Jomini_V_Clausewitz

In the profession of Arms, military professionals have long debated, argued, cited, and applied the principles of two great theorists from the Napoleonic period, Clausewitz and Jomini. The theories and teachings of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini are more similar than distinctly different and must coexist for successful implementation of National will in today’s dynamic, geopolitical environment. Carl von Clausewitz was a great macro level theorist, whose background and philosophy set the stage for the education of military leaders and creative employment of the direct elements of national power. Carl von Clausewitz spent his entire life in the profession of arms. He was born in Prussia in 1780 and first served in combat at the age of 12. He became a Colonel in the Russian Army and culminated his career as the Prussian Corp Chief of Staff at Waterloo. His greatest contribution and legacy to the profession of arms was his theories and teachings outlined in his final publishing, On War. His theories continue to be relevant today. In fact his work is quoted 5 times in military publications. His theory of the paradoxical trinity and total war concept set his work in On War apart from other more prescriptive works. Antoine-Henri Jomini’s work, like Clausewitz, is referenced and forms a philosophical basis for current United States military doctrine as evidenced throughout military publications. Jomini’s writings were more direct, less abstract and therefore more easily understood than readable than Clausewitz. A large portion of this and the similarity of their work is due to the fact that Jomini’s work was based on the lessons he gleaned from reading and studing Clausewitz. In his work, Summary of the Art of War, Jomini breaks down and expands on numerous concepts originally laid out in Clausewitz’ On War. Perhaps a large portion of the similarities exist because Jomini simply clarified much of Clausewitz work. Jomini and Clausewitz shared many concepts that hold true across all levels of warfare. The decisive point technique, also referred to as center of gravity is a key factor in military leverage theories of both men. “The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends, the loss of center of gravity ultimately results in defeat. Both men had a clear understanding of this fact and both men applied this truism as a common theme throughout their publications. Clausewitz more along the lines of theory at strategic levels and Jomini dictating it down to the tactical level. They also shared an understanding of the application of the full spectrum of warfare between politics (both internal to a country and external) and actual combat operations. While they both understood that war is simply politics by another means; Clausewitz’ writing directed that at levels we consider Operational to Strategic. The differences between their works was more frequently than not, a result of where in the Strategic, Operational, or Tactical level of warfare they were addressing. Clausewitz theory of military genius was the basis for teach “how to think” not what to think, and applies to the higher echelons of command and politics. We see this throughout the teachings of US doctrine. As leaders progress through our military educational system we see that their teachings take on an ever increasing scope with respect to the geopolitical aspects of warfare. We see this in the art portion of warfare that we teach at the higher levels of military education. This art aspect of the warfare is applied to the Military Decision Making Process by the commander in his assessment of the tactical problem and initial commander’s intent. Jomini’s belief that teaching the science of war along side of “what to think” in specific tactical situations, leads to a like outcomes based philosophy that is applicable at the lowest levels of combat. We see this sort of “do this and achieve this outcome” or outcome based philosophy directed at the basic skills level of our professional education system. At this level the task, conditions and standards reflect a Jomini, scientific flavor even through the large portion of the Military Decision Making Process. In the Military Decision Making Process, we find hard quantifiable aspects thtat the staff officers produce and enter into a decision matrix for the commander to apply. The beauty of the United States military’s professional education is that we have, very successfully blended the theories into a homogenous mission planning solution. The theories and teachings of Clausewitz and Jomini are more similar than distinctly different and must coexist for successful implementation of National will in today’s geopolitical environment. Current United States military doctrine is a relatively smooth blending of the two philosophies. As a leader analyzes and applies situational information to the tactical problem; they begin in the realm of the Clausewitz and move toward the specific doctrinal templates of Jomini to successfully solve the tactical problem at hand. In that planning the staff applies the science and hard line rules (Jominian influence) to the Commander’s larger scale and perspective artistic portion (Clausewitzian influence) resulting in effective mission accomplishment.