THE EMERGING PICTURE--论文代写范文精选

这个有影响力的地位被广泛了解,接近上述思想并与此混淆。到目前为止,我们认识单词属于语法范畴,并进一步限制这些类别的传统衔接。我不认为我们说话或理解语言，是通过求助于深层结构。下面的essay代写范文进行叙述。

The Universal in Grammar
Addressing a symposium on innate ideas, Chomsky (1967) spoke of his own experience in the study of natural languages and their grammars, found it substantiating a view of language familiar from the classical grammarians, and this view in turn justified in the contemporary philosophies of Descartes and Leibniz. On the first point, he argued that overt similarities between sentences are a poor guide to how we understand them, and stressed the distinction between this 'surface structure' and the 'deep structure' which conforms to the grammatical rules of the language. For Chomsky the competence of a speaker rests on knowledge of these rules, even though such knowledge may only be implicit; and the rules in turn reflect an innate capacity which extends also to the laws of logical reasoning, and hence the commitment to philosophy called rationalist. 

This influential position is widely familiar, and falls close enough to the ideas introduced above to occasion confusion between them. All I have claimed so far is that we recognize words as belonging to syntactical categories, and further constraints on how these categories are conventionally articulated. I do not think that we speak or understand speech by recourse to deep structures in Chomsky's original sense, for people do on occasion violate the conventions, whether for emphasis, in disdain, or in an effort to express unusual or complex ideas. It is also the case that Chomsky's early transformational generative grammar did not live up to his expectations; that on into the 1980s he turned to 'government and binding;' and when in the following decade interest turned to thematic roles, he tempered the claims for his research, envisaging a long road ahead. Rather obscured in this way is the fact that we can now discern with some confidence what is truly universal in language on a world scale, and the hard fact that this preserves nothing of the subject-predicate form of classical grammar, or, therefore, the venerable Scholastic metaphysics that motivated it. Instead, what is confirmed is the truly ancient distinction between roots and complements, so that the general form of a linguistic constraint governs how they may combine. With this comes a new kind of insight, that the general forms of sentences are given by the order of the root elements, which varies with word-order (Green & Vervaeke, 1997).

Nature and Culture
Here is strong evidence in favor of the contextual mind, for the idea of the complement is the semantic trace with which we started. Secondly, in Jakobson's classic study of aphasias we have substantial evidence that the processing of language encompasses two distinct aspects in sequence, and this view is sufficiently substantiated by Townsend and Bever (2001) and confirmed in experiment by Hagoot (2003). Evidently there is always a question of sequencing in the background, and one can characterize the general form of a language as a convention governing how this natural sequence is articulated with the root syntactical categories through a conventional expectation of word-order. 

Note the subtle but fundamental divergence from Chomsky and all rationalist linguistics: this convention is not a set of rules, but rather an adaptation of a natural capacity by association with syntactical categories. Hence all one can now strictly refer to innate knowledge is categories themselves, and these then fall into place with the critical philosophy of Kant, and not Descartes or Leibniz! Indeed, when Chomsky (1967: 238-9) actually came to Descartes, he cited his appeal to a Platonic idea of mathematical form, so any application to language can only follow if mathematics is regarded as a language, the position taken only recently by Wittgenstein. Not surprisingly, nothing today survives of Chomsky's early ambition for a specifically Cartesian linguistics.

Instead, a new significance is found in the dimension of time. Kant admitted time as the only dimension of psychological phenomena, but to ill-defined for further study; and Bergson (1889) as the dimension in which the mind may intervene through action in the flow of events. Here time emerges in a much more abstract sense as the generic independent variable of all our learning and experimentation. In view of what is now known of language, one can say that a human culture entails a conventional sequence of syntactical roots which then patterns the universal independent variable for a specific domain of linguistic discovery, and expression.

