Alexender_the_Great

Biography: Alexander the Great (Greek: Αλέξανδρος ο Μέγας or Μέγας Aλέξανδρος, Megas Alexandros; July 20 356 BC – June 10 323 BC), also known as Alexander III, was an ancient Greek king (basileus) of Macedon (336–323 BC). He was one of the most successful military commanders in history, and was undefeated in battle. By the time of his death, he had conquered most of the world known to the ancient Greeks. Following the unification of the multiple city-states of ancient Greece under the rule of his father, Philip II of Macedon (a labour Alexander had to repeat because the southern Greeks rebelled after Philip's death), Alexander conquered the Achaemenid Persian Empire, including Anatolia, Syria, Phoenicia, Judea, Gaza, Egypt, Bactria and Mesopotamia and extended the boundaries of his own empire as far as the borders of Punjab. Before his death, Alexander had already made plans to also turn west and conquer Europe. He also wanted to continue his march eastwards in order to find the end of the world, since his boyhood tutor Aristotle had told him tales about where the land ends and the Great Outer Sea begins. Alexander integrated foreigners into his army, leading some scholars to credit him with a "policy of fusion." He encouraged marriage between his army and foreigners, and practised it himself. After twelve years of constant military campaigning, Alexander died, possibly of malaria, West Nile virus, typhoid fever, viral encephalitis or the consequences of heavy drinking.. His conquests ushered in centuries of Greek settlement and cultural influence over distant areas, a period known as the Hellenistic Age, a combination of Greek and Middle Eastern culture. Alexander himself lived on in the history and myth of both Greek and non-Greek cultures. After his death (and even during his life) his exploits inspired a literary tradition in which he appears as a legendary hero in the tradition of Achilles. Personal life Main article: Alexander the Great's personal relationships Alexander's lifelong companion was Hephaestion, the son of a Macedonian noble. Hephaestion also held the position of second-in-command of Alexander's forces until his death, which devastated Alexander. The full extent of his relationship with Hephaestion is the subject of much historical speculation. Alexander married two women: Roxana, daughter of a Bactrian nobleman, Oxyartes, and Stateira, a Persian princess and daughter of Darius III of Persia. There is also an accepted tradition of a third wife- Parysatis whom he is supposed to have married in Persia though nothing is known about her. Another personage from the court of Darius III with whom he was intimate was Bagoas. His son by Roxana, Alexander IV of Macedon, was killed after the death of his father, before he reached adulthood. Alexander was admired during his lifetime for treating all his lovers humanely. Influence on Ancient Rome In the late Republic and early Empire, educated Roman citizens used Latin only for legal, political, and ceremonial purposes, and used Greek to discuss philosophy or any other intellectual topic. No Roman wanted to hear it said that his mastery of the Greek language was weak. Throughout the Roman world, the one language spoken everywhere was Alexander's Greek. Alexander and his exploits were admired by many Romans who wanted to associate themselves with his achievements, although very little is known about Roman-Macedonian diplomatic relations of that time. Julius Caesar wept in Spain at the mere sight of Alexander's statue and Pompey the Great rummaged through the closets of conquered nations for Alexander's 260-year-old cloak, which the Roman general then wore as the costume of greatness. However, in his zeal to honor Alexander, Augustus accidentally broke the nose off the Macedonian's mummified corpse while laying a wreath at the hero's shrine in Alexandria, Egypt. The unbalanced emperor Caligula later took the dead king's armor from that tomb and donned it for luck. The Macriani, a Roman family that rose to the imperial throne in the 3rd century A.D., always kept images of Alexander on their persons, either stamped into their bracelets and rings or stitched into their garments. Even their dinnerware bore Alexander's face, with the story of the king's life displayed around the rims of special bowls. In the summer of 1995, during the archaeological work of the season centered on excavating the remains of domestic architecture of early-Roman date, a statue of Alexander was recovered from the structure, which was richly decorated with mosaic and marble pavements and probably was constructed in the 1st century AD and occupied until the 3rd century. Character Modern opinion on Alexander has run the gamut from the idea that he believed he was on a divinely-inspired mission to unite the human race, to the view that he was a megalomaniac bent on world domination. Such views tend to be anachronistic, and the sources allow for a variety of interpretations. Much about Alexander's personality and aims remains enigmatic. There were no disinterested commentators in Alexander's own time or soon afterward, so all accounts need to be read with skepticism. Alexander is remembered as a legendary hero in Europe and much of both Southwest Asia and Central Asia, where he is known as Iskander or Iskandar Zulkarnain. To Zoroastrians, on the other hand, he is remembered as the conqueror of their first great empire and as the destroyer of Persepolis. Ancient sources are generally written with an agenda of either glorifying or denigrating the man, making it difficult to evaluate his actual character. Most refer to a growing instability and megalomania in the years following Gaugamela, but it has been suggested that this simply reflects the Greek stereotype of an orientalizing king. The murder of his friend Cleitus, which Alexander deeply and immediately regretted, is often cited as a sign of his paranoia, as is his execution of Philotas and his general Parmenion for failure to pass along details of a plot against him. There is also the view that this may have been more prudence than paranoia. Modern Alexandrists continue to debate these same issues, among others, in modern times. One unresolved topic involves whether Alexander was actually attempting to better the world by his conquests, or whether his purpose was primarily to rule the world. Partially in response to the ubiquity of positive portrayals of Alexander, an alternate character is sometimes presented which emphasizes some of Alexander's negative aspects. Some proponents of this view cite the destructions of Thebes, Tyre, Persepolis, and Gaza as examples of atrocities, and argue that Alexander preferred to fight rather than negotiate. It is further claimed, in response to the view that Alexander was generally tolerant of the cultures of those whom he conquered, that his attempts at cultural fusion were severely practical and that he never actually admired Persian art or culture. To this way of thinking, Alexander was, first and foremost, a general rather than a statesman. Alexander's character also suffers from the interpretation of historians who themselves are subject to the bias and idealisms of their own time. Good examples are W. W. Tarn, who wrote during the late 19th century and early 20th century, and who saw Alexander in an extremely good light, and Peter Green, who wrote after World War II and for whom Alexander did little that was not inherently selfish or ambition-driven. Tarn wrote in an age where world conquest and warrior-heroes were acceptable, even encouraged, whereas Green wrote with the backdrop of the Holocaust and nuclear weapons. Legend Alexander was a legend in his own time. His court historian Callisthenes portrayed the sea in Cilicia as drawing back from him in proskynesis. Writing after Alexander's death, another participant, Onesicritus, went so far as to invent a tryst between Alexander and Thalestris, queen of the mythical Amazons. When Onesicritus read this passage to his patron, Alexander's general and later King Lysimachus