Eastern_Front__Why_Did_the_Soviet_Union_Survive_in_1941_

Eastern Front: Why Did The Soviet Union Survive In 1941' The largest and most unforgettable war of our time was World War II. No regime of the world remained untouched; humanity was living in fear and devastation, trying to survive. Although World War II affected the entire world, the greatest devastation and the greatest struggle for survival, took place on Russian soil. On 22 June 1941, the war shifted to the East where many great battles took place, and Allied victory begun. This war, which the Soviet Union wages against Nazi Germany, named the Great Patriotic War. It was the hardest time for Russian people, and the first year of war was the worst time for Soviet Russia. In 1941, the Soviet Union lost all his western republics with their population and resources and also about one million soldiers and officers of the Red Army. How did Russia survive with all its losses' Scholars have dealt extensively with the question of Russian survival, with differing opinions. Historians have explained the outcome of the Eastern Front generally in one of two ways: usually, an author's explanation will deal extensively with the role of the weather (the cold, snow, mud), or with Hitler's ignorance, in explain German defeat. This question is still opened for many historians; even though a significant amount of studies has been done on this subject, there is still no good explanation found. For example, Vladimir Petrov in his book June 22, 1941, states that Russia survived because of the heroism of its people. Richard Overy in his Why the Allies Won, states that Russia survived because of the political system, rapid relocation of the industries, and ability to restore troops fairly quickly. There are many arguments that are similar to the examples provided above. All these statements are quite correct, and all of these factors were reasonably significant in the survival of Soviet Russia. However, the most significant factor for Russia's survival was the Red Army. The USSR survived because the Red Army survived, and that Hitler failed to take Moscow. What goals did Hitler pursue in his aggression' The key point in Operation Barbarossa was to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in Western Russia. Hitler planned to achieve this under the risk of leading each of the three main army groups with armored spearheads. To accomplish this mission the Germans intended to trap Soviet armies in a series of encircled “pockets” with mechanized forces, and then destroyed the Red Army with infantry. In the case of the German Luftwaffe, they concentrated the bulk of their fighter aircraft on the Eastern Front to facilitate a rapid and timely conclusion to hostilities. For such an operation, the German forces had to be well-prepared. The German Army had to employ for this maneuver all available troops with the limitation that occupied territories must be secured against surprise. Hitler and his General Staff hoped to subdue Russia in a few months (Glantz, 293). And why wouldn't they think that way' The Germans had superior military power not only to Russians, but they had proven superior to all of the European powers as well. Due to German successes up until Operation Barbarossa, many German soldiers considered their army invincible. When the Germans attacked, the Soviet Union was vulnerable because of its unpreparedness. Hitler sent 55% of his divisions to fight on the Eastern Front in order to reassure that the war would be short and that the losses would be insignificant (Dear, 434). In addition, Germans, at the beginning of invasion, were popular among at least part of the Soviet citizens, and especially Ukrainians, Polish, Latvians, and Lithuanians who were tired of Stalin's dictatorship, and were looking at German intruders as liberators. They did not realize that Hitler's war was driven on racial matters, and it was unthinkable for him to consider liberating Slavs or letting them live outside of German control. Hitler was on his way to clear the world of Jews, Slavs, and political systems that differed from his way of dictatorship, in order to territory and to create the appropriate environment for the superior race of Aryans to flourish (Glantz, House, 55-57). The first strike of Germans was terrific. “Before dawn on 22 June 1941, three German army groups, 3.05 million men, 3,350 tanks, and 2770 aircrafts, attacked across the Soviet border. The German ambassador in Moscow delivered a declaration of war six hours later” (Dear, 434). The plan “Barbarossa” was unleashed and the Great Patriotic War began. For the first forty-five minutes of the attack, the fascist aggressor began his air offensive along the Soviet border. The border guards suffered large losses (Petrov, 218). To eliminate Russians and save their own infantry, the Germans made sure to enforce massive artillery blows supported by air attacks (218). While trying to fight in a defensive manner, soviet border commanders were eager to receive any kind of guidance on what to do. German army group intercepted an alarming question from a Soviet military transmitter: “They are shooting at us. What shall we do'” The