Liberation_War_of_Bd

MUKTHIBAHINI OPERATIONS AND TOTAL PEOPLE’S WAR INTRODUCTION 1. Bangladesh a brave and heroic nation, earned its independence in 1971 at the cost of millions of its brave son of the soil. Liberation war of Bangladesh is a glorious episode of the nation’s history, distinct from liberation wars fought elsewhere. Birth of Bangladesh, as a separate physical and political entity on the world map is associated with memories of great sacrifices, bitter struggle and great pain. Liberation war of 1971 is a landmark event in nation’s history and that of the world. It was fought at the backdrop of a protracted history of subjugation, struggle for identity, dignity and freedom in all spheres of life. It was prolong and costly in terms of destruction and death. One of the major manifestations of the war is the operation conducted by large, well organised army against helpless, unarmed people led by an odd assortment of poorly armed soldiers and Mukti Bahini. At the backdrop of a trail of contributory events the traumatic massacre of 25 March 1971 unfolded a full-scale war beginning with resistance operations. Having withstood the shock of the initial onslaught, the Liberation Army took the battle to the entire enemy artery by guerrilla warfare. Throughout the nine months of war, operations of different dimension and magnitude were conducted from within and outside the territory. The Indian government trained and equipped Bangladesh guerrillas in order to keep the Bangladesh movement alive. Eventually, operations in the early months prepared the stage for the final offensive. These ranged from actions by relatively large forces to a small-scale engagement; fought either in conformity to or outside the overall plan. There were representations from all three services and mass people. The war leaves a host lessons for the students of military history and demand due reckoning. 2. Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 with two wings – the East and the West, separated by thousand miles of Indin Territory. Except the religion, people of the two wings had nothing else in common1. People of the Eastern Wing were denied of equal rights and a new form of colonization began. Government in the west controlled the Armed Forces, the bureaucracy, and the political and economic spheres of Pakistan. 1 Islam Rafiqul, BU, A Tale of Millions, Ananna Publishers, 3rd Edition 1986, P 30. 3. Beside the disparity other contributory factors of the war can be summarised as follows: a. 1948-1952. While addressing a mammoth gathering on 21st March 1948, Mr. M A Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan announced Urdu to be the state language. Bengali students defied this proclamation through The 'Language Movement' of 1952, which was temporarily silenced by brutal killing. b. 1954. Election victory of the United Front against the Muslim League was denied. c. 1956 -1957. Formulation of first constitution with no significant concern for the East and postponement of the election scheduled for 1957. d. 1958. Martial Law enacted with General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Democracy was a far cry and evidence of dominating the Bengali nation was prominent. e. 1965. During Indo-Pak War the notion - ‘defence of the East lies in the West’ surfaced. The Bengalis were convinced more than ever before that they were being neglected.2 f. 1966. Sheikh Mujib’s six points programme for greater autonomy responded by 'Agartala Conspiracy' case leading to severe civil unrest. g. 1969. On 25 March, in the face of extreme pressure for autonomy, Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahya Khan presumably for tougher actions.3 h. 1970. Awami League’s victory in national and provincial assembly and the centre’s ploy not to hand over power once again revealed the military juntas intent. j. 1971. On 7 March, Sheikh Mujib in his historic address declared, ‘movement this time is the movement of emancipation’. Bilateral talks during the period brought no significant result. The scene was ready for an armed confrontation. 4. Once the Pakistani Army started its onslaught, the Bengali elements were simply traumatized and had no apparent response. The Bengali soldiers did take extreme 2 3 Niazi A.A.K., The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, P 35. Islam, Op. Cit. PP 56 - 58. 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED steps in the process of being disarmed. However, with the declaration of independence troops from all regular and para military forces from all over the country joined the fight, forming the nucleus of the resistance. All five East Bengal Battalions, 17 EPR wings, elements from other services and civilians resisted the barbarous hordes causing often high casualty on them. In the face of continued brutality and lack of matching military might remnants of hard core youths continued to organize sporadic resistance. In the mean time, voluntary participation from general mass beefed up the skeleton formed by the regular forces. From the ashes of mass resistance, a liberation army, popularly known as Mukti Bahini was raised. 5. The bravery and courage displayed by Mukti Bahini during the war of liberation shall ever remain as a source of inspiration. In the liberation war, the entire nation stood as ‘Single United Team’ where people from all walks of life fought valiantly against an organized army to free their sacred motherland. The world witnessed the martial capacity of a so-called ‘Non-martial Race’. It was the people’s war where the regular forces and guerrillas fought together for a single common cause of liberating Bangladesh. AIM 6. To analyze the Mukti Bahani operations in the light of ‘Total people’s war’. SCOPE 7. The subject will be unfolded as follows: a. b. c. The concept of ‘Total People’s War’. Mukti Bahini Operation in light of total people’s war. Analysis on Mukti Bahini operations in light of total people’s war. THE CONCEPT OF ‘TOTAL PEOPLE’S WAR’ 8. Total People's War is a military-political strategy invented by Mao Zedong. The basic concept behind People's War is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the interior where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of 'Mobile Warfare' and Guerrilla warfare. A guerrilla war is usually an ideological war. It is a war of the weak against the strong. Guerrilla warfare cannot, by itself, bring 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED final victory. Guerrilla warfare can only weaken the strength of the enemy. It does not mean that all the people are fighting; rather all people are supporting the fight. A guerrilla war must not consist of unorganized destruction; it must be of systematic character. A guerrilla movement has its base within the people. The people support, care for and conceal the guerrillas. The enemy’s arsenals are the guerrilla’s sources of weapons. The principal requirements for guerrilla warfare are: a people who will give assistance, sufficient geographical room, and a war of long duration. 