reportedly quipped, "I wonder where I was at the time." In the first centuries after Alexander's death, probably in Alexandria, a quantity of the more legendary material coalesced into a text known as the Alexander Romance, later falsely ascribed to the historian Callisthenes and therefore known as Pseudo-Callisthenes. This text underwent numerous expansions and revisions throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, exhibiting a plasticity unseen in "higher" literary forms. Latin and Syriac translations were made in Late Antiquity. From these, versions were developed in all the major languages of Europe and the Middle East, including Armenian, Georgian, Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Hebrew, Serbian, Slavonic, Romanian, Hungarian, German, English, Italian, and French. The "Romance" is regarded by many Western scholars as the source of the account of Alexander. It is the source of many incidents in Ferdowsi's "Shahnama". A Mongolian version is also extant. Some believe that, excepting certain religious texts, it is the most widely-read work of pre-modern times. Alexander is also a character of Greek folklore (and other regions), as the protagonist of 'apocryphal' tales of bravery. A maritime legend says that his sister is a mermaid and asks the sailors if her brother is still alive. The unsuspecting sailor who answers truthfully arouses the mermaid's wrath and his boat perishes in the waves; a sailor mindful of the circumstances will answer "He lives and reigns, and conquers the world", and the sea about his boat will immediately calm. Alexander is also a character of a standard play in the Karagiozis repertory, "Alexander the Great and the Accursed Serpent". The ancient Greek poet Adrianus composed an epic poem on the history of Alexander the Great, called the Alexandriad, which was probably still extant in the 10th century, but which is now lost to us. Alexander as a great leader Alexander was ambitious young leader, who wanted to win and rule the whole world. He was a master of astute personality and was a powerful leader. He was determined to seek action and glory, rather than pleasures and riches. There are many reasons that Alexander was such a great and successful leader. His army consisted of fewer than 40,000 men and it was not easy to keep this large group of men entertained and healthy under the harsh conditions of war that existed at this time. He was able to maintain this large group of men by giving them certain freedoms and providing them with various forms of entertainment between battles. He also was able to maintain his image as one of being brave, caring, and at the same time stern. We must remember that these men fought only with throwing spears (javelins), lances, bow and arrows, short swords, and some fought on horses (cavalry). These different weapons made up different units that he would send in to do specific types of battle. Alexander was very much war oriented and therefore did not put off his battles to marry and have children, even though this would leave the kingdom without a ruler in the event of his death. He was much more concerned with his fame than with what would happen to his empire should he be killed. As a general and leader Alexander was closely involved with his wars and his men. Unlike most generals or rulers he did not stay on the defensive side of his assault to ensure his safety but rather joined his men and led them on attacks. In order to keep morale up among his men he allowed those who were recently married to go home and see their families when they were not fighting. Following each battle he would personally go around to the hospital tents and talk with his men that had been injured in battle and allow them to boast of how brave they were. When men died in battle he would grant their families relief from land-tax and personal service. He also provided entertainment in the form of concerts and plays for his troops after a battle. In case there was a delay between battles he would hold sporting events where the winners would receive prizes that he provided. Leadership qualities of Alexander Are leaders born, or are they made' Alexander’s father had entered alliances with powerful Greek city-states like Athens. He had also signed a non-aggression pact with Persia in 343 BC, the same year that Alexander was sent to study under Aristotle. But make no mistake about, once Alexander I was King, diplomacy was never really an option. Had Alexander shown too much of it, some Greek city-states would have sought independence and left the confederation that his father had built. As a result, being courageous and audacious was the strategy; acting with swift militarily might the tactic. To accomplish this, Alexander needed to recruit and motivate men of virtue to fight with him. This was paramount, without the right men, grandeur would have been an oasis throughout Alexander’s journey. He knew for example, that before venturing to Persia, he would have to call back Parmenio to serve as his second-in-command. So he did without hesitation. Parmenio had proven to be his father’s trusted lieutenant. In hindsight, what Alexander most proud of is not merely being a successful military commander, but mainly having been able to motivate my men to endure so much, take on such great odds, come out victorious and remain relatively altruistic. That was rewarding in itself. In that era, leadership was a way of life, one that needed to be demonstrated through actions, not words alone. Cyrus the Great was a Zoroastrian. Zoroastrians had a saying: good thoughts, good words, good deeds. Indeed. Leonidas taught him to live, eat, sleep, fight and ultimately bleed alongside his men. Since his time, this practice has become rare. Not only did Alexander fight alongside his men, he rode ahead of his troops in combat and wore something that stood out so enemy troops could recognize him from the distance. His trademark two white plumes did the trick. Cowardice never had a place in his time, especially if you sought the respect and unconditional loyalty of your men. He dares you to show him a leader who fights in your day or exposes himself to the enemy. Ironically, he ruled an empire from abroad. The entire time he led the Greeks, he was waging a war. While he needed to exert diplomacy in his adventure, being a diplomat was out of the question. Even once he conquered Persia and India, the mere notion of becoming a mere administrator made him ill. He was a soldier, he was a warrior, he was a commander. He might have been diplomatic, but he was no diplomat. Certainly he was no administrator. Away from the battleground, Alexander possessed the one distinct characteristic that is not taught: charisma. Before the advent of mass media and instant communication, captivating the hearts and minds was essential but far more challenging. Before winning over the conquered, he would have to win over his own men. To achieve this, Alexander needed to win over the facts and convey them in the proper light. Artistotle’s nephew Callisthenes accompanied him in his sojourn to Persia. Callisthenes was in charge of the positive recording and strategic dissemination of his cause; it worked brilliantly back home and abroad. Alexander believes this is what you call propaganda today. Divine intervension The religious makeup of Alexander’s world was different. It was not rare for Man to have many Gods and many people practiced polytheism. In fact, some mortals would cross the line and become immortal. Over the course of his life, he struggled with his quest for immortality. Alexander’s mother Olympias told him that he was a direct descendent of Achilles. Mother also proclaimed that it was not Philip who impregnated her, but rather, a serpent. Father mentioned that he saw her sleep with a serpent in bed. Later on, she told Alexander that Zeus was his father, but in Alexander’s era, serpents were closely associated to the God Zeus Ammon. Throughout history, serpents have also symbolized a man’s reproductive organs, so you can perhaps