Eu_Membership_of_Turkey

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2 2. MECHANISM OF EU 2 2.1. Institutions 2 2.2. History 3 2.3. Enlargement 3 3. Effects of EU Membership of Turkey 4 3.1. EU Membership criteria 4 3.2. History of Turkey’s Bid for EU Membership 4 3.3. Budgetary Implications of Turkey’s Accession 7 3.4. Accession of Turkey to the Internal Market 8 3.5. Migration of Turkish Workers 8 3.6. Arguments for Turkey Joining the EU 9 3.7. Arguments against Turkey Joining the EU 11 3.8. Implications of Turkish Membership for the European Union 13 4. Conclusion 14 5. REFERENCES 16 1. INTRODUCTION The EU is a unique construct, it is neither a state nor an international organization; it can be described as a political organisation (Peterson & Shackleton, 2002). Its aims are to provide collective goods (internal market, a single currency and international power) which its member states cannot provide on its own (Peterson & Shackleton, 2002). The member states that make up the EU remain as independent sovereign nations. The EU describes itself as a “…fair and caring society, committed to promoting economic prosperity and creating jobs by making companies more competitive and giving workers new skills. Its aim is to spread prosperity, democratic progress, the rule of law and human rights beyond its frontiers…” (European Union, 2007, para. 4). The EUs objectives for the challenging 21st century are “to; • provide peace, prosperity and stability for its peoples; • overcome the divisions on the continent; • ensure that its people can live in safety; • promote balanced economic and social development; • meet the challenges of globalisation and preserve the diversity of the peoples of Europe and to • uphold the values that Europeans share, such as sustainable development and a sound environment, respect for human rights and the social market economy.” (European Union, 2007) 2. MECHANISM OF EU 2.1. Institutions There are three main institutions that are involved in the general decision making process and especially in the enlargement process. The European Commission is a body of 27 independent members - one member of each country - who represent the interests of the European Union as a whole. During the enlargement process the negotiations are carried out between the candidate and the European Commission. After that, the Council of the European Union has to decide whether the country is becoming a member or not. The Council of the European Union represents the member states. Meetings of the Council are attended by one of each member states ministers. Once a positive decision has been made, the European Parliament must give a positive vote by an absolute majority of its members. There are 736 Ministers in the European Parliament who represent the European citizens and are directly elected by them. (European Union, 2007) 2.2. History The origin of the EU can be found in the early 1950´s. In the “treaty of Paris” (18 April 1951) the six founding countries Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed to a common market of coal and steel in between them (European Union, 2007). Since that time the union steadily increased their members and their political influence so that there are 27 members of the EU at the moment (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). 2.3. Enlargement In general, any “European state could become member of the EU” (European Union, 2007b) if it “respects the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (European Union, 2007b). Furthermore the Copenhagen criteria from 1993 expects, that by the time a new member joins it must have • …stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; • a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; • the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including support for the aims of the Union. They must have a public administration capable of applying and managing EU laws in practice… (European Union, 2007, para. 9). 3. Effects of EU Membership of Turkey 3.1. EU Membership criteria Turkey has to fulfil the membership conditions, the so-called Copenhagen criteria if it wants to become a member of the EU. They are: • Stable framework of institutions which ensure democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities • Functioning market economy which is capable to handle competition and market forces within the European Union • Ability to comply with the duties of membership, which includes supporting political, economic and monetary objectives of the Union • adoption and implementation of the European legislation, the so-called acquis communautaire. Additionally, the EU holds the right to decide if it is ready to absorb a potential new member (European Union, 2007). Prerequisite for EU membership is that Turkey obtains macroeconomic stability, adopts the CAP and liberalises its service sector. A potential membership is expected to have positive effects on Turkey. Price distortion will be reduced, economic growth will be boosted and