlateloco was passed in 1967, instituting a ban on nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean islands.(Winters,2005) In the backdrop however was the formulation for a more broad and general answer to continued nuclear proliferation. Foreseeing the spawning of new nuclear powers was Ireland, which already in 1961 proposed a UN resolution which obliged all states, non nuclear and nuclear alike to negotiate a more comprehensive answer to proliferation.(von Weizsacker,2009) For this type of solution to be facilitated however, the two main nuclear players, the US and the USSR would have to be brought to the negotiating table. As a tool of enhancing and promoting the two party talks of limiting nuclear proliferation, A UN Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was established in 1962 which asked the two super powers to propose a unified agenda on the scaling down of nuclear activity. The two sides would finally convene in 1964 and conceptualize a plan based on four key principals beginning with the implementation of a more thorough nuclear non proliferation treaty(NPT).(von Weizsacker, 2009)As a way of specifying which nations who would be effected by the treaty, the two powers agreed that any state which produced or tested a nuclear weapon or divide prior to 1967 would be considered a Nuclear Weapon State. By clearly marking which states were officially renowned nuclear powers, the treaty would bind these powers with the non nuclear states in the world and provide regulation to ensure that states would not proliferate and conduct the trade of any nuclear material of any kind to those states deemed non nuclear. The latter in turn would not actively pursue and accept any type of nuclear material assistance and would commit to refraining from developing nuclear weapons programs themselves. As a way of alleviating non nuclear state fears that they would be in turn bullied by the already nuclear states, a provision was included to oblige all nuclear armed states to enter into a process of nuclear arms reduction and eventual all out elimination of weapons and related testing. An additional incentive to entice non nuclear states to ratify the treaty was also included which allowed them to develop peaceful nuclear technology and formally declared their incontestable right to meet their pressing energy demands through the benefits of civilian nuclear programs. With all the provisions of the treaty ratified and agreed upon, signatures opened in 1967 and the treaty soon after went into action in 1970. Determining the efficiency and success of the NNP Regime In 1963, US President John F Kennedy issued a murky prediction of a major upswing in nuclear prediction around the world, in which he expected at least 20-30 new nuclear states to arise.(Perkovich,1998) Further more, upon the treaty’s inception, some Australian officials expressed concerns over the treaties futility, arguing that nuclear weapons were simply a stage in the evolutionary advancement process of a state.(von Weizsacker,2009)Observing the span of the four decades following the ratification of the treaty would tell a different story however. After world nuclear proliferation was at its peak in the 1960’s, with 3 states taking on the status of nuclear armed nations, proliferation began to lose footing and entered into a downward spiral with the inception of the NNPT in 1970.(Walsh,2006) Excluding India, which was not a partaker in the NNPT, there were no officially recognized additions of a nuclear armed states leading into the end of the 20th century. In fact the NNPT seems to have played a deterrence factor, and countries who had nuclear weapon ambitions and even countries who built and actually possessed nuclear weapons completely disarmed and ceded over their material to the IAEA.(Perkovich,1998) Of the 24 countries that attained the capacity to go nuclear, all have forfeited their weapons ambitions and remain non nuclear weapon states to this day.(Walsh,2006) One must only need to look at the examples of Australia and Egypt, and their quests for nuclear arms, as further demonstration of the achievement and success of the NNPT.(Walsh,2006) For decades Australia’s government had made repeated attempts to create a nuclear weapons program, and government decisions prior to their ratification of the treaty seemed to be pushing them in that very direction. Upon signing the treaty in 1973 however, those attempts ceased to exist. Egypt could be seen in very much the same light, as prior to its ratification of the treaty in 1981, the Egyptian government took countless pro-acquisition initiatives, which upon ratification of the NNPT, turned to zero. Further more, states such as South Africa and Libya, who had reached the phase of actually building nuclear weapons, completely disassembled their existing arsenals and programs, and transferred all nuclear related materials to the oversight and jurisdiction of the IAEA. (Walsh,2006)While a rosy picture could be painted of the NNPT’s successes heading into the 1990’s, new challenges to the treaty began arise as countries like North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, began to construct covert nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore the rise of terrorist groups induced the fear that non-state actors could get their hands on nuclear related materials and inflict inhumane catastrophes in targets of their choosing around the world.(Ferguson,2006) The NNPT and The World of Today As the world neared the end of the 20th century, it became apparent that while most NNWS were fulfilling their obligations to the NNPT, treaty members such as Iraq, North Korea, and later Iran were circumventing and manipulating the treaty, using it as cover to construct secret weapons programs.(Baulte,2004) The flaws of the NNPT began to creep out, bringing with it much criticism and calls for reform. The inherent problem exposed within the treaty began to materialize in the fact that the NP Regime lacked proper verification and enforcement measures to ensure that all treaty members were holding to their end of the bargain. The international community was always convinced that NNWS adhering to the NNPT would remain committed to their pledges, and that the IAEA would simply serve as a verification tool of declared state nuclear installations and materials.