Feed-Forward
Not since Skinner has a theory of language been so closely integrated with a theory of knowledge, and now addressing precisely and substantially the failure of the conditioning paradigm. Here Domjan, Cusato & Villarreal (2000) offer the important concept of feedforward as a general mechanism providing physiological readiness for generic types of activity. Note the powerful implication that action passes from the general to the specific, as by the binding of categories under specific circumstances and contingencies. Anatomy provides for a typing of activities through the utilities of specific organs and limbs, and there then is an obvious parallel between the articulation of parts of the body in physical action and the articulation of 'parts of speech' in language! Feed-forward effects a state of readiness, but this is not the same as the 'disposition' of the philosophers. 

There is a subtle divergence here from classical learning theories in the implication that we do not learn behaviors, but rather options for behavior, a view which importantly opens onto philosophy of freedom. Consistently, where a restricted ranges of performances are required, as in work settings, they are bound in roles, which then bracket the feed-forward required, possibly at risk to general fitness and health. It follows that any social construction of knowledge must proceed indirectly, through roles and the rules which govern them, which is much how the matter appears in law, in the sociology of Durkheim (1895. 1912), and after him in social anthropology. All of this is of no little practical significance in life, for stress and the hazards it brings is found above all associated with changes in the roles an individual is expected to perform.

Semantic Context
Applying the logic of feed-forward to the view of language processing that now emerges from Jakobson, Townsend and Bever (2001) and Hagoot (2003), one may say that there is a semantic feed-forward by association, whether from the verbal stimulus or the cognitive context of one's will to speak. This establishes a semantic context, outlining what the conversation or address is about, within which the choice of words then traces a path. This purposeful view of language now contrasts rather strongly with the currently authoritative position of Bernard J. Baars (1988, 1997), which relies rather on the logic of feedback. 

Baars has consciousness in the guise of an executive authority equipped with a 'global work-space,' modeled on the 'short-term memory' 13 or 'working memory' of earlier research. In place of a semantic context he has various associative networks recruited to the current task, but remaining unconscious, which then leaves consciousness as his primary interest awkwardly under-explained. The notion of associative feed-back to the current focus of attention serves in the model to cover the transfer of short-term to long-term memory, but the dynamic and neural supports remain unclear. 

More to the point, Baars is palpably riding on a long line of research deriving from the classic study of Jacob von Uexküll (1938), which introduced the funktionkreis, whence the concept entered cybernetics to become the familiar feed-back. Uexküll's research ranged from muscle tone and biological rhythms (Uexküll, 1904a,b. 1905) through positional cues (lokalzeichen) in sensation, to the lived world of an organism (Uexküll, 1909), so that he can justly be claimed as a pioneer of the contextualizing mind. The funktionkreis comes in Uexküll's last work, which founded theoretical biology, in which perspective it states the theme of selfregulation. Yet one must allow that it enters at a much lower level of organization than Baars' concepts. In respect of the intelligence called sensory-motor, feedback is required to maintain balance, and again to adjust the frame of reference for displacement of the visual field, so that stationary and moving entities can be properly distinguished. 

This is not a trivial problem in physics, and indeed exercised Galileo and Newton at some length; only once it was resolved could the traditional notion of impulse be clarified as momentum. Much closer to Baars' concerns, C.S. Peirce famously rejected the reflex arc model on which behaviourism was founded as inadequate to psychological understanding, citing something like the 'unconscious inference' of Helmholtz (Hayeck, 1968: 312&n7), which he later clarified as 'background knowledge' supporting judgements of what is improbable (Popper, 1963: 240). Baars (2002) would recover this via feed-back from the store of experience that has lost its autobiographical roots, and is then surprised to find that what emerges is always a personal context, relevant to current concerns. Still relying on a dynamic of feed-back he then runs into a contradiction between positioning and sequence in language processing: "Even the role of consciousness in learning could be a consequence of voluntary attention. Thus conscious access to selfsystems of the prefrontal cortex might enable the other functions" (Baars, 2002: 51). Here Baars retrieves the personal context at the expense of starting the feed-back loop where the linguistic signal-train terminates, which is simply far too late for the comprehension of conversation as we know it.（essay代写)

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