9. A total people’s war needs a unified leadership, not only at national level but also down to the local level. The strategy of total people's war was used heavily by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Similar ideas were advocated and used by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution. 10. In its original formulation by Mao Zedong, people's war exploits the few advantages that a small revolutionary movement has. Popular support can be one of them—against a state's power with a large and well-equipped army. People's war strategically avoids decisive battles, since a tiny force of a few dozen soldiers would easily be routed in an all-out confrontation with the state. Instead, it favours a three stage strategy of protracted warfare, with carefully chosen battles that can realistically be won. a. In stage one, revolutionary force conducting people's war starts in a remote area with mountainous or otherwise difficult terrain in which its enemy is weak. It attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area. b. As it grows in power, it enters stage two, establishes other revolutionary base areas and spreads its influence through the surrounding countryside, where it may become the governing power and gain popular support. c. Eventually in stage three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it seizes power in the entire country. 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED MUKTI BAHINI OPERATIONS IN LIGHT OF TOTAL PEOPLE’S WAR 11. The evil actions by Pakistani political and military leaders ultimately brought nationalistic and patriotic people together for the cause of liberating the motherland. The resistance started sporadically and ultimately escalated into Total People’s War. The root of the crisis which culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh lay in the immoral political intention of Pakistani Government. Political Intention of Pakistan Government 12. The strategy of the then Pakistan Government had been to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan by ruthlessly suppressing popular uprising in East Pakistan. The Pakistani Government envisaged that the demand for autonomy in the then east Pakistan was the brain child of the few ambitious political leaders of the east and it can be diminished by killing few thousands of Bengali leaders. This mentality was reflected by the comment of the then governor of East Pakistan Lieutenant general Tikka Khan known as Butcher of Beluch. He said, “Give me one week, I will bring back normalcy to East Pakistan”. Bhutto, the leader of Pakistani peoples Party expressed the same view to some foreign journalists and said “The autonomy issue has been created by few intellectuals. A few thousand dead in Dhaka and east Pakistan will be quiet soon.” 13. To materialize their political aim the military leaders also played a vital role which was expressed by the comments of General Rao Farman Ali. He said “We know how to push our way through and we will do that at all costs”. Accordingly the first batch of troops arrived at Dhaka by Boeing aircraft on 28 February 1971 under strict security cover. Tanks were brought to Dhaka from other cantonments and these were put on soft tracks for use on city roads. From the next day onward, troops movement by air from western wing to east became a regular feature. What followed was a serious of actions and counter actions, treachery, betrayals and blunders, as if all in a stage play, leading to the genocide of the Bengalis that started from the night of March 25, 1971. 14. On 25/26 March midnight, Pakistan Army launched the ugliest genocide by the order of General Tikkah Khan. The strategy of the occupation army was to destroy the seeds of Bengali nationalism and subjugate them forever. Simultaneous attacks were 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED launched on at EPR HQ at Peelkhana, police line at Rajarbag, Comilla, Jessore, Rangpur, Chittagong and EBRC. Hundreds of EPR personnel, police and new recruits of EBRC were brutally killed. About 300 teachers and intellectuals were killed on the first night. Birth of Mukti Bahini 15. Initial Activities and Resistance. Immediately after the crackdown of 25 March the Bengali forces reacted spontaneously in different parts of the country and armed resistance gradually grew up. The whole Bengali nation became united to protest against the most atrocious genocide of the world. The Officers and men of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 East Bengal Regiment, Police and EPR encountered the Pakistan Army. The heroic public including, Students, laborers, farmers, intellectuals and service personnel started rebellion. 16. Formation of Mukti Bahini. Mukti Bahini consisted of the regular and the irregular forces. The regulars were later called ‘Niomito Bahini’ (Regular Force ) and the irregulars were called ‘Gono Bahini’ (People’s Force). The Niomito Bahini included EBR, EPR and Police. The Gono Bahini was the forces consisted of students, peasants, workers and political activists. The total estimated strength of Niomito Bahini was 80,000. It comprises approximately 6000 regular in EBR’s six battalions who formed the nucleus, about 15000 men in EPR and 45000 police both armed and semiarmed. By the first week of April, most of the revolting Bengali troops had been flashed out into rural areas. 