Clauswitz_vs_Jominis

MARITIME STRATEGIST 2006 Maritime Strategist I. Introduction The world of maritime strategist has been around for decades. It is shaped and colored by wars and conflicts between nations and groups. From these occurrences, numerous strategic experts appeared and gave their contribution to the science of maritime strategy. Within this paper, we are comparing the work of Carl Philip Gottfried Von Clausewitz and A.H Jomini and how they independently contribute to the field of maritime strategy. II. Discussions II.1. Clausewitz and Jomini: the Persons II.1.1 Clausewitz Carl Von Clausewitz was a professional soldier who lived from 1780 to 1831. He had been a soldier when he was 12 years old and so on until the end of his life. He died of Cholera, a disease he suffered when he was still on active duty in the age of 51. The famous writer saw his first combat as a 13 year old boy in 1794. He experienced first hand Prussia’s disastrous military humiliation by Napoleon. He fought his way to becoming a Prussian III Corps chief of staff in 1815. The history also noted Clausewitz as a significant contributor to Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, as his corps held Grouchy’s forces at Wavre with only half the enemy’s forces (Howard, 1983). The person behind the soldier appearance was an idealist and a fierce staff officer. However, his temper made many people believe that he was unsuitable for command. He was often considered too open to liberal ideas and his ideas on war are heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period. Some of these ideas were ‘uncomfortable’ to conservative aristocrats. Many believed Clausewitz to be the high priest of Napoleon while he was actually representing the ideas of Napoleon’s opponent, Gerhard Von Scharnhorst (Howard, 1983). II.1.2 Jomini Antoine-Henri Jomini on the other hand, did claim that he interpreted Napoleon to the military world. The man joined the French army in 1798, but returned to business after the peace of Amiens in 1802. Then he started to write on military subjects for a couple of years, generating the famous ‘Traite de Grande Tactique’ which was published in 1803. In 1804, the man returned to the army and served many campaigns including the Austerlitz and Prussian campaign. He joined the Russian army in late 1813 and spent most of his career in the Russian service (Elting, 1964). The man was not close to other soldiers as he was not popular to his superiors. However, no one can deny his presence as the best known military commentator of his day. Like Clausewitz, Jomini had written a book especially on the request of a royal prince. Among other acts, he advised Czar Nicholas during the Crimean War and Napoleon III during his Italian campaign. Nevertheless, despite of his popularity, many officers still viewed Jomini with strong skepticism (Elting, 1964). However, although the works of Antoine-Henri Jomini influenced military thinking within the 19th and 20th centuries, there are still many misunderstandings of Jomini's thought due to the obscurity of Jomini’s publishing history (Alter, 1975). II.2. Clausewitz and Jomini, Their Works II.2.1 Clausewitz’s Work Clauzewitz written several famous books during his life, but none is as famous as the ‘Vom Kriege’, or translated as ‘On War’. It was considered one of the most important single works ever written on theories of warfare and strategy. Many believed that the principal importance of Clausewitz’s approach to strategic theory is its realism. The book displays profound realistic in that it describes the complex and uncertain manner of the world we occupy. Clausewit’s theory takes account of both the frailties of human nature and the complexity of both the physical and psychological world (Clausewitz, 1973). His ideas contain the argument that ‘war is merely a continuation of politics’. Many considered this as the core of Clausewitz philosophy; however, it is only the tip of the ice burg for the theory itself. Some of his ideas are: the strategic and operational center of gravity, the culminating point of the offensive, the culminating point of theory, the dialectic approach to military analysis, the fascinating trinity of war, the methods pf critical analysis, etc (Clausewitz, 1973). II.2.2. Jomini’s Work Jomini’s work is often compared to those of Clausewitz. This is logical because many consider that they are the opposite yet connected in nature. If Clausewitz’s work was philosophical and harder to comprehend, Jomini’s military writings are simpler and more readable for commoners. Marketers indicated that while Clausewitz’s theory was complicated and harder to understand, Jominis seems to put more effort in attracting readers towards their work. He also dealt with a number of practical subjects like logistic and sea power (Brinton, 1944). II.3. Clausewitz and Jomini: the Differences and Interactions II.3.1. Differences In comparing the work of these two strategists, there are several things people come to notice. First, they have different relationship toward Napoleon. While Clausewitz takes account of the perspectives of Napoleon’s opponent, Jomini claims to be Napoleon’s interpreter into the world of war philosophy. However, this is only a fraction of existing differences between them. Observers often stated that the differences between Clusewitz and Jomini are rooted in their differing concepts and perspectives of the historical process and of the nature and role of military theory. With Clausewitz, history is always seen as relative terms and never absolute He boldly rejects any absolute categories, standards and values. He has his on views and understanding of the past. In a sense, as a historian Clausewitz always attempt to enter mindsets and attitudes of the discussed time period. In his mind, history is a dynamic process of change, shaped by forces beyond anyone’s control and comprehension. Furthermore, the comparison between Clausewitz works with other writers always takes account of the famous sentiment that ‘war is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means. Clausewitz always believed that we can see war in various forms depending on the nature of policy and the society in which it occurred (Edmonds, 1951). In the views of Jomini, history and war are static and furthermore, simple. Unlike Clausewitz who considers war as nothing more than an extension of politics, Jomini saw war as a great drama. It is a stage for players of military geniuses, which has the capabilities beyond normal people. In terms of the revolutionary warfare in which he himself was involved within it, he saw nothing more than technical changes, and these changes did not alter the essence of war itself (Edmonds, 1951). As mentioned previously, Jomini took pride in drawing his practical strategic prescriptions from his experience in the Napoleonic wars. Unlike Clausewitz who stressed on realism with little regards on the resulted level of complexity of his writing, Jomini elaborated his perspectives under the purpose of