Is_War_a_Permanent_Feature_in_the_International_Landscape_

Do You Agree That War Remains a Permanent Feature of The International Landscape' Discuss with reference to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Immanuel Kant argued war is not an inevitable aspect of human existence in asserting “perpetual peace is no empty idea, but a practical thing which, through its gradual solution, is coming always nearer its final realization”. History would prove otherwise. Indeed the twentieth century has been the most belligerent in our history with two devastating world wars and numerous regional and international conflicts. War has been an ever-present part of human history, with evidence of tribal warfare dating back at least 12,000 years. This persistence provides good basis for the assumption that war will continue to be a permanent part of the international landscape. This assumption is not wholly based on the tautology that because war has always been it will always be. To further prove this assumption this essay will examine theories asserting that changes in society and the global political climate mean war is no longer a necessary institution, as well as identify some reasons for war and explain why they are still relevant in the modern world. Some argue that state interdependence and the increased influence of non-state actors has resulted in increased stability, as now countries are more intertwined and reliant upon each other, so the benefits of war are greatly reduced. However while globalisation is becoming more predominant, it is indisputable that similar international co-reliance existed before many confrontations. Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Saddam Hussein was viewed as a puppet ally of the US. In some cases these relationships have actually been the source of tension. There is no assurance that interdependence heightens global security, in some cases it can diminish it. Increased interdependence among nations means states have a vested interest in the political affairs of other sovereign nations. This may lead to a situation in which, due to a change to an unfavoured regime, one nation finds it beneficial to intervene in another, to a greater extent than they would have, had their fates not been so intertwined. Even if there is increased co-reliance it is indisputable that seemingly altruistic behavior, historically and currently, has been motivated by self-interest. It can be argued that institutions such as the European Union (EU) are examples of steps towards a common security pact but the exclusivity of these regional alliances can lead to tension in themselves, for example Turkey’s growing frustration in its efforts to accede to the EU.  The problems then move from a state versus state issue to groups versus groups merely shifting the arena in which conflict arises. Furthermore, an element of control or policing is required within these unions and the potential for conflict remains. If a world union was created, it should, in theory, be stable, but there will always be recalcitrant nation states such as Iran or The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. This could result in a highly adversarial world prone to conflict, reducing the effect of a world union. The closest thing to a world union we have currently is the United Nations (UN), which has so far proved ineffectual in regulating individual state behavior on many occasions. It was unable to effectively reprimand the US after the Iraqi invasion carried out despite a lack of UN mandate. The General Assembly recognised this inadequacy in stating “the current United Nations system of administration of justice is slow, cumbersome, ineffective and lacking in professionalism” in a resolution aimed at improving these systems but it still remains to be seen whether the United Nations can truly fulfil their purpose “[t]o maintain international peace and security”. A major barrier in allowing the UN to realise this purpose is its lack of enforcement power. It is unlikely that this power will eventuate, as states have in the past been very unwilling to cede any form of sovereignty to the UN. The UN was created with very noble endeavors, but its ambitions may be too lofty to ever overcome state self-interest. For nations to go to war they must see it as beneficial in some regard. In the past these benefits have been far easier to ascertain and the costs involved comparatively insubstantial. While the tools of tribal war killed proportionally more, today’s tools lead to higher absolute death totals and are much more destructive. Some say that these costs have become too high and that war is no longer a viable means of achieving the aforementioned benefits. This proposition is flawed in many ways: it assumes states are rational in their decision-making, their cost-benefit analysis accurately reflects outcomes and that there are no hidden benefits or ulterior motives. It is incorrect to assume states act entirely rationally in determining the advantages in participating in war. Firstly, because individuals decide state actions, inherent human irrationality imbues state actions with emotional value judgments that can impede completely logical evaluations of situations. Secondly, values and rationality can differ greatly from culture to culture. This becomes even more of an issue when assessing and predicting the behavior of other nations. Assumptions based on perceived notions of rationality can lead to poor decision-making on one side and unexpected reactions from another. One of the reasons behind the attack on Pearl Harbour is an example of these incongruous beliefs. The Japanese place high value on honour and viewed America’s behavior in negotiations as flouting diplomatic protocol. To the US this attack seemed entirely unwarranted. It has often been seen in the past that states underestimate the costs of war. The initial projected cost of the war in Iraq was $50 to $60 Billion. To date $748 billion has been spent with the long-term costs now estimated at $4 trillion. The notion that nations may refuse to participate in war based on financial predictions may be true, but when estimations so often fall short of the reality relying on high projections to deter war becomes an unlikely safeguard. The real benefits of war may not be promulgated to the public. The initial justification for the invasion of Iraq was “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.” Seven years on it has come to light that there were no weapons of mass destruction, no support for terrorism and as yet, attempts to ‘liberate’ the Iraqi people have failed. Either these explanations are yet to be recognised, were ill advised, or used