In_Bloom-Opium_in_Afghanistan

Development is a complex issue, with many different and sometimes debatable definitions. However, achieving human development is linked to a position of development which views it as freeing people from obstacles that affect their ability to develop their own lives and communities. Development, therefore, is empowerment: it is about local people taking control of their own lives, expressing their own demands and finding their own solutions to their problems. Therefore, there may be two different types: developed and underdeveloped. A developed country is one that has a good economy in both an international and national senses. It is a country that has a good economy at home, and afar, and has a respectable standard of living. Fundamentally, a developed country must have a large infrastructure with adequate support for trade, and a government that is relatively stable. Likewise, underdeveloped is the opposite. To analyze the degree of severity in which a state is underdeveloped, one must fundamentally understand the nature and types of underdevelopment. The term, ‘underdeveloped’ can describe several different circumstances. These different types of underdevelopment are: political, social and economic. Through these types, an underdeveloped nation may experience a combination, ranging in different degrees of severity. Afghanistan, a landlocked South-Central Asian country of modest size is bordered by Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with over 36 percent of the population living in absolute poverty, and a further 37 percent living only slightly above the poverty line in 2010. However, if Afghanistan were located in a peaceful region, surrounded by stable countries, the question of national unity and identity might not appear so large. But three decades of war, revolution, terrorism and foreign intervention by Russia, Pakistan, The Arab world and the United States have made that question vitally important, both within and outside the country’s borders. Also, Afghanistan rests mostly on bare mountain ranges and high rocky plains, contributing to an impoverished population, because they cannot produce, or are limited in products that require rich black soil to export, and gain money from. Consequently, because Afghanistan is in short supply of traditional crops such as wheat, grapes and saffron, they rely on resources that they have and can produce a big supply off of, such as the cultivation of opium poppy. Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistance plant easily grown in most parts of Afghanistan, with a growing cycle that conveniently spreads a farmer’s workload throughout the year. Opium is grown legally in some countries for medical purposes, but a huge demand in the illicit market, is driving Afghanistan to supply illegal opium. Currently, as of March 2010, Afghanistan is the greatest supplier of illicit opium at 92%. However, in 2004, approximately 523 tons of morphine was produced worldwide from opium for medical purposes. As a result, opium is also refined for use in legal prescription painkillers such as OxyContin and Vicodin. In spite of this, superpowers such as, Australia and France currently produce most of the world’s opium used for medical purposes, leaving little flexibility for Afghanistan to enter this competitive market. Despite its serious uses for medical purposes, because Afghanistan has limited governmental control, Afghanistan’s opium poppy harvest ends up on the international market as heroin, which is also produced by opium poppy. Such factors have sparked numerous debates over whether Afghanistan should be able to enter the market as an illicit producer of Opium. However, although many international communities, as well as Canada, strongly agree on eradicating opium production in Afghanistan, the privately funded Senlis Council, founded by Canadian lawyer Norine MacDonald has been the forefront of a campaign trying to legalize opium production in Afghanistan by suggesting that: Village-cultivated poppy would be transformed into morphine tablets in the Afghan villages. The entire production process, from seed to medicine tablet, can thus be controlled by the village in collaboration with government and international actors, and all economic profits from medicine sales would remain in the village, triggering economic diversification. As internationally tradable commodities, locally produced medicines would also benefit the Afghan government (MacDonald cited in Schmidt 2010:71). For the purpose of this paper, I will agree with the privately funded Senlis Council’s stance on opium production in Afghanistan, and argue that Afghanistan’s cultivation of opium should not be drastically curbed or eradicated, and that the country should be able to enter the market as an licit producer of opium, because the industry brings socio-economic development and political benefits to the country. Lastly, I will establish my personal relationship and connection to the topic associated with opium production in Afghanistan. The cultivation of opium poppy provides incomes and livelihoods to many Afghan people. Because it provides these, it creates jobs. The cultivation and production of opium has significantly increased in Afghanistan since 2001. Afghan farmers have grown opium poppy for generations; however, not until the 1970s did they grow it in significant amounts for export. With the exception of 2001, when the Taliban strictly enforced a suspension on poppy cultivation due to 9/11 attacks, opium poppy cultivation has been steadily increasing for over the past two decades. This is because; more and more money is needed in the country to support the nation, due to ongoing attacks from the United States; contributing to the country being impoverished and weak. The cultivation of opium poppy makes powerful economic sense to the impoverished farmers of Afghanistan. It is the easiest crop to grow, and by far the most profitable. Many farmers are driven by poverty, and continue to cultivate opium poppy to provide for their family. For example, an Afghan farmer can make 17 times more profit growing opium poppy--$4,622 per hectare, compared to only $266 per hectare for wheat. Opium poppy is also drought resistant, easy to transport and store, and, unlike many crops, requires no refrigeration and does not spoil. With Afghanistan’s limited irrigation, electricity, roads and other infrastructure, growing traditional crops can be extremely difficult. Therefore, farmers are simply unable to support their families growing traditional crops; and because most rural farmers are uneducated and illiterate, they have few economically viable alternatives to growing opium poppy. Afghanistan’s economy has thus