reply came from headquarters: “You must be sick. And why wasn't your message enciphered'” (Erickson, 113). Several hours after the attack began, the People's Commissar issued order to attack the enemy. Nevertheless, in Moscow the German invasion was regarded as a “provocative action” rather than a war (Petrov, 219). By noon on 22 June, The Red Army air force had lost twelve hundred planes, eight hundred of which were destroyed on the ground. Western Special Military District suffered the most damage. At the end of the first day of the war, the Germans were able to break through the Dubisa River in the northwest and to ford the Neman River sixty kilometers south of Kaunas. Soviet Fourth army troops had to retreat and abandon Brest (Petrov, 219). However, German troops failed in taking the fortress by assault; rather, the Nazi army blocked and bypassed it (222). By July 9, 1941, “the Western Front (former Western Special Military District) had lost 341,073 of its original 627,300 strength, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners” (Bellamy, 193). Average daily loss was 23,210. They died with or left behind them 4,799 tanks, 9,427 guns and mortars and 1,777 combat aircraft (193). “But several Soviet divisions, now reduced to 1,500 – 2,000 men each, managed to work their way out of encirclement and survived to be reconstituted and appear in the accounts of subsequent battles” (193). The Soviet Union lost its territory up to Minsk, the capital of Belarus ( see map 8.2, Bellamy, 186). Other Fronts had similar to Western Front losses. While the Germans were executing Operation Barbarossa; the Soviets were defending themselves in the enormous pool of Soviet blood. In the very first fantastic encirclement the Germans destroyed or swallowed up over 417,000 Soviet soldiers. Nearly all of the Soviet mechanized corps lost 90 percent of their strength during the first week of war. By the end of 25 June 1941, the Soviet 6th Cavalry Corps had suffered more than 50 percent casualties (mostly from air attacks); and one of its tank divisions was out of ammunition. Another of its divisions could gather only 3 tanks, 12 armored carriers, and 40 trucks (Glantz, House, 51-53). Below is a map (Wikipedia) that shows the “encirclements”, and armies that were defeated between June and the end of August of 1941. Giving the devastating effects of the German onslaught, how did the Soviets survive' The statement that will be argued from this point on is: The Soviet Union survived because the Red Army survived. By 22 June 1941, the Red Army had 3 million troops, and about a million in reserve (Erickson, 40). A total of 4 million troops were organized into approximately 177 divisions, 20 of which were mechanized corps. Shortly after the German invasion, the Red Army recruited many more soldiers into its ranks. Almost 5 million troops joined their comrades on the Eastern Front (Glantz, House, 68). These men were even more inexperienced than the previous group of May 1941. The facts clearly showed that these soldiers were untested for battle, due to a lack of time and training. Over all, Germany had apparent qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Red Army. In addition, the Red Army was very poorly organized. There were too many commanders, chiefs of staff, and brigades leaders. Many times Soviet soldiers found themselves confused about whom to listen to or follow. Above is a table of organization of Soviet Armed Forces; by looking and analyzing the example above, it is quite clear that the system was too confusing to follow (Dear, 1211). Also, deployment of Red Army wished for better organization. The defense of Mother Russia was organized in a zone 300 to 400 kilometers in depth. Close to the border in the first echelon of defense, 56 divisions and 3 brigades were deployed up to 50 kilometers in depth. Behind them, there were divisions of the second echelon were 50 to 100 kilometers from the border, and all the tank divisions were deployed in the second and third echelons. The first echelon had only a few units; up to one regiment holding a broad front along the border, while the main force kept in barracks or camps 10 to 50 kilometers to the rear. Average frontage per division was about 50 kilometers, and along the Prut River and the Carpathians, 100 to 120 kilometers (Wikipedia). In the frontier areas fortification was still under construction. Even in those few areas where defensive structures had already been built, armaments and equipment had not yet been installed. To complete building the new defensive line closer to the new frontier, Russians striped old fortifications 150 kilometers to the east. Therefore, when the war started, the Red Army found itself stripped of fortifications both near the frontier and in the interior. Before the fighting started, there were many warnings about the German attack. Soviet intelligence in Berlin sent a number of warnings to Russian headquarters. However, Russian high commanders ignored all these warnings. Marshal Malinovsky had this to say in retrospect, “The question of clarification whether one could open fire if the enemy invaded our territory, the answer followed: Don't give to provocation and don't open fire!”