as a front to legitimise a hidden goal. American citizens have expressed outrage that the “Government exploited [their] patriotism and deep desire for revenge” after the 9/11 attacks to justify the Iraqi invasion. Karen Kwiatkowski, a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel of the Pentagon working with the National Security Agency, maintains the war in Iraq had nothing to do with war on terrorism or liberation of the Iraqi people despite the entire mission being named Operation Iraqi Freedom. So what were the goals of the Iraqi invasion' There were many traditional reasons for engaging in warfare contributing to the Iraqi invasion, such as securing resources and increasing international prestige. However none of these were the casus belli, given that public opinion would not have swayed in favour of missions directed at these illegitimate and selfish reasons. Evidence suggests that these were contributing reasons. Gwynne Dyer a military historian asserts that a significant factor of US going to war was to repositioning itself as a country that must be obeyed and in 2001 President Bush’s cabinet approved military action in Iraq to secure stable oil supplies. However within the Iraqi and more recent wars there is an emerging catalyst. President Eisenhower warned against something he called the “military-industrial complex”, that is the intimate relationship between government, military and industry that would result in giving industry unwarranted influence to lead the country in directions advantageous to itself. Lieutenant Colonel Kwiatkowski and many others propose that the Iraqi invasion was just this, a huge leap towards a pre-calculated war. She explains the government’s willingness to go to war existed because of the relationship between Vice-President Dick Cheney and industrial arms manufacturer Halliburton. Profit motivated corporations increasingly have the power to influence the appropriations bill in the US. Since the end of the second world war the federal government has spent more than half its tax dollars on past, current and future military operations, influenced in no small way by military industrial lobbyists. This relatively recent motivation for war provides yet another reason war may breakout perhaps increasing war’s prominence in the international landscape. It would seem war is gradually evolving from not just a means of ensuring security and benefits for the nation as a whole but to a more selfish instrument of economic advantage to private industry. Lieutenant Colonel Kwiatkowski points out “if you join the US military now you are not protecting America, you are serving a political agenda”. War is a significant element of our history. Its persistence indicates it will remain an intricate component of the interactions between states and cultures. There is no convincing evidence we as a society have changed sufficiently for this to no longer be the case. But as globally valued resources become less abundant there is more impetus for conflict. With the profit-orientated corporations, which stand to gain from war, having significantly more influence over policy makers, we are at higher risk of sustained warfare than ever before. Not only will war remain a permanent feature of the international landscape but without dramatic societal change it may well become a more ominous threat. Reference List Belasco A. (2009) The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terrorism Operations Since 9/11. Congressional Research sServices. Report Number 7-5700 Bull H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London, MacMillan. Bush, G.W. (22 March 2003) Presidential Address. Eisenhower, D. (17 January 1961) The Farewell Address. Herszenhorn, D. M. (Tuesday 18 March 2008) Estimates of Iraq War Cost Were Not Close to The Ball Park. The New York Times [Online] Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/washington/19cost.html [Accessed 20 April 2010] Kant, I (2005). 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(2008) Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, vol. 1 Institute for Defense Analyses IDA Paper P-4287, pp. ES-1 -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. Thomson, J. E. (1995) State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research, International Studies Quarterly, 39(2), p 215. [ 2 ]. Why We Fight (2005) [Film] Directed by: Jarecki, E. USA, Sony Pictures Classics [ 3 ]. Richardson, J.L. (1992). Questions About A Post-Cold War International Order, Canberra. Australian National University Press. p 7. [ 4 ]. Wheeler N.J. and Booth K. 'The Security Dilemma', in Baylis J. and Rengger N.J. (1992) Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World. Oxford, Oxford University Press. p 48. [ 5 ]. Resolution 61/261: Administration of Justice at the United Nations, GA Res. 4 April 2007. [ 6 ]. United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1. [ 7 ]. Bull H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London, MacMillan, p 252. [ 8 ]. Stoessinger J.G (1998) Why Nations go to War. 7th ed. New York, St Martin’s Press [ 9 ]. Keegan, J. (1994) A History of Warfare. New York, Random House. p 53. [ 10 ]. Keeley L.H. op. cit. [ 11 ]. Hedley Bull, op. cit. p 188. [ 12 ]. Sutherland, S. (1992) irrationality, reissued by Pinter & Martin 2007 [ 13 ]. Herszenhorn, D. M. (Tuesday 18 March 2008) Estimates of Iraq War Cost Were Not Close to The Ball Park. The New York Times [Online] Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/washington/19cost.html [Accessed 20 April 2010] [ 14 ]. Belasco A. (2009) The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terrorism Operations Since 9/11. Congressional Research Services. Report Number 7-5700 [ 15 ]. Herszenhorn, o.p cit. [ 16 ]. Bush, G.W. (22 March 2003) Presidential Address. [ 17 ]. Shrader, K. (Thursday 22 June 2006) New Intel Report Reignites Iraq Arms Fight. The Washington Post [Online] Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062201475.html [Accessed 21 April 2010] [ 18 ]. Woods, K.M. and Lacey, J. (2008) Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, vol. 1 Institute for Defense Analyses IDA Paper P-4287, pp. ES-1 [ 19 ]. Why We Fight, op. cit. [ 20 ]. Ibid. [ 21 ]. Ibid. [ 22 ]. Ibid. [ 23 ]. Mackay, N. (Sunday 6 October 2002) Official: US oil at the heart of Iraq crisis. The Sunday Herald (Scotland) [Online] Available from: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1006-03.htm [Accessed 22 April 2010] [ 24 ]. Eisenhower, D. (17 January 1961) The Farewell Address. [ 25 ]. Why we Fight, op. cit. [ 26 ]. Melman S. (1985) The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline NY: Simon & Schuster. [ 27 ]. Why we Fight, op. cit.