Leadership_and_Change

It is the hour of need, faced with the dire prospect of being removed from the face of the earth that creates the catalyst to change and adapt to overcome our enemy. However not all militaries successfully transform to overcome their adversaries capabilities or advantages. The ability to successfully transform a military to win conflicts comes from two things, military leadership and the military culture created by the leadership. It is when culture and the correct leadership combine that there is a potential to create enlightenment within a culture and you see willingness and desire for improvement to enable transformation of a military to successfully respond to and overcome an enemy’s effort against them. To understand the “enlightened military culture” I write about in this paper, I refer to the definition of culture to better explain what I envision when I state military culture is the primary reason for any given military to adapt and transform successfully to overcome a foe’s challenge. Culture is the “predominating attitudes and behaviors that characterize the functioning of a group and or organization”. To hone in on the essence of what culture can be, I include the following clarification of what can happen within a culture when the conditions are right, “development of the intellect through training or education which in some cases results in enlightenment from such training or education” (Culture). In my opening statement I also mention leadership as a critical component to creating military culture. I will not spend a lot of time on this subject but my perspective is that without leadership of any kind nothing is possible, even with leadership an enlightened military culture is not possible if it is not selfless and focused. To analogize, leadership is the soil from which all military cultures grow from. In the most perfect conditions you develop through training and education an enlightened military culture, open to change and adaptive in its processes to gain the tactical and or operational advantage against an adversary that has parity of capability and tactics or the sudden advantage brought by a modern technology introduced to the battlefield. In this paper I will cover some of the positive examples in where it is the rare leadership that develops and fosters the more successful military culture that can transform to meet the challenges of its foes. In reading about the changes a given military placed upon themselves to adapt to the current threat and gain advantage over the enemy, there really was not that one “Constantine” moment that the truth and path to success was revealed to the military commander (Gibbon). It is instead a mix of leadership, culture and circumstances of the battlefield causing changes at the tactical level, that if taken in consideration by senior leadership when trying to make changes in their army’s doctrine result in success against the enemy. The following examples focus on the German Military institution the “General Staff” that began developing in the early 1800’s. Of all the readings the German General Staff embodied the positive military culture/leadership combination. The combination that enabled the German military to change in order to overcome the status quo and move beyond the current accepted military doctrine or tactics to gain the advantage over a foe(Lupfer). The first example that I will discuss, but was not fully discussed in any of the readings is the staff of the “Reichsheer” it is from this staff the military cultural enlightenment will come forth and enable the German army to adapt and change in response to the enemy actions and their own actions against the enemy during the time frame discussed in the readings (Lewis). “The German General Staff was an institution whose rise and development gave the German military a decided advantage over its adversaries. The Staff amounted to its best “weapon” for nearly a century and a half” (Wiki). The German General Staff (GGS) existed since 1806, and in 1814 its official existence was established by law (Wiki). Initially the staff was part of the Prussian Army and later became part of the German Army as the political landscape changed in 1871 (Wiki). This capable staff really came into its own in 1857 under the control and supervision of the Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke. “The General Staff reformed by General von Moltke was the most effective in Europe, an autonomous institution dedicated solely to the efficient execution of war, unlike in other countries, whose staffs were often fettered by meddling courtiers, parliaments and government officials” (Wiki). Entry onto this staff was not bought or allowed due to connections of politics or royalty, but based on merit and intelligence (Wiki). But first the candidate had to complete the “Kriegsakademie” (war academy). To get into the academy the Prussian army selected annually the best 120 junior officers to attend the academy, standards at the academy where so demanding that only half the class would graduate from the course successfully(Wiki). From this group the top twelve officers would be selected to be trained by the chief of the general staff to become members of the small but highly trained GGS. These select few officers would become Chiefs of Staff in “major formations” of the Prussian and eventual German armies (Wiki). General von Moltke also developed studies that brought in technologies like rail and telegraph to be integrated into military planning. Additionally he created a historical division to publish accounts and lessons learned on past and current conflicts, much like our current CALL system. (Wiki) To summarize the GGS is the foundation for a very