Boston's__Big_Dig_

Boston’s “Big Dig” The “Big Dig” was a tremendous highway project that was conceived in Boston Massachusetts in the 1970s and completed in 2005. The project would undertake many never before accomplished engineering and construction marvels. The goal of the project was to bury the interstate in an effort to restore much real estate that had been taken away from the city decades ago when the Central Artery was constructed (Gelinas et al., 2007). At the conception of the project many stakeholders were skeptical and downright against the project. The plan was to gain public and political support in an effort to secure federal funds and to get the project started. The initial price tag for the big dig was approximately $2 billion dollars when the planning took place in the late 1970s. In date of completion dollars this equated to just over $4 billion dollars. In terms of calculating the estimated cost of the project, the first error was not calculating for inflation and any unexpected problems. By the time actual construction had begun in 1991 the initial estimate was too low due to inflation and the cost of mitigation to gain support of the project. “Over 14 years, Massachusetts, its consultants, and its contractors carved canyons under Boston while the city hummed above. They designed and built seven and a half miles of highway—161 miles of separate lanes—more than half of them in tunnels. They built six interchanges and 200 bridges” (Gelinas, 2007). Although the project seemed to be on track and a success on the surface, at least to the public, it was a well known fact to the state, the project manager and the consultant company that the project was over budget, going to take longer than expected, and the federal money was gone. This information was hidden from the public in an effort to prevent a loss of public support. Early on in the project, there was little or no communication between many of the internal and external stakeholders. There was an outreach to the local community, particularly with residents living close to major worksites and those mostly affected by the project. As a result of the extensive mitigation effort towards the community, costs were grossly underestimated. No one took into consideration the extensive expense of dealing with the media, community, regulatory agencies, auditors, and local stakeholders (Greiman et al., 2007). “The government served in a dual role as regulator and owner of the big dig. The project organizational structure required that some managers report directly to the governmental owner, while other managers reported to the project's design and construction program manager. A truly integrated project should centralize decision making and accountability for all core functions of the project” (Greiman, 2007). Rather than having the consultant firm of Bechtel and Parsons handle all aspects of the big dig, the work should have been split between separate consultants. Checks and balances of the consultant firm that had oversight of the entire project were non existent. In 1998, in the name of cost reduction, the state created more confusion by folding public employees and private sector employees into one integrated project organization. The state took it a step further and designated Bechtel and Parsons as its owner’s representative (Gelinas et al., 2007). By having a state that owns, and theoretically oversees, a project of this magnitude designate the consulting firm as it’s owner’s representative raises the ever important question, who is really in charge' Bechtel and Parsons now designated as the owner’s representative never took on any of the risks that the public sector carries as the actual funder and owner of the project. The risk Bechtel and Parsons now carried was no more than that of an advisor, however, the power they had over the project was that of the owner and manager. Bechtel and Parson’s longtime big dig director Keith Sibley stated that, “Our contractual responsibility as management consultant was to deliver a professional standard of care, not to guarantee the contractors’ work” (Gelinas, 2007). It’s extremely difficult to assess decisions that are made under an integrated project organization when lines are blurred about where the responsibility lies with each decision. The problem of unclear responsibility was a recurring issue during the entire project. Even after completion of the project, and the collapse of a ceiling that took the life of a 38 year old woman, responsibility is extremely murky. Contracts were negotiated separately with designers and contractors leaving little room for collaboration among the project's most important stakeholders. “Under a design-build model, designer and contractor are retained at the same time, developing a strong working relationship from the start through shared goals and methodology” (Greiman, 2007). While there are many lessons learned from the big dig, we must realize that as difficult as the project turned out to be, there is a tremendous amount of good information to take away from the 14 year, and nearly $15 billion dollar event. “The wrong lesson to take from the Big Dig is that other states shouldn’t bother with ambitious infrastructure. While the Big Dig’s real worth will be measured in decades, its impact so far, three years after workers dismantled the Central Artery, shows its value. Travel time through downtown at afternoon rush hour is down from nearly 20 minutes to less than three, consistent with pre-construction estimates” (Greiman, 2007). Any major project, especially those of the magnitude of the big dig, will struggle with unforeseen events, technical complexities, local issues, and political issues that will inevitably lead to cost increases and time delays. Gelinas, the author of Lessons of Boston’s Big Dig, provides us with a list of the following major lessons learned: • Project integration is critical to success. • Goals and incentives must be mutual and built into contracts throughout the project life cycle to ensure quality, safety, financial soundness, and a commitment to meeting budget and schedule. • Continuous improvement and rigorous oversight are both essential. • Doing things as they have always been done does not work for complex projects that require constant innovation and a culture of collaboration. While the big dig may be considered an utter failure by most, much value has come about as a result of the project and its completion. “People look at the Big Dig and it makes them more skeptical, and therefore they ask harder questions, whether it's on the cost side or the management side. The Big Dig underscores what happens if you don't get it right. Hopefully, people will learn from this" (Szep, 2007). References Gelinas, N. (2007). Lessons of Boston’s Big Dig. Retrieved from URL: http://www.city- journal.org/html/17_4_big_dig.html Greiman, V. (2011). The Big Dig: Learning from a Mega Project. Retrieved from URL: http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/appel/ask/issues/39/39s_big_dig.html Szep, J. (2007). U.S. looks for lessons in Boston's "Big Dig" Retrieved from URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/12/us-usa-boston-dig-idUSN0929767420070712