17. Independent and Local Forces. In addition to Mukti Bahini there were few other independent forces that operated locally. Abdul Quader Siddique of Tangail organised a strong force comprising mainly students and villagers which was known as “Quadaria Bahini”. This force carried out a number of successful operations in and around Tangail and was able to keep this part of the country liberated throughout. Another group composed of young patriotic Bangladeshi having been trained in “Dehradun of India”, operated independently dividing into four sectors. This group was known as “Mujib Bahini”. This force operated under the direct guidance of government nominated political leaders. 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 18. Organization. In 13 April 1971, the provisional government of Bangladesh was proclaimed at Mujibnagar, Colonel Osmani was appointed Commander-in–Chief to organise armed resistance against the Pakistan army with the ultimate aim of winning freedom. Colonel Osmani established his HQ at Calcutta and appointed Lieutenant Colonel MA Rob and Group A K Khandaker as his Chiefs of Staff. At the end of April the resistance movement entered in its next phase. From being solely land forces organisation it expanded into all services structure. Many of the Bengali naval and air force personnel who were stranded in West Pakistan defected to join the liberation war. 19. Area of Responsibilities of Sectors. The Mukti Bahini at this stage were highly disorganised and lacked co-ordination. The provisional government decided to reorganise and co-ordinate all activities of the Mukti Bahini. To bring all the elements of Mukti Bahini under one umbrella and unify their efforts they were organised into a number of sectors. Thus entire Bangladesh was divided into 11 sectors having independent responsibilities. By July 71, 8 sectors could be made operational. 6 7 8 9 10 11 3 2 1 5 4 Figure – 1: Sector Area of Responsibility 7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED a. Sector 1. This sector comprised of Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts covering up to River Feni at Subhapur. There were 2000 regular troops and 8000 guerrillas. 137 guerrilla groups were inducted all over Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The regular troops of number 1 sector mostly operated along the eastern border of Belonia Bulge, in Chagalnaiya and Subhapur. b. Sector 2. Number 2 sector covered the entire Noakhali district, almost whole of Comilla less the area north of Akhaura-Bhairab railway line, and in the initial stage some parts of Faridpur as well. There were 6000 regulars and 35000 guerrillas. The sector was divided into 7 sub sectors from Ahkhaura in the north to Belonia in the south. c. Sector 3. Number 3 sector controlled Habigonj subdivision of Sylhet, Kishorganj sub division of the Mymensing and small portion of Comilla, north of Ahkhaura Bhairab line. This sector had almost 30,000 guerrillas and 4000 regulars. d. Sector 4. This sector was responsible for the central part of Sylhet, comprising of Moulovibazar and Sadar sub division up to Sylhet-Tamabil roads. Sector comprised of 4000 regulars and 9000 guerrillas and was divided into 6 sub sectors. This sector covered more then 100 tea gardens and entire hilly and jungle areas of the South- Eastern part of the Sylhet. e. Sector 5. Number 5 sector was given the responsibility to control the North part of Sylhet from the Sylhet-Tamabil road in the east up to the border of Mymensing in the west. The sector composed of 800 regulars and 5000 guerrillas. This sector covered most of the marshy areas of Sunamgonj and Chatak. f. Sector 6. This sector comprised of Rangpur district and Thakurgaon subdivision of Dinajpur. This sector at Rangpur kept about 600 square miles of Bangladesh liberated throughout the liberation war. This sector had 2000 regular force and 9000 guerillas. 8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED g. Sector 7. Number 7 sector was responsible for the southern part of Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Bogra and Pabna. This sector comprised of 2500 regulars and 12,500 guerrillas. This sector was divided in to 8 sub sectors. h. Sector 8. This sector was comprised of Kustia, Jessore, Faridpur and the northern part of Khulna. This sector had 3000 regulars and 25,000 guerrillas and the sector was divided into 7 subsectors. j. Sector 9. This sector was responsible for the district of Barishal, Potuakhali and southern part of Khulna. This sector had about 20,000 Mukti Bahini. The water channels of Barishal- Patuakhali were mostly dominated through river patrolling by 9 sector troops. k. Sector 10. The area of operation of sector 10 were the inland waterways and coastal areas. The HQ of this sector was in Palassey and the operation was directed from Bangladesh Forces Headquarters. l. Sector 11. This sector was responsible for Tangail and Mymensing district less Kishorgonj subdivision. There were 25,000 Mukti Bahini in this sector. This sector was divided into 8 subsectors. 20. Training of Mukti Bahini and Induction Inside Bangladesh. Training of freedom fighter was given the top priority in every sector. Thousands of young men crossed over to India. Training camps were opened in every sector and NCOs were appointed as instructor to train the Mukti Bahini. Young men got concentrated into 50 training camps, which had been hastily established to impart urgent training. Trainees completed their training within very short time and were ready for combat. The first batch of 700 trained guerrillas had been inducted in Faridpur area by mid May. The next phase started with the long process of recruiting, training and organizing them into effective guerrilla bands. Mukti Bahini gave enough impetus to the movement by organizing ‘Gram Parishads”- village cell into all 62000 villages. Thus the scope of guerrilla operation expanded. Imparting training to them was easy. Every 6 weeks, 2000 trained guerrillas were turned out for operational use. With the flow of arms, guerrilla activities were expanded towards urban areas. 