the in general the economy will attract more FDI. Another positive effect is that Turkey will receive EU funds, this will improve the infrastructure. These benefits will have a price that Turkey has to pay. The adoption of the EU legislative means cost for example in obtaining macroeconomic stability or complying with EU directives (Togan, 2004, p. 1013) However, in general, the fulfilment of the economic and of the legal prerequisites of the Copenhagen Criteria is not seen as a problem but rather the political one. For example, questions in relation to minorities (Kurds) and torture are not resolved in a satisfying way from the EU’s point of view. 3.2. History of Turkey’s Bid for EU Membership Since Turkey was founded in 1923, it has been known as a secular democracy, with a predominantly Muslim population and strong ties with the West. Only 2% of Turkey’s territory lies within the European Continent, according to Professor Sophie Meritet, in her lecture on the EU’s structure. Journalist Susan Sachs writes, “Turkey has been an associate member of the European Union for more than 40 years and a full NATO member for even longer. But its path to the European Union had been blocked by its longstanding conflicts with neighboring Greece, its occasional military coups, human rights shortcomings and recurring financial crises” (par. 16). Without a doubt, Turkey has encountered several obstacles in its bid for full EU membership. The web site Euractiv.com provides a chronology of some events involved in Turkeys’ bid for accession to the EU. This history is crucial to understanding the issues currently at play. The first significant step came in February 1952, with Turkey’s full membership in NATO. In 1959, Ankara applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community and, in 1963, signed the Ankara Agreement, which integrated Turkey with the European Customs Union and acknowledged Turkey’s ultimate goal of full EEC membership. The first financial protocol was also signed in 1963, followed by the signing of the Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol in Brussels in 1970. In January 1973, the Additional Protocol became effective, setting out how the Customs Union would be established. With Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the military coup d’etat on 12 September 1980, relations between Turkey and the European Community came almost to a standstill in the early 1980s (“EU-Turkey Relations”). A turning point was reached in September 1986, when the Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting resumed the association process and, in April 1987, Turkey applied for full EEC membership. The European Commission responded in December 1989 with a refusal to begin accession negotiation. Although confirming Ankara’s eventual membership, Turkey’s economic and political situation, as well its poor relations with Greece and conflict with Cyprus, were cited as creating an unfavorable environment with which to begin negotiations (“EU-Turkey Relations”). Yet Turkey was eventually declared a candidate in December 1999. At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002, the EU outlined the political and economic conditions that Ankara would have to satisfy before formal accession talks could begin. The so-called Copenhagen criteria require that Turkey have a functioning market economy and stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (Phillips, 2007). With the 2002 election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a pro-European party with Islamist roots, a number of reforms led to increased political and economic stability. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who became Turkey’s Prime Minister in March 2003, made it a priority to prepare Turkey for eventual EU membership, and passed several constitutional and judicial reforms to that end. (Solana 12). As Turkey’s political reforms continued, the EU leaders agreed on December 16, 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey beginning in October 2005. Despite an attempt by the Austrian government to offer Turkey less than full membership, EU accession negotiations were officially launched, and Turkey has closed its first chapter in negotiations in June 2006 (Wikipedia, 2007). In spite of this, Turkey encountered several roadblocks along the way. Specifically, these included strained relations with the Kurds in northern Iraq and separatist PKK guerillas who resumed fighting following a ceasefire (Zakaria 45). Another major challenge that Turkey faced was Cyprus. Javier Solana writes, “A condition for the opening of membership talks was that Turkey extend its customs union to all the 2004 entrants, which included Cyprus. Admitting the Greek Cypriot republic without settling its dispute with the Turkish Cypriot north was, as Lord Patten concedes, ‘a mistake’. A UN plan to reunite the disputed island fell apart in April 2004 when the Greek-Cypriots, who had been promised membership of the EU in any event, overwhelmingly