evolved to the point where it is now highly dependant on opium. Although less than 4 percent of fertile land in Afghanistan was used for opium poppy cultivation in 2006, proceeds from the harvest brought in over $3 billion, which is more than 35 percent of the country’s total gross national product. According to Antonio Costa, “Opium poppy cultivation, processing, and transport have become Afghanistan’s top employers, its main source of capital, and the principal base of its economy.” Today, a record 2.9 million Afghanis are involved in opium cultivation in some way, which represents nearly 10 percent of the population. However, although, Afghanistan’s overall economy is being boosted by the impact of opium profits, less than 20 percent of the $3 billion in opium profits actually goes to impoverished farmers. That being said, the practice is illegal. According to Micklethwait, the Afghan government has poor governing structures, and the overproduction of opium poppy, could drive the macroeconomics of the country to be undomesticated, by bringing in a large influx of dollars or other currencies into the countries’ banking system. Conversely, development is empowerment and therefore, we should let the Afghan people work together, and take control of their own lives. By having a product that is stable, and unique, Afghanistan is able to bring in money, which the country lacks. Although, all the opium profits do not go to the impoverished farmers, the farmers still get some money, and that is what counts. According to William Byrd of the World Bank, “The alternative livelihoods, supported by the current U.S. strategy are too often short-term ‘cash for work’ projects that do not provide a lasting incentive for farmers to give up opium cultivation.” Either way, the cultivation, procession and transport of opium poppy should not be eradicated, because it brings in more money than any other export in Afghanistan, and also creates multiple jobs for the country itself. If one were to eradicate the cultivation, Afghanistan would not be left with merely anything. Moreover, despite the many efforts to suppress or reduce illegal opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by international communities, they have not helped curb or eradicate the practice. Instead, many international governments gain money from the production and cultivation of opium poppy. As previously stated, less than 20 percent of the $3 billion in opium profits actually goes to impoverished farmers, while more than 80 percent goes into the pockets of Afghanistan’s opium traffickers and kingpins and their political connections. Therefore, not only are Afghani governments gaining money from the cultivation, but also, international governments in which they are selling the illicit opium poppy are to. This may be evident with the United States who have been trying to eradicate the illegal cultivation of opium poppy for approximately two decades. The United States is completely equipped with the right equipment to fully eradicate opium fields by using chemical herbicides from the air. However, even though there are limitations within the country of Afghanistan, such as the chemicals harming residents, both sides know that they are somehow gaining profit from the cultivation, and therefore keep the fields alive. Even though the United States claim they believe in counter-narcotics, if the United States truly believed counter-narcotics as a high on their agenda, they would have eradicated the cultivation of illicit opium poppy as soon as possible. In addition, not only does the cultivation of opium poppy in someway help the United States government, but also the Karzai government in Afghanistan. The increase of opium poppy is used to strengthen the Karzai government’s law enforcement capability, judicial system and border security by using money that is brought into the country through the production of opium poppy. Seeing as opium poppy is a stable and strong resource that produces a lot of money, it is used as a base or foundation for overall development in the country. Next, not only do the profits of the illegal cultivation help development within the Afghani government, but also their overall military. Although many of the profits go towards the Taliban, profits also manage their way to the countries military, to help support themselves in times of war. I believe this benefits Afghanistan because by having their own ammunition, it creates empowerment. It creates empowerment by having the country work together and use the weapons, rather than relying on the United States to help them defend themselves against attacks from the Taliban or Al Qaeda. Furthermore, seeing as the ultimate goal of suppressing illicit opium poppy production has failed throughout the decades, illegal businesses supporting opium have begun. Intelligence agencies, powerful businesses, drug traders and organized criminals are competing for the strategic control over the heroin routes, formally through Afghanistan. Heroin is a multi-billion-dollar business supported by powerful interests, which requires a steady and secures commodity flow. A large share of this multi-billion-dollar revenue of narcotics is deposited in the Western banking system, where superpowers can get the drug cheap in Afghanistan, and sell it on the market for more. In fact, it has been recently established, that British and Canadian troops are smuggling heroin, by using military aircraft out of southern Afghanistan. Therefore, it is evident that through this illegal drug cultivation, not only is Afghanistan gaining money, but also creating political ties and businesses with other countries. This helps elevate development a lot, by introducing trade into the country. However, this trade can only prosper if the main actors involved in narcotics have political friends in high places. Legal and illegal undertakings are increasingly intertwined and blurred, between “business people” and criminals. In turn, the relationship among business partners and Afghanis must be tainted, in order for the practice to be eradicated. All in all, the cultivation of opium poppy creates business and political ties within Afghanistan. Therefore it should not be curbed or eradicated. -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. Rubin, B. 2000. “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” World Development 28(10): 1789-1803. [ 2 ]. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp'Cr=afghan&Cr1=&NewsID=34239) [ 3 ]. A brief history of Afghanistan by Shaista Wahab, Barry Youngerman [ 4 ]. Rubin, B. 20001790. “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” World Development 28(10): 1789-1803. [ 5 ]. 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