9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Figure – 2: Training of Mukti Bahini 21. Formation of Regular Brigades. A new organizational concept started gaining ground as the war progressed. Guerrilla warfare continued to harass, weaken and bleed the enemy through small actions, by adopting hit and run tactics. But it was not capable to gain, hold or consolidate ground through this type of warfare. However effective this type of warfare may be, it cannot replace the conventional warfare. So, on successfully organising the Mukti Bahini into different sectors, the Bangladesh Forces Headquarters decided to raise three infantry brigades from the regular forces of these sectors. The aim was to fight conventional battles so that subsequent advance into Bangladesh territory could be made. This was a landmark in the organisational and operational aspect of the Liberation Forces. They were organized to advance and hold the areas towards final victory and also to augment the strength of Mukti Bahini in different sectors. The organisations and activities of these brigades are briefly described below: a. ‘Z’ Force. The first brigade known as the ‘Z’ Force was raised in the Tura hills, opposite to Mymensingh, on 7th July 1971. The force was named after its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rahman. The 1st, 3rd and 8th East Bengal Regiments were integrated in ‘Z’ Force. The brigade was launched for independent operation in the north. ‘Z’ Force Headquarters was raised at Teldaha. 10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. ‘K’ Force. The second regular infantry brigade ‘K’ Force was raised in September 71 at Melaghar, near Agartala. Lieutenant Colonel Khaled Mosharraf commanded ‘K’ Force and consisted of 4, 9 and 10 East Bengal Regiments.. c. ‘S’ Force. The ‘S’ Force was raised at Hejamura, opposite to Sylhet border in October 71. Lieutenant Colonel K M Safiullah commanded the force. Its Headquarters was established at Fatikchara and had two battalions namely 2 and 11 East Bengal Regiments. 22. Formation of Artillery Units. With the raising of infantry brigades, it was decided to raise artillery elements to support them. These were as follows: a. Mujib Battery. This battery was raised in late September and placed under command of ‘K’ Force. The battery was equipped with 6 x 3.7-inch howitzer. The battery Commander was Captain Pasha and Later Captain Anwarul Alam. b. 2 Field Battery. This battery was raised at Khalashar, opposite to Sylhet and placed under Command of ‘Z’ Force. The Battery Commander was Captain Rashed Chowdhury. This battery was equipped with 6-x 105 mm Pack Howitzer. 23. Formation of Naval Component. The necessity for the formation of naval component arose from the continuous build-up of Pakistan forces in East Pakistan. Though the Chittagong port handled about 31 lac cargo in 1969, this tonnage doubled in 1971 due to the induction of four Pakistan Army divisions with their ever-increasing logistic requirements. More over the various inland river ports of Chandpur, Narayanganj, Daudkandi, Barishal, Khulna etc. linked the major military cantonments in the country. The ports of Chittagong and Chalna were the main inlets for military hardware and oil. So, it was felt essential to form a naval component to disrupt the Pakistani sea / river lines of communication with the overall aim of weakening their infrastructure. a. Naval Commando. The naval component of Bangladesh forces had 2 elements: the irregular naval commando and the regular naval forces. Few naval personnel, who were on leave in East Pakistan, joined the liberation war in 11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED different sectors initially. On May 23, a secret training camp code named C2P was commissioned on the bank of the river Bhagirathi at the historic site of Palassey. The nucleus of the naval commando was initially built around of eight Bengali sailors who had deserted the Pakistan Navy, while undergoing training in Toulon, France, on board the newly procured submarine. These intrepid sailors escaped from France to Spain, from where they found their way to India to join the liberation war. However, the majority who joined later was 500 volunteers among better-educated, healthy, good swimmers and adventurers young men. b. Organisational Structure. The naval commandos were divided into four task groups located at Chittagong, Chalna, Narayanganj and Chandpur. Each sector was in turn allotted four task units generally comprising personnel who hailed from that area. A task unit again comprised 10 task elements. Each task element had three frogmen armed with one rifle, one/two neutrally buoyant mine, one grenade, diver’s knife, swimming fins and a diver’s compass. c. Birth of Naval Force. Navy was formally born in Nov 71. On 09 Nov, Bangladesh fleet was inaugurated with 6 riverine launches captured from Pakistani junta and two Broke Marine type gunboats named Padma and Palash, acquired from India. These crafts provided mining capabilities with successful blocking of Padma river entrance. 24. Birth of Air Force . In the absence of air assets, the Bengali airmen fought on the land shoulder to shoulder with their army counterpart. Air Force came into being on 28 September 1971 at Dimapur near Jorhat in Assam at an abandoned runway of World War-II. Air Force started their operation with one DC-3 ac, one Otter and an Alluete helicopter. Though it may seem to be very insignificant, but the raising of Air Force added a new dimension to the war of Liberation. Overall about 250 officers and 700 airmen participated in the land battle in the absence of aircraft and air base. With the creation of BAF, many other civilian ex-PIA pilots, and Plant Protection Pilots also joined Air Force. The secret code of the Force became “KILO FLIGHT”, and its Commander was Sqn Ldr Sultan Mahmud. 