see how the two stories came to be. Had this been Alexander only brush with divinity, and then he might have disregarded Olympias’ claim for she had always done everything in her power to advance his interests and hype up his aura of grandeur. What are mothers for, right' When Alexander liberated Egypt, he decided to head down through Northwestern Egypt through the Libyan Desert to visit Siwah. This was in February 331 BC. Admittedly, Alexander rarely ventured off course for six weeks during his journey. But at the same time, he always consulted with divinity before a major advance. Call it hedging you. He was merely covering his ass. Frankly, while he was starting to believe his immortality, he still needed confirmation. He would get it at Siwah. Throughout Alexander’s life, he wanted to overshadow Perseus and Hercules. And since both of these men could trace their lineage to Zeus, it was fitting that he too be able to draw this relationship. Note that Hercules was both the son of Zeus and a mortal who became a God. So there was no reason for Alexander to disbelieve his immortality, especially as the victories accumulated and he repeatedly escaped death. Either way, it is fair to say that in order for Alexander to defeat the mighty Achaemenid Empire, a trip through Siwah would be necessary to reinforce my credentials. What took place at Siwah was noteworthy, because it continued a motif of divine intervention throughout my life. Alexander consulted with the Zeus-Ammon oracle where he pronounced him to be the son of Zeus-Ammon. The term ammon is a derivation of amun, which is related to the Greek word ammos, meaning “sand.” Ammon was thus the more exotic, sandy version of the Greek God Zeus. Later on in Alexander’s life, he did begin to adopt the practice of prostration, where people would bow before him. Many of his Macedonian brothers wondered why he would adopt such a practice. The truth is that by then, Alexander had begun to adopt some Persian ways to gain credibility with locals throughout the Persian Empire. Besides, he also thought that it was only fair, since by now, he had achieved what no mortal man had ever accomplished: defeating the Persian Empire and become King of Kings, an immortal amongst men. But before becoming King of Kings, King of Asia or King of Persia, Alexander faced numerous obstacles. Ambitious goals “My son, ask for thyself another kingdom, for which that I leave is too small for thee.” Philip II Alexander’s father had built up an impressive army, but Alexander knew how to leverage it best. He led his army throughout the entire known world over the next twelve years Work smart Alexander did things his way. He thought it was the smart way, now people call it the Great way. After winning the Battle of Gordium in 333 BC, he solved the legendary mystery of the Gordian knot. What was this famous knot' According to Greek legend, Gordius was a poor peasant who had this intricately tied knot, called, you guessed it, the Gordian knot. He used the knot to secure his oxcart. An oracle had told the people that their future king would present himself riding in a wagon. Seeing Gordius’ oxcart, they made him king. For his gratitude, Gordius was wise enough to dedicate his oxcart to Zeus, tying it up with this knot. Another oracle then proceeded to state that the man that could undo this knot would become the uncontested, unanimous ruler of Asia, sort of like the holder of all those boxing titles in the modern era, if you wish. Suffice to say that it was quite in vogue to try to undo this knot, but no one came close. No one until, take a guess… you got that right: yours truly! By 333 BC, Alexander had liberated Asia Minor from the Persians and found himself in the town of Gordium in the central mountains. Alexander was thirty-three and had been in power for three years. He was undefeated by now, having already crossed the symbolic Hellespont across Granicus River. Effectively, he dealt a psychological but fairly small blow to the Persian Empire and his nemesis, King Darius III Codomannus. As such, Alexander had yet to demonstrate what I could really do. He needed to constantly remind his men of the virtue in their mission: to free the world, conquer Persia and export Greek culture. But doing so took more than words; it took action. So across this knot Alexander came. The knot sat next to the Temple of Zeus Basilica for over a hundred years. There was no way that Alexander would breeze through this city without trying to undo the knot. The problem was that the ends were tucked away inside the knot. Why Alexander was great' Alexander III (356-323 B.C.), king of Macedon, parlayed his father Philip II’s conquest of Greece into an empire that expanded from the Balkans to the Nile to the Himalayas, subduing tens of millions of people along the way. Like Napoleon, Alexander was rather short. He was blond with a ruddy complexion, and according to one source, had one eye as dark as night, the other as blue as sky. He was raised by his mother, Olympias, to believe he was descended from the mythical characters Achilles and Herakles. His father, Philip II (382-336 B.C.), consolidated power in Macedonia, then subdued the Greek city-states to the south. Although the Macedonians spoke Greek, they were considered hicks by the sophisticates of Athens and Thebes. But Alexander was quite enamored with Greek philosophy, science and art. His empire fell apart soon after his death, but his lasting legacy was that he spread the Greek language and civilization to all the lands that he conquered. The unifying nature of this cultural tradition, called Hellenism, was the basis of more permanent institutions, like the Roman Empire and Christianity. Above all things, Alexander was a great military commander, leading his troops into every encounter. A bit of an over-achiever, the historian Plutarch wrote that Alexander wept upon learning that the universe was infinite. When asked what was wrong, he replied: “There are so many worlds, and I have not yet conquered even one.” Ten main reasons for the greatness 10. Trained in philosophy by Aristotle How many of history’s a great leader can claim to have had one of the great philosophers as their personal tutor' Out of all the intellectuals at the prestigious Academy in Athens, Alexander’s father, Philip, chose Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) to instruct his 13-year-old son. Aristotle, who had been the student of Plato, was offered a handsome salary to move to the town of Mieza, deep in the Macedonian countryside. In the nearby Temple of the Nymphs, Aristotle taught the young prince geography, zoology, politics and medicine. Alexander was greatly influenced by the philosopher’s teachings. On later military campaigns, Alexander brought scientists with him and sent plant and animal specimens back to his former mentor. 9. Tamed the horse Bucephalus Philip, Alexander’s father, bought a horse called Bucephalus for the exorbitant price of 13 talents (1 talent = 27 kg of gold), but the rambunctious animal bucked all comers. Watching the futile attempts, Alexander noticed that the animal was frightened by its own shadow. He bet his father that he could mount the horse. By turning Bucephalus toward the sun so its shadow was behind it, Alexander was able to climb into the saddle and gallop around triumphantly. To which his father said: ‘My boy, you must find a kingdom big enough for your ambitions. Macedonia is too small for you.’ Bucephalus remained Alexander’s faithful steed until it died in what is now present-day Pakistan, fighting elephant-mounted brigades. 8. Assumed Father’s Throne in Timely, but Ruthless, Manner Alexander’s father, Philip, was stabbed by one of his bodyguards in 336 B.C. at a wedding banquet. Although few scholars think that Alexander was directly involved in the assassination, he wasted no time dispatching any possible rivals ‘ even instructing his mother, Olympias, to execute the infant son of Philip’s last wife. Alexander spent the next two years quelling rebellions in the lands conquered by his father. Thebes revolted on a false rumor that Alexander was dead. Showing no mercy, Alexander slaughtered or sold into slavery 30,000 inhabitants before leveling the city to the ground. By setting such an example, there were no significant uprisings in Greece during Alexander’s 12-year Asia campaign. 