(Petrov, 218). Meanwhile, front was moving close and close to Moscow. On 8 October, the troops of the Army Group Center closed encirclement around Vyaz’ma. Almost all routs to Moscow were open. Moscow was a crucial communications hub; all of the country's main headquarters were located there. The Russians knew very well that Moscow was something that they could not give up, and that the loss of Moscow would mean the loss of the whole country. Therefore, the greatest efforts and patriotism were shown in the defense of Moscow. Its defense cost the Soviets innumerable casualties. The Red Army lost 658,279 troops between September and November 194l (Bellamy, 277-278. Map 10.5, 258 ). In the end of November, German troops lost their possibility to further advance. Soviet Army stopped them with just 41 kilometers to go to the Kremlin. This was the culminating point. “The logistical bungee cord, stretching from around Warsaw, through Minsk, and then Smolensk (see Figure 12.2 below), was starting to pull them back. The exhausted German forces were halted at Yakhroma on the Moskva-Volga canal and at Krasnaya Polyana at the beginning of December. Some German troops undoubtedly did get further than kilometer 41. However, the Germans ordered their troops to withdraw almost immediately, and consolidate on a 'winter line', which passed through there. So it is fair to say that the main German formations reached kilometer 41, and that was the nearest to Moscow that any of them stayed for any appreciable length of time” (Bellamy, 318). [pic] The first hours of the war had already shown that Hitler's political effort to isolate the Soviet Union in the war against Germany had completely failed. Even his ally Japan was waiting for results of invasion and did not open the second front against the Soviet Union on the Far East. The Red Army was weakened by its losses, but stood strong in against German attackers. Red Army soldiers fought as savagely as they did not only out of desperation, but from patriotism as well. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Far East tens of divisions were expecting Japanese invasion. The Soviet Supreme Command had to keep about 700,000 troops in the East, while they were necessary on west front and under the Moscow. “In late September the NKGB’s man in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, had reported that Japan’s aggressive intentions lay to the south, to seize the rubber and oil of south-east Asia” (Bellamy, 308). After that, Soviet Command could move 27 regular divisions from the Far East. “Since the start of the Great Patriotic War some 70 divisions had been brought from interior Military Districts, and 194 divisions and 94 brigades had been newly raised. …But, unlike the newly raised and scarcely trained new formations, the 27 divisions moved from the Far East … stood out for their quality. At this critical moment, that is what counted most” (310). Newcomer troops made possible counteroffensive because before the Soviet forces did not have enough strength to launch a counteroffensive. The Germans had depleted many units of the Red Army. For example, The 108th Tank Division was down to 15 out of 217 tanks, and many rifle divisions had less than 3,000 men (Glantz, House, 87). Nevertheless, the cold winter and the lack of equipment that was needed played a role in German weaknesses at that time. On 6 December, a German soldier wrote to his family in Vienna: General Winter has stopped us with his icy hand. It's very difficult to move forward. Frost has already reached 30 degrees [Fahrenheit, probably: -34° Celsius]. Every day is filled with anxiety for us. The Russians are west of us - now there's a paradox. We have also had many cases of second and third degree frostbite. The letter never reached Vienna. It is in the Russian archives. That probably means the soldier died in the Russian counteroffensive that started in earnest that day (Bellamy, 322). The Red Army campaign started on 5 December 1941. The first target of the Soviet offensive was to eliminate the threatening forceps north and south of Moscow. Red Army commander Konev sent his 29th and 31st armies, which were part of newly formed Kalinin front, to the north side of the bulge. The next day the 30th and the 1st Russian Armies struck from positions north and south of Dmitrov on the Volga-Moscow Canal. By noon, the Red Army was overrunning the headquarters of LVI Panzer Corps outside Klin. Due to this success, Zhukov sent three additional armies – 20th, 16th, and 5th in order to encircle all of the Third Panzer Army. Lieutenant General Govorov also concentrated a “shock attack” of three rifle divisions and several tank brigades to attack on 14 December. The Germans recklessly moved back and forth along lateral routes to bolster the defenses of endangered sectors (Glantz, House, 87). Similar operations were performed in the south (see Figure 12.3, Bellamy, 325). By 16 December, the Red Army counteroffensive at Moscow had forced the Army group center commander, von Bock, to withdraw and adjust his positions. Hitler opposed the general withdraw of forces. In addition he