25. Logistics. Logistics of Mukti Bahini is discussed as under: 12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED a. Support from India. After the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971 in a bid to curb all resistance, the Indian government decided to open the borders to admit Bengali refugees and the Bengali resistance fighters. By mid May, Pakistan Army had occupied all major towns in Bangladesh and had driven the battered remnants of the Mukti Bahini across the border into India, forcing the Mukti Bahihi to switch to guerrilla warfare. The Indian BSF (Border Security Force) had given supplies locally to the Mukti Bahini since April and had even made some incursions across the border in to East Pakistan, but these efforts had been disorganized, uncoordinated and inadequate to meet the needs of the Mukti Bahini. On May 15, the Indian army took over aiding the Mukti Bahini and launched a full-fledged integrated operation, codenamed “Operation Jackpot”. a. The Operational Setup. The Operation Jackpot was commanded by Maj. Gen. B.N. Jimmy Sarcar. The border areas around Bangladesh was divided into 6 logistical sectors, each to be commanded by a Brigadier from the Indian army. The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were: (1) Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal, C.O Brig. B.C. Joshi - serving Mukti Bahini sector no. 6). (2) Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal, C.O Brig. Prem Singh - handling logistics for Mukti Bahini sector no. 7). (3) Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar, C.O. Brig. N.A. Salik, giving logistical support to sectors no. 8 and 9). (4) Delta (HQ: Devta Mura, Tripura, C.O Brig. Sabeg Singh, supporting sectors no. 1,2 and 3). (5) Echo (HQ: Masimpur, Assam, C.O Brig. M.B. Wadh, coordinating logistics for Mukti bahini sectors 4 and 5). (6) Foxtrot, (HQ: Tura, Meghalaya, C.O Brig. Sant Singh, 13 RESTRICTED supplying sector 11). RESTRICTED Through this network, Mukti Bahini sector commanders communicated with the Bangladesh Forces Headquarters in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Lt Gen J.S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command, was closely involved in the operation. b. Logistic During Operation. It was not only the Indian Army who was the source of logistic resources but also the total population of Bangladesh. As it was a war to liberate the mother land, people of all class, cast assisted the Mukti Bahini with what ever they can. Since the Mukti Bahini leaved of the land, the contribution of the total mass is immense. Accept weapon, ammunition almost all other combat supply was provided by the people of this land. The population assisted in keeping the supply chain active all the way from Indian border to operation area. The total population assisted the Mukti Bahini with food, shelter, information, medicine and above all with the affection, respect. Mukti Bahini Operations 26. Mukti Bahini and Total People’s War. The Bangladesh Liberation war was more of a resistance movement than an organized revolutionary war. As regards Mao’s three phases of War of Resistance, Mukti Bahini could not be entered into, the way they have been prescribed by Mao Zedong. Phases-First and second –Guerrilla Defensive, and Attrition and Strategic Stalemate-were successfully entered into. During the first phase, the Mukti Bahini leaders succeeded in organizing the movement. Volunteers were recruited and trained with India's covert support. Mukti Bahini leaders were able to secure the support of the local people for the movement against the Pakistan government. In the second phase, guerrillas succeeded in wearing down the Pakistan forces. A direct action against enemy forces was evident. Sabotage and guerrilla action had multiplied manifold. Collaborators and the known reactionary elements were sought and liquidated. Vulnerable military and police outposts were being subjected to continued attacks and weak enemy columns were repeatedly ambushed. This yielded substantial quantity of arms, equipment, medical supplies, and radio equipment to the Mukti Bahini. The whole nation had been motivated to achieve liberation and it had asserted itself to the optimum extent. At this juncture the Indian Armed Forces intervened and Mukti Bahini acted as major adjunct to the Indian armed forces. 14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 27. Integration of Efforts. The Liberation war was a whole hearted combined effort where the people from every stairs of the society contributed. The entire Bengali population participated in the liberation war directly or indirectly. The Niomito Bahini (Regular Force) was given the task to fight the conventional battle against the occupied army and the Gono Bahini (Irregular Bahini) was given the specific task to carry out guerrilla activities and sabotage. At the same time the intellectuals, writers, poets, journalists, singers, dramatists, painters, officials played vital role to boost up morale and fighting will from Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra. The most popular program turned out to be ‘Charam Patra’ (The Ultimatum) by M R Aktar mukul. More than twenty newspapers came out during the war of liberation. Only some of the newspapers were printed. Most were cyclostyled and few were hand written. But whatever the method of publication the idea behind each newspaper was - to inspire the people to fight the Pakistanis. Another significant aspect of or liberation war was the contribution of foreign artists like Ustad Ravi Shankar, Ustad Ali Akbar Khan and western singer George Harrison. ‘The concert for Bangladesh’ contributed raising voice against genocide worldwide. The foreign journalists and photographers played a significant role to raise worldwide public opinion in favour of Mukti Bahini. 28. Effectiveness and Importance of Mukti Bahini Operations. Despite the limitations and challenges rising from the transport system, remoteness of the guerrilla bases, unavailability and inadequacy of proper supplies, and the decision of Bangladesh High Command to put the maximum number of guerrillas into battle in the minimum time possible, the operation was effective. The Mukti Bahini destroyed or damaged at least 231 bridges, 122 railway lines and 90 power stations, while killing 237 officers, 136 JCOs/NCOs and 3,559 soldiers, of the Pakistan army and an unspecified number of EPCAF and police and an estimated 5,000 Razakar personnel during the period of April-November 1971. The Mukti Bahini efforts also demoralized the Pakistani Army to the extent that, by November, they left their bases only if the need arose. The contribution of the Mukti Bahini to the eventual defeat of Pakistan was enormous. 