7. Perfected Macedonian Military Style, the Phalanx The most distinctive element of the Macedonian war machine was the phalanx. Developed by Alexander’s father, the phalanx was a tight formation of soldiers ‘ usually 16 by 16 ‘ carrying shields and sarisses, which were 20-foot-long spears made of cornel-wood. The back rows of the phalanx held their sarisses upright, hiding the movement of forces behind the lines, while the front rows kept the enemy at bay with an impenetrable wall of sharp pikes. On flat terrain, the phalanx proved unbeatable. Alexander also had at his disposal light auxiliaries, archers, a siege train, and a cavalry. Thanks to his father, Alexander’s army was largely a professional one. In earlier times, Macedonians would stop fighting during the harvest, but Philip and Alexander paid the men enough that they could afford to be soldiers full-time. This meant they were often better trained than their adversaries. 6. Crossed the Hellespont After solidifying his rule of Macedonia and Greece, Alexander looked east to Asia and the Persian Empire, which was led by Darius III. Alexander assembled an allied Greek army of 5,000 cavalry and 32,000 infantry to avenge the Persian invasion of Greece in 490 B.C. With 60 naval vessels, Alexander crossed the Hellespont (a narrow strait separating Europe and Asia -’ now called the Dardanelles) in 334 B.C. From his ship, Alexander threw his spear onto the shore. As he took his first steps in Asia, he pulled his weapon from the sand and declared that these lands would be won by the spear. But the first order of business was a little tourism! Being quite fond of the Trojan War story — even keeping a copy of Homer’s Iliad tucked under his pillow, Alexander made a special trip to Troy to perform several sacrifices and to trade some of his armor for a sacred shield in the Temple of Athena. 5. Untied Gordian Knot, Loosed Metaphor for the Ages According to legend, the Phrygians, who lived in what is now central Turkey, were told by an oracle to make king the first man to ride into town in an oxcart. As luck would have it, this man was Gordius, a poor peasant. After his coronation, Gordius dedicated his cart to the god Zeus and tied it to a pole outside the temple. The knot was made of cornel bark, which hardened over time. It was said that whoever untied this intricate knot would conquer all of Asia. Alexander could not pass up such an opportunity, but there were no ends to the knot for him to even get started. In frustration, he sliced it in half with his sword, proclaiming, “I have loosed it!” The Gordian Knot has since become synonymous with an intractable problem that requires an unconventional solution. 4. Simply Divine: Declared Son of a God After defeating the Persians at the Battle of Issus, Alexander decided to enter Egypt, which had been under Persian rule for almost 200 years. The Egyptians despised the Persians for their heavy taxes and religious intolerance. They gladly anointed Alexander as pharaoh, initiating a cultural exchange between Greece and Egypt that lasted for the next three hundred years. While in Egypt, Alexander also made the dangerous journey across the desert to the shrine of Zeus Ammon. It is said that he was guided by ravens and blessed with rain. Upon his arrival, the priest apparently told him he was the son of Zeus. Whether or not Alexander believed in his own divinity, he played it up to his own advantage. 3. Founded Alexandria Besides razing cities, Alexander also founded about 20 new ones, naming most of them after himself. The most enduring of these is Alexandria on the coast of the Nile delta. In a superb natural harbor where the Persians had once erected a fortress, Alexander had his architects build a grand city along Greek lines. Alexandria later developed into a cosmopolitan port, with schools, theater, and one of the greatest libraries of antiquity. Greeks ran the city’s administration, but Egyptians were allowed to keep their customs and religion. Egyptians could only become citizens if they learned Greek and accepted Greek traditions. 2. Defeated the Persians After less than a year in Egypt, Alexander resumed to chasing after the Persian emperor, Darius III. At the plains of Gaugamela, Darius assembled an army of 200,000, which included cavalry wearing chain mail and chariots with blades spinning out of the wheels. Alexander’s 47,000 men attacked Darius’ flanks, splitting the Persian forces, while Alexander charged into the center. The Persians broke ranks and were routed. Darius escaped by horseback, only to be later killed by one of his own men. Having conquered the Persians, Alexander was named King of Asia. He took Babylon and Persepolis, the Persian capital. In an attempt to solidify his rule, he began to dress like a Persian, and married a Persian dancer named Roxanne. His men found it unbecoming of their king that he thought it necessary to please a defeated enemy. 1. Extended Empire Into India; Partied — and Died — Like a Rock Star Alexander’s vision of Asia was that it ended just on the other side of India. Wanting to conquer the continent, he persuaded his men to march east. The Indian king Porus and his elephants fell to Alexander, but the weather and the mountains wore out his men. It soon became clear that Asia was larger than had been estimated. With his campaign suffering from ‘mission drift,’ Alexander succumbed to his men’s pleas and turned back. But he decided on a circuitous route: down India’s rivers to the ocean, then along the coast back to Persia. It was probably Alexander’s greatest mistake, as 15,000 of his men died of starvation or heat in the Gedrosan Desert — more than all those he lost in battle. The journey may have taken its toll on Alexander as well. At a banquet back in Babylon, he drank excessively — as usual — then fell ill of a fever, most likely due to malaria. He died a few days later, just shy of his 33rd birthday. The Degradation of Alexander the Great’s Motivational Tactics Alexander III of Macedon possessed an innate ability to motivate his troops and boost their morale. In fact, it was this ability that allowed him to conquer the entire world, as it was known in the 4th century BCE. It would have been impossible for Alexander to make his far-reaching conquests if he had not been able to foster high morale among the men he led. Such morale was very largely the product of his own courage and ability as a leader.[1] However, Alexander’s motivational tactics deteriorated over his career and led to the loss of control over his troops and subjects directly preceding his death. Whereas he once employed altruistic and genuine motivational tactics on his men early in his command, he gradually began using more sinister strategies on his kinsmen. This paper will analyze the phenomenon based on a study of three major times in Alexander’s career when his strategies became apparent: the battle at Issus in 333 BCE, the battle of the Malli in 326 BCE, and the mutiny at Opis in 324 BCE. The initial incentives to motivate his troops were simple for Alexander to accomplish. First, he asserted his bravery in combat alongside the troops and military cunning as their general at the battle of Chaeronea (Aug. 4, 338 BCE[2]), fighting with his father Philip before Alexander’s rule. Carney notes that “the ability of the king to share in the common lot of the army could also be an effective disciplinary tool.”[3] Secondly, the whole campaign against the Persians would have primarily been an incentive to follow Alexander. The two regions had been at odds for a long time, and to conquer the nation’s archenemy would have gained Alexander monumental support. Isocrates states in his speech to Philip in 346 BCE, I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes, to reign as king over the Macedonians, and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians, for if you do these things, all men will be grateful.