ordered Army Group Center to use “fanatical resistance” until the reinforcement could arrive (Glantz, House, 88). In January l942 Stalin became incredibly over ambitious and optimistic. The difference between the summer and fall defensive operations and success of December was incredible. By 1 January 1942, Soviet forces had retaken Kalinin in the north and Kaluga in the South and were besieging a sequence of German strongholds (Glantz, House, 91). The great battles are not without flaws, there were some mistakes made by Soviet forces. If it was not for Stalin's stubbornness who wanted “too much too soon”, the Red Army would have preformed much more efficiently than it has (Glantz, House, 91). It became apparent from that point on that the Red Army was learning German techniques and using them against Nazi forces. Titans switched places! The Red Army began its offensive operations. The experience of the first year of the war gave the Red Army a model of well-prepared and well-organized assault operations. By looking at and identifying these mistakes, the Generals and commanders of the Soviet Armed Forces came to the following conclusions: first and perhaps most importantly, were the changes in force structure. The mechanized corps was much too large, and its organization was adjusted accordingly. The tank brigade became the largest mechanized Soviet unit. This was important because the smaller size was more realistic for inexperienced Soviet commanders. The corps was also abolished for the rifle troops. Stavka (Senior Red Army Leadership Organization) formed about 170 rifle brigades. These brigades consisted of various support battalions, which in total represented 4,400 men. Such structure was significantly easier to control. In addition, when all the mechanized units were immobilized by cold during the winter of 1941-1942, the horses, ski battalions, and brigades proved to be very effective. Air units were also reorganized in size into only 30 rather than 60 aircraft (Glantz, House, 89-103). However, it was much easier to reorganize the troops than to change one's tactical judgment. In the beginning, Soviet commanders often experienced clumsiness. Yet, the Stavka, by reorganizing the Army, and making it more efficient, set a seed of much more effective fighting force, which would become very significant in 1942 and 1943. Hitler's failure to understand the importance of occupying Moscow at the beginning of the war, which could have resulted in German victory, doomed the Germans throughout the entire war. Hitler was convinced that the most important strategy in winning the war on Eastern Front was to capture the Crimea and the industrial region of the south thus cutting of the Soviets from the oil wells in the Caucasus (Lucas, 9). It is understandable because he wanted to get resources from occupied territories, but his expectations were failed as well because of Russian tactic of scorched earth. During retreats, Russians were moving everything was possible to the East and destroying everything they could not relocate. The victory over the Soviet Union was expected in a few months. However, German troops were trapped there for nearly four years. The Red Army's ability to reinforce the human power to her fronts, and to improve the quality of their armed forces, prolonged the struggle in those desperate first months, and at the end deprived Germans of the victory over Russia. There were several reasons that contributed greatly to the survival of Soviet Union; nevertheless, the Red Army played the key role in the survival of the USSR. It is out of the ordinary to examine that impossible could be achieved with knowledge and will. The Senior Red Army Leadership deserves all the credit in winning this brutal war. The ability to reform and reorganize the whole army during such a devastating time, and with such losses was close to impossible. The Red Army was not only able to adapt to German strategies, but they were able to become better than Germans as well. In spite of what the nations thought, and what Hitler planed; Soviets showed to the Nazis and to the entire world that it is impossible to defeat the Russians. Bibliography for “Eastern Front: How did the Soviet Union Survive in 1941'” Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. Print. Dear, Ian. The Oxford Companion to World War II. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print. "Eastern Front (World War II)." Wikipedia. 11 Oct. 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2011. . Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War With Germany. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983. Print. Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve Of World War. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1998. Print. Glantz, David M., House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1995. Print. Lucas, James. War on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945. New York. Stein and Day Publishers, 1980. Print. Overy, Richard. Why the allies Won. New York. W.W. Norton & Company, 1997. Print. Petrov, Vladimir. June 22, 1941. Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press, 1968. Print.