Daniel_Dennett_Kinds_of_Minds

In Daniel Dennett’s book, Kinds of Minds, Dennett’s theory regarding the origin of minds is difficult to disprove given the large body of studies, research, and evidence for the evolution of creatures over time. It is obvious that we have evolved from what Dennett refers to as “self-replicating macromolecules” (p. 20), which evolved into gradually more and more complex life forms, until we could begins to call them organisms, creatures, plants, animals, and finally, humans. This evolutionary perspective hinges on the scientific perspective of empirical study, and is the section of his overarching theory that revolves around the least amount of guesswork and speculation, and is not to be disputed here. What is to be disputed is the far more open-ended, less stable, and more interesting topic of the nature of our minds as humans, and the minds of whatever else has minds that are similar enough to ours, (whether we ever identify them as such or not) that are able to think similarly to the way we do. Dennett’s beliefs and ideas about the nature and origin of our thoughts are questionable at best. His contention that our thoughts just randomly bubble up to the surface without any sort of way to select and sort through them is off base and too extreme. His idea that a few thoughts or even just a single thought are picked out of the endless sea of various thoughts, and that is the thought that gets chosen, quite randomly, and is the one that is sent to our brain and gets acted on is premature given the lack of conclusive knowledge in this area, simplistic, and plain wrong. We have the ability to greatly affect the result of this supposedly random process. We deserve more credit for our thoughts. Just look at our ability to change our thought patterns over time. It is true that the majority of the time for the majority of people, their thoughts appear to magically bubble up with little control on the part of the person in question, but this is a habit they have formed. They do not consciously think in the fullest sense of the word. Their thoughts are automatic, largely in response to the things in their environment, another’s words to them (replying with “I’m fine” when asked how they are doing without actually thinking about it). But also in a general sense most people have automatic responses and actions as they go about their lives. We have a set routine that may consist of waking up, brushing our teeth, going to work, coming home and watching our favorite television program. Within this regular schedule of activities, we have corresponding, familiar thoughts we are accustomed to, and corresponding feelings and emotions that go with our thoughts. Most people will not change these things, and in that sense out thoughts just bubble up without any actual choosing what we think. However, this does not mean we cannot at any point stop for a moment and consciously choose to do, think, or feel something we entirely choose, having complete control of the whole process. We may be composed of self-replicating macromolecules that do most things without our having any control or even knowing when or how they occur (breathing, heartbeat, fighting pathogens, etc.), but thinking is the one activity that is separate and completely under a different category. It is the thing that separates us from the organisms that have virtually no control over their existence, in which they have the ability only to live and eventually die. Dennett’s ideas about our thoughts also begin to imply that we are less responsible for our actions, etc… as his entire ideas about mind imply in general. Intuitively, we know that blah, which is precisely why Dennett ignores this idea- it is not able to be proven scientifically, and he concentrates on being too scientific to explore the topic of the mind, which is the domain of a philosopher traditionally. And despite the fact that he acknowledges that we humans have made strides in understanding nature, and the nature of the mind, we are simply not close enough, not even able to see a shadow of the full truth in the far distance. (In fact, Dennett is of the opinion that it is likely we may never know). There is indeed some kind of controller that, when properly used, can be called upon to “call the shots” and be in charge, as Dennett mockingly calls the puppeteer controlling an unruly body puppet (p.80). There is a part of us humans (and any other possible candidates) that is above the nervous system and other bodily parts that act as minds of their own. Though we may blush, sweat, or tremble without thinking about it at first, it is possible to bring these behaviors under control with focus. It is not appropriate to call the more primitive aspects of ourselves minds in the traditional sense at all. More than anything, they are reactionary measures. These are mind-like systems that we have in common with lesser animals and organisms which we have kept over time, still useful to an extent, but not nearly efficient as our true minds. It may be gradual, a matter of steps, but there is definitely a kind of cut off, a pivot point that distinctly separates us from other animals. It makes sense intuitively as there are major gaps between us. We do have that extra something, and just because science has not found it yet doesn’t mean it isn’t there. Maybe its not to the extent that Descartes separated it, but there is some kind of energy we possess. This something may have been from evolution, or it may not have, but we possess it, and it is what makes us radically different, even though we are so very similar to many animals (primates especially).