29. Conventional Battles. Bangladeshi forces fought number of important battles. It is beyond the scope of our study. However, following paragraphs are dedicated to give a brief account of some of the important ones: a. Battle of Belonia. During the 3rd week of June, Belonia fell to the enemy. Owing to the susceptibility and importance of the bulge, 'K' Force was 15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED given the task to clear the enemy defence at Belonia. On 8 November- the D Day, own troops infiltrated undetected and took the enemy by surprise. Later, number of Pakistani attacks were foiled. Isolated enemy positions on the north were attacked and captured simultaneously. Enemy casualty included some 80% of the deployed strength of which 49 were taken prisoners while very few managed to exfiltrate. Capture of Belonia signalled the final offensive, which was to be launched in 3 weeks time. b. Battle of Kamalpur. Kamalpur was a strong Pakistani border outpost (BOP) situated on the mouth of the old Brahmaputra and on the road link with Mymensingh via Jamalpur. About two companies of 31 Baluch excluding Razakars were deployed in the BOP. The area needed to be cleared for ensuring safe entry from the north. On 010330 August 1971, 1 East Bengal of the 'Z' Force first launched a major attack on the BOP. Attack was launched with two companies. In this attack Captain Salahuddin – one of the Company Commanders died. Though the attack was not successful, but the Pakistani Forces for the first time realized that the Bangladeshi know how to fight fearlessly. The Senior Tigers evoked fear in the mind of the enemy at Kamalpur. c. Battle of Akhaura. The battle of Akhaura was one of the significant battles of liberation war. The operation was planned in 2 phases. By November 30, all preliminary preparations were completed. The H hour was at 0100 hours on 01 December. The attack went on in time and progressed steadily. By dawn the area North of Azampur Rail Station was cleared. There was stiff enemy resistance in and around the station and bitter fighting took place there. By 1500 hours enemy resistance was cleared up to area South of rail station. The enemy withdrew to the south. On night 01 / 02, enemy launched a vigorous counter attack and recaptured the station. On the morning of 03 December own troops again launched an offensive. However, on 04 December 'S' Force and Indian 57 Mountain division launched simultaneous attack and Akhaura fell on 05 December and the entire Pakistani troops stationed at Akhaura surrendered to the Joint Command. 16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Battle of Hilli. The battle of Hilli was one of the fiercest battles fought during the liberation war. This battle was fought in two stages. The first stage continued from 22 November to 26 November and the second battle took place from 6 December to 11 December. 4 Frontier Regiment of 205 Infantry Brigade of 16 Infantry Division was deployed in Hilli complex. The H hr was 222000 November 1971. In the first stage own troops could capture only Noapara and Morapara and failed to capture Basudebpur. In the second stage, as per the Allied plan 202 Mountain Brigade of 20 Mountain Division started offensive on 09 December. By evening of 11 December the battle of Hilli was over and the axis was open to Goraghat. e. Battle of Kanairghat. The battle of Kanairghat was one of the important battle fought during the final offensive. The place Kanairghat is located between ATGRAM, ZAKIGANJ and CHARKHAI spreading both side of the river SURMA. It was almost a company plus of Pakistani force located at Kanairghat. Maj Rab of sector-4 was tasked to capture Kanairghat with sector troops where he had only four companies under him. The area was encircled from both the flanks and enemy position was attacked from three directions on 040530 December. The objective was captured at around 1030 hours. Major Sarwar with 25 soldiers surrendered to Mukti Bahini. f. Battle of Teliapara. Battle of Teliapara was fought in the initial stage of liberation war to establish a foothold by own forces on the motherland. Teliapara was located along Itakhola- Chunarughat road where 'S' force headquarters was located. Own troops deployed here was tasked to disrupt enemy's movement by extensive raid and ambushes. On 10 May, the enemy launched attack on own defensive position at Teliapara. After a number of attack and counter attack own troops withdrew from Teliapara . In this battle own forces suffered considerable casualties and on 19 May the battle was over. 30. Unconventional Battles. Trained guerrillas were sent inside Bangladesh in group of 5 to 10 to perform specific tasks like carrying out raids and ambushes, to inflict causalities on the Pakistanis and seriously restrict their movement. They also disrupted industrial production, blowing up electrical poles and sub-station thereby disrupting 17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED power supply. Vehicles, railway and river crafts which were used by the Pakistani troops and military supplies were systematically destroyed by the guerrillas. Finally the guerrillas stroke deadly to blow the isolated Pakistani groups. The Gono Bahini’s activities rendered several units of Pakistan army in absolute disarray and these were devoured by the Niomito Bahini from June onwards. Gono Bahini guerrillas created a virtual hell for marauding Pakistani troops by launching raids in and around Dhaka, by knocking out power houses, raiding ordnance factory and damaging beyond repair a plant which was converting motor launches into gun boats –meant for use of Pakistani troops. Tea processing units in and around Sylhet and a number of jute mills in Narayangonj as also Nabarun jute mills in Dhaka, Eastern Oil Refinery of Chittagong, Titas Gas line from Brahmanbaria to Dhaka came under attack. Three sugar mills of Panchagarh, Darshana and Thakurgaon, paper mills in Khulna, steel mills and fertilizer factory in Chittagong were thoroughly wrecked and brought to grinding halt. Dhaka town remained plunged in darkness for several days because of the disrupted electrical supply. An illustrious feat of Gono Bahini was to derail a passenger train, which was packed with Pakistani soldiers by bombarding it 2 km away from Fulgazi railway station. 