Logistics_in_Peace_Support_Operations

LOGISTICS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS Forth delivery to Participants of NDC Course 19 on 24 March 2011 by Maj Gen ABM Gana DSS psc (+) plsc (+) fwc MSc Comd NACST LOGISTICS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS INTRODUCTION 1. Would Peace Support Operations (PSOs) be a thing of the past' The answer to this question is unlikely to be in the affirmative since the insatiable nature of man persists, leading to clashes of interests and eventual conflict with others. This human nature that influences relations between individuals also prevails within and between nations often resolved by might. The great historian, Jean Jacque Babel observes that, ‘‘over the last 5 ½ millennia, the planet lived in peace for a mere 292 years... In the long period, there had been 14,500 wars, big and small, that carried off an astronomical 3.64 billion people.’’[i] Added to this was the loss of 7.34 million more lives in the First World War alone.[ii] The League of Nations was, therefore, formed in 1919 as a global mechanism against all forms of aggression. In furtherance of the same objective, the Kellogg – Briand Pact was signed by over 60 countries on 27 August 1928 banning all forms of war.[iii] However, both had a crippling beginning and early demise having been buried on the same day with the first casualties of the Second World War in 1939, with a further loss of about 42 million lives.[iv] These astronomical casualty figures, in the face of mankind’s inability to resolve conflicts peacefully, suggest the need for an alternative collective security mechanism. 2. The United Nations (UN) Charter came to live in 1945 as a global solution where ‘‘We the people of the United Nations (became) determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…’’[v] The organisation has so far succeeded in preventing global conflicts, but contends with lethal and fluid limited wars to necessitate continuous intervention by neutral parties. Consequently, nations continue to contribute men and materiel towards conflict resolution, taking the form of PSOs. The operations refer to the employment of peacekeepers in a conflict ridden environment, within or between states, for the purpose of restoring normalcy. This security concept gained credence amongst statesmen, diplomats, humanitarian organisations as well as armed and police forces worldwide. Thus, the primary purpose of constituting and engaging armed forces against adversaries in resolving politics by other means is extended to include the provision of combat and logistics support capabilities in PSOs. The logistics process in focus captures the interface between military and civilian logistics essential for supporting conflict resolution efforts in its ramification. Military components, forming the largest contingent in most peacekeeping environments, remain partially self-supporting, augmented by extra-institutional agencies. Therefore, the logistics systems in support of military contingents and civilian components depend on both military and civilian definitions and adopted practices to underscore its importance. 3. The importance of logistics support in peace enforcement operations may be found in the words of Maj Gen RA Adesina that, ‘‘three factors are crucial for the successful execution of any military campaign. The first is logistics. The second is logistics while the third is also logistics…Any nation that cannot sustain its troops in combat logistically has no business in fighting a war.’’[vi] Neglect of and the inability to meet logistical needs accounted for the numerous failures of ECOMOG forces in its conflict resolution efforts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone through the 1990s. This belies the erroneous legitimacy accorded to strategy and tactics in earlier military parlance that presents logistics as a step-child. It further underscores the principle of equivalence between strategy, tactics and logistics – the tripod of all military engagements. Strategically, therefore, the engagement of the military, supported by other organisations, depends on money, more money and much more money for the acquisition of all logistic requirements as well as their operation and utilisation. It also upholds the significance of cooperation and coordination amongst civilian authorities and military commanders whose roles interconnect strategically and operationally in conflict resolution efforts. 4. Lest we forget that in 1997, US Amb Marshall McCallie suggested that ‘‘If the international community has a large group of military units in Africa which it could draw a selected peacekeeping force, then the international community would be much better prepared to respond to a crisis in Africa.’’[vii] The London Economist News Magazine was quick to observe that: The days when European or American frontline troops intervened in Africa even for humanitarian purposes may well be over. The death of American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, and the more recent death of French soldiers in Central African Republic seem to have convinced Western governments that Africa is not worth their soldiers’ lives…the call nowadays is for African solutions to African problems.[viii] 5. Although extra-regional forces still participate and support PSOs in Africa, initial thrusts are often borne by the continent. The initial interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were sub-regional initiatives supported by the regional organisation. The earliest intervention against genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was another African initiative. In like manner, the initial intervention in the ongoing crisis in the Darfur Region of the Sudan in 2005 was conducted by the African Union (AU). That African problems are African problems in the face of incessant intra-state conflicts underscores the necessity of continuous study of PSOs. To narrow down, the major problem militating against PSOs by Africans in Africa remain that of poor logistics support. Therefore, a glimpse at logistics amongst carefully selected military strategists and officers of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) such as the present audience is apt to the favour of efficient and successful future performance in PSOs, especially on the African continent. AIM 6. The aim of this lecture is to discuss logistics support in PSOs with a view to identifying the way forward. SCOPE 7. This lecture covers the followings: a. Conceptual clarifications. b. Strategy for effective logistics support in PSOs. c. Mission life cycle and finance. d. Logistics challenges in PSOs. e. The way forward. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS CONCEPT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 8. The framers of the UN Charter did not envision intervention in conflict in its current form, therefore, the charter does not contain the word peacekeeping or the phrase PSOs. In its original sense, the concept of collective security was based on the engagement of opposing forces employed for the Second World War. Forces of member nations are to come under the command of the Chiefs of Staff of the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. However, the incessancy and growing complexity in maintaining international peace and security led to a broader view of the Charter, especially as it relates to Chapters 6, 7 & 8. A new dimension came to the fore when the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1956 was passed by the General Assembly to establish the UN Emergency Force 1 between Egypt and Israel as its first peacekeeping mission in its current form.[ix] This gave birth to the concept of peacekeeping operations in its current form. 9. In place of peacekeeping operations, the dynamic nature of conflict resolution led to the later coinage of the phrase – PSOs, which is broad and flexible, attracting various definitions by institutions and individuals without losing the substance. In that context, the US Joint Warfare Publication defines PSOs as ‘‘an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace.’’[x] It is designed ‘‘to help implement negotiated settlement of conflicts between previously hostile parties, encouraging former opponents to build a peaceful future together.’’[xi] PSOs capture preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, disarmament and humanitarian activities. CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS 10. Many definitions are proffered for the term logistics by various practitioners of both civil and military extractions. From the commercial perspective, the Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology (NITT) defines logistics simply as ‘‘the flow of material, information and money between consumers and suppliers.’’[xii] The same institute present logistics from a global perspective as ‘‘the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to consumer requirements.’’[xiii] From the military perspective, logistics is defined as ‘‘the science of planning and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy, primarily in the areas of personnel management.’’ 11. That logistics in military parlance is the bridge connecting a nation’s economy with its forces deployed in the field coupled with the entry of highly dependent technological products may require an elaborate definition. Such a definition should capture the indices of logistic art along with the processes from cradle through the planning and execution phases. In that sense, Lt Gen William G Pagonis offers that: Logistics is the careful integration of transportation, supply, warehousing, maintenance, procurement, contracting and automation into coherent functional areas; and in a way that prevents sub-optimization in any of these activities; and in a way that permits and enhances the accomplishment of a given goal, objective or mission.[xiv] 12. In PSOs, mediating agencies, contingents and, possibly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would ‘‘plan, organize, mount, sustain and account for duly authorized operations’’ throughout the mission life cycle.[xv] This goes with military performance mostly at operational and tactical levels of PSOs. In that context, one UN module presents logistics elaborately as: The science of planning and carrying out the administration, movement and maintenance of forces and materials needed on a UN mission, and includes activities related to communications, engineering and aviation services. It is…the art of transporting, housing, supplying and providing technical support to … military and civilian police, staff from numerous UN agencies as well as civilian specialists who serve on multi-role missions.[xvi] 13. The major difference in logistical arrangement between the military on one hand and UN and other mediating agencies on the other hand is the accounting procedure of the latter that extends to the reimbursement of TCCs. However, none of the definitions may be dismissed since PSOs involve civilian staff and contractors who manage and provide logistic requirements respectively; the military that creates enabling environment for peace making and peace building in addition to winning the battle-for-hearts-and-minds; and the holistic support being provided by the UN or any other mediating agency in terms of principal staff selection, formulation and issue of policy guidelines and directives as well as funding. This implies that where the modalities and bulk provisions of mediating agencies end, the retailing that may take place in unfriendly environment begins by and also for the military. Worthy of note is that the definitions proffered by both military and civilian agencies are equally applicable to PSOs where regional organisations act as mediating agencies. CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT 14. PSOs differ in size, nature and purposes, but tailored towards the resolution of anticipated or prevailing conflicts. They graduate from small mediation or observer groups of differing specialisations to larger groups, mostly composed of civilian, police and military personnel or contingents. The concepts of logistics support practiced include the self reliance method that revolves around dependence on own provisions and the local economy, but allows for out-of-theatre repairs of technical facilities lacking local support capacity; self-sufficiency where TCCs rely on their own resources to be appropriately reimbursed by the mediating agency; lead nation approach usually for medium sized operations that depends on the provisions of one principal member supporting other contingents; the force logistics support group concept that handles large sized operations, which may be formed by a group of nations and coordinated by one State; and civilian contract support system that falls under the direct supervision of mediating agency and assumes added significance as operational intensity and duration increases. A combination of these concepts is often found in large scale PSOs such as UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and many more. 15. These concepts of logistics support, though designed by the UN for supporting PSOs, are closely applied by regional agencies while acting in mediating roles. This is evident with logistic practices in PSOs conducted