[4] Alexander certainly would have grown up with that mentality about the Persian conquest. When dealing with his troops he was considerate, and since he shared in their trials and tribulations he could identify with how they were feeling. “Alexander sought to lead by indulgence as well as by example” and he gained popularity with “compassionate leave.”[5] By “indulgence” and “compassionate leave,” Keegan means that Alexander would indulge his troops with things like spoils of war and days of rest, and he would be sympathetic to soldiers who had recently been married or had children, allowing them to return home to see their families.[6] These incentives were obviously effective since he was able to amass a large army (about 35,000[7]) for his trek to the East. He began his war with a good relationship between himself and his troops, but this would change over the course of the next eight years. In the beginning Alexander led in accordance with the traditional Macedonian custom, in fact they seem to have had an open and stable relationship, which was “extremely personal” according to Carney.[8] “A study of the ancient evidence reveals a degree of flexibility in the attitudes of Alexander and his men toward each other…(the soldiers) were in a sense his equals and he lived among them as one of them.”[9] However, things such as Alexander’s insistence on proskynesis in his court even among Macedonians later in his reign (this began in 327 BCE), shows a disparity between the two ruling styles. The style Lock mentions is based on the premise that the king is an equal of the soldiers; but with proskynesis it has obviously shifted to a largely-separated hierarchy, more in the custom of Oriental rulers. The first event to be analyzed was in 333 BCE at the Issus River. Before the battle against Darius— a decisive victory for Alexander though not the end of this war for Persia— Alexander fell ill with a fever. Parmenio, one of Alexander’s top generals, sent a message stating that the king’s medic Philip had been bribed by Darius and instead of medicine, would give the king poison.[10] At this point in his career, Alexander had a stable enough rapport with is subjects that when he read this note, he immediately drank the liquid in question and then handed the letter to his doctor. This showed the trust and relationship he kept with Philip, and the confidence he had with his subjects. Despite the good relations Alexander had with his subjects at this point, his troops were tiring. He had marched them well into Asia Minor and past the Taurus Mountains, and according to Green they were becoming “sodden, exhausted and resentful.” Alexander, however, was able to rouse and motivate them with his “outrageous optimism.” [11] Before the battle, Alexander made sacrifices to the local gods, for on the next morning he would go into battle. This is a genuine way to motivate the troops by paying respect in the customary fashion, which we can assume would have bolstered his troops’ morale. Alexander used the gods in many ways to motivate his troops. He was known to make sacrifices often, as seen here. Before leaving Myriandrus, Alexander sacrificed a four-horse chariot to Poseidon, possibly in hopes of avoiding confrontation with the Phoenician fleet of Darius.[12] His deification at Siwah[13] could have had positive and negative connotations to his men. On the one hand, they would have been honored and strengthened to have a god on their side, moreover to have a god leading them. On the other hand, the troops eventually became incensed at their king’s insistence on his deification, since Macedonian and Greek culture conflicted with the idea of living deities. Alexander made constant references and parallels to gods. One such parallel that came up often was to Achilles. An instance happened before the battle at Malli when Alexander, like Achilles is said to have done battle with a river. Another parallel to Achilles, according to an account by Anaximenes, which is much more evil occurred at the siege of Gaza. Alexander was angered by a wound he received from a man who pretended to fall in battle, so he bound the city’s commandant Baetis in the same style that Achilles bound Hector’s body in the Iliad, and tortured him to death this way.[14]. A different god-parallel that Alexander made was when he allied himself with Heracles, since the Macedonian royal family claimed descent from him. Finally there was his parallel to Dionysus. Alexander wished to be included alongside the two gods the Arabs supposedly worshipped; Uranus and Dionysus; because Alexander thought that his achievements had outdone those of Dionysus.[15] These alignments certainly mounted tensions between him and his troops, especially before the mutiny at Hyphasis that forced Alexander to turn back. “(The troops) regarded Alexander’s pretensions to divinity as ridiculous and blasphemous.”[16] A different religious incident that may be a good foreshadowing of Alexander’s change in interactions with his troops can be seen in the incident with the Gordian knot. In the legend, “an ancient oracle had foretold that anyone who contrived to loose this knot would become lord of all Asia…(and) for a long while Alexander struggled with this labyrinthine tangle, but to little effect.” Alexander then got frustrated and slashed the knot with his sword, exclaiming “What difference does it make how I loose it'”[17] If we are looking at this instance as a foreshadowing metaphor for Alexander’s techniques in motivating his troops, we can see the parallel between his use of force and underhanded methods in loosening the knot, thereby fulfilling the oracle’s prophecy, and his increasingly sinister tactics in motivation. During the battle of Issus, Alexander again showed both military brilliance and bravery in battle. He positioned his troops and adapted them to Darius’s army in such a way that the right flank instantly crushed the Persian opposition, and the left flank soon followed. When the center started to falter, he was able to swing over and come to their aid. He soundly defeated the Persians, and turned their retreat into a “rout.”[18] While in the midst of battle, Alexander made a headlong attack on Darius himself, forsaking his own safety to eliminate the head of his enemy. Bravery in battle was one of the most highly regarded and rewarded actions in the ancient world, and to see your commander showing more bravery than the soldiers would certainly be motivating. If Alexander’s mental capabilities and fighting ability did not motivate the soldiers to continue following him, the treasure that was gained from this battle certainly would have. Even though Darius had sent much of his entourage to Damascus before the battle, the Macedonian army captured “no less than 3,000 talents of gold.”[19] The women of Darius’s baggage train were “severely manhandled” by the troops and the army was allowed to rest for a while. Although these soldiers were to see more action and strife in the eight years with Alexander than most would in their lives, it seems they also gained more booty than most soldiers ever would. When the battle was done, Alexander personally circulated around his camp to visit the wounded and give them strength. He asked his troops to tell him their stories personally, and he allowed them to embellish as much as they wished, which was good psychotherapy for the troops. This would help to build a strong relationship between the leader and his subjects. Alexander then honored the dead with a fabulous parade and ceremonial burial, and he decorated soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle.[20] Alexander again took over coin mints and began issuing more of his own currency, which in part prompts Green to say this battle “brought in welcome spoils, and had excellent propaganda value.”