Doctrine

Which domain/element of DOTMLPF drives change the most in the military/Army and explain why/how' Capabilities-based approach (CBA) is the current process by which the military is taking a vision and ultimately converts it to solution for the combat capability. At the joint level, this process is called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS identifies capability gaps and potential materiel and non-materiel solutions within the domains of DOTMLPF. DOTMLPF is a joint term and analysis methodology that originated in the Army. DOTMLPF stands for: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities. Doctrine describes the way we fight. Organization deals with how we organize ourselves to fight effectively. Training describes how we prepare to fight tactically while materiel encompasses all the “stuff: necessary to equip the forces. Leadership and education depicts how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight from the squad leader to 4-star general. Personnel assure the availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations and facilities describe installations and industrial facilities that support our forces.(1) I will argue that the Doctrine domain in the DOTMLPF is the element that drives change the most in the military. Doctrine is very important to the United States Army. It summarizes both how the Army defines its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield. “Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should be organized (large heavy divisions or small military transition teams to embed in local security forces), what missions it should train to accomplish (conventional combat or counterinsurgency, or some balance between those two kinds of warfare), and what equipment it needs (heavy tanks supported by unarmored trucks for a conventional battlefield with front lines, or light armored vehicles to fight an insurgent enemy)” (Nagl). One could argue that one of the reasons the United States was not prepared for the insurgency war in Iraq was the nonexistence of counterinsurgency doctrine. There was no strategy of how to deal with roadside bombs. The United States “had not trained its soldiers that the key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting the population, nor had it empowered them with all of the political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills they needed to accomplish that objective”(2). Lieutenant General Petraeus eventually took responsibility for all counterinsurgency doctrinal development in the United States Army. The new doctrine introduced operational design that focused on” identifying the unique array of enemies and problems that generate a contemporary insurgency, and the adaptation of operational art to meet those challenges” (2). It also constructs the lines of operation that include Combat Operations, Building Host Nation Security, Essential Services, Good Governance, Economic Development, and Information Operations. All of them need to address simultaneously to achieve successful completion of counterinsurgency operations. The doctrine also recognizes “the unique leadership challenges inherent in any war without front lines and against an enemy who hides among the sea of people, and then prescribes solutions to the logistic problems of counterinsurgency campaigns”(2). It was an example of how doctrine development created change across other domains of DOTMLPF. Another example of how the doctrine led the rest of the military changes is when the Army Found itself in need of a “transformation” after the fall of the “Berlin wall”. General Sullivan along with General Franks understood that the Army needed to change its focus from concentrating on the Soviets to looking forward into the global threat. They initiated several changes in the Army doctrine that was necessary for the post-cold war Army to redefine its mission. In the late 1990’s General Shinseki further revised Army doctrines, which significantly overhauled the entire way the Army was organized. This in turn dictated the type of training required, type of equipment necessary, the educational needs of new leaders and the facilities needed for the “new” Army. This doctrinal “transformation” made the way to Army modernization and the introduction of modular forces and Brigade Combat Teams. Modular transformation of forces required changes in equipment, rebalancing and redistributing of forces to create the right mix of high-demand units and to assign Soldiers with critical and high-demand skills in both the Active and Reserve Component.(3) In the current world of “persistent conflict”, The United States Armed Forces will find themselves fighting a asymmetric and unconventional war and will need to be prepared to face ever-changing enemies not knowing where the next attack will come from. There are people that believe that advances in technology will be enough to provide us with a battlefield advantage. However, mere technological superiority cannot reshape military events. Rather, such superiority has to be coupled with appropriate doctrine in order to generate a change. "The issue of doctrine is huge," says P.W. Singer of the Brookings Institute. "Choose the right doctrine and you've found the blitzkrieg of the 21st century”(4). This is the reason I believe that Doctrine is the element of DOTMPLF that drives the change the most in the military. Bibliography 1. F100: Managing Army Change, Selected Readings. 2. Nagl, L. C. The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 3. 2007 Army Modernization Plan 4. U.S. Army Future Follows New Doctrine by Paul McLeary