Jomini_and_Clausewitz

It is common for analyses of the work of Jomini and Clausewitz to point to the differences between the two. The most basic of these arguments is that Jomini addressed issues at the tactical and operational level and Clausewitz insights were more political and strategic. But if viewed from a broader prospective, one could argue that not only could their viewpoints coexist but that some of their ideals were very similar and that they complement each other. I would argue that a comparison of their philosophies would reveal that; both suggested the concentration of forces on the enemy’s decisive point, emphasized simple operations and battle planning, and both theorists had similar ideas concerning politics and warfare. Jomini and Clausewitz suggested that all military planning should focus on identifying and exploiting an enemies’ weakness so that an offensive operation could divide and conquer the enemy. Clausewitz referred to this decisive point as a center of gravity. Clausewitz argued that “the idea strategy is to identify the enemy’s centre of gravity, and then to direct all one’s energies against it” (Malik, 1999). He defined this center of gravity as “that point in the enemy’s organism – military, political, social, economic, etc. – at which, should he be defeated, or should he lose it, the whole structure of national power will collapse” (Clausewitz, 1908). Jomini referred to his idea of a center of gravity as a decisive point. Jomini’s definition of a decisive point is “that point in the enemy’s defences which if attached, destroyed or captured would cause the enemy’s total collapse” (Malik, 1999). This is evidence that Jomini and Clausewitz agreed that all enemies have a center of gravity and it should be attacked. However, as aggressive both measures may sound, both Jomini and Clausewitz believed in the simplicity of warfare. Jomini and Clausewitz both understood the complexities and the friction of war. Both writers warned that while war seemed like a complicated machine, the individual battles were simplistic in nature. They suggested the goal of producing simple battle planning and orders so that every Soldier could understand the intended outcome. Clausewitz wrote “But the general relations also give certain results, and although few in number and simple in form, still they are very important, because they belong to the very essence of the thing, and constitute the basis in all other decisions” (Clausewitz, 1908). Jomini believe that simplicity was a cardinal virtue “because he believed that they more simple a decisive manoeuver is, the more certain will be its success” (Malik, 1999). Again, both theorists understood the importance of simple, easy to understand, clear orders and operations. Jomini and Clausewitz also agreed that simplicity had to be maintained even to the political, diplomatic, and Command-in-Chief level. Although they had different theories as to the tactics of war, Jomini and Clausewitz had very similar ideas about the interaction between politicians, diplomacy, and warfare. Both theorists warned that the commanders and political leaders should be in agreement with the objectives of the war. Clausewitz goes on to suggest that the ultimate responsibility of the actions should always belong to the Commander in Chief. In On War, Clausewitz noted that ‘but it is both natural, and as long as no anomaly rises also advantageous, that the Commander-in-Chief should retain direct control to the utmost extent which circumstances will allow” (Clausewitz, 1908). Evidence of this agreement on politics is Jomini’s “direct borrowing from On War: "[T]he first care of a commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war." (Bassford, 1993). Compare this with Clausewitz’s writing: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” (Clausewitz, 1908). And, both were in “agreement that war was essentially a political act” (Bassford, 1993) There is no argument that Jomini and Clausewitz presented different approaches to warfare. However, they share some common ideas on the enemies’ center of gravity, simplicity, and the role of politics. As John Malik wrote “It should be noted that the differences between the strategic thought of Jomini and Clausewitz have been overemphasized to some extent because of their tendency to see one another as competitors” (Malik, 1999). Malik continues saying “when their words are compared . . . on the basis of broad concepts, much military thinking is common to both” (Malik, 1999). For today’s military leaders to be effective in the current global operations, we must disregard the initial assessments of their writings and realize that they present complementary advice on military operations. Works Cited Bassford, C. (1993). Jomini and Clausewitz; Their Interaction . 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe . Georgia State University . Clausewitz, C. v. (1908). On War, Volume 3. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & co., ltd. Malik, J. (1999). Contemporary Security and Strategy. New York: Routledge.