Clauswitz's_Trinity

Carl Von Clausewitz’s definition of war and his theory of “the remarkable trinity” are still relevant today with non-state actors’ presence around the world. The purpose of this essay is to expand on the applicability of Clausewitz’s theory in today’s wars where non-state actors play a huge, more global role. Many theorists disagree and believe Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” is obsolete. I totally disagree. This paper explains the role played in war each one of the actors of the trinity: the people, the armed forces, and the government. The trinity connects each element with its respective human actors: the people, the army, and the government. In other words, taking together both elements and actors, it means that in war, whether limited or total, it is necessary to maintain equilibrium between them. The feelings of the population, the professional qualities of the army, and the policy of the government must be articulated in a well-balanced strategy that allows the nation to achieve its national security objectives. Clausewitz's “remarkable trinity” is comprised of three categories of forces: irrational forces (violent emotion, i.e., "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity"); (2) non-rational forces (i.e., forces not the product of human thought or intent, such as "friction" and "the play of chance and probability"); and (3) rationality (war's subordination to reason, "as an instrument of policy"). Theorists interpret this as "the people, the army, and the government. This “remarkable or paradoxical trinity,” as it has been called, is Clausewitz’s framework, or model, for understanding the changeable and diverse nature of war. The "people, army, government" interpretation of the trinity has caught on among both proponents of Clausewitz and his critics. It has, for example, been enshrined in U.S. Army doctrine. Conflicts in the world today often involve armed opposition groups who act autonomously from recognized government. Included in this category are rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerillas, liberation movements, freedom fighters and de facto territorial governing bodies. The Non State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) believes there are well over 190 recognized non-state actors (NSA). This does not include farmers, drug cartels and many of the smaller loosely organized NSAs. Ideology, objectives, strategies, level of organization, support base, legitimacy and degree of international recognition vary greatly. Terrorist groups can be defined as organizations that commit violent acts that seemingly have no purpose other than to inflict terror among the civilian population. The acts of violence are not directed at military troops or other military targets. They are not for defense. The purpose of the acts of violence is to disrupt the social fabric by creating a high level of fear among the civilian population. A non-state actor may or may not be considered a terrorist group. The groups that fall under the NSA heading can vary greatly. They are defined as "organizations with less than full international recognition as a government who employ a military strategy." Globalization is strengthening the role that political guidance is playing in war, it may well increase the elements of chance and uncertainty, and it is clearly heighten basic feelings of hostility among different cultures. It is this last area that Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria sees as the most critical in the war on terrorism. If there is a center of gravity in this conflict, it is in the ideas that have fueled radical Islam. Clausewitz’s definition of war and his theory of “remarkable theory” are relevant with today’s contemporary non-state actors’ involvement with Nation States in war. Clausewitz summarizes war as: 1. An act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. 2. A clash between major interests, which are resolved by bloodshed. 3. Fighting is the only principle generally designated as war. A Nation State raises a military to deter aggression or to become the implementing force of aggression against its enemies. Similarly, non-state actors compose militias, al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, and or Hamas mission is to inflect their will on others. Terrorist and insurgent groups go to lengths to infuse hostility in their membership. Thus, for Clausewitz war might change color like a chameleon, but its essential nature remains constant—violent, unpredictable, and prone to escalation. Chance and probability, as Clausewitz meant them, relate not only to random occurrences at the tactical level, but to making assessments and judging probabilities at a strategic level, and this remains valid in any type of conflict. In modern terrorism or insurgency, war is subordinate to policy, whether that policy is a religious vision such as the jihadist view of al Qaeda, or the secular goal of self-governance and self-determination. Clausewitz explained that the elements of the trinity correspond to three institutions: the people, the army, and the government. Echevarria notes that “Clausewitz recognized that these institutions could take many forms; government could be a non-state actor or tribe, while the army could be any group of fighters.” Trinitarian warfare is as alive and well in the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as it was in the Napoleonic era, and remains a useful concept by which to analyze insurgency. Clausewitz recognized that a crucial relationship existed between the three and that if a balance was not maintained, collective effect of the trinity as a powerful force becomes muted. His theory suggested that the three entities are inextricably linked and that neglect in one area means to neglect in all areas. Although this is a basic interpretation of a complex idea, the point is that all parts of the equation are important. Certainly a perfect balance cannot be maintained at all times, but the caution is that there is a limit. Recent events have emphasized the validity of non-state actors and non-military custodians of violence on the world stage. However, the idea that Clausewitz’s theories are obsolete is wrong. Clausewitz’s writing about the remarkable trinity remains valid nature of war and the interaction of politics and war remain valid and crucial to a complete understanding of wars in the past, today and in the future. Bibliography Bassford, Christopher. "Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz." Clausewitz.com, Date unknown. http://www.clausewitz.com/FAQs.htm. Echevarria, Antulio J. "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's not What We Thought." Naval War College Review 56, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 108-123. The Clausewitz Home Page, Clausewitz.com -------------------------------------------- [ 1 ]. Clausewitz on War [ 2 ]. Antulio J. Echevarria, draft review of Clausewitz in English submitted to Armed Forces and Society. [ 3 ]. Antulio J. Echevarria, War, Politics and RMA- The Legacy of Clausewitz. [ 4 ]. Christopher Brassford and Edward Villacres, Reclaiming the Clausewitzian, Parameters Journal of the U.S. Army War College. [ 5 ]. Wikipedia [ 6 ]. Margaret Buse, Non-State Actors and Their Significance. [ 7 ]. Antulio J. Echevarria, War, Politics and RMA- The Legacy of Clausewitz [ 8 ]. Bart L. Denny, Is Clausewitz Relevant In Low-Intensity Conflict, bartdenny.com