successful military culture that will adapt and transform itself and the German military to meet the future military challenges of the coming decades until the General Staff ceases to exist during WWII. Moving forward to WWI, I want to show how military culture was the most important aspect in a military’s ability to transform in order to overcome new challenges on the battlefield. This is another example using the German army and it’s already discussed General Staff. The scene is two opposing forces arrayed along an extended linear front where maneuver to gain advantage over your foe is not easily done with the extended lines and entrenched positions. Penetrations of these lines were the only way to gain any advantage and to give up any defended ground was not an accepted condition for either side. On top of this condition there was the supremacy of the artillery as the number one cause of killed and wounded (Lupfer). End result both sides were in a war of attrition along static defensive lines. The German Staff over time published experiences gathered from the field armies and little by little tactics changed that allowed success and with smaller costs (Lupfer). The German tactic for trench warfare started to recommend a second line of defense in case of a breakthrough, counterattacks were now part of the defense plan and it was not necessary for orders from high command to initiate the counterattack thus making the reaction to the penetration more responsive. The Germans started to better utilize the effects of terrain to protect and screen forces from enemy fire and observation. In addition the Germans were quick to take the lead of their enemies and improve upon what they learned. All of these incremental changes lead to a major doctrine change, the development of the German “elastic defense in depth” which was initiated in the fall of 1916 and fully implemented in time for the spring allied offensive of 1917(Lupfer). This doctrine change was not the silver bullet for the Allies’ offensive but it did work where applied correctly. More importantly it shows how a military culture embodied within the General Staff could take lessons learned and tactics gathered from the enemy and subordinate elements then turn them into a new doctrine for the defense. Additionally this same culture in 7 months transforms the German military to conduct this type of defensive doctrine (Lupfer). Both of these efforts to adapt are great examples of how military culture and leadership can effectively allow transformation of a military in a short time frame while mired in the conduct of a war. Ultimately this doctrine shift allowed Germany to stay in the war for another year and go on the offensive in the Spring of 1918 using their new doctrine for the attack (Lupfer). The offensive action of 1918 was yet again another example of the GGS taking lessons learned along with ideas from the enemy and implementing it with the usual intensity and dedication as was done previously for the doctrine change to the German defense. The new offensive doctrine was called “The Attack in Position Warfare”, and was designed to create the strategic breakthrough derived from the initial penetration of the front lines (Lupfer). The doctrine change was successful but was too late in the war to help Germany pull out a win (Lupfer). Ultimately Germany lost WWI due to the sheer cost of fighting on two fronts and suffering the losses derived from fighting a war of attrition against a foe of allied nations and their cumulative greater resources and numbers. However due to the efforts of the German’s Military most “effective weapon” the General Staff, the German military was able to adapt and change on various occasions to effectively transform doctrine for the offense and defense of their army (wiki). These transformations allowed a breakaway from the war of attrition brought about by position warfare and successfully undertake an offensive doctrine that allowed maneuver against an entrenched enemy. The new offensive doctrine was a success compared to previous offensive operations in just the size of territory captured compared to the relatively small cost of wounded and killed (Lupfer). To compare, the allies had similar doctrines and regulations for conduct of war but they did not have the General Staff and the subsequent military culture derived from such a professional “corporate” military staff (Lupfer). It was the GGS’ willingness and understanding that improvement must be continually made to their military. Even when successful in battle the staff would review their actions because there is always room for improvement (Lupfer). This unique ability for critical self evaluation was made possible by the enlightened military culture created by the professional development of the GGS, truly the real reason the German military was able to transform in response to military conditions, tactics and doctrine of its allied foe during WWI. BIBLIOGRAPHY Dictionary.com, "culture,” [Internet]. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. [cited 2009 Nov 3]. Source location: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/culture. Available: http://dictionary.reference.com. Gibbon, Edward. “The decline and fall of the Roman Empire.” New York: The Modern Library, 2005. Lupfer, Timothy T. “The dynamics of doctrine: the changes in German tactical doctrine during the First World War.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981. Wikipedia contributors. German General Staff [Internet]. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia; 2009 Oct 8, 20:43 UTC [cited 2009 Nov 3]. Available from: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php'title= German_ General_ Staff&oldid=318728445.