1918

What were the most important reasons that the spring 1918 offensives did not achieve decisive victory for Germany' At the strategic and operational levels, how are the reasons that you have identified important for military planning today' Based on the required reading of Warfare, Cambridge Illustrated History by Geoffery Parker, pp 298-294, the most important reasons that the Spring 1918 offensives did not achieve a decisive victory for Germany are: Lack of any decisive strategic goal Failure to exploit tactical success while “reinforcing failure” Forming elite units within The German Army, by taking the best soldiers from existing units. Lack of any attempt at a political solution Germany felt it had to win at any cost, while the Allies, with American soldiers entering the conflict in larger numbers, could settle for limited losses and simply delay Germany These reasons are important in military planning today, because now, as then, our knowledge and ways of waging warfare change with new technology, ideas and concepts; however the military objective, to destroy an enemies will and ability to fight must be understood by the politician while the political objective, to successfully defeat an enemy and restore peace and economic trade, must be understood by the military in order to achieve a workable strategic goal. In simple terms, we want to win the war, not just battles. The battles and military operations must create an environment to restore peace and economic trade. If we look at Erich Von Ludendorff, Germany’s Commanding General, his concepts of “Defense in Depth” and “Attack in Depth” were revolutionary in their times and many of the concepts are practiced today, however the question is, what did he hope to achieve with these operational tactics. History shows us his opening offensive was successful, though the allies had realized the benefit of “Defense in Depth” they had not yet developed their operations and had not employed this concept at the tactical level. Strategically the allies understood that packing their front lines with soldiers exposed them to enemy artillery fire, and that holding them out of range, instead of in the front trenches, forced an enemy to advance along a known route of advance into increasing resistance, yet operationally this was not employed, as a result the allies still packed their front trenches with soldiers where the enemy artillery could do considerable damage, and all allied artillery could do was counter battery fire, leaving German troops relatively unscathed. Early successes in Von Ludendorff’s southern operation threatened to divide the allied lines, and caused so much concern that the allies, unknown to the Germans, considered abandoning their positions for a retreat. Had Von Ludendorff envisioned a strategic goal of dividing the allied lines, under the age old doctrine of divide and conquer, then his next move would have been clear, to reinforce the successful operation in the south, to achieve his goal and force a break in the years long stalemate. No such strategic goal existed, and consequently Von Ludendorff threw the last of his reserves into the struggling northern offensive, thereby reinforcing failure while failing to exploit success. The result of this error in tactics, allowed French General Petain to rush in reinforcements and contain the German drive. Von Ludendorf’s forces were further weakened by the formation of the storm trooper units. The cream, of the regular army was taken for these elite units. While this was, revolutionary, by allowing junior officers and even NCO’s to make individual tactical decisions, the fact was this left the entire remainder of the German army as second rate at best. Coupled with the fact that the U.S. forces were beginning to arrive in theatre in large numbers, the Germans were left with an all or nothing situation. By failing to recognize a strategic goal, breaking the allied line, and reinforcing the struggling northern drive, all of Germany’s remaining elite soldiers were killed in the attack or halted. To make matters worse, the discipline that Germany so relied on in it’s Storm troopers, broke down and looting broke out. One might surmise that had these soldiers had a firm and clear strategic goal, their training would have focused them on the objective before the battle. As a result of the time lost, Allied forces, now aware of the axis of the German advance, could now concentrate their resistance and contain the German advance, while destroying the best trained units in the German Army. With their elite units destroyed, the morale for the remainder of the German army collapsed. Hand in hand with the military failure was the lack of any political solution by Germany. After over 5 years of conflict, both sides had become tired of war. On the German side the political solution was handled by the military, Germany’s Von Hindenburg, and Von Ludendorff. Thus, the only solution proposed was a military one. Defeat your enemy by strength of arms. Had a comprehensive political solution been developed a chance would have existed to settle the conflict through diplomacy. What did Germany hope to gain from the war' It is clear that territorial gain was not the primary objective, especially after so many years of stalemate, all the countries involved suffered incredible economic losses. Once a military solution had been achieved, that being the securing of the nations boarders, other solutions could have been sought. With a purely military option there was no end except victory and the only strategic goal being the annihilation of one side or the other. In the 1918 offensive, the allies could afford to give ground to delay the Germans. Germany was limited on resources and on manpower, whilethe untapped and vast resources of America were rapidly building up to play a critical role in replacing Allied losses. Germany could not replace it’s losses. The significance of these lessons today is apparent. Strategically and operationally, explaining the purpose of entering a conflict has to extend all the way down to the NCO level. What goal do we have in mind' What do we want to accomplish and how do we win' A soldier can not take initiative unless he is aware of what outcome is wanted. What use is it to attack a strong point, if by passing it will accomplish the same thing' The military is the ultimate method of projecting national will. Without understanding the Strategic objective of that will plans cannot be made to achieve that objective. With that strategic goal clearly in mind, strategic and operational planning becomes a reality and alternate means of achieving that goal by other than military force may become apparent. Technology can also play a vital role. In WWI the value of the tank was seen only in a single battle, and even then was not recognized. Once the objectives are defined technology can be employed or developed to the maximum effect. Politicians must consult with the military leaders to have an understanding of the military’s capabilities, while military leaders must thoroughly understand the political objectives and needs of the nation so that they may develop the plans and technology necessary to achieve those objectives. The two are linked and must communicate between each other. Without this communication there is the risk of fighting battles to gain ground but have no affect whatsoever on the course of the conflict. In today, world, lack of a strategic or operational objective is magnified by the use of the public media. In World War I the carnage of the battlefield was not realized by the mothers and fathers at home, therefore, the national will was relatively unaffected by the out come of battles. The only people affected immediately were those directly involved. The remainder of the population could be motivated and led with patriotic slogans and signs. Today with the battlefield shown around the globe almost as soon as it happens, the population wants to know why their soldiers, who are their sons and daughters, are dying. Why did we lose these people' For what reason, or said another way, for what goal' This easily translates into a strategic objective and operational plans. Politicians and generals alike are called onto the carpet to justify the objectives and their operations. With the concept of war crimes, affirmed after the defeat of Germany in World War II at the Nuremburg trials, use of military force has come under increased world scrutiny. After the conflict questions of why the conflict happened, and what means were used to avoid it, are sure to arise. In the end, Germany failed to achieve a decisive victory in the spring of 1918 because it did not consider what was needed to achieve a decisive victory, The German Military simply attacked in force where it thought it could win some land, and that is what it did, it won some land of no particular importance to the strategic and operational objective of winning the war. If we do not heed the lessons of history, and define our goals beyond winning the next battle, we run the risk of repeating history and failing. Strategic planning drives operational planning. Without one, the other is virtually impossible to successfully complete and employ. Without both, victory is virtually impossible.