a theory that will be available to be taught to future officers. His work contains instructions to deal with common military problems like river crossing, the defense of mountainous areas, etc. There are many other differences between Clausewitz and Jomini’s work; however, these differences can be traced back to philosophical factors mentioned above (Edmonds, 1951). III.3.2 Interactions Despite the various differences and even contradictions between the two strategists, there are actually many points of divergences within their personalities, military experiences and life philosophy. Observers of the work of these two strategists discover some points of intersection. Despite the fact that they say little of each other, they are often described as two people who interacted intellectually, influencing each other thinking. This tendency was displayed within their work, sometimes obviously and sometimes discretely. For example, Clausewitz used a great deal of Jomini’s geometric vocabulary of bases, lines and points. Sometimes the two analysts share the same view over a single case, like in the case of using mountains as useful defensive lines. On other occasions, clausewitz even accepted the fundamental strategic theme of Jomini, although this was rarely done because Jomini craved practicality while Clausewitz did not. In one occasion, Clausewitz accepted the understanding that the theory of warfare tries to discover how people could gain preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. However, he added his classic Clausewitzian realism by mentioning that bringing each case to the decisive point is not always possible due to the moral factors like mistakes of the enemy, fake impression created by daring actions and even personal desperation (Harsh, 1974). Within their interaction, Clausewitz did not always agree on how Jomini drew his conclusions. There are occasions where Clausewitz was recorded to be extremely skeptical of Jomini. However, this is a matter of specific cases and not a general objection as people might took it. For example, because of Clausewitz critiques, some writers figured that Clausewitz was an advocate of concentric attacks, in complete contrast with Jomini’s advocacy of ‘interior lines’. In fact, Clausewitz did not discuss much about concentratic operations because he felt that Jomini had already done so well in explaining the opposite approach (Harsh, 1974). In the other way, Jomini also acknowledged many of Clausewitz works. He even acknowledged the truth about the basic philosophy of many of Clausewitz’s work, which assumed there is a strong connection between politics and war in which Handel (2000) considers war to be a last arbiter of the destiny of nations and ideologies. Despite their harsh remarks toward each other, the work of these two writers indicated that they were thinking on parallel tracks. In some occasion, Jomini elaborated that there are several basic disagreement between his work and Clausewitz. The most obvious point is that Jomini felt that it is important to shape the theories for instructional purposes. Jomini believe that regardless of the fact that wars are essentially political acts, there are practical implications that can be deducted from the phenomenon. Clausewitz shared little of this sentiment (Harsh, 1974). Jomini found that the Prussian approach adopted by Clausewitz are arrogant, in the sense that it regards reader’s perspective only by a very small proportion compare to its desire to account for all influential factors into discussion. To Jomini, this approach was clearly too metaphysical in nature and too difficult for anyone to digest, moreover to unfamiliar people. Another reason might be the simple nature of intellectuals to compete. As Clausewitz, Jomini included in some of his works, harsh comments and even insults toward his competition’s work (Jones, 1985). II.4. Clausewitz and Jomini: Their Contributions Overall, the work of Clausewitz is often mentioned as the best work in maritime strategy yet. On war is the required reading in most military academies. Others, like Jomini’s work, Suntzu, Liddel and Fuller are considered complimentary. Because of his Prussian approach with vast philosophies and commitment toward realism, the book ‘On War’ is considered the most relevant to the current condition, even when wars of the future might prefer nuclear weapons than artilleries. However, recent development revealed a new tendency. Observers revealed apparent efforts of reviving Jomini. Some believed that these attempts are parts of a reaction against the predominance of Clausewitzian theory since the Vietnam War. In fact, recent tendencies have considered Clausewitz to be obsolete entering the 21st century. On the other hand, people within the range of the discipline began to see that Jomini has contributed literatures of real value and usefulness. It’s more practical doctrine provides a larger possibility of understanding war of past, present and future. However, many still believed that a deeper sense of understanding can only be reach by reading Clausewitz’s On War. III. Conclusions Clasuewitz and Jomini are both soldiers of numerous wars and battles in their time. Some even stated that the two experienced many of the same wars and their work are inspired by the same events. However, their work displayed significant differences in approaching war as a specific phenomenon in the world. While Clausewitz rather put wars as extensions to politics, Jomini put wars as great occurrences which contain drama and memorable actions of the players within the war. In his work, Clausewitz displayed a tendency of maintaining relevance and realism rather than producing an easy-to-read literature. On the other hand, Jomini believed in writing for his readers rather than being arrogant and complicated. Besides these basic differences, there are many other details in which they criticize each other and even harshly protested each other’s work. However, in many occasions, they are similar in thoughts. Both acknowledge each other’s contributions into the field of maritime strategy with exceptions of their own. Recent development indicated that the world of maritime strategist prefer to quote Jomini’s work rather than digging through the complicated literature delivered by Clausewitz Bibliography Alger, John I. 1975. Antoine-Henri Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey Brinton, Crane, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert. 1944, Jomini. Edward Mead Earle, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton University Press. Clausewitz, Carl von. Colonel J.J. [James John] Graham. 1873. On War. N. Trhbner. London Corbett, Julian. 2004, Maritime Strategy. Dover Publications Elting, John R. 1964, Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon' Military Affairs, 17-26. Edmonds, Brigadier General Sir J.E. 1951, Jomini and Clausewitz. Canadian Army Journal, vol.V, No.2. Friedman, Norman. Us Maritime Strategy. 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