under the auspices of the AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa. Indeed, the documented logistics systems of the UN served as the template for the drafting of the Logistics Directives for ECOWAS. STRATEGY FOR EFFECTIVE LOGISTICS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 16. The success of logistics support in PSOs is based on the earlier mentioned concepts that thrive on some principles and planning factors. The principles that govern UN logistics systems are foresight, flexibility, responsibility, coordination, cooperation, simplicity, sufficiency, economy and accountability. Among the strategic considerations are financial appropriation, contributions from TCCs, host nation’s logistic facilities and donations from willing nations. Contributions from NGOs do not fall within the authority of mediating agencies, but require joint coordination as a means of enhancing synergy. Added to these principles and strategic considerations are operational factors essential for planning PSOs. They include operational tasks, environmental needs, time and space, manpower level, materiel availability and anticipated duration. These principles and factors are universal to logistics in PSOs in support of the military and police contingents as well as civilian components, specialised agencies and, at times, NGOs. 17. These universal principles and factors notwithstanding, the military, whose roles advance to the conduct of peace enforcement missions akin to war, still recognise its own principles and factors. This is largely connected to the retailing ability of the military and swift delivery means as well as protection capacity from hostile actions. In general terms, the 5 principles are those of foresight, flexibility, economy, simplicity and cooperation. These logistics principles that guide the military, take due cognisance of centralised control of resources and personnel as well as subsequent decentralised execution of logistical activities. In applying these principles, the military considers the logistics planning factors of Demand, Distance, Duration and Destination. These are further guided by the technical factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available, Support Available, Civil Considerations and Constraints (METT – TSC2). These principles and factors govern the checklist that expels rigidity as PSOs are constantly influenced by alterations in tasks that, in turn, influence associated operational methods and counter measures. The success of logistics support depends on the ability of operators to identify, plan and coordinate all logistic categories, sources, outlets and activities at all levels. The following practical measures are essential for effective planning and execution of logistic activities in PSOs: a. Mutually agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between mediating agency and TCCs, followed by inspection to ascertain capacity and capability. b. Cooperation and coordination between political leadership of TCCs and military authorities in preparation for agreed tasks for any PSOs. c. Mission analysis in both tactical and logistical terms, which underscores the high capacity potentials of planners and operators. d. Projected logistic requirements to drive the strategic and tactical plans as well as the divergent needs of the peace building phase and other humanitarian imperatives. e. Unbroken commitment of sponsors in meeting pledges so that logistic shortfalls could be bridged at the planning stage through other sources. f. Application of logistics planning factors and principles earlier enumerated. g. Established relationship between sources of logistics support and the coordinating cell to be established at the mission area. 18. The successful execution of logistics in PSOs also relates to the integration and coordination of logistic provisions received from various sources, generally, mediating agencies, TCCs, voluntary donor governments, other donors and host governments. This requires a coordinated decision-making body and process in addition to agreements to be established in specified MOU, in order to: a. Streamline items to be supplied by each contributor and their timings. b. Ascertain the categories, types and levels of support being provided by TCCs. c. Determine transport sources and select supply routes in relation to the distribution plan. d. Supervise the process of warehousing and operators’ responsibilities. e. Inspect and ascertain local support facilities available and their utilisation. f. Employ specialised personnel for logistic duties within mission area. MISSION LIFECYCLE AND FINANCE MISSION LIFECYCLE 19. Mission life cycle refers to all activities from the commencement of a PSO to its conclusion. In logistic circle, the life cycle covers planning, deployment, sustainment and liquidation phases. Logistics support for each phase is determined by the specific tasks as would be mandated by the mediating agency as well as the implied ones that experts would identify and collate for a thorough mission analysis. Consequently, mission life cycle is influenced by the nature of terrain and engagement, equipment types and quantities, personnel level and support capability as well as the desired end-state and anticipated duration. These determinants influence logistic requirements in types, condition, quality, quantities, placement and rate of flow. 20. The mission life cycle of PSOs is based on projections made by mediating agencies regarding the nature, scale and duration of missions at hand. These are significant factors along with size of contingents that determine financial requirements to be solicited from regular and specified contributions to mediating agencies. However, some mission life cycles have defied all projections, only to be supported continually by the mediating agency hoping for desired end-states. Mission creep was evident in the conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir Region as well as in Cyprus since 1947 and 1972 respectively. FINANCE 21. Mediating agencies have their sources of raising funds and systems of financing PSOs. Under the UN system, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) estimates financial requirements of authorised PSOs based on the submission of its subordinate Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD). The estimate is presented to the General Assembly for approval. The approval is made based on the advice of the Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Question (ACABQ). Thereafter, the Secretary General has the power of expenditure for that particular mission. In the mission area, authority for expenditure is vested on the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) with caveats while the Chief Finance Officer plays specialist roles. The CAO could expend up to $ 50,000 on his own merit while the field committee established for financial control could authorise expenditure of up to $ 200,000. Expenses beyond $ 200,000 are to be referred to the UNDPKO for approval. 