(Baulte,2004) The problem was that it failed to take into account states executing undeclared activities. The regime simply lacked the tools and authority to investigate in circumstances of concealment. This complex is inherent in the fact that without proper teeth, or in other words, the overwhelming backing of the international community, the NNPT and the IAEA lack much leverage in their ability to enforce their provisions. In Iraq in 1991 this would change, IAEA inspectors were indeed given the forceful backing of the UN community, and additional safeguard agreements and protocols were added to the NNPT so that it would have a more broad pool of tools to work with in detecting clandestine nuclear programs such as Iraq’s. Surprise, random inspections soon became the norm and as a result Iraqi Ruler Saddam Hussein, under pressure of the IAEA, closed down his nuclear program. (Baulte,2004) Still, other deficiencies of the treaty would soon transpire in connection to the provisions that comprise it. Article IV declares that all nations have the inarguable right to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. This means that rogue nations such as North Korea, and Iran, could legally under the treaty develop a civilian nuclear program, while retaining the capacity to if need be overhaul the program and switch to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.(Walsh,2006) This is where problems with Article X of the treaty come into play, as it specifies that those countries whose security interests are under threat could legally renounce and withdraw their signature from the treaty. In the case of North Korea, Pyunyang expressed a fear of a US pre-emptive nuclear strike, and in Tehran, a ‘fear’ of a nuclear Israel is said to play a part in the regimes contemplation of withdrawing from the treaty.(Winters,2005) Still, while the treaty requires some re-working in dealing with these exceptional circumstances of states that repeatedly threaten their neighbors, on the whole NNPT members have remained committed. Although North Korea withdrew from the from the treaty in the 1990’s it has expressed a desire to forgo its nuclear program and under the proper terms and conditions, open up its country to IAEA inspectors. More so countries that blatantly cheat and rebel against the Non Proliferation Regime are ostracized in the international community, and are subjected to harsh penalties and sanctions.(Walsh,2006) Insubordination does not go unnoticed, and if there is a will in the international community to effectively punish such states, the NNPT will have retain the same deterrence it had with Iraq in 1991, in its dealing with these other violating states. Non-State Actors: NGO’s and Terrorist Groups Another inherent problem in the structure of the NNPT is its lack of solution in dealing with non-state actors, or terrorists who are actively pursuing nuclear weapons to inflict catastrophes of insane proportion to the civilized world. After the collapse of the USSR, nuclear arsenals and related materials which were positioned in the former Soviet republics were kept poorly guarded, and under inefficient supervision, leading to the theft of nuclear devices and materials.(Scheinman,2005) These materials, which are feared to have ended up on the black market, could then be used in construction of a fully operational low-grade nuclear weapon or dirty bomb. A Stanford University study in 2006 revealed that more than 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium have been stolen and recovered.(Ferguson,2006) According to the IAEA, 25kg of highly enriched uranium is required in the construction of a nuclear weapon, while just 9kg of enriched plutonium could also be used in assembly of a bomb.(Ferguson,2006) Even more frightening was the revelation shortly after the 9/11 attacks of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan establishing a secret underground proliferation network in which he sold nuclear secrets to rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, while even making contacts with terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and the Taliban.(Scheinman,2005) In the age of globalization, where the international transfusion of information via the internet is being carried out at unprecedented levels, it is not difficult to fathom further type activity of non state groups exploiting the interconnected world to find that ex-soviet scientist who for the right price will provide all the assistance and information necessary.(Ferguson,2006) While this type of scenario poses a dire threat to the welfare of the world, the NNPT has proven adept and amenable to adjusting in order to counter act such threats. Just as terrorists are using the age of globalization in their quest for nuclear related information, NGO’s are exploiting the interconnected world in their quest to lobby world governments over the agenda of fighting nuclear proliferation.(Burroughs,2005) Beginning in the 1980’s, it was the NGO project led by the Parliamentarians for Global Action, which pushed world governments to solidify and increase provisions to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. More recently, NGO groups succeeded pushing UN members to adopt resolution 1540, which required all member states to actively hunt down 3rd party groups who are pursuing nuclear technology. Additionally, a 2005 proliferation conference was held which enacted and strengthened provisions over the protection of a states nuclear related material and legally binded countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It also enhanced cooperation between and among States regarding rapid responses to track and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, diminish any radiological consequences of sabotage, and disrupt and combat related violations. Strong NGO presence at the NPT Review Conference in 1995, helped push world leaders to acquiesce to the indefinite extension of the NPT into the 21st century.(Burroughs,2005) Conclusion Above all, one of the major pieces of criticism of the NNPT is that it has failed to fully implement its agenda. (Winters,2005)While the regime works to prevent the creating of NWS, those states with existing nuclear arsenals under the treaty pretty much fly under the radar, in direct contradiction with one of the key provisions of the NNPT which calls for complete disarmament of all known nuclear powers. While this criticism is indeed valid, it completely overlooks the facts today there are fewer states actively pursuing nuclear proliferation than at any point since 1945, and the world nuclear holocaust predicted in the 1960’s failed to materialize as a result of the NNPT.(Walsh,2006) As of 2003, 186 countries had signed the NPT making it one of the largest international arms treaties ever produced.(Winters,2005) Although the NNPT today is in a process of adjustment in its coping of problems the new age has to bring, much can be said of the saying, ‘if there is a will, there is a way.’ If the international community, NGO’s, and key world powers are willing to commit the resources and effort to provide the NNP Regime with the teeth it needs to enforce its policies, we will live in a much safer world in the years to come, and the NNPT will continue to go down as one of the biggest success stories global governance has to offer.