rejected it in a referendum. (The Turkish-Cypriots, desperate to be admitted to the EU as well, endorsed it.)” (Solana, 2007: 13). When Turkey refused to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots, the EU suspended negotiations on eight of the 35 “chapters” in the membership talks (Gorvett, 2007). The impact of Turkey’s 2007 parliamentary elections on further EU-Turkey negotiations remains to be seen. Solana writes, “Mr. Rehn insists that this is not a train-wreck, noting that good technical progress is being made and a new chapter will be opened shortly. ... He suggests that the right course is to muddle through the rest of 2007. ® After that the Turks will have a choice: to resume their reforms, putting their talks back on track towards membership later in the decade, or to turn away from the road towards Europe altogether” (Solana, 2007: 13). The earliest date that Turkey could enter the EU is 2013, the date when the next six-year EU budget will come into force (2013–2019) (Wikipedia, 2007). Ankara is currently aiming to comply with EU law by this date. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul announced a seven-year plan and 400-page timetable to implement technical reforms that would bring standards ranging from the environment to energy and health in line with those of the EU (“Turkey Says it is Committed to Change”). Brussels, however, has refused to back 2013 as a deadline. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, in a BBC interview late last year, indicated that Turkey is a long-term issue, and believes that it will take at least 15 to 20 years for Turkey to gain membership in the Union. Given that the entire 27-member EU block must vote unanimously on whether to accept Turkey as a member, there is no immediate resolution in sight. The following sections examine both the pro-accession and anti-accession arguments surrounding this heated topic. 3.3. Budgetary Implications of Turkey’s Accession Flam describes in his articles the EU budgetary effects of Turkey as a member. The main idea of the EU budget is that revenue and expenditure are arranged it such a way, that each country gives a specific percentage of its incomes, existing of VAT, custom duties and its GNP, and that money is distributed across all countries through budgets subsidies: But not every country gets everything back what he paid. Poor countries like Portugal and Greece get more money from the EU than they give, but countries like the Netherlands and Luxembourg get less many back than they pay the EU, respectively net recipients and net contributors. As can be seen from the above table, the expenditure is mainly aimed at two destinations: Agriculture and Structural Operations which is about subsidizing disadvantaged countries for structural development. The agricultural policy is about protecting the EU’s farmers from the fierce competition from development countries, by buying excessive food supply at administratively determined prices. Luckily this Common Agricultural Policy is gradually shifting from price to income support (Flam, 2003). But if Turkey will join the EU, there is a big chance that they will become a big net recipient, because Turkey has a large agricultural sector and is a poor country. This means that if Turkey will join the EU, it will cost the EU a lot of money. Luckily, as Flam argues, the history of past enlargements shows that when EU countries that joined EU became big net contributors or big net recipient’s rules were changed, as was the case in UK’s accession. Although it can’t be denied that Turkey will become a large net recipient if it joins the EU. 3.4. Accession of Turkey to the Internal Market When Turkey joins the EU, it will also fully take part in the internal market. Both economies will merge to a great extent. As a result both economies are affected by it, the Turkey’s economy more than the EU economy since the EU’s economy is relatively big compared to the Turkish economy. CPB argues that both economies will be affected positively because of three reasons. The first reason is that because of the accession, there will be a big administrative barrier removed between Turkey and the EU´s member states (red tape reduction). It will be reduced to a comparable level of which is already present between the current EU members. An example of this would be goods on which duties are levied at on the border which causes delays, costing money. According to CPB there is a lot to be gained in this way. A second reason is that accession to the internal market implies a reduction of technical barriers to trade. This will result in a better harmonization of rules and procedures and technical standards. A harmonization of this kind is already in place, but the accession of Turkey would even further harmonize this issue so that it will give a significant advantage to the economy. The last reason is that because of the accession, doing business with Turkey would be more attractive because Turkey can be trusted more; they are under stricter supervision of the European Commission. Accroding to Lejour et al. (2004) that study showed that if the Central and Eastern Europe Countries joined the internal market, they benefited far more from the membership of the internal market compared to the membership of the previous in place customs union. The accession itself is far more important than the harmonization of regulations and removal of administrative and technical trade barriers itself. 