22. Funds for conducting PSOs are sourced from regular UN budget and voluntary contributions. There are also assessed contributions based on formula ratio to be determined by the General Assembly, which recognises the financial strength of member states. However, the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council contribute more, which justifies their special roles in the preservation of global security. The US pays the largest share, which stood at 27.1% of the total sums expended on PSOs in 2004. As the number and scope of PSOs increase, the costs increase correspondingly.[xvii] On the whole, these sources provide adequate funds for the UN to sustain peacekeepers while meeting related financial obligations in terms of personnel management, force sustainability and reimbursements. 23. Regional organisations secure funds through similar sources. In Africa, the protocols specify the sources of funds as the Secretariat from annual levy, regional and international agencies as well as bilateral and multilateral sources.[xviii] Similarly, in the case of ECOWAS, finances shall be raised from provisions in annual budget, community levy and special request to be made to the UN and other international agencies. Other sources include voluntary contributions and grants from bilateral and multilateral sources.[xix] A bridge is also made between urgency of induction associated with the sub-region and financial limitations, as TCCs are required to bear all expenses for the first 3-6 months to be reimbursed later. LOGISTICS CHALLENGES IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 24. There are numerous challenges relating to logistics support in PSOs. Those discussed at the strategic level relate to peacekeeping in Africa by African. Issues considered are regional infrastructure, faulty intelligence estimate, effects of changing mandate on logistics, difficulties in funding regional PSOs, inadequate force provisioning and partisanship. INFRASTRUCTURAL INTEGRATION 25. Logistics is not a process that relies on the moment, but one that strives on preparation, amongst which is the provision of infrastructure. In that regard, while on enforcement operations, the UN Security Council would require ‘‘armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the rights of passage…’’ from member countries .[xx] In terms of facilities to be provided, the call nowadays is for regional integration of infrastructure for utilisation during PSOs and other collective security operations. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has 11,500 kms of military pipelines (known as the NATO Pipeline System) in Europe with depots in 14 countries for use during peace, crisis and conflict periods. The pipelines are commercially adapted during normalcy with strict safeguards under the Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency with headquarters in Versailles, France. The pipelines are further integrated with national systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Spain. They receive, store and transport POL using 13 compatible modules, thus, providing a multinational approach to common needs and problems.[xxi] Roads, railways, air and maritime transport systems are also integrated for reason of capacity utilization. These resources that were developed during the Cold War era are now available for Out of Theatre Operations. They were readily available for NATO forces in their PSOs effort against Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic to stop the massacre of the Bosnian people. The same infrastructure is being employed in support of the International Assistance Stabilisation Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban Government in 2002. 26. Unlike the European arrangement, infrastructural facilities are limited in Africa that houses peacekeepers continually since the 1990s. Logistics support for operations in Rwanda had to depend on airlifts due to its landlocked geography and the absence of cheaper alternatives. Current PSOs in the Darfur Region of the Sudan is also bedevilled by infrastructural limitations. Provisions made to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by NGOs are done across country due to limited road networks in the general area. Medicare depends on mobile systems while generators are the sources of power in affected areas.[xxii] 27. Addressing infrastructural limitations may take time in Africa, but efforts are being made in that direction. Under the auspices of New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the Trans African Highway have further programmed interconnectivity of African countries using roads and railways. Such facilities, driven by continental economic integration plan, provide security benefits in the movement of supplies to peacekeepers, refuges and IDPs. FAULTY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 28. Most PSOs commence after the crises at hand have escalated due to some political factors such as non-intervention policy, lack of interests of Major Powers and the often long durational process before the issuance of mandate. Only then do planners of PSOs kick-start intense mission analysis, general preparation and eventual induction of forces. Among the limitations is faulty intelligence estimates that contributed to numerous errors in the past. During the enforcement operations (OP EL-SADAI) that countered the coup of 26 May 2007 staged by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), logistical lapses were recorded. It also affected the progressive phases of OP SANDSTORM that dislodged the rebels and instituted democratic governance in a troubled West African State. In the PSOs conducted in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, faulty intelligence estimate in the face of vanishing logistics support played major roles in the decade long mission creep suffered. This brought untold hardship to ordinary citizens. In the Liberian example, out of a population of 2.5 million in 1989 when the conflict started, 1.2 million were displaced and about 200,000 killed.