Jomini_and_Clausewitz_Coexist_in_Many_Modern_Militaries

Clausewitz saw war as a shared complexity between the government, military and the people, while Jomini viewed war in terms of the victorious hero dominating the battle field with manageable principles of war.1,2 Principles of both Clausewitz and Jomini writings on War coexist within US Department of Defense doctrine and senior leadership thinking. Jomini was the first of his time period to document operational principles of war, which he called “grand tactics.” 3 Field Manual 3-0 of U.S. Military Doctrine defines nine principles of war which contain four primary elements of Jomini’s fundamental operational principles, offensive, mass, maneuver and economy of force.1,4 U.S. doctrine states, “As a principle of war, offensive is synonymous with initiative.”4 Which directly matches up with Jominian tactics, he strongly supported gaining and maintaining the initiative through offensive operations as does the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0.1,4 Both consider the offense as the decisive choice of war and both consider defensive only rational as a middle ground moving back toward the offense.1,4 Further evidence of the U.S. Army’s Jominian operations character lies in its similarities of Lines of Operation. “Interior lines usually represent central position, where a friendly force can reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition.” 5 U.S Army Field Manual 3-0 devotes large sections of Chapters five and six to this major Jominian concept. Jomini’s original strategy of “interior lines,” suggested pure contiguous lines of operation focusing on the advantages of interior versus exterior lines of operation.6 The U.S. Army continues to document a desire to maintain the same relationship especial for contiguous linear battlefields. 5 American army planner’s focus on decisive points and the calculating application of military theory to provide the commander with solutions to problems in war, this further suggests the Jominian character in U.S. Army doctrine. In schools of tactics, U.S. Army officers repeatedly study the use of the military decision-making process (MDMP) for deriving solutions for operations in war.7 Through a step-by-step process, the MDMP is designed to assist military planners in discovering obtainable solution to any problem that they may encounter. Its systemic approach to problem solving relies on simple rules governing the movement of forces, the synchronization of their effects, and the discerned application of maximum power at decisive points on the battlefield.7 The clarity and optimism of the MDMP relies on Jominian hopes that war can be controlled and that the diligent officer can master the application of violence.1The U.S. Army follows the Jomini’s roadmap through the MDMP, the Principles of War, and the operations doctrine to enable commanders and their staffs a fundamental system for tactical planning, limiting the need for a single natural military genius. Clausewitz on the other hand weights emphasis on ambiguity, complexity and politics tending to become more important at the senior leadership levels of nations and militaries. Clausewitz, while the philosopher had insisted that war was "simply the expression of politics by other means," 2 U.S. Army Field Manual 1 (FM 1) includes the moral dimension giving civilian control over the military. 8 The U.S. Armed Forces does not wage war in its own name or under its own authority. Under the Constitution, the decision to use military force belongs to the American people acting through Congress and the President acting under the people’s authority. Once the Nation decides to authorize military action, it relies on the professionalism of its military leaders to ensure the judicious application of violence. 8 Colin Powell, former U.S. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, writes in his book, “Governments must exhaust all, political, economic, and diplomatic means, before a nation resort to military force.” 9 When a nation is engaging in war, every resource should be used to fulfill decisive force against the opposition, minimizing friendly casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the enemy force to surrender, Powell writes. 9 Clausewitz wrote, “No one starts a war, or rather no one in his senses should do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it.” 2 Colin Powel wrote, “Political governors must document a war’s objectives, while armies meet them. Finally, the people must support a war. Since they supply the treasure and the sons, and today the daughters too, they must be convinced that the sacrifice is justified.” 9 Clausewitz teaches that a soldier in all of his skill and honor forms just one side of that of a triad. The military, the government, and the people must all be on the same page to wage a successful war. 9 Jomini writings emphasize principals and application on war articulating deployment doctrine at the tactical level of war. The U.S. Army’s doctrinal of war at the tactical and operational levels shows that it mirrors Jominian principles. Combatant commanders are the senior military leadership tacticians and therefore the middle ground for where we can formulate the coexistence of both Jomini and Clausiwitz principles. Combatant commanders are involved in the day to day operations and maintenance of the force and have the responsibility for planning, leading, and executing operations. Cause and effect relationships at the combatant command level are more direct and the certainty of factors influencing decisions is higher. However, problem solving at the officer and civilian leadership levels above combatant commanders have a tendency to become more complex and for effects to become more separated from causes. Politics, media, and other factors beyond the combatant commander’s control begin to intrude on decision making at this level and the Clausewitzian logic makes a better fit. Jominian principles exist at the combatant commander’s level while Clausewitzian principles exist at the more senior military and civilian leaderships levels of government. Reference Page 1. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphi: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; Google Books Online, pp. 175 Strategy. http://books.google.com/books'id=nZ4fAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=baron+de+jomini+art+of+war&source=bl&ots=EpznA8j5-x&sig=rqs8V4MOhb7x1A_7UTkuA1IpSEE&hl=en&ei=c4teTZedNZP3gAeNifWEDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false 2. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War A Modern Military Classic, General Carl Von Clausewitz, Colonel F. N. Maude, J.J. Graham, 2008, Wilder Publications, Google Books Online, 77 What is War. http://books.google.com/books'id=GfBevjKluggC&printsec=frontcover&dq=clausewitz%E2%80%99s+on+war&source=bl&ots=QwGMu2RTGB&sig=BcYiiIqilLvWi4_QEx-WtaCAhrg&hl=en&ei=cpFeTd3AFIvrgQf3-NmhDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CG4Q6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=clausewitz%E2%80%99s%20on%20war&f=false 3. Jomini, 178, Strategy. 4. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual, 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC, 14 June 2001), A-1, Appendix A. 5. FM 3-0, 6-12. 6. Jomini, 189-197, Tactics. 7. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual, 5-0, The Operations Process, (Washington, DC, 10 March 2010), B-1, Appendix B. 8. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual, 1, The Army, (Washington, DC, June 2004, June 2004), 1 9. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, Joseph E. Persico, The Random House Ballantine Publisher, Google Books Online, 200 http://books.google.com/books'id=nTSl-KqcSJQC&pg=PA200&lpg=PA200&dq=colin+powell+my+american+journey+on+clausewitz&source=bl&ots=LTYDKzHnlE&sig=isEKyKPEwMjjx1CBed4--7fTWX8&hl=en&ei=3CVUTZyFJMi1tgf-t9SfCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false