North_Korea's_Nuclear_Crisis

Abstract The problem about North Korea’s nuclear threat has perplexed international organizations and some East Asia countries for several decades. Firstly, this paper introduce a brief coverage of the overview of the North Korea’s nuclear crisis. And then, it goes to show the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and outlines the current debate surrounding the issue. In the most important section, there are three key recommendations on how the UNSC should go about responding to the nuclear problem and helping to reconcile the nuclear threat of North Korea to the society. The key policy recommendations include: 1. to create beneficial condition and get North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks; 2. to mild the UNSC’s resolutions on North Korea and make them acceptable to North Korea; 3. to ask North Korea to join in a Declaration of Denuclearization to eliminate its nuclear weapons program. Finally, there is a response to the strongest counter-argument against my proposed solution. North Korea’s nuclear crisis overview The nuclear crisis with North Korea has become progressively more serious since it issued an announcement that it has successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time ear Mount Mant’ap and P’unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong Province on October 9, 2006 (NTI, 2009). In recent years, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a number of countries such as the United States, Japan and South Korea have paid more attention to the nuclear issues, and also condemned North Korea’s nuclear weapons program had posed a grave threat to international peace and security, especially to its neighboring Asia countries such as China, South Korea and Japan. However, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war (Avery and Squassoni, 2006). This paper aims to address the problem of North Korea’s nuclear. History North Korea started its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s when the North Korean president Kim ll-sung made a decision to accelerate the development of a domestic nuclear capability. In 1985 United States officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that North Korea had a substantial arsenal of weapons and a secret nuclear reactor was being built near the small town of Yongbyon (Aftergood and Kristensen, 2006). Under international pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985, and also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992. However, the nuclear threat of North Korea was not eliminated due to the shock announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT, and North Korea asserted that this was a ‘self-defensive measure’ taken to defend its ‘supreme interests’ (Mack, 1993). The UNSC passed a resolution in 1993 urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT for the second time, and several months later, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that North Korea had completed the reprocessing of this spent fuel, a new nuclear crisis occurred. This led to the first round of Six-party Talks in August 2003, which aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program (Preez and Potter, 2003). In this issue, there are several significant actors which include North Korea, the UNSC, and the members of Six-Party Talks ( the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea). It is the key of addressing this issue to deal with the relationship between North Korea, the contracting states and the UNSC. They all have continued negotiations to map out a verification plan to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and end Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The U.S. has contributed to North Korea’s siege mentality by pursuing a theatre missile defense system and by encouraging Japan to expand its military role in the region (Feffer, 1999). The problem is significant because the nuclear threat of North Korea can result in an arms race. Other countries in the world, especially its neighboring Asian countries, would be nervous and afraid of the attack from North Korea. In addition, it has made the environment much less stable and mush less secure since the North Korea’s nuclear test. In order to the international peace and security, it needs to eliminate the nuclear threat. The current debate surrounding the problem On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a multistage rocket over Japan, but it failed and landed in the Pacific Ocean. North Korean officials insisted that it was a communications satellite launch (Crail, 2009). However, international community and many countries which include the United States, South Korea and Japan considered the launch as a long-range missile, and condemned it was an act that defied UNSC Resolution 1718, which decided that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) suspend all ballistic missile activities (Crail, 2009). Others doubted that North Korea tested a nuclear-capable missile that flew about 3,200 km (2,000 miles) before plopping into the Pacific Ocean (Economist, 2009). Facing the denunciation, Pyongyang has threatened to boycott the six-party talks and give up disarmament agreements, recover disabled nuclear facilities, resume plutonium production, and take all measures to increase its nuclear deterrence if UNSC views the launch as a ‘hostile act’ and punishes it. Simultaneously, it says that any expanded sanctions will be considered a declaration of war, and it also