[xxiii] 29. That intelligence failure contributes to the long durations often suffered in conflict resolutions in Africa and its consequent effects on logistics, calls for active intelligence centres, preventive diplomacy, high readiness units, speedy passage of resolutions and well stocked logistics centres. These have already been initiated in Africa with a view to ensuring effective intervention and durable peace across the continent. With the exception of preventive diplomacy, lack of political will is the only snag against the full realisation of other programmes. EFFECT OF CHANGING MANDATE ON LOGISTICS 30. Mandates are issued by the UN Security Council for both UN and regional PSOs, which determine the nature of engagement, number of troops and equipment levels to be provided. In the Liberian example, the first UN resolution came much after the sub-regional intervention using ECOMOG. Regarding the operational phases, UN mandates that followed were continually changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and vice versa to suit changing security scenes and programmes towards resolution. 31. At onset, ECOMOG force level stood at 3,000 men. The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 788 of 1992 that followed, towed the path of enforcement operation, hence, force level increased to 16,000 by 1993. The UNSCR 866 established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to work along with ECOMOG, the first time a UN mission would be jointly undertaken with a regional organisation. They were to create the necessary space for peace making between warring parties, therefore, presented a peacekeeping posture. Force level then dropped to 8,430 in February 1995. The UNSCR 972 wanted effective ceasefire, effective arms embargo and disarmament, therefore, towed the path of enforcement. Force level ascended to 11,000 in early 1997.[xxiv] In the same year, UNSCR 1116 set the stage for elections, therefore, needed some free atmosphere, requiring a peacekeeping posture. Added to this was the need to move forces to neighbouring Sierra Leone where another crisis had erupted. Force level, therefore, dropped around 1999. With the eruption of fresh crises in Liberia, forces were re-inducted as ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 4 August 2003 and 1 October 2003 respectively.[xxv] Force level was kept at 10,645.[xxvi] 32. Continuous fluctuation in force level implies the employment of strategic lift for scaling down and beefing up of contingents among other logistic implications. Without prejudice to reasons for the changes in mandates in Liberia, fluctuations in force level demean logistic efficiency, especially in a region with a low financial base and materially dependent military forces. Since strategy and tactics are driven by logistics, regular change in mandate need not affect force level and equipment holding to pose logistic problems that exerts on force efficiency. More so that experiences suggest that the intensity or otherwise of African conflicts remain uncertain, therefore, better approached with standing forces until durable peace is relatively attained. DIFFICULTY IN FUNDING REGIONAL OPERATIONS 33. Unlike operations mediated by the UN and economically vibrant regions, funding regional and sub-regional PSOs in Africa has not been very successful due to weak financial bases of member states. The first and only Organisation of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping mission in Chad in 1982 was almost bankrolled by Nigeria. The failure of the UN to intervene in Liberia from the beginning of the crisis led to the ad hoc formation and induction of ECOMOG on 24 August 1990. The attention and priority of Major Powers was on the Gulf Crisis, therefore, material and financial donations to support the sub-regional initiative were mostly sourced from within member states. 34. During the period of the 2 West African conflicts, Africa’s debt burden stood at $ 275 billion, representing 73% of the continent’s Gross Domestic Products (GDP). As a result, over 30% of the continent’s foreign exchange earnings were expended on debt servicing.[xxvii] With the debt scourge, no appreciable donations were received from member nations, which caused Nigeria to expend $1 million daily.[xxviii] Former President Olusegun Obasanjo placed the total figure at $12 billion. In the face of acute financial limitations in 1989, the Standing Mediation Committee on Liberia called for ‘‘the creation of a special emergency fund for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia.’'[xxix] Consequently, during ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, troops were paid a paltry sum of $ 150 monthly as against the $ 1,028 of the UN. This wide disparity in allowances would have contributed to the low morale occasioned with ECOMOG troops, leading to some lapses and the recorded mission creep. In March 1991, therefore, Nigeria had to challenge some African nations for failing to settle outstanding sums totalling $45 million for the Regular Budget and the Liberation Fund.[xxx] 35. That Nigeria expended $ 1 million daily to sustain ECOMOG operations in Liberia cannot be a permanent avenue for funding PSOs within ECOWAS or the continent. The cost of conducting robust PSOs in Liberia for the projected 6 months would have been less than the cost of over a decade-long operation. It is in recognition of these that the sub-regions need to hold a reasonable percentage of annual levies in consolidated funds to meet intelligence projections. Funds would then be disbursed at early stages to meet force generation and projected logistic requirements of peacekeeping missions. However, other sources would be explored simultaneously. INADEQUATE FORCE PROVISIONING 36. The challenge associated with force provisioning is not peculiar to PSOs sponsored by the UN, but to regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa. The organisations are handicapped to effectively sponsor PSOs in their respective jurisdictions. During the Liberian crisis, ECOWAS initially agreed that each contingent is to be self-sufficient for the first 3 months. On the contrary, TCCs had to re-supply their forces throughout the operation. There was no centralized logistic distribution system, leading to numerous shortfalls. Lift capability was also highly deficient. In mid-1995, ECOMOG had only one functional helicopter meant for the Force Commander. Inadequate maintenance of equipment was evident as TCCs operated old equipment frequently undergoing repairs. Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania, for example, used primarily Chinese and Soviet equipment that proved difficult for them to secure spares and repair services. Most contingents, therefore, relied on Nigeria that provided most of the heavy weapons, military aircraft and naval vessels as well as POL for the entire operation.