Dien_Bien_Phu

SUBJECT: Book Report on Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot by Howard P. Simpson 1. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot is about an important battle fought in the spring of 1954 between the North Vietminh “peoples army,” and the occupying French Army Forces. Dien Bien Phu is located in the mountain territory of Northwest Vietnam. Its occupation was meant to stop the communist Vietminh from advancing into Laos. It was not a major engagement, but a deciding battle that would not only end the Indochina war, but also serve as a precursor for the American Vietnam War. 2. But overall Dien Bien Phu was not just a critical test of France’s ability to hold Indochina and stop the communist advance in the eyes of history. It was an exercise of blunders, misjudgment and failure at high levels that sealed the fate of those fought. It also showed Vietnam’s determination to win the war at all costs. 3. In the beginning Colonel Dominique Bastiani, commander of French forces at Dien Bien Phu, objected to occupying the area. He, like other battle-hardened officers, knew that you didn’t roadblock in Vietnam and that the Vietnamih were highly adaptive. However, General Henri-Eugene Navarre, the overall French Commander, was headstrong. He pushed this operation at the higher levels and made it happen. After a long bloody battle, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Vietnamih forces at Dien Bien Phu, was victorious. On 8 May 1945 the French were defeated. They withdrew, leaving a buffer zone between North and South Vietnam. In the remaining years, the North began a push to take over South Vietnam, which invoked American involvement and an outcome not unlike what the French had experienced. 4. There were numerous lessons learned at Dien Bien Phu. One of them was that the battle was a typical example of the underestimation of non-conventional guerilla forces by regular forces. This guerilla type campaign waged by the North Vietnamese during the long 8-year campaign was flexible and well suited to the weather and terrain of Vietnam. The problem is not so much that the French Army on the ground could not handle this type of warfare; it was the decisions of the generals and higher-ups that affected the outcome of the war. French troop movements and tactical decisions that were issued from higher were based on a conventional European war doctrine. Generals who were not familiar or frankly not concerned with how the North Vietnamese fought greatly underestimated the ‘peasant army’, as they saw fit to call them. 5. This blunder was exploited by General Giap. Generals Giap’s leadership style, who’s actions are still read about today, turned his ‘peasant army’ into an impressive fighting force. He did not do this through superior technology, but by taking care of his soldiers, pushing them to their limit, utilizing limited equipment effectively and greatly deceiving the enemy. The fortified positions set up by the French, such as bunkers and command posts clearly defined a ‘front line.’ Giap capitalized on this by slowly and covertly digging tunnels up to the front line in order to disembark troops. 6. Also, Giap utilized manpower to quietly move artillery pieces up steep slopes and hills. This enabled Giap to bring artillery rounds down upon the French airstrip. His artillery pieces were entrenched in places where French commanders though they could never be. The French knew that the Vietnamese could not overcome the airfield without heavy artillery, and so did the Vietnamese. The air bridge from Hanoi to Dien Bien Phu that was once in place was eventually overcome. In the end, the French had to rely on airdrops, most of which fell into enemy hands. 7. This leads into the second blunder that led to the French Army’s defeat, the over dependence on air support and supply. Dien Bien Phu continued the tradition of the French Army’s need to establish a stronghold in terrain not of their choosing and build an airstrip to establish supply. The overall plan was meant to ‘cut off’ the Vietminh from their supply and their advance into Laos. However, the Vietminh was a highly mobile enemy army who was familiar with their terrain and whose means of supply were crude but effective. For the French this worked for a while, but the result was a Vietminh Army who was able to adapt. 8. The weather considerably hindered air support operations and when it broke to allow operations to continue, anti-aircraft fire ultimately downed 15 aircraft and damaged many more. In essence, the Vietnamih used the French Army’s dependence on air supply to work towards their advantage. This led to a huge French morale problem and a heavy loss of life and equipment. 9. Just like the American perspective, the French compared the numerous Vietnamih casualties to the French Army casualties and declared it a ‘victory.’ What they did not understand was the attitude of the Vietnamih. Gen Vo Nguyen Giap, knew as well as Ho Chi Minh knew, that this would be a war of attrition. And that what they were willing to sacrifice greatly exceeded what their enemy was willing to sacrifice. They knew the western gung ho spirit and can do philosophy often obscure the lessons of history. Soon French sentiment at home grew tired of the war and pushed for an end, just like the eventual American sentiment. This not only led to French defeat but American defeat as well. 10. Eventually, after 56 days of fighting a cease fire was called. After the French withdrew from Dien Bien Phu, they withdrew from the war. The French learned that Vietnam was an unwinable situation, but the American government did not think so. The next 8 years would prove to be a costly learning experience for America. 11. This book was very interesting. I found the author had the ability to convey the feel of the battle through the text in the book. It has a very detailed account of the battle as well as the events leading up to it. I especially liked its relation to how it affected future American decisions because of the courses of action France made as well as how similar the war was for France and the United States. 12. However, I did find the title to be misleading. I initially though this book was about an American battle that was forgotten by the American people. My disappointment was soon turned into happiness in that the book turned out to be very entertaining, even though it was not what I expected. Also, the Author’s constant use of French General’s names, Divisions and Companies was confusing. This made the book hard to follow as far as troop movement and placement were concerned. I found myself reading sentences twice just to follow along with the continuity. Nevertheless, the books historical relevance and continuity with well-known Vietnam era history, made this read very entertaining. 13. I would definitely recommend this book to anyone. It is a very readable book and contains a lot of historical information. I learned several things about the Vietnam War that I did not know before which put my understanding into a new light.