Sharing Intentions--论文代写范文精选

这些成分的经验并不直接。胡塞尔表示,许多这样的预设是文化的默许,有意识的经历面向一个对象,虽然不一定是区别的。例如,母亲可以直接感知她的婴儿是否一直在睡。无论什么程度的意识,直接经验是固有的联系。下面的paper代写范文继续阐述。

Abstract
Infants responsiveness to facial expressions, gestures or sounds and their ability to imitate is not based upon inference, analogy or simulation. It is the direct perception of others and the intentional potentialities of their own body that facilitates understanding others as animate beings like themselves [11]. Mirror neurons are supportive of this view since they provide an intermodal and nonseparable link between action and perception. In the following, we develop a formal model of the concepts introduced in the previous section. We start with the notion of intentionality following the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl .

Intentionality 
According to Husserl, human experience is intentional, i.e. it aims toward something beyond itself. This means that every experienced phenomenon is about, or of something, i.e. it is directed. For instance, the infant’s perception of its mother or the mother’s imagination of her child’s well being are intentionally directed experiences. Moreover, intending something is always accompanied by certain flavours such as bodily sensations or moods but also communal norms, conventions and historical traditions. For instance, the infant might be hungry while perceiving its mother or the mother might be depressed while imagining her child being sick. Those constituents of experience are not directed and thus open. According to Husserl, many of such presupposed meanings are tacitly taken over from our culture and belong to the so-called lifeworld (Lebenswelt).

Directedness
Intentional experiences are directed though not necessarily toward an object that is explicitely distinguished. For instance, the mother can directly perceive her infant as being her child or she can deliberately reason about the amount of time the child kept sleeping last night. No matter what degree of awareness, directed experience is inherently temporal and has a correlational structure. This structure inseparably connects intentional act (noesis) and sense or appearance of an object (noema). Noemata correspond to all anticipations we have about, or of, an object. For instance, in perceiving her infant the mother presupposes it to be her child. She does not explicitely judge but rather implicitly anticipates the senses which constitute the relationship to her child. Noesis is the way or mode in which this anticipation takes place or unfolds. It discloses the noemata of an object in time and so gives meaning to it. For instance, if the mother sees her child crying, the mode, or way she anticipates her child changes toward a stronger bodily tension [4].

Openness
Open intentionality corresponds to Husserl’s lifeworld (Lebenswelt) [9]. The lifeworld is always and already pregiven or presupposed and presents directed experience in a certain light. For instance, bodily sensations such as pain, moods such as happiness, or absorbed skillful activities such as driving and dancing are open, prepredicative and complement directed activities. They only take on an object-directed structure in moments of breakdowns, e.g. I attend to my hurting knee or the strange engine sound. Hence, open intentionality is subpersonal but can potentially be brought to awareness. It forms the horizon or ground of all our activities. Husserl considers intersubjectivity as crucial for the generation and transformation of this presupposed horizon [9]. In the next section we will formalize what happens if an infant’s directedness towards its mother and vice versa becomes embodied or internalized and so a part of the lifeworld. Anticipations can become entangled and thus they can not be separated into directed intentionalities of either mother or infant.

Discussion 
In this section we discuss shared intentionality from a phenomenological perspective. Intersubjectivity or shared intentionality is considered as a constitutive aspect of phenomenal experience. An agent’s experience is analysed in terms of conditions of possibility for manifestation. In other words, we examine the role of intersubjectivity as a condition for animate beings and inanimate objects to become manifest in experience. We divide our discussion of intersubjectivity in two parts. Firstly, we look at face-to-face encounters like the mother-infant interaction presented in the previous section (empathy). Secondly, we examine the disclosure or manifestation of intentional objects precisely as being there for, or accessible, to others (co-subjectivity). We will argue that both dimensions of intersubjectivity can be understood under the umbrella of shared intentionality as developed in the previous section.

Empathy One of the core problems of phenomenological intersubjectivity is the question of how we can have access to other minds [37]. In particular, one of the most intriguing questions is the relation between empathy, the experience of otherness, and our existence in a common or shared world. We shall focus on empathy first. Empathy is a form of social perception enacted in face-to-face encounters and directed toward the experience of the other. Contrary to the argument from analogy3 , empathy is inherently active, direct and non-inferential (cf. section 2). Therefore, perceiving others is not attributing internal mental states inferred from observed external behaviour rather behaviour as perceived is expressive. 

According to Scheler (1954), expressive behaviour is neither perceived as a mere body nor as a hidden psyche but as a unified whole [12]. Furthermore, perceiving others as animate beings is different from perceiving physical objects. The other is given as bodily present or as a lived body (Leib) and not just as a transcendent object (K¨orper). As defined in section 3, empathy is an intentional act that is directed towards the other’s lived experiences. In this dynamic process, subjectivity of the other is disclosed from the second-person perspective. The second-person perspective is one’s own open lived experience directed toward the open and directed lived experience of the other. 

Obviously, this nonseparability of first-person perspective and second-person view is reminiscent of the nonseparability of shared intentionality as introduced in the previous section. Crucially, empathy is not a multi-stage process where one observes mere external behaviour (behaviourism) and then adopts a theoretical stance to infer or compute the internal mental state of the other (cognitivism). As Heiddegger points out, grasping mental states of others is the exception rather than the rule. Under normal circumstances we understand each other well enough through our shared engagement in the common world [38]. 

This preflecitve otherness (alterity) accompanying everyday social encounters is often called primary intersubjectivity [39]. Moreover, social interaction extends toward secondary intersubjectivity [40] or the ability to share attention and intention. Here, interacting partners do not only relate to each other but refer to objects and events around them. In such triadic situations, agents learn to understand other’s intention by means of other’s expressive and contextualized behaviour. For instance, gaze-monitoring indicates that agents seek to verify the attention of the other towards the same thing, e.g.

a hammer lying on a table, as well as to validate whether their intention is understood and thus shared. Hence, intersubjectivity in social perceptions is not always exclusively directed towards others but often mediated through the pragmatic circumstances of our encounters. For instance, when perceiving a hammer and nails, I see those tools as affordances or possible uses which were essentially learned in an intersubjective and pragmatic context. Likewise, perceiving other agents is pragmatic and context-dependent. Here, affordances are possible intentions associated with the perception of the other embedded or situated in pragmatic contexual situations, e.g. 

I perceive my friend as someone who is an expert with tools like hammers and nails. From a developmental perspective, Tomasello (1999) has proposed that we gradually develop our understanding of others starting from (1) animate beings (from birth onwards) over (2) intentional agents (9-12 months) to (3) mental agents (4-5 years) [2]. In the first stage, children solely empathize by perceiving expressive behaviour and so they can distinguish animate from inanimate beings. Approaching their first year of life, expressive behaviour is increasingly experienced as goal-directed and context-dependent. Phenomena such as gazefollowing, joint attention, shared engagement and imitative learning are indicators for children being able to see others as intentional agents. 

Apparently, these stages correspond to primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity. The third stage essentially derives from social interactions in the previous stages. To understand others as mental agents requires to understand that others have beliefs and thoughts differing from one’s own thoughts and beliefs. Children need to engage in discourses in which diverging perspectives emerge, e.g. disagreements, misunderstandings or requests for clarification. Importantly, understanding others as mental agents requires primary and secondary intersubjectivity upon which narrative competency and skilful practical reasoning develops [41]. However, narrative and practical reasoning skills do not involve reference to unobservable, abstract and general entities as postulated by some kind of theory of mind, e.g. TT. Rather such skills are grounded in observable events that take place in the world. The concrete and particular context is of primary importance for the determination of meaning [42].(paper代写)

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