[xxxi] 37. Nigeria that played the role of sub-regional hegemony is also saddled with similar problems. In 1993, the House of Representatives recorded poor logistics, low payment for personnel, lack of medical team, poor feeding and absence of essential facilities as factors militating against the efficient performance of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone. Other aspects recognised in the report were poor vehicle states, limited communication equipment and non-availability of indigenous food.[xxxii] Also, the Nigerian Armed Forces that moved her troops and those of other nations in the 1990s for PSOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed to exercise similar performance for the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2005. Consequently, NATO had to move 3 battalions each from Nigeria and Rwanda and one from Senegal to Darfur in July 2005 for participation in AMIS.[xxxiii] This call for urgent reappraisal of situations, especially in Africa that is so directly affected, with a view to enhancing logistics in future PSOs. 38. In addressing the problem of force provisioning, Africa is establishing a rapid deployment brigade in each sub-region. This is being established along with logistics bases akin to the UN bases in Brindisi, Italy and Oslo, Norway, to meet common logistical needs. So far, only West Africa and East Africa have selected their sites for logistics bases in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Nairobi, Kenya, respectively. This too, is not without financial implications. Currently, the US that owns the site chosen for the logistics base in West Africa is asking for a compensation of $ 10 million from a sub-region with a weak financial base.[xxxiv] In the light of the financial implications of establishing 5 logistics bases and the slow pace of actualising them, the AU faces the challenges of reversing her decision. Current thinking revolves around establishing one central logistics base for all sub-regions on a site yet to be determined.[xxxv] PARTISANSHIP OF SOME CONTIGUOUS STATES 39. All participants of PSOs are expected to observe the principles of neutrality and transparency that are being questioned in some peacekeeping environments. Without prejudice to opposing views, intra-state conflicts typical of the African continent are catalysed within neighbourhoods. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that rebels against the Ugandan Government has its headquarters in Southern Sudan. The Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) has its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. The Sierra Leonean crisis under the umbrella of the Revolutionary United Front had the support of the Government of Liberia under Charles Taylor. The Tutsi response to genocide in Rwanda was launched from Uganda. Rwanda that later arrested Gen Lauret Nkunda in 2008, was his sponsor against the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[xxxvi] With partisanship of such unparallel magnitude by contiguous nations, staging logistics support bases for PSOs would be limited to other neighbouring countries considered neutral, irrespective of the strategic and technical limitations that inhibit efficiency. INSECURITY OF NGOS AND THE EFFECT ON LOGISTICS 40. Humanitarian organisations that partake actively in supporting refugees and IDPs are no longer secure in peacekeeping environments within Africa as warring parties violate related international laws without remorse. Resources meant to alleviate human sufferings are forcefully diverted to the prosecution of civil wars. In Mobutu’s Zaire, came numerous instances. In March 1997, Laurent Kabila forcefully took 15,000 gallons of fuel from UNHCR Depot in Goma. He used the fuel to ferry 300 troops for the attack on Lubumbashi on 9 April 1997. Kabila also relied on stolen truck for troop’s mobility and stolen food for force sustenance. Mobutu’s forces equally hijacked UN chartered aircraft to transport weapons in his futile bid to evict opponent forces led by Kabila. Worst still, the hijacked aircraft landed in a UN refugee camp where Rwandan Hutu refugees were hopelessly converted into Mobutu’s first line of defence.[xxxvii] In Liberia, Charles Taylor restlessly murdered civilians while forcefully engaging medical and other professionals to the benefit of his forces. 41. The development in the Darfur Region of the Sudan presents another dimension of logistic shortfalls. The Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In response, 13 NGOs were expelled from Darfur on 3 March 2009 for alleged partisanship. Al-Bashir accused the NGOs of being ‘‘collaborators and spies acting as political mercenaries with intelligence goals.’’[xxxviii] He further directed all foreign NGOs to leave the Sudan within one year and any relief materials would either be dropped at strategic points for delivery by citizens or not brought in at all.[xxxix] No one is left in doubt that NGOs being willing donors, would rather be expelled than place resources in the hands of Al-Bashir and his war machine. Worst still, that the resources so contributed would only strengthen the Sudanese forces through direct consumption or as a weapon of war against the Darfurians that it is meant to support on humanitarian grounds. To the US Amb to UN, Susan Rice, and aptly so, the expulsion puts the lives of 1.5 million Sudanese IDPs at the risk of lacking food, shelter, health care and drinking water, since their wellbeing largely depends on the provisions from NGOs.[xl] 42. The incessant security threats to and direct attacks on NGOs as well as the political dimension to logistics lead to humanitarian catastrophe among IDPs that largely depend on such provisions. This in turn expands the role of military logisticians in supporting an affected population to bridge the wide shortfall. Therefore, the challenge before the continent is that of prioritising the security of NGOs and other humanitarian organisations irrespective of their quest for independence and neutrality. Added to this, war crime trials seem to concentrate on issues other than logistics. Kabila and Mobutu escaped the trial and conviction while Taylor’s trial centres on human right abuses. It need be emphasised that violators of the neutrality of NGOs ought to be visibly sanctioned via the ICC platform with a view to deterring future perpetrators of such unethical conducts. THE WAY FORWARD 43. The success story of preventive diplomacy underscores its sustenance with a view to preventing the diversion of funds from developmental pursuit to meeting logistic needs of peacekeepers. Nevertheless, Africa needs to be well prepared for intervention in conflict environments through the development of local support capacity. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SUPPORT CAPACITY 44. Most logistic problems identified with African peacekeepers revolve around limited resources, obsolete equipment, scarcity of spare parts and maintenance quagmire. They result from poor planning, lack of financial capacity for adequate procurement and over dependence on foreign military hardware and support facilities by member states. This calls for a comprehensive approach to self reliance, which can be achieved through a durable national industrial policy driven by the private sector. Perhaps, national militaries could strengthen the laudable idea by linking their Research and Development (R&D) outfits with industries possessing the potentials for defence related productions. The South African experience where 50% of funds for R&D are provided by the military suffices. FUNDING 45. Funding plays a primary role in logistical activities since it is money converted into goods and services in support of a task. In that regard, poor capital base militates against the performance of PSOs in Africa. Added to existing sources, an agreed percentage of UN reimbursement to African states that participate in UN mediated PSOs could be dedicated to regional and sub-regional accounts. This, however, would be based on consensus since some countries are not known for participation in PSOs, which denies equity. Also and without prejudice to assistances rendered by the UN to regional PSOs, one other option is for the former that authorises interventions to partially bankroll PSOs directly mediated by regional or sub-regional organisations. STRATEGIC LEFT CAPABILITY 46. Lift capability is required for speedy induction of peacekeepers with a view to ensuring early intervention, especially in crisis involving genocide and other crimes against humanity, such as Rwanda of 1994. One country each in the 5 sub-regions with private air lines could be earmarked to provide strategic lift whenever required. Ethiopia in East Africa, South Africa in Southern Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Cameroun in Central Africa, Libya in North Africa, for example, could be officially earmarked as strategic lift nations. Internal and detailed arrangements could then be left for the governments of such countries to be followed by periodic inspections. Similar arrangements could be made for sea lift based on national capabilities. PROPOSED LOGISTICS BASES 47. The Call for Centralised Logistic Base. Recent call for a centralised logistic base as against the 5 bases earlier proposed relates to the financial difficulties that bedevils the African continent. However, this option creates the problem of mobility in moving stocked items to distant flashpoints, especially while operating multiple PSOs concurrently. This was particularly the case with ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In another scenario, a central logistics base could fall within a conflict ridden environment that would prevent usage. There is, therefore, the need for alternative logistics bases to underscore the advantage of the decentralised option. The UN may also be requested to establish and run a logistics base in Africa to ease transportation and reduce other cost when required to operate within the vicinity. 48. Stocking the Bases. The major problem of stocking the proposed logistics bases revolves around paucity of funds. This led to the proposal that 0.5% levy be placed on all imports to be dedicated to the Security Fund of the AU for stocking the depots. Added to this, member states could be levied according to their financial capacities for initial stocking of the bases. Military related industries operating in Africa may also be requested to assist in stocking the bases with some of their products. Assistance may also be sought from the UN and willing donors towards equipping the 5 logistics bases. 49. Types of Stocks. Logistics items to be stocked in the 5 logistics bases should be non-perishable items identified to create shortfalls in previous PSOs. Areas of special interests are those of transportation, communication and medicare. Perishable items may be outsourced to companies capable of delivering at short notice, taking cognisance of culture and traditions of respective peacekeepers. AMMUNITION SUPPLY 50. One observation in the ECOWAS provision that requires further review might be the case of ammunition supply. It is in the ECOWAS Standby Force Operational Framework that: Provision of 1st line ammunition (3days of Supply) for national weapons is a national responsibility. 2nd and 4th line will be provided by ECOWAS, subject to confirmation that it can meet the requirement (ammunition type and quantity).[xli] 51. The option that ECOWAS could provide 2nd & 4th line ammunition to forces subject to confirmation that it can meet the requirement, places a major burden on ECOWAS itself. For reasons of differing weapon systems, existing national supply sources, expiration period and disposal capabilities, possible laxity by contingents, the said clause needs to be reviewed. The provision of ammunition could be exclusively reserved for TCCs to be reimbursed according to existing rules. CONCLUSION 52. Logistics is wide in scope and cannot be exhaustively discussed in a simple lecture, therefore, needs to be studied continually. It is dynamic in planning and execution, therefore, requires attention and supervision. It is the engine or bloodline of PSOs that must be effectively and efficiently handled, therefore, needs to be cherished by all strategists. It is of interest to all parties as suppliers or consumers, therefore, call for the observance of associated principles and factors. Those commanders that neglect logistics before, during and after any assignment embrace failure, therefore, the key to the success of great commanders. 53. To borrow the words of late Maj Gen JN Garba, ‘…Africa is great… (but), her problems are immense. … the time has come for concrete action…we must not worry, weaken or falter… If we do not solve our problems, nobody else will. It is time to labour and not seek rest, to fight and not heed the wounds. Let us, therefore, rededicate ourselves anew for the challenging tasks ahead…’.