3.5. Migration of Turkish Workers In Turkey, the PPP-adjusted income is three times lower than it that of a regular EU country. It will probably take more than 30 years before the PPP-adjusted income in Turkey about equals that of the average EU country. Until those 30 years, the difference in PPP-adjusted income stays a strong incentive for Turkish immigration to the other EU countries. With a possible accession, this will not only be the case in future, but has also proved itself in the past. Turkish migration to Western Europe was very high in the 1960’s, where a lot of Turks immigrated to Germany and to a lesser extend the Netherlands. Also a lot of Turkish people where recruited as guest workers in a lot of European countries, but that stopped after the oil crisis which was in 1973-74. Most of those workers went do Germany, which now has about 2.1 million workers of Turkish origin. The Netherlands now has 250.000 Turkish workers. The willingness for a lot of Turkish people to migrate to other EU countries when Turkey is a member of the EU is a source of fear for the current EU members. For that reason immigration will be under certain restriction in the case that Turkey will become member of the EU, under current EU regulations this restriction may take up to seven years. 3.6. Arguments for Turkey Joining the EU Economic. Done right, EU membership could ensure that the Turkish economy remains the fastest-growing in Europe. Moreover, a vibrant Turkey could provide Europe with the added workforce, aggressive entrepreneurs, and new markets it needs to revive its flagging competitiveness. Turkey’s economy is modernizing rapidly, with a narrowed trade deficit and increased foreign investment. In 2004 and 2005, growth was above 7% (Gorvett, 2007: 54) far above average growth in the EU. Although the current GNP per capita is still lower than all of the other new EU countries, the current economic growth rate suggests that in a few years, Turkey will have overtaken Poland and Romania (Pope, 2004: pars. 2-4). Meanwhile, exports have also soared. In 2006, they topped $86bn, with a shift away from the traditional textiles underway (Gorvett, 2007: 54). Turkey has even narrowed its trade deficit with Europe, with exports to Europe covering four-fifths of imports compared with two-thirds five years ago (Meritet). Just one Turkish company, Koc Holding’s Arcelik, now claims 4.3% of the market for kitchen and washing appliances from Portugal to Russia, and Is Bankasi’s Pasabahce commands 12% of the European home glassware market (Pope, 2004: par. 7). At the same time, the country has reined in its high inflation rate, which often hit triple figures in the late 1990s but is now down to around 10%. For the first time in 35 years, the Turkish Economy achieved single digit inflation in February of last year (Meritet, 2007). Further, increasing numbers of multinationals are entering Turkey. Ford Motor Co. has shifted production for Europe to Turkey, while Toyota Motor Corp. and Honda Motor Co. are fast expanding Turkish car plants. DaimlerChrysler AG now makes half of all its Mercedes buses for the European market in Turkey (Pope, 2004: par. 10). Taken together, these economic factors strengthen the case for Turkey’s membership in the EU. Energy Resources. Within the last decade, Turkey has become a hub for energy resources. At a recent European energy conference, Turkey was described as an important partner for the formation of a European energy policy, and has a major role in diversifying energy supply routes (Butler and Taylor, 2007). Currently, Turkey is hesitant to sign on to the European Energy Community Treaty, in part because it fears that the EU would not have an interest in admitting Turkey as a full member once it gains free access to Turkey’s energy sector through this treaty. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated, “Turkey can help the EU secure its energy supply, while integration into the EU’s internal energy market will enable Turkey to build a functioning and reliable domestic energy market and the infrastructure needed for its rapid economic growth” (quoted in Butler and Taylor). Although Turkey could potentially play an important role through such a treaty, this is not enough. If the EU chooses to take the steps necessary to show that it is willing to admit Turkey as a full member, both parties stand to benefit Turkey from the promise of full EU membership, and the EU from a greater opening of Turkey’s strategic energy sector. Religious. The common view from Turkey and among members of the EU, is that the EU is a “Christian Club.” For that reason Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim country, is viewed with some skepticism. Solana writes, “many Muslims would see a failure of Turkey’s membership hopes as a rebuff administered by a Christian club. Not only would that further sour the West’s relations with the Islamic world; it would also cause disaffection among the EU’s own 15 million-strong Muslim population, many of whom are already hostile to the countries they live in” (Solana, 2007: 13). Admitting Turkey would actually provide a chance for the EU to demonstrate that it is fully committed to its stated mission of integration and becoming united through diversity, rather than simply as a body that gives lip service to these values, as some critics currently see it. In addition, another argument holds that, far from being a dangerous proposition, tying Turkey to the EU “would help the block become a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism and raise its profile on the world stage” (Bilefsky and Pope, 2004). Demographics. The EU’s population is graying, with an increased number of aging baby boomers and retirees. Turkey’s young (23% of population is under 15) population (“Accession”) might act as a balance at a time when Europe is starting to feel the effects of its aging demographic profile, according to Professor Legros in her lecture on European demographic trends. Turkey’s current population is 71 million, and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest current EU member state Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020 (Hughes, 2004: 3). Political Reforms. Given that political reform in Turkey is an ongoing process, the opening of EU negotiations is seen by many in Turkey to be fundamental to ensuring continued reforms, particularly in the judicial and human rights areas. (Meritet, 2007). Phillips writes, “For Erdogan, the stakes of accession are very high. By bringing Turkey to the EU negotiation table, he would bind Turkey more closely to the West; he would also fulfill Atatürk’s vision of Turkey as a modern European country while affirming the country’s popular Islamic identity. Turkey’s rejection by the EU could cause a domestic backlash against the West and embolden ultranationalists and religious extremists bent on derailing Turkey’s liberalization, democratization, and demilitarization” (Phillips, 2007: par. 27). Clearly, the promise of EU membership is considered by accession advocates to be a key incentive for deepening democracy in Turkey, as it has been in other applicant countries. 3.7. Arguments against Turkey Joining the EU Economic. The anti-accession side of the argument also makes an economic case; specifically, that Turkey is not sufficiently advanced, with its “high debt, big income gaps, slow-moving bureaucracy and intrusive military” (Stokes, 2007: 3681). The Turkish economy, while booming compared with past years of high inflation and instability, has a long way to go before reaching the bloc’s minimum standard (Meritet, 2007). Further, there is concern that Turkish membership would bring a significant cost burden, with specific regard to agricultural subsidies. Fischler, Agricultural Commissioner of the EU, estimated that farm subsidies alone would cost more than 11.3 billion ($13.9 billion) a year (Bilefsky and Pope, 2004). Additionally, the issue of job losses to Turkey is also a significant concern among EU member states. In a recent poll, EU respondents worry about estimates that Turkish migration into the European Union could more than quadruple from its current level of 50,000 a year, and fear that this competition for jobs will undercut wages (Stokes, 2007: 3685). Political Influence. Other anti-accession parties object that Turkey would have disproportionate political influence within the EU because of is large population. As the second-most-populous EU nation after Germany, Turkey would have one of the largest delegations in the European Parliament (Meritet, 2007) and could help form a blocking majority in the powerful European Council. Many Germans note that, if Turkey ever joins, it is likely to become the most populous member by 2020, with more voting weight and more MEPs than Germany (Solana, 2007: 14). Given that Germany is such an established EU member, and the public largely perceives Turkey as an outsider because of its Muslim, secular status, the fact that Turkey would have more votes might make many EU states uncomfortable, leading to further delays in Turkey’s bid for accession. Human Rights Record and National Reforms. The EU member states’ concerns over Turkey’s human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey’s prolonged application process (Phillips, 2007). Although Turkey has undertaken significant reforms since 2002, problems in implementing these reforms remain. For example, reform has yet to affect the behavior of many judges or police at the village level, where allegations