31. Naval Operations. Naval Commandos through their various clandestine operations left a remarkable significance during the liberation war. Through their mighty blows the naval commandos sank or damaged over 100,000 tons of shipping and brought the liberation war before the notice of the world body. a. Operation Jackpot. After a rigorous training for months as many as 160 commandos were nominated for carrying out the first clandestine operation under the code name “OPERATION JACKPOT”. Operation Jackpot was designed to give the first punch by the Naval Commandos into the vital elements of the enemy. Under this operation a plan was chalked out to carryout simultaneous attack in the Chittagong Port, Mongla Port, Chandpur, Narayangonj and Daudkandi Ferry Ghat. The attack was initially planned to be launched simultaneously on 14 August 71. But later it was shifted to 15 August 71. In order to make the operation a simultaneous one, signals were passed through Radio. The first signal was passed over Radio through a song on 13 August 71. So that Naval Commandos were ready in all respect to carry out 18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED operation as per the plan. In the morning of 15 August 71 the second song was played from ‘Akash Baani Radio Center’ signaling the final instruction for launching attack in the night of 15 / 16 August 71. Other than in Daudkandi an almost simultaneous attack was launched in all the areas as planned in the ‘OPERATION JACKPOT’. (1) Operation in Chittagong Port. A group of Commandos was tasked to carry out operation in Chittagong Port. In the guise of vegetables vendors, farmers and fishermen. In the evening commandos divided into 12 sub groups for attack. In the face of all adversities the commandos got into the water with a limpet mine tied around their chest. In the midnight the Commandos placed the mines on to the designated targets. Shaking the entire harbour the mines started exploding one after another. Out of fear the Pakistani force started firing like shower on the both banks of the river. The commandos however reached their RV safe and sound. In this attack 10 targets were completely destroyed and sunk out of which two were the gunboats of Pakistan Navy. (2) Achievements of Naval Commandos. From mid August 71 the valiant Naval Commandos carried out as many as 45 challenging operations and completely destroyed about 75 thousand metric tons of arms, ammunition and other materials and partially destroyed about 100,000 tons of similar items. 32. Air Operations. In November 1971 Air Force carried out its first mission. Mission planning and target selection was made as per the intelligence report. Chittagong and Narayangonj fuel dumps were wisely chosen as the first priority targets. Air Force was assigned to carryout this task with utmost secrecy. On 24th November 71, the Otter was positioned at Kailashahar and the Alloutte at Teliamura, in India. Air Force could successfully accomplish this mission. Another important mission carried out by Air Force was in the evening of 3rd December 1971. It was a foggy moonlit night of the early winter. The heavily loaded otter took off from Kailashashar at about 2300 hours for Chittagong. With a little difficulty, it could detect the target. Then the attack started with the rocket, bombs and guns. During the last attack, heavy anti-ac shell was 19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED fired from the ground and from the naval ships. None could hit the aircraft. But own aircraft could successfully hit the fuel dump and the anchored oil tankers. Spectacular fireball was noticed after the hit. 33. Mukti Bahini in the Final Offensive. By November, weaknesses in Pakistani deployment, preparation and logistics were vivid. Morale was lowering everyday and human values decayed to a point of no return. To take the advantage of favourable situation Mukti Bahini planned and started offensive operation to capture different important areas along the border. With the declaration of war by Pakistan with India, the Indian troops marched in on 04 December and joint offensive operation commenced. 1 a. II Corps (Jessore - Khulna Area). With the aim of liberating area upto west of Padma River, Indian 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Divisions organised into several columns captured Jessore, Jhenidah, Chuadanga and Meherpur. Before they could advance further towards Faridpur, the war ended. b. XXXIII Corps (Rajshahi - Bogra - Rangpur Area). The main thrust went at Hilli by 20 Mountain Division, while minor thrusts were directed at other bordering towns for containing enemy strongholds at Rangpur and Dinajpur. Beside the fall of Hilli as discussed earlier, Kurigram and Lalmanirhat were captured by 06 December while Panchagarh and Thakurgaon earlier on 03 December. By 16 December almost entire North Bengal upto the northern tip of Bogra were captured. c. IV Corps. Akhaura was captured on 05 December. Brahmanbaria was captured next followed by Ashuganj. Part of Pakistani 14 Division along with divisional headquarters withdrew towards Bhairab Bazar across the Meghna River. The withdrawing Pakistani forces also demolished the Bhairab Bazar Bridge. Leading elements of 57 Mountain Division along with 2 EB crossed River Meghna in country boats and proceeded to Narshingdi. Along with this river crossing, a massive heli lifting was also undertaken to build up forces in the enemy's rear for speedy advance towards Dhaka. By 12 December, 311 Mountain Brigade, part of 73 Mountain Brigade and S Force crossed River Meghna using a dozen MI-4 helicopters and indigenous means. Narshingdi was captured intact. Thereafter, 311 Mountain Brigade headed for Demra while 73 20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Mountain Brigade advanced towards Tongi via Ghorashal. By 14 December, the leading elements of 57 Mountain Division had reached the outskirts of Dhaka. c. 101 Communication Zone (Mymensingh - Tangail Area). This zone along with the troops of 11 Sector advanced along Kamalpur - Jamalpur and Haluaghat - Mymensingh Axes. 95 Mountain Brigade neutralised Kamalpur BOP after a bloody and fierce battle and then seized Jamalpur fortress of Pakistani 31 Baluch which was ordered to withdraw to Dhaka. 