threatens UNSC to apologize immediately for violating its sovereignty (Zhang, 2009). The officials of North Korea say that North Korea is a sovereign country like China, the United States and Japan, and they have rights to a space program, even though a UNSC resolution supposedly bans their missile work (Kim, 2009). Once again, Pyongyang is playing the tit-for-tat strategy to prepare for a larger bargaining chip in a new round of nuclear negotiation (Zhang, 2009). The role of UNSC The UN Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the United Nation’s most powerful body. The Security Council in international collective security is given the power by the UN Charter to: Investigate any situation threatening international peace; Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute; Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations; Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary; Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation. They also recommend the new Secretary-General to the General Assembly (Charter of The United Nations, Chapter V). Policy Recommendations: How the UNSC should go about responding to the nuclear threat of North Korea In responding to the problem about North Korea’s nuclear threat, this section advocates that the UNSC a three-pronged solution in order to ensure that North Korea will stop its nuclear weapons program and the nuclear threat to the world. The UNSC should try to get North Korea back to the Six-Party talks as soon as possible and then discuss the solutions. Additionally, the UNSC should adjust its resolutions on North Korea’s nuclear problem. Furthermore, the UNSC should promote an agreement between North Korea and other five members of the Six-Party Talks to eliminate the nuclear weapons program. Firstly, the UNSC should persuade and exhort North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible. As a retaliation to the UN Security Council's presidential statement issued on April 13, 2009 condemning North Korea's April 5 rocket launch, demanding an end to further launches, and calling for expanded sanctions, North Korean Foreign Ministry said that the Six-Party Talks have lost the meaning of their existence, and vowed to withdraw from the talks (Snyder, 2009). Since August 2003, members of the Six-Party Talks have convened in Beijing for several rounds of negotiations aimed at curbing North Korea’s nuclear program. After four rounds of talks, the summits produced the Statement of Principles in September 2005. According to the pact, Pyongyang would eventually abandon its nuclear program, rejoin the NPT, and allow IAEA monitors to return. In exchange, North Korea would receive food and energy assistance from the other members. The statement also paved the way for Pyongyang to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan, and for the negotiation of a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula (Zissis, 2008). Therefore, the Six-Party Talks are the peace talks that help to reconcile the dispute among the states and the nuclear crisis of North Korea. Now, North Korea has retreated from the talks, what the UNSC needs to do is to create beneficial conditions which North Korea can accept, and to persuade North Korea back to the talks. Furthermore, the UNSC should water down any possible proposals for new sanctions against North Korea and deal with this problem in a way without arm forces. The official of North Korea announced that any new sanctions would be considered as a declaration of war. Both China and Russia expect that the UNSC could water down any possible proposals for new sanctions against North Korea (TheBlackShip, 2009), and there is obvious that North Korea has been in a fit of rage with the sanctions, although the UNSC’s resolutions have helped to limit the development of North Korea’s nuclear technologies and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a great extent. In response to the first nuclear test of North Korea in October 2006, the UNSC acted on its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It unanimously supported a U.S.-drafted resolution, Resolution 1718. The UNSC and a number of countries all condemned the test as a clear threat to international peace and security. This enabled it to exercise its enforcement powers under Chapter VII and order sanctions that were legally binding on member states. The Security Council was able to obtain a consensus to take serious and comprehensive sanctions against North Korea (Security Council, 2006). The UNSC Resolution 1718 includes: Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching; Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA (SCR 1718, 2006). The UNSC’s Resolution 1718 prohibits the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to North Korea of materials, equipment, goods, and technology that could be used in its ballistic missile or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. It also requires states to prohibit their nationals from providing any technical advice or assistance relating to the provision, manufacture or maintenance of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. Further, it requires member states to freeze the funds and other assets in their territories by persons or entities designated by the Security Council as engaged in or providing support for North Korea’s WMD or ballistic missile programmes. What is more, the sanctions in Resolution 1718 will make it extremely difficult for North Korea to export its nuclear technology to other states or