of torture continue. “It is an exercise in changing mentalities. And that transformation takes time” said Ahmet Acet, deputy secretary-general for European Union affairs in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (quoted in Parker). In addition, the general elections scheduled for November in Turkey leads many to believe that the current single party government will be replaced by a coalition (Zakaria, 2007: 45). For these reasons, many EU member states and anti-accession parties believe that changes will occur at a slower rate, and that Turkey will not have enacted sufficient reforms to become a viable EU member within the timeframe that it seeks. Loss of European Identity. Critics of Turkish membership in the EU claim that admitting Turkey to the Union may weaken Europe’s identity. For example, Frits Bolkestein of the Netherlands, the EU’s single-market commissioner, warned that Europe risked being dominated by Islam if Turkey joins the EU. He cautioned that “if that happens, then the Siege of Vienna in 1683, in which troops defended against Ottoman Turks, would have been in vain” (quoted in Khan, 2007: 40). In addition, in a letter to fellow EU commissioners, Agriculture Commissioner Frans Fischler of Austria wrote, “There could be a fundamental backlash after entry,” and added Turkey was “far more oriental than European, with a largely agrarian population that remains culturally estranged from Europe” (quoted in Bilefsky and Pope). While these opinions may be on the extreme side of the anti-accession perspective, these nationalistic considerations nevertheless must be acknowledged and addressed as the EU-Turkey negotiations move forward. 3.8. Implications of Turkish Membership for the European Union Given the ongoing developments in this complex issue, specific impacts of Turkish accession cannot be identified with a strong degree of certainty. However, some trends are apparent. Kirsty Hughes’ comments illustrate the many, often conflicting factors at play in this issue. Hughes states, “Turkey is a large but relatively poor country with a strategically important but complex and sensitive geographical location. It is a secular state with a large Muslim population. The main impacts on the EU come from these characteristics” (Hughes, 2004: 28). As one can see from economic and demographic considerations discussed above, as well as the argument for a more diverse European Union, Turkish accession would have positive outcomes for the EU, and it is in the best interests of the EU member nations that Turkey be democratic, politically stable, and prosperous. Clearly, Turkish EU membership can contribute to these strategic goals for the benefit of both Turkey and the member states. Turkish accession will have considerable impact on the Union because of its size. It will be the same size as Germany on accession and by 2025 will be the largest member state (Meritet, 2007). However, Turkey is, and will remain for many decades, a small player in economic terms (Hughes, 2004: 6), and this will limit its political influence in the areas of economic policy. With respect to foreign policy, Turkey will have an especially important impact given its borders with the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. This will shift the Union’s borders to the South-East and increase the Union’s range of interests in these difficult regions (Hughes, 2004: 24). Turkey will look to be a significant player in the development of EU foreign policy. While Turkey will have a strong impact on the political dynamics among the EU’s member states, it alone will not be the deciding factor in Europe’s future political directions. Most importantly, Turkey’s status as a secular state with a large Muslim population (Hughes, 2004: 34), will signal to those within the European Union, as well as globally, that the EU is not a ‘Christian Club.’ As Hughes points out, “At a time when the ‘war on terror’ is creating global tension and division, and where 9/11 created a backlash experienced by many Muslims worldwide, Turkey’s relations to the EU take on a broad geopolitical significance. A rejection of Turkey by the Union would be taken as a strong negative signal by many” (Hughes, 2004: 28). 4. Conclusion To sum up, Turkish accession will have important effects for the EU. The issue of accession is a multilayered one, for which there are no easy answers. There are many factors at play, from sentiment within European member states, to Turkey’s own evolving (reforming') political, social and economic landscape. For this reason, Turkey should be considered according to the same standards as other EU candidates--through adoption of the acquis communautaire EU legislation and through meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey has been in a constant process of modernising its economy since the foundation of the Republic. However, this process was also characterised by policy mistakes, errors in economic development and political problems (Lake, 2005b, p12). The