[xlii] ENDNOTES ----------------------- [i]. Jean Jacque Babel quoted in Vicilli Mamnotov: Disarmament – The Command of the Times, (Progress Publishers, 1979), p.9. [ii]. The Webster’s Dictionary records the casualties of the First World War as follows: Central Powers 3,350,000; France 1,390,000; Russia 1, 700,000; Britain 780,000; US 120,000. These figures give a total of 7,340,000 human lives wasted. [iii]. Frank Billings Kellogg was the US Secretary of State between 1925 and 1929. He represented his country in the course of fashioning the Pact and was the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1929. Aristide Briand was 10 times the French Prime Minister between 1909 and 1929. He participated actively in the formation of the League of Nations and advocated for a federal European Union. He was instrumental to the formulation of the Locarno Pact in 1925 and the issue being discussed, both of which were against any form of war. [iv]. The Webster’s Dictionary also records the casualties of Second World War as follows: Russia 17 million; Germany 6 million; Jews 6 million; Poland 5.6 million; Japan 2 million; Yugoslavia 1.6 million; France 570,000; Rumania 460,000; Italy 450,000; Hungary 430,000; Britain 400,000; US 400,000; The Netherlands 210,000. This gives a total of 41, 120,000 human lives. [v]. Opening phrase to the United Nations Charter. [vi]. RA Adesina, Reversed Victory, (….., 2002), p…. [vii]. Amb Marshall McCallie, CROSSROADS Magazine, (US Information Centre of August 1997, Vol 3), p.13. [viii]. The Economist of 18 October 1997 as quoted in the speech of Nigeria’s former Foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Tom Ikimi, in an address to then OAU. The address was reported in the Daily Times of Monday, 24 November 1997. [ix]. Dag Hammerkjold was Secretary General between April 1953 and September 63 when he died in a plane crash in Africa. In his effort to prevent conflict between super powers due to their opposing interests in the North and South Korea, he exploited the opportunity and the General Assembly, in place of the Security Council, passed the first Uniting for Peace Resolution. The 1950 conflict between North Korea and the Republic of Korea witnessed the intervention of the US with 16 other countries in alliance. Though it carried the UN flag under the name United Nations Command, it is no longer classified as a UN peacekeeping mission. Found in Fact about the United Nations. [x]. ‘‘The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations’’, Joint Warfare Publication (Second Edition), (London, 2002), p.2. [xi]. Introductory words to the UN Peacekeeping Assistance Teams: Advisor’s Guidebook. [xii]. Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology Course Module, ‘‘Logistics and Supply Chain Management Programme – Principles of Logistics’’, (Course Code: LSGM 504), p.1. [xiii]. Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology Course Module, ‘‘Logistics and Supply Chain Management Programme – Global Logistics’’, (Course Code: LSGM 511), p.6. [xiv]. Lt Gen William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains – Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, (Harvard Business School Press- 1992), p.2. [xv]. Harvey J Langholtz (ed), ‘‘Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Intermediate Logistics Course’’, (UNITAR Programme, New York, 1999), p.4. [xvi]. Harvey J. Langholtz (ed), ‘‘Peace Operations Training Institute Module ‘‘Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction’’, (Williamsburg, VA USA, 2008), p.19. [xvii]. James W. Swigert (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary), ‘‘Challenges of Peacekeeping in Africa’’, presentation before the Africa Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee in Washington DC, (Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 8 October 2004), p.2. [xviii]. Africans Constitutive Act, Article 36. [xix]. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Articles 36&37. [xx]. UN Charter, Article 43 (1). [xxi]. “Logistics Support for NATO operations,” at www.nato.int/logistics/logistics-e.pdf.7/30/2007. Accessed 1 Aug 2007. [xxii]. Unstructured interview with Col II Abbah, the Commander of NIBATT 1 in AMIS on 23 March 2009. [xxiii]. Christopher Tuck, http://web.Africa.ufl.Edu/asq/v4/ v4c 1 a 1. htm Accessed 25 June 2004. [xxiv]. Ibid (for force level only). [xxv]. Unstructured interview with Maj Olabode, a member of the Nigerian Contingent for both operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone on 26 March 2009. [xxvi]. While others are ECOMOG forces, the last were UN forces from Bangladesh (3,237), Ethiopia (2,546), Nigeria (2,134) and Pakistan (2,728). [xxvii]. Ministry of Information and Culture, Abacha Speaks, (The Blue-Heavens Communication and Publishing Company Ltd, Lagos, 1998), p.40. [xxviii]. Course Content of the ‘‘Peacekeeping in Accordance to the Rule of Law’’, 2002, in the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies of the USA. [xxix]. Comfort Ero http://www.jha.ac/articles/a005.htm Accessed June 2002. [xxx]. Maj Gen IOS Nwachuku, in his address as Nigeria’s Minister for Foreign Affairs to the OAU 53th Ordinary Summit in March 1991 at Addis Ababa. Reported in publication of Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity, pp 283-4. [xxxi]. Maj Gen BA Jinadu , ‘‘Nigeria in Global Peace Support Operations’’, lecture delivered to students of Logistics Management Course, NACOL, in June 2004, p.12. [xxxii]. Ado Audu Dogo, Nigeria National Assembly member and Chairman House Committee on Army, as reported in the Daily Trust Newspaper, (Vol 6 No. 95, 19 September 2003), pp1 &2. [xxxiii]. Logistics Support for NATO operations, Op Cit. [xxxiv]. Unstructured interview with Brig Gen Hassan Lai, the Director West African Rapid Reaction Brigade in Abuja on 17 Mach 2009. [xxxv]. ibid. [xxxvi]. It is opined that Rwanda did not arrest Gen Nkunda merely for the love of peace and the progress of the continent, but out of compulsion. Rose Kabuye, Director of Protocol to the Government of Rwanda was arrested on 9 November 2008 at Frankfurt International Airport by German authorities. She is accused of being part of those that blew the Presidential aircraft in 1994 that killed President Habyarimanna and eventually led to the genocide in Rwanda. The arrest was allegedly made as a bargaining chip to compel the Government of Rwanda to stop supporting Gen Nkunda against the DRC. Although Rose Kabuye is still being held in France awaiting trial, the future cannot be determined. But another objective was achieved. [xxxvii]. Mark Malan, Ibid. [xxxviii]. Aljazeera News of 16 March 2009. [xxxix]. ibid. [xl]. Susan Rice, current US Ambassador to the UN on Aljazeera News of 21 March 2009. [xli]. ECOWAS Standby Force Operational Framework of 24 November 2006, Section 6 – Equipment and Logistics, pp.17 of 19, paragraph.46. [xlii]. Maj Gen JN Garba, in his address as Nigeria’s External Affairs Commissioner to the 13th Summit of the OAU in 1976 at Mauritius, Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity, p.158.