95 Mountain Brigade advanced towards Modhupur, while 11 Sector advanced along Haluaghat - Mymensingh Axis and captured Mymensingh unopposed. Thereafter, both the columns along with 167 Mountain Brigade hurriedly allotted to 101 Communication Zone rushed towards Tangail in the wake of retreating Pakistani Forces. On 11 December, 2 Para Battalion was dropped at Kalihati near Tangail. The Para Battalion in conjunction with the troops of Quaderia Bahini established several roadblocks on Mymensingh - Tangail Road. Finding himself trapped, Brigadier Quader, the Pakistani Brigade Commander surrendered. After linking up with the Para Battalion the Brigade reached Joydebpur on 13 December and Tongi Bridge on 14 December. By first light 16 December, 101 Communication Zone reached Mirpur Bridge. ANALYSIS OF MUKTI BAHINI OPERATION 34. Bangladesh became an independent state by a nine months operation. It was done by a charismatic and bloody liberation war. Independence is not achieved by regular forces only rather it was a total people’s war. We have already discussed the initiation of liberation war and how it became a total people’s war. Our great fighters fought the battle with all the battle field operating system including the battle field imperatives. Our recently reviewed doctrines also guided by that success. With all the principles of war followed, operations of Mukti Bahini is a classic example of asymmetric war. a. Battle Field Imperatives in the LW. Bangladesh Army has recently accepted some principles which provide more specific guidance than the traditional principles of war. In the doctrinal parlance these are known as Battle field imperatives. Most of these imperatives were actively available in our 21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED liberation war. The Niomito Bahini and Gono Bahini were created to maintain balance, they acted faster than their entrenched enemy, and they had unity of efforts during operations. Moreover, those indigenous forces used our terrain and weather in their favour to conduct conventional and unconventional warfare against the occupation Army and dominated events up to victory. b. Battle Field Operating System in the LW. Liberation war will be marked for combined arms operation that involved synchronisation of various battle field operative system. The Niomito Bahini and Gono Bahini were under central command, these forces used fire power, manoeuvre, intelligence judiciously. Minor engineer support, indigenous logistic support and unconventional war efforts were meshed together. Their combined capabilities produced the battle winning effect which resulted ultimate victory. c. Principles of War in Liberation War(LW). War of Liberation is a unique example of application of the principles of war. Adherence of the principles of war by the allied forces and non-adherence by the Pakistani forces had significant role in result of the campaign. While analyzing the war, we find most of our present day principles of war were observed in the LW. These fundamentals were applied intelligently by the Mukti Bahini. These principles of war also guided our inexperienced unconventional forces to the out standing success against one of the most organised army of the world. On the contrary the Pakistani forces were defeated due to wrong strategy, diplomatic failure and non-adherence of principles of war at every stage of the battle. d. Total People’s War - An Option for Bangladesh. Total people’s war is one of the plausible solutions on the question of enhancing our defence capability. During the war of liberation, our forces used Indian territory as bases of operation where the guerrillas and the regular brigades were trained. But in the event of any future invasion, the choice has to be limited to own territory only. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to train guerrillas inside Bangladesh while the war would be on. In such reality Bangladesh Army needs to play a very important role during peace time in training and preparing the nation for a future conflict. 22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CONCLUSION 35. The War of Liberation was a culmination of long drawn struggle against misrule and brutality. People deprived in all spheres of life were left with no other option but to take up arms to establish their fundamental rights. It was a struggle for independence and self-rule. It however took long 23 years to reach its culmination. The first major struggle in the form of Language Movement began as early as the partition of the subcontinent. Later, the movement took different shape with the change in overall political scenario of Pakistan. Impatient and greedy power-seeker of the West denounced the authority of the popularly elected Bangali leaders and parties, albeit being the majority. Political situation deteriorated very fast and reached its culmination with the declaration of Sheikh Majibur Rahman on 07 March 1971 giving an indication of armed struggle. 36. The War of Liberation ended with unconditional surrender of Pakistan Army on 16 December 1971. Analysis of Mukti Bahini operations and major battles clearly shows that our inferiority in terms of resources were made-up by the efforts of total peoples war. The guerrilla activities were so harmonized that the occupation forces had to spare a significant share of their time guessing the next blow by Mukti Bahini. Although the Bangladeshi forces did not decisively win all major battles, each engagement contributed towards the attainment of the ultimate victory. 30. The victory of the people of Bangladesh was a victory of ideals and national spirit. The liberation war bound peoples together who had been suppressed since long. With proper guidance and leadership they were organized and fought a ‘Total People’s War’ which overwhelmed the world and Bangladesh was borne. In fact the achievement of Mukti Bahini was a combined effort. It will be an incomplete history if we do not mention the contribution of mass people who did not take up arms physically but supported the armed struggle throughout by every means. Concurrent occurrence of conventional war, guerrilla warfare and popular support really gave the appearance of the liberation war as a truly ‘Total people’s War’. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 2. A Tale of Millions, Islam Rafiqul, BU The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Niazi A.A.K 23 RESTRICTED