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After careful consideration of all the past and present information available to me, as well as recent observations, I identified 3 top organizational challenges that must be addressed prior to our next combat rotation. First, we must regain our foothold and our reputation within our Division by addressing some of the ethical dilemmas facing the 56th since our last combat rotation. Second, it is imperative that the Brigade (BDE) establishes, refine, and disseminate our battle focused mission essential task list (METL) for the upcoming rotation. Third, with training guidance issued, the BDE will reduce it’s footprint within daily operations providing command and control for the Battalions (BN) as their non-commissioned officers prepare their unit’s for impending BN level evaluation exercises. Prior to addressing these challenges, we will conduct a BDE formation tomorrow morning addressing the unfortunate and untimely passing of COL Volar. Following the BDE formation, soldiers are to be released for the rest of the afternoon. Furthermore, we will conduct a funeral at the post chapel for all of those who knew COL Volar personally and those who require additional closure in light of his death. This funeral is paramount for the families and unit members affected by his loss, as well as the BDE’s ability to move forward and prepare for combat. With COL Volar’s death behind us, there are immediate issues to address. There were two major items brought to my attention over the last couple of weeks that are critical to our future success. If the Division cannot trust the 56th to do the right thing and we fail to foster an ethical environment for our soldiers, undoubtedly any progress we make from here to our deployment is at constant risk. First, I want to address the 104 Financial Liability Investigations of Property Losses (FLIPL) pending from Iraq. With these FLIPLs still pending, subordinate units are unable to accurately report both one hundred percent and cyclic inventories during our recovery cycle. This will also negatively impact our ability to life cycle existing equipment and order new equipment based off lessons learned from our last deployment. I expect that each FLIPL will result in fair and equitable findings for those involved. Major Domingo will take the lead on assigning investigating officers to appropriate 15-6 proceedings and provide LTC(P) Johnson weekly updates on the status of our remaining FLIPLs. Additionally, LTC(P) Johnson will oversee the investigation of the allegations of the potential wrongful shooting of the Iraqi citizen. 1LT(P) Thompson and MAJ Chadwick will provide initial discovery to LTC(P) Johnson, who will in turn, brief me personally on his recommendations. After consulting with CPT Darnell, my guidance reference this unfortunate event will follow. Similar to the FLIPLs, the BDE is responsible for creating an environment for our soldiers where they never question right or wrong under the current command. Our soldiers must feel confident they can act with legally and morally with our full support behind them. Such an environment is a pillar of combat operations in an asymmetrical area of operation where split second decisions are made and acted upon. As we begin to stabilize our ethical and operational environment for our soldiers, I want to focus on training the BDE for combat. The need for a refined METL and training guidance is evident after careful analysis of our transition from a Heavy BDE to a Modular BCT prior to our last deployment, as well as the lessons learned from the combat rotation. My training guidance is largely based off the recommendations of the BDE staff headed by LTC Rockwell. Shooting, moving, and communicating in a combat environment is the sole focus of our METL training. Emphasizing a correct and balanced training effort at the lowest subordinate unit allows the right skill set preparation for battle. Addressing training shortcomings in cultural awareness, civil affairs, and the I/O campaign is also critical. Finally, the ability to execute the full spectrum of battlefield functions, from the fire team leader to the BDE commander, is a cornerstone of combat success. Upon completion of the BDE staff’s refinement of the BDE METL and training focus, my guidance will be issued to the BNs. The BDE staff will ensure the BNs nest their guidance with the BDE and provide oversight with little or no direct audit from the BN. Upon completion of the upcoming Yearly Training Brief, the BDE will provide command and control of the BNs when necessary, while exercising the appropriate communications platforms during their exercises. I expect MAJ Foldberg to continually monitor and train the BDE until we have a common BDE communications platform throughout primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication. In the event that our equipment is damaged or antiquated from the last rotation, MAJ Foldberg will advise MAJ Domingo on BDE communications priority acquisitions. At the completion of each BN culminating training exercises, an after actions review of our accepted BDE communication footprint will be conducted. Armed with my refined and focused training guidance, the backbone of the Army must take over and get to work! CSM Howell will energize his respective BN CSMs to develop and execute a demanding and effective training plan to satisfy my guidance. In conjunction with the synchronization of his subordinate leaders, CSM Howell will work with the DIV CSM to find a middle ground between the demands of red cycle and the demands of the BDE. As the BDE and BNs spot check at every level, I expect first line supervisors to conduct hip pocket training and not let any time be wasted. The more our NCOs can exact from our soldiers on a daily basis, the more opportunity they will have to spend much needed time at home with their families. I challenge all the NCOs of the BDE to adopt a “work hard, play hard” attitude by maximizing both unit and family time. Training after hours and on weekends is highly discouraged for my staff or the BDE’s soldiers, unless a specific training event is conducted. BN commanders will be prepared to brief me on the necessity of weekend training in the event that it is scheduled. The aforementioned organizational challenges can all be assessed by quantifiable and quantitative measures. First, the settlement of the FLIPLs and legal pursuit of the shooting incident are both objective in nature. The soldiers of the BDE must be informed as any significant findings come to light. When negative administrative or legal actions are exercised, rumors and perception are very dangerous to the morale of the BDE. Second, swift and effective guidance to the BNs is my burden. My success is measured by clear guidance and approval of my BN commander’s nested guidance. Finally, performance on culminating exercises at the BN level will provide quantifiable results. The results of these collective tasks directly correlate on how well our NCOs have trained our soldiers on their common combat skill tasks. The BDE also had significant manning issues in the staff as well as clearly defining the roles of our officers during the combat rotation. Although important, these issues cannot be addressed until we further understand the next mobilization force array and mission set. Furthermore, organizational turn over and knowing exactly what team we are taking into theater is not concrete. Once we are approximately 120 days from deployment, the BDE staff will clearly define primary and alternate roles within the TOC based off the AARs of the BN culmination exercises and our theater requirements. At the end of this demanding year, I am confident that our combat readiness and morale will be at an all time high as we enter the impending deployment cycle for our upcoming rotation.