to non-state actors, as it has similar prohibitions on the sale or transfer of the prohibited items from North Korea (Beckman, 2006). In my opinion, the Security Council’s actions should both indicate the international community’s firm position and help create conditions for the peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue. The resolutions basically reflected that spirit; however, sanctions were not the end in themselves. After North Korea’s rocket launch, China did not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to and from the DPRK, and urged the countries concerned to adopt a responsible attitude in that regard, refraining from taking any provocative steps that could intensify the tension. And most of Member States who firmly opposed the use of arm force still believe that the six-party talks are the realistic means of handling the issue (Security Council, 2006). In other words, the best way politically is some mild U.N. Security Council resolutions that would be sufficient to get the parties to eventually return to the table. Finally, after trying to create beneficial condition to North Korea and get it back to the Six-Party Talks, the UNSC should ask North Korea to join in a Declaration of Denuclearization to make North Korea commit itself to the goal of the complete elimination of its unclear weapons program, including all fissile material in whatever form. If North Korea is unwilling to accept more explicit language that specifically refers to weapons-grade enrichment facilities, the United States, along with the others in the Six-Party Talks, would make publicly clear their understanding that such facilities are covered. The United States would declare its respect for North Korean sovereignty and commit itself in the Declaration to the goal of normalized relations and a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War. Each side would provide the other with an explicit conditional security assurance. The United States would pledge not to initiate a military attack against North Korea or to seek to undermine its government. This pledge would remain effective both during negotiations on the four steps and thereafter, provided that North Korea abides by the terms of the agreements negotiated. North Korea would pledge not to initiate a military attack against the United States (Harrison, 2004, p.7). North Korean officials have announced that they want a direct talk with the United States in order to obtain a reliable security assurance (Zhang, 2009). In addition to pursuing denuclearization, the United States should opt for a radical change in relations between North Korea: a peace treaty for the peninsula, the normalization of all political and economic relations, and a big economic package for North Korea, including increasing integration into the global economy. Only a major improvement in its overall situation might lead North Korea to consider some change in course and give up its nuclear weapons. Response to Counter-arguments Some have argued that North Korea is a sovereign country, and it has right to develop their own technology of nuclear just like the United States and Russia. The UNSC’s resolutions on North Korea are not fair. And also they think the Six-Party Talks is meaningless to North Korea. The Deputy Ambassador to the UN from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pak Tok Hun (2009) said: ‘Every country has the right, the inalienable right to use the outer space peacefully. Not a few countries, many countries, they have already launched satellites several hundred times. Does it mean it would be fine for them to launch satellite but we are not allowed to do that' Its not fair.This is a satellite. Everyone can distinguish a satellite with a missile. Its not a missile. I know most of the countries now recognize its not a ‘missile’ .’ In addition, some experts suggest that to press the council to issue a strong statement condemning Pyongyang for ending its compliance with international measures against the spread of nuclear weapons and urging it to again shoulder its responsibilities. However, North Korea’s rocket launch has violated the UNSC Resolution 1718 because it used the ballistic technology. Additionally, its underground nuclear test in October 2006 and a series of missile launches in the last few decades have jeopardized the international peace, stability and security. The best way to deal with the nuclear problem is getting the Six-Party Talks reconvened. Any extra sanctions may lead to worse conflict between North Korea and other states or the United Nations, even lead to the Second Korea War breaks out. Conclusion Facing the greatest challenge of North Korea’s nuclear threat, the UNSC’s decisions should contain carefully consider and targeted measure, aimed at resolving the main issue. Additionally, the UNSC and the Six-Party Talks member states should try to make the DPRK reconsider its dangerous course, and come back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and resume its participation in the Six-Party Talks without preconditions. Through political and diplomatic means is the only way to address the North Korean nuclear problem. Although some experts hope the UNSC could tighten the sanctions on the DPRK, it may has an opposite effect that enraging the DPRK to make the conflict worse, and in fact it has retreated from the talks. Therefore, the UNSC should mitigate the sanctions on the DPRK, and provide a beneficial condition to it. 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