strengths of the Turkish economy make the significant potential clear and suggest strongly its development to a modern economy. However, the weaknesses show that a series of structural and macroeconomic reforms combined with political and microeconomic reforms are crucial to the further progress (Lake, 2005a, p. 74). Learning from the mistakes made in the past, the economy should be run by the rule of law rather that political discretion and favouritism. Considering the EU as a role model and implementing the necessary reforms with its help will bring significant benefits for Turkey, independent if Turkey will be a member of the EU in the end or not. The institutional reforms will increase transparency which results in a more effective and successful economy (Lake, 2005a, p. 69). At the same time, the reformation process will logically improve Turkey’s position in the global economy as it will be strengthened in general. To sum it up, Turkey’s situation in regards to its potential EU membership can be described by “the journey is the reward”. It is also important to take the long term aspects into account when looking at the question of Turkey’s suitability. Turkey’s large workforce and its growing population might be a threat at the moment, but will surely be a chance for Europe in the future. Europe’s population is decreasing and its workforce is getting old. Young educated Turks may help the EU´s economy in 20 to 30 years time (Lake, 2005). Concerning the issues of human rights violations in Turkey, one should recognize that this argument cannot be used against a general accession of Turkey. The same argument of ´stabilization of human rights` was used in favour of Spain, Greece and Portugal, all coming out of dictatorship, when they joined the EU. (Diez, 2007) The history of accession negotiations shows that the chances for Turkey’s membership are very good because every country that was granted with accession status became a member of the EU (Kaloudis, 2007). Hopefully Turkey uses this motivation and the support of the EU to keep up the speed of reforms and improvements to use its great potential to become a strong member of the EU. 5. REFERENCES A.M. Lejour, R.A. de Mooij and C.H. Capel 2004, Assessing the economic implications of Turkish accession to the EU, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Bilefsky, Dan and Hugh Pope. "Turkish Bid Reveals Europe's Fears." The Wall Street Journal 13 Sept. 2004 Butler, Daren and Paul Taylor. "EU, Turkey at Odds over Energy Community." Turkish Daily News on the Web 7 June 2007. 9 June 2007 Diez, T., 2007, “Expanding Europe: The Ethics of EU-Turkey Relations”, Ethics & International Affairs, 21, 4, pp. 415-424 European Union, 2007, “Integrating new members into the EU for the mutual benefit”. http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm European Union, 2007b, “Panorama of the EU”. http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_ en.htm Gorvett, Jon. "A Major Growth Market for Years to Come'" Middle East Apr. 2007: 54-55. Harry Flam 2003, Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics Of Accession, Institute For International Economic Studies Stockholm University Hughes, Kirsty. Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement. Friends of Europe: European Policy Summit, 2004 Kaloudis, S, 2007, “Why Europe cannot ignore Turkey”, International Journal on World Peace, XXIV, No. 2, pp.37-62 Khan, Adnan R. "Pride and Prejudice." Maclean's 17 Oct. 2007: 39-41 Lake M (2005a), The EU and Turkey A Glittering prize or a millstone. London: Federal Trust for Education and Research. Lake M (2005b), Turkey and the European Union: a personal view. London: Federal Trust for Education and Research. A.M. Lejour, R.A. de Mooij and C.H. Capel 2004, Assessing the economic implications of Turkish accession to the EU CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Meritet, Sophie "European Institutions." The University of Paris Dauphine. 15 May 2007 Parker, George. "Turkey to Step up Reforms for EU Accession." Financial Times on the Web 15 Jan. 2007. 8 Jan. 2007 Peterson, J. & Shackleton, M. (ed) 2002, The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York Phillips, David L. "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." Foreign Affairs September/October 2004. 8 June 2007 Pope, Hugh. "In Terms of its Economy, Turkey Already Looks Like Part of Europe." The Wall Street Journal 3 May 2004 Sachs, Susan. ""Europe Bloc Says Turks Can Apply." The New York Times 18 Dec. 2004 Solana, Javier. "Ins and Outs" The Economist 17 March 2007: 12-15 Stokes, Bruce. "Turks at the Gate." National Journal 11 Dec. 2007: 3680-3688 Togan S (2004), Turkey: Toward EU Accession. The World Economy 27, no. 7 (July 1), p. 1013 - 1045. http://www.proquest.com Wikipedia. 2007, "History of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union." Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia Zakaria, Fareed. "A Quiet Prayer for Democracy." Newsweek, 14 May 2007: 45