[21] Alexander employs a method after the battle that is clearly underhanded. Once Darius realized that he was not going to easily beat Alexander on the battlefield, he tried to settle the struggle by making a deal with his enemy. He agreed to concede the territories and cities in Asia west of the Halys River, as long as Alexander agreed to sign a treaty of friendship. Alexander then concealed this letter, for it would surely make Parmenio (and undoubtedly many others) urge him to accept the terms, while Alexander’s insatiable conquer-lust was still not satisfied. Alexander forged a second letter and presented it to his Companions, that made Darius sound more arrogant and ran in accord with Alexander’s plans— the Companions moved to reject Darius’s letter, even though they did not know what they were rejecting. [22] Alexander replied to Darius’ correspondences (one of which offered Darius’s daughter in marriage) saying, Come to me, then, as you would come to the lord of the continent of Asia…And in the future let any communication you wish to make with me be addressed to the King of all Asia. Do not write to me as to an equal. Everything you posses in now mine; so, if you should want anything, let me know in the proper terms, or I shall take steps to deal with you as a criminal.[23] Therefore it seems that Alexander purported Darius to be the arrogant and insulting communicator, when in fact he played that role himself. This is sinister because Alexander blatantly lied to his men in order to trick them into following him on his quest. If indeed the king had been like an equal, as Lock suggested, he would have relayed the letters as they were received. At the battle of Malli, Alexander again displayed a variety of tactics to motivate his troops and keep them loyal to him, and again we see him working in deceitful manners. As mentioned above, before the event he aligned himself with Achilles as having done battle with a river, when in fact he had barely escaped drowning in the Chenab.[24] Again we need to keep in mind Nagle’s assertions (above) about the troops’ unhappiness with deification when analyzing how his troops were taking this constant reference to the gods by their leader. It could be possible to either add to their morale or add to their frustration. I agree with Nagle on his point that troops were becoming fed up with his attempts at self-deification. When they realized that they are about to undertake another dangerous siege, they threaten to mutiny. In response to this Alexander blatantly lied to them, saying that the Ocean was closer than they thought, and that the tribes ahead were “unwarlike.”[25] This is more evidence that Alexander was undermining the importance of his troops’ opinions and was driving them according to his whims alone, and even keeping them from comprehending the situations they were in. Although Alexander was able to rally his troops and avoid a mutiny, his troops’ morale was “still perilously low.” When his troops found themselves in front of the Mallian gates, their confidence failed them and they refused to begin the siege. Infuriated, Alexander grabbed a scaling ladder and mounted the walls himself to “shame” his troops into following him. “Greek hoplites were motivated more by concern for the good opinion of their fellow hoplites and their hoplite general than by fear and punishment”— this must have been magnified in the presence of their king. Cowardice in the Macedonian army was worse than disobedience.[26] On one hand this is a good motivational technique in that it shows their leader’s willingness to fight and to exhibit bravery, however on the other hand, the idea of shaming your inferiors into following you is a less than respectable method of motivation. This was typical of Alexander though. “Unlike Persian kings, he was not surrounded by bodyguards but led them. This may be interpreted as a mark of his courage or an instance of his rashness.”[27] Another element of motivation that Alexander was employing in his cavalier attack on Malli was a fear tactic. Jumping onto the perimeter walls by himself put Alexander in serious danger, and made him not just a prime target for archers, but it made him the only target for every archer inside the city. Curtius explains that Alexander took huge risks at Malli “in an attempt to regain his domination over the soldiery.”[28] The risk he had run was great, and the consequences would have been disastrous for his army should he have been killed. Carney notes, “A King might compel his men to fight by removing any hope of safe return except victory.” [29] Had Alexander been cut down either by swords or archers, his men would have found themselves stranded in the middle of Asia Minor. Without Alexander’s name striking fear into all surrounding enemies, the troops would certainly have been met with merciless opposition on all sides, making a safe retreat back to Macedonia impossible. Demades and Leosthenes are variously attributed to having compared the army after Alexander’s death to the Cyclops after having lost its eye.[30] If this was Alexander’s purpose, then it is another instance of Alexander using devious strategies to inspire his kinsmen. Alexander’s tactics, whether underhanded or not, were effective for the immediate purpose of inciting his troops to battle. Seeing their leader in such dangerous peril made them scramble up on the siege ladders so frantically that they snapped the ladders and could not mount the walls, except for three of his Companions. The troops frenetically battered the front gates until they had broken them down, but at that point Alexander had taken an arrow wound in the chest.[31] Once in the battle his troops fought with “savage, almost hysterical cruelty” because they were frightened and desperate.[32] Green and Tarn both agree that this was a uniquely dreadful event in Alexander’s campaigns, because once the troops breached the gates of Malli, there was merciless slaughter with wild abandon[33]. Inside of the gates at Malli, the troops massacred every man woman and child they came across. While it is a gruesome truth, this as well was a method that Alexander used to help motivate his troops. The permission to slaughter enemies, and even enemies’ families, was a way to satisfy soldiers’ bloodlust, despite its barbaric nature in our view.[34] We have seen Alexander employ this same tactic earlier (September 335 [35]) when Thebes was razed to the ground early in his reign, and all its inhabitants murdered. After Alexander fell with an arrow wound in the chest, he was taken to have it extracted, which was a dangerous procedure. He fainted after the wound hemorrhaged and the rumor quickly circled that he was either dead or dying. His troops went frantic at this news, and Macedonians not on campaign with him acted the same. In Bactria three thousand Greek mercenaries revolted instantly.[36] This revolt is a good representation of the negative effect Alexander’s actions were having on his subordinates at this point. I suggest that if he had been employing purely genuine tactics with his men and citizens all along, and had he not been raising tensions (with his constant Persianization, inclusion of Asiatic youths, deification, and marriage to Roxane[37]) he would not have been confronted with revolts when he came close to death. The first incentive to remain loyal to Alexander in connection with Opis happened before the mutiny when Alexander agreed to pay for the soldier’s debts. This however was taken by the troops as a trick to expose those who had been living too lavishly while on campaign. Alexander had to agree to make it an anonymous list, so that he would have no access to who had been most extravagant in their spending before the soldiers agreed to accept the offer. Alexander also took time to bestow gifts upon soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle. The king was certainly thinking ahead to future motivations as well. “He promised his veterans at Opis to give them rewards enough to incite new Macedonian drafts to be ready to share the same dangers and exertions.”[38] This is an altruistic act that Alexander extended, which the troops were right to finally accept. Perhaps the troops’ hesitancy helps color the state of their relationship at the time. Alexander then wanted to clean up his ranks a bit by dismissing soldiers who were either wounded or were too old to be effective in the army anymore, which “was seen as rejection, and proof that he had lost touch with his men.”[39] This, according to Carney is the reason that the troops revolted in 324 BCE, when she says, “permanent separation from the commander tended to generate break-down in discipline, partly of feelings of rejection.”[40] According to Robinson and Hammond it was because Alexander wanted to incorporate 30,000 Asian boys in the dismissed soldiers’ place. At this news the Macedonians still in the homeland “went frantic thinking Alexander’s dismissal is a sign that Asia will be his permanent base.”[41] Whatever the reason for the mutiny, the fact remains that the troops were dissatisfied in their leader and revolted against him. They had done this about 2 years earlier at the Hyphasis River, which made Alexander end his eight-year campaign and begin his return to Macedonia. This time, however, the king was more prepared for the mutiny and knew how to handle it. “The outcome of this confrontation was in many respect the opposite of the earlier trouble; this time the army entirely failed in its goals and the king succeeded.”[42] The first tactic Alexander used in order to reverse the tide of this mutiny and keep his troops under his influence was a sinister one. Alexander employed a fear tactic by selecting the 13 greatest instigators of the mutiny and sentenced them to immediate execution.[43] Carney notes “Macedonians had the habit of speaking freely, even bluntly, to their king-commanders.”[44] So Alexander should not have over-reacted to such a situation as he did. This immediate reliance on perfidious strategies towards his countrymen and subjects shows the disintegration in his esteem and regard for his troops, and it helps explain the situation between the king and those under him just before his death. “The threat of punishment by the king or at his order— fear in short— may have made Macedonians much more focused on obedience, especially in the reign of Alexander,”[45] says Carney, however she goes on to say that “capital punishment is rarely mentioned by the sources.”[46] We have seen Alexander use fear tactics against other people such as Thebes when he had his army raze it to the ground and against the Tyrians in his siege of the city. His murder of Parmenio and Philotas would have been a fear tactic against any other generals threatening his power but I assert that purging the upper-rank generals and capital punishment against his lower-rank troops are very different things, and violence against his own men is a new convention that displays a loss of honor in dealing with his inferiors. Directly after this event, while the army was caught in its stunned, dumbfounded silence, the king used a second tactic to sway his troops back to his side when he jumped onto the rostrum and delivered a speech to all his men.[47] In this speech he “tried to wheedle, chastise, inspire or flatter his troops out of mutiny according to Curtius and Justin.”[48] When the troops jeered that Alexander could go on fighting with “Father Ammon” at his side instead of an army, Alexander responded by beginning his speech with an affirmation of his Macedonian heritage by listing the accomplishments of his father Philip. Then he went on to assert his superiority by listing his own accomplishments juxtaposed to his father’s. This made him look even more successful and grand. “It seems more than likely that Alexander began his speech with a reference to his father’s achievements, if only to highlight his own even more significant accomplishments.”[49] Alexander went on to remind his troops of their wealth and his poverty, and of his willingness to stand among them and fight with bravery. “There is no part of my body without a scar,” he said “except for my back.”[50] After this he preached to the troops about the honors he bestows on fallen soldiers, with lavish burials (which could include funeral processions and games), and the remissions granted to the families of killed soldiers from monetary dues and service obligations. According to Justin, Alexander alternated between rebuking his men and telling them not to tarnish the glorious campaign with seditio, suggesting that the speech emphasized the success of the campaign and heaped guilt on the veterans for betraying Alexander.[51] Nagle goes on to point out that Alexander tries to turn the complaints back on the troops (a good example of his rhetorical intelligence) by saying the true situation was that the troops were deserting him, not the other way around.[52] This, although manipulative, was a good tactic for motivation since he never lied to the troops outright (although it can be assumed he embellished certain things), but instead he tried to reason with them through rhetoric and language. Again, before anyone could react to what had happened, Alexander stormed off of the rostrum to his quarters and shut himself off from all contact for three days. Despite his oratory skill, the army was still standing in opposition to the king. According to Carney, Alexander won by “seclusion and blackmail.”[53] By blackmail, Carney is alluding to Alexander’s announcement that all Macedonians in the upper ranks and Companions unit would be replaced with Persians— perhaps a better way for Carney to have put it would be emotional blackmail. “Alexander was angry and abusive to the Macedonians, and he persisted in promoting the Persians, until the Macedonians were humbled and he wept with them over a reconciliation.”[54] This is a sinister strategy, since he refused to take the wishes of his troops into consideration, and he refused to talk or reason with anybody. By shutting himself off from his Companions and troops, he basically avoided the issue and toyed with the thoughts and emotions of his men. Then his threats, whether valid or not, was a cheap way of influencing the army to concede to his wishes. The results of this event are hard to analyze because of Alexander’s untimely death. According to Arrian, “After this about 10,000 got their discharges at their own request…as Alexander had intended all along.”[55] So in this regard he was tremendously successful. However, Carney states that the resolution at Opis hurt the relationship between Alexander and his men despite its immediate effectiveness.[56] Alexander’s ability to motivate his troops was impressive. Even though his tactics deteriorated over the course of his career from altruistic methods to sinister strategies, he was still effective and efficient in making his troops follow his bidding. “The mutinies at Hyphasis and at Opis are the only occasions during Alexander’s lifetime on which the Macedonian troops can clearly be seen asserting their collective will…the decision to turn about was forced upon Alexander by the spontaneous opposition of the troops.”[57] These statements show the ruthless efficacy of Alexander’s motivational skills for the majority of his career, but it does not deal at all with the quality of his methods to motivate. I assert that Alexander would not have been able to motivate his troops at this point without using these sinister and underhanded techniques, which we have seen happening more and more frequently in his reign. In the beginning of his career, such as at Chaeronea, he could gain support and following through military strategy or skill, but he had raised the tensions so much at this point that he needed to employ more extreme methods. With his constant Persianization, such as the acquisition of Persian dress and proskynesis, the strain on the relationship between the monarch and his subjects had become so dire that simple, altruistic tactics were obsolete and would have crumbled under the pressure of the army’s amassed will. Looking to the mutiny at Opis is a prime example of this. Alexander tried a variety of means to get his troops back under his wing, but it was the sinister ones that became effective in the end. When he tried to pay the soldiers’ debts (altruistic effort), they received it warily and uneasily. When he selected the 13 biggest instigators for immediate execution (sinister act), he was completely successful in quieting the shouts and accusations from his men. When he tried to convince them through rhetoric in his speech (altruistically), he was unable to convince the troops back to his side, and finally when he shut himself off in his quarters and threatened to replace all Macedonians in the Companion class with Persians (also sinister) he broke the opposition’s mental state, making them come rushing and crying to apologize. This clearly illustrates the ineffectiveness of his altruistic methods regarding motivation in the later stages of Alexander’s life, and the necessity of using sinister methods. Carney says that at this time, Alexander “clearly had no support among the officer corps for continued campaigning,” and we can easily make the assumption that the lower-ranked soldiers felt the same.[58] The purpose of this paper is not to pass judgment on these tactics, but to show the degradation over time, and now to assert my opinion that this was not merely natural change in Alexander’s demeanor, but a necessity and series of planned contrivances on the part of the king. Perhaps if he had been more sensitive to the feelings of his troops and not insisted on constant campaigning and Persianization he would have retained the affection of his troops and not had to resort to these degraded methods. The mutiny at Hyphasis seems to have been nothing more than a refusal of the soldiers to follow a general who was making extreme physical demands upon them for inadequate returns. The mutiny at Opis is more plausibly interpreted as a symptom of the estrangement which had developed between Alexander and his men.[59] The fact remains that Alexander had set up a situation where he had no other choice if he wanted to retain control over his men, and therefore he had to resort to methods of motivation that were more evil and dishonest than he had used early on, and these methods led to problems in the relationship that I am certain would have ended with serious repercussions had Alexander lived long enough to experience them, in fact, by the time Alexander had died, Carney states that he had already “let himself be defeated by his own army,” and goes further to suggest that “if he had to confront Macedonian enemies, he cannot have counted on the discipline of his troops.” Despite the necessity of Alexander’s acquisition of sinister motivational techniques, they would have been detrimental in the long run, because they “poisoned the relationship between the king/commander and his troops— a relationship at the heart of Macedonian military discipline— and thus threatened to compromise future control of the army.” [60] Nils Marthinsen 5.2.03 Annotated Bibliography Reference: (www.wikipedia.com) (Ref Book: The Confessions of Alexander the great) Alexander’s Tactics of Motivation Brunt, P.A. “The Aims of Alexander.” Greece & Rome, series 2, CP 12.2 Alexander the Great. (1965) 205-215. Carney, E. “Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander.” Classical Philology, CP 91 (1996) 19-44. Green, P. Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991. Hammond, N.G.L. Sources for Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Isocrates. Address to Philip. Trans. G. Norlin, Loeb Classical Library. http://luna.cas.usf.edu/%7Emurray/classes/aa/source04.htm, May 2003 Keegan, J. The Mask of Command. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1987. Lock, R. “The Macedonian Army Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great.” Classical Philology, CP 72 ( 1977) 91-107. Nagle, B.D. “The Cultural Context of Alexander’s Speech at Opis.” Transactions of the American Philological Society, CP 126 (1996) 151-172. Pearson, L. The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1988. Robinson, C.A., Jr. “The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great.” The American Historical Review, CP 62 (1957) 326-344. Warry, J. Warfare in the Classical World. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1980. ----------------------- [1] Warry, 1980, 72. [2] Green, 1991, 73. [3] 1996, 29. [4] See Isocrates Address to Philip, chapter 154 [5] Keegan, 1987, 45. [6] Carney, 1996, 25. [7] Arr. I.11; Dio. 17.17. [8] Carney, 1996, 28. [9] Lock, 1977, 91. [10] See Dio. 17.41.4-6; Arr. 2.4.7-11; QC 3.5-6. [11] 1991, 227, for both quotes. [12] Green, 1991, 227. [13] Robinson, 1957, 331 brings up an interesting point about the deification of Alexander that would lessen the validity and if it had been obvious to the Macedonians certainly would have diminished his godliness in their eyes. The deification occurred when the priest welcomed Alexander as “son of Ammon.” Since Alexander had come to Siwah as a pharaoh, the priest was forced to address him this way because according to Egyptian customs, a pharaoh is already the son of a god (Amon-Re). This was not a prophecy, instead it appears Alexander chanced into the title, and exploited the opportunity to help attain his goals. [14] Pearson, 1983, 247. It should be noted that Anaximenes’ credibility is under question and uncertain, lacking corresponding evidence. Although this is an awful and heinous act, I do not count it among Alexander’s sinister motivational techniques as I have explained them here because the act is not directed at his own men. While this may have been an effective technique on his opponents, I do not think cruelty to the enemy would have influenced the army to follow Alexander [15] Green, 1991, 470; Arr. 7.20.1; Plut. Moral. 326b. [16] Nagle, 1996, 167. [17] Green, 1991, 213-214. [18] Green, 232. [19] Green, 1991, 233. [20] The ideas in this paragraph are from Keegan, 1987, 46. [21] Green, 1991, 235. [22]Dio. 17.39.1-3. Diodorus is the only source that mentions this forgery. Other sources such as Arrian (2.14) and Curtius (4.1.7-14) cite the letters from Darius as having an insulting and demanding tone, which could be a cover-up for Alexander’s forgery. [23] Arr. 2.14-15. [24] Green, 1991, 418. [25] Green, 1991, 418-419. [26] Carney, 1996, 22 for all quotes earlier in the paragraph. [27] Warry, 1980, 78. [28] 9.4.16-23. [29] 1996, 27. [30] Carney, 1996, 31. [31] Arr. 6.12.3; Green, 1991, 422. [32] Green, 1991, 419. [33] Tarn vol. 1 page 103, [34] Carney, 1996, 26. [35] Green, 1991, 148. [36] Carney, 1996, 30. [37] Robinson, 1957, 336. Robinson states that these moves were obviously attempts to placate the Iranian nation, and thereby to possibly set in motion motivational tactics to gain their support in the future. Alexander however did not take into account the negative results concerning his motivational effectiveness with the troops he already had. [38] Brunt, 1965, 212. [39] Nagle, 1996, 167. [40] 1996, 30. [41] Carney, 1996, 39. [42] Carney, 1996, 19. [43] Arr. 7.9 [44] 1996, 23. [45] 1996, 24. [46] 1996, 27. [47] For the speech see Plut. Alex. 71.1-4; Just. Epit. 12.11.5-8; D.S. 17.109.2-3; Curt. 10.2.15-29; Arr. An. 7.8.3. The content of the speech is under debate, although the fact that some sort of speech occurred is certain. Nagle asserts that, although some scholars think the speech is just a “rhetorical exercise by Curtius and Arrian…the nucleus of the speech is indeed authentic.” (1996, 164.) [48] Carney, 1996, 31. [49] Nagle, 1996, 164. [50] Arr. 7.9.10. [51] Nagle, 1996, 165. [52] 1996, 166. [53] 1996,42. [54] Hammond, 1993, 183. [55] Arr. 7.9.f40. [56] 1996.41. [57][58]B¤Ä( B Ù Ú '“ ñàת•}•ª•g•R:/h÷9õh0Xj0Jh´|Âh0XjCJH*[pic]OJQJ^JaJmH sH .h´|Âh0Xj6'CJOJQJ]'^JaJmH sH (h´|Âh0XjCJOJQJ^JaJmH sH .h´|Âh0Xj5'CJOJQJ Lock, 1977, 104. The sources for these assertions are Arr. 5. 25-28; Curt. 9.2; Dio. 17. 93-95. [59] Carney, 1996, 36. [60] Lock, 1977, 105. [61] 1996, 37, 41, and 42 respectively for the final quotes.