Binding:Contextual Philosophy of Mind--论文代写范文精选

发现精神生活的现象学，这是一致的,它不是一个领域的原始主体性，每个心中充满自我和他人的存在。解决精确的语义问题,威尼康特提出了一个过渡对象的第三类,作为文化的代表。下面的essay代写范文进行详述。

Abstract
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) confronted the binding problem in syntax, the assignment of variables to establish reference and semantics. Here syntax is an insufficient guide, and they appealed to thematic roles (e.g. agent, patent, instrument) as an additional semantic guide. Thematic roles share critical features with propositional attitudes such as belief and desire, in that they demonstrate what Quine (1960: 141ff) called referential opacity. To say that 'she intended the insult she delivered' is not quite so say 'she intended the insult he suffered,' for the meaning of 'the insult' may not be transferable between the contexts concerned. Now these propositional attitudes are just what Fodor (1981) took to supply semantic values to mental states, and the problem of the ambiguous interpretability of semantics in general (Gödel's (1929) theme, from his doctoral thesis) is just a generalization of this phenomenon. Thus in comprehending a conversation, one must consistently distinguish one's own meanings in speaking from those discerned in hearing. Here we return to the problem posed at the outset, with the interesting implication that the ancient impasse in philosophy of mind was occasioned by semantics not adequate to natural language! There is now an expectation that we have risen above such difficulties through the return to ordinary language in Analytical philosophy, but thematic roles are not a conception due to this development.

Psychoanalysis after Freud
It is a consistent finding of the phenomenology of mental life that it is not a realm of pristine subjectivity as one might well suppose following Hume: rather each mