Mister_1

TECHNOLOGY AND THE MODERN WAR MAJ EDWARDO TORO MAJOR, INFANTRY INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EDUCATION PHASE II H100 ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY “Which of the military revolutions covered during H100 is the most important to how warfare is practiced today' Karl Clausewitz’s theories of “fog and friction” are just as relevant today as they were when he initially used the terms in 1806. Many theorists debate the impact of technological advances will have on modern day war. Our technological superiority may, as Clausewitz suggests, make our strategic options seem obvious. Clausewitz describes friction as corresponding to factors that differentiate actual war from war on paper. One could just as easily replace the word paper with computer as a modern representation of war. However, no scientific formula will be developed to completely categorize all the options inherent in war. War has a human aspect that cannot be replicated by mere information technology. Some military strategists believe that the current technology age will lend itself to a revolution in military affairs (RMA). However, there are varying arguments as to whether effectiveness of these technological advances on modern warfare. War cannot be reduced to a mere science that can be calculated by a computer program. There is a human dimension of war that requires individuals to use intuition to make decisions on the battlefield. Information dominance may lead to increases in the precision and lethality of future weapon systems but will never completely clear the fog of war. Decision cycles will be reduced through the use of information systems by facilitating more comprehensive and rapid intelligence gathering. The Military’s ability to interpret and disseminate intelligence will be greatly improved with technology. Peter McMaster, a freelance writer with experience on defense and technology issues, argues that technology will not be the deciding factor in future wars and encourages the military to, "abandon the dangerous and seductive illusion". Clausewitz outlines factors that contribute to friction: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. The Army Field Manual 3-90, when explaining the art of war, describes the commander’s ability to exploit the enemy’s fears and weaknesses as an example of the human element of battle. Combat takes a heavy toll on the mental and physical stamina of Soldiers. These factors cannot be calculated by advanced weapon systems. The extreme physical exertion during combat impedes a Soldier’s clarity of thought and thus will continue to create friction on the battlefield. History has proven that over reliance on technology has caused failures in military strategy. Our theories on information domination assume that our adversaries will be just as reliant on advance information technologies as we are. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, our adversaries are much more likely to operate in low technology environments. US Army Colonel HR McMaster states in an article published in Survival magazine that the military is characterized by "a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security." McMaster suggests that lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan prove that modern warfare has more connection to previous warfare than with the concept of the future fight with systems such as the Future Combat System. According to McMaster, dominance of the battle space will not be accomplished through surveillance and information technology. Clausewitz explains the concept of supremacy as the “Holy Grail” of warfare but caveats that the military advantages of technology rarely produce prolonged battlefield imbalances. Technologies always emerge to exploit vulnerabilities in current technologies. In the years between the World Worlds the U.S. Navy focused their efforts on very long range daylight systems while the Japanese developed the Type 93 Long Lance torpedo. The U.S. version relied upon advance computer systems to calculate the firing formula but the drawback was significant, the ship had to maintain a steady course to fire accurately. The Japanese weapon system was a longer range missile and could be fired while traveling at up to 45 knots and could fire at night. This is yet another example of the failure of our so called advanced technology. By not putting their reliance on advanced technologies, the Japanese were able to produce a more effective weapon. Followers of the concept of the revolution in military affairs point to several premises to support their theory. The main premise is that technological advances will make the battlefield “transparent”. The problem with the premise is that it ignores or dismisses our enemies’ ability to use asymmetric warfare techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in our technologies. Current U.S. Military doctrine focuses on net-centric warfare. Net-centric warfare centers on traditional warfare using advanced technological weapon systems. Yet, according to Rafal Rohozinski, author of the Art of War in the Information Age, non-state actors are using techniques centered on Social Netwar. Under the concept of Social Netwar, groups can use political and informational methods to gain popular support for their cause. These non-traditional methods that will be employed by our adversaries will not be as easily affected by high-tech weapon systems. The political and informational techniques used by potential adversaries will create new variances of fog and friction in the battle space. Richard Barnet was quoted as saying, “the war economy provides comfortable niches for tens of thousands of bureaucrats in and out of military uniform who go to the office every day to build nuclear weapons or to plan nuclear war; millions of workers whose jobs depend upon the system of nuclear terrorism; scientist and engineers hired to look for that final ‘technological breakthrough’ that can provide total security; contractors unwilling to give up easy profits; warrior intellectuals who sell threats and bless war”. Barnet was the author of numerous books and articles on globalization, the environment, security issues and other matters of public policy. While staying ahead in the technology race, we will gain some advantages on the battlefield but the fog of war will not be completely lifted. Clausewitz theories imply changing plans will make the human factor of war just as important as any technological advances. Clearly, it is unpredictable how friction will manifest itself in a “technological altered” environment. However, the theories of “fog and friction” created by Karl Clausewitz are unmistakably as relevant today as there were when he first devised them. WORKS CITED Ancker, Clinton and Michael, Burke, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, 10 Mar 2008, http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/october_2003/10_03_1.html Clausewitz, Carl von. OnWar. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1984. Buxbaum, Peter. Technology and the Fog of War (2008). ISN Security Watch, 21 Feb 2008