Book_Review

Barnet R. Rubin’s book titled “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan” is a very comprehensive in-depth study of the Afghan history and the reasons behind the disintegration of the Afghan society and failure of the state. The first part of the book mostly goes through the days of the Musaheban family, especially Zaher Shah and Daud Khan’s regimes and the politics, and perceives that in the days of Zahir Shah’s regime and politics the new activists were born in the pathways of Kabul University. It deeply describes the reasons and stages of the formation of communists and Islamists evolved and sponsored by the foreign governments through the end of Daud’s regime. The second part of the book discusses the development of the communists since their overtaking as Marxist revolutionary agnostic to the days when Najibullah was quoting the Holy Quran. It clearly explains the changes in the policies of the regimes as signs of the larger changes in international politics. It also quantifies the decline of the Afghan economy and the devastating control of the Soviets over its “communist pawns”. The last part of the book is an expedition into the life and policies of the regimes and the role of the Pakistan ISI in the day-to-day operations of those regimes. Overall this book provides an account of the nature of old regime, the rise and fall of the PDPA, and the Mujahedin resistance. According to his thesis, the author argues that the main reasons behind the fragmentation of Afghanistan and disorder in the Afghan Society due to Afghanistan’s tribal structure and ethnic multiplicity has been intentionally amplified by the outside powers and internal parties seeking to dominate. Moreover, he argues that outside aids has played critical role in facilitating central leaders to maintain power and to force different ethnicities and tribes to consolidate, and that when the aid runs out for some reasons, the leaders are left helpless and quickly loses power to internal dominant parties because they have never developed a centralized, institutionalized and economically independent state under a shelter that justifies the right of all varied groups. One of the strengths of the author in writing this book is that he gives the readers an overview back from Ahmad Shah Durrani’s period to further develop his thesis. He explains that how the culture leadership in Afghanistan has started relying first on building tribal relationships and then on foreign aid to maintain their power. Also, the author’s close study of the history and make-up of the Afghan communist party, PDPA and its relationship with the Soviet Union makes his works reasonably strong. He provides a detailed study of where the PDPA members came from, and where they got their education. According to him, there was no true ideological division between the two main wings of the PDPA, the Parcham and Khalq. He points out that it was Parcham that saw value in working inside Daud’s government with progressive elements before the Sawr Revolution while Khalq advocated for an unclearly defined revolution. He argues that the major fronts in revolutionary Afghanistan-Parcham (urban close to the old elite, and Persian speaking), Khalq (more rural, tribal and Pashto speaking) and Islamist (mostly rural)- were all products of the new education brought to the country in the 1960s that depended on outside, foreign assistance to survive and grow as he says “ rentier revolutionary produced by a rentier state.” The author, in addition, does a good job at explaining events and motivations behind Soviet intervention and the various phases of their failed counterinsurgency campaign. He argues that radical social changes sought by Hafizullah Amin and his Khalq faction in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, combined with the high level purges of the army led to a rapid disintegration of the military, including mutiny, all across the country. He says that it was this disintegration of the army and then the internal disintegration of the state and party that allowed revolt to spread so quickly in late 1978 and early 1979, and this was this integration rather than the military force of the resistance, that prompted Soviet intervention. Overall, this shows a good introduction to Afghan tribal and ethnic dynamics and one of the most authoritative reviews of the PDPA during the Soviet era. Besides, the use of tables and charts in breaking down some important information in figures and details proves his work adequate for its readers. For example in chapter 1 he uses different tables to explain the tribal and ethic origin, and secondary and higher education of the Afghan political elites. Also, in part of his book, when he comes to explaining the components of the state fiscal crisis from 1975-1990, he uses the tables and charts significantly to show exactly the source of money coming to the government, and the total and area of expenditure of the government evidently by each year. Generally, he clearly gives the information by figures which show his real hard work in the area of his subject and make it different to the other authors of the Afghan history.