Ile_H110_Argumentative_Essay

YOUR NAME HERE DDE CORE ADL PH2 AY08-09 02 H110 Argumentative Essay The study of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Ulysses Grant, and the other “great captains” is still valid for a current military professional even given the changes in warfare over the past 150 years. September 4, 2010 Winston Churchill once said, “those who forget history are bound to repeat it.” As I progress through my military career, I find that this is more true than I previously thought. Even with the changes in warfare over the last 150 years, the study of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Ulysses Grant, and the other ‘great captains’ is still valid for the military professional. Warfare has changed greatly over time. The advances in weaponry, transportation assets, and intelligence gathering equipment show little resemblance to the equipment used by Napoleon’s army, or even that used by Army of the Potomac. However, the use of those weapons and assets, and the traits of the leaders directing those weapons and armies, have a number of similarities that have survived across the advance of time to the modern warfare of today. Therefore, by becoming a student of past successful leaders and successful operations, today’s military professional can find traits and strategies to help him find success on the battlefield today. A review of some of the great military leaders of the past will show today’s military professional some of the traits and tactics to help be successful today. Let’s first examine some of the traits of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Grant that contributed to their success on the battlefield. Napoleon possessed an exceptional understanding of terrain and troops, both friendly and unfriendly. This attribute is not to be taken lightly. With this skill, he was able to select and motivate talented subordinate field commanders. With his subordinate commanders excelling, he was able to focus his own great will power and energies into the command requirements of the battle, viewing the ‘big picture’ and thinking for the entire army and the entire campaign or operation. He was able to inspire his troops. The inspired and motivated troops formed an army that was loyal to their commander and willing to suffer hardships for success. Inspiring and motivating soldiers is still a significant part of the job of today’s military professional. Clausewitz writes about the characteristics of a great leader. In his book, On War, Clausewitz writes about another trait of a leader that is relevant today; courage. Clausewitz feels that courage is the soldier’s top requirement.[i] He says that there are two kinds of courage; courage in the face of personal danger and courage to accept responsibility.[ii] I suspect that no military professional will argue that courage in the face of danger is an important trait of an effective leader. Front line leaders, particularly in combat arms, are repeatedly drilled to lead from the front. Without the courage to face danger, leading from the front is not possible. The courage to accept responsibility is also important to today’s leader. Cohesiveness and loyalty only afforded by soldiers to a leader that has earned it in their eyes. Accepting and managing the great responsibility of leading men is crucial in our efforts to get men to follow us. Clausewitz writes that willpower is another factor that a leader needs for success on the battlefield. Specifically, he writes that stronger motives increase willpower, and willpower is always both an element in, and the product of, strength.[iii] Today’s leader can apply that lesson, to stay on task, or on target, regardless of the mission, be it combat or paperwork. Napoleon was said to have tremendous willpower, and in fact, was able to impose it on others such that they would perform at level higher than they thought possible. Grant shows an ability to give direction to his trusted subordinates, but not micro-manage their operations. Much like Napoleon was able to inspire and motivate his subordinate commanders, Grant was able to accomplish the same thing with Gen. Sherman’s attack on Johnson during the Civil War. Grant was able to put talented and able subordinate leaders around him allowing him to concentrate his energies on the entire campaign while his subordinates concentrated on their specific missions and operations. The tactics used the some of the great captains of the past are still useful today. For example, Napoleon achieved success by executing his operations with energy, resolve, great speed, and relentless pursuit.[iv] One of his greatest victories, Austerlitz, was won with fast strategic movement while maintaining the initiative. Napoleon preferred deep strategic penetration supported by superior tactical planning and a tactical deception plan. Grant, upon taking control of the Army of the Potomac, made great use of economy of force and concentration of effort to achieve success against Confederate forces in his spring offensive. He identified the railroad systems and junctions as decisive points and directed his subordinate commanders to attack them.[v] Just as military leaders are taught today to find a weakness and exploit it, Grant was doing it many years ago. Grant also demonstrated the principle of massing forces at a critical point to penetrate the enemy defenses. He gathered the Army of the Potomac and other subordinate corps to face Lee in a decisive battle in which Grant had the advantage of numbers and maneuver.[vi] Again, current doctrine teaches us to concentrate at the point of attack in order penetrate deeply. Finally, today’s military leader can benefit from study of the writings and actions of great military leaders of the past by looking at the political aspects they had to deal with and see the similarities to the responses and solutions of the old greats. Grant demonstrates to us the benefits of developing relationships, while maintaining the proper segregation of duties, with the civilian leadership that ultimately commands our military. He writes in his personal memoirs that in his meetings with President Lincoln, he was told what President wanted, and gave his firm commitment of his efforts to do as the President asked. Later, with a good relationship with the Secretary of War, Grant discovers that Lincoln was wiling to provide whatever resources necessary for the spring campaign.[vii] Grant can only learn these valuable insights by cultivating and developing his relationships with the nation’s political leaders. Clausewitz’s writings affirm to us that wars can be considers as acts of policy of the civil government to which we serve. Further, he discusses that wars are a continuation of those policies, just by means other than strictly political.[viii] Today’s military professional needs to learn that lesson such that he conducts himself as a instrument of United States policy and carries with the him the representation of such. As illustrated above, the study of the ‘great captains’ of the past is still valid for the modern military professional. The writings, actions, and characteristics of these great leaders can bring a wealth of benefits to the professional who studies their ways and is able to apply them to today’s battlefield and leadership problems. Bibliography: Ross, Steven T. “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare.” The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987. Edited by Harry R. Borowski, 309–24. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1988. von Clausewitz, Carl. “What is War'” On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 75–89. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Book of Readings, 50–61. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992. Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885–86. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Book of Readings, 50–61. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992. Note: ----------------------- [i] von Clausewitz, Carl. “What is War'” On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 75–89. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Book of Readings, 50–61. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992). 12. [ii] Ibid., 12. [iii] Ibid., 8. [iv] Ross, Steven T. “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare.” The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987. Edited by Harry R. Borowski, 309–24. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1988. 2. [v] Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885–86. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Book of Readings, 50–61. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992). 2. [vi] Ibid., 5 [vii] Ibid., 3 [viii] von Clausewitz, Carl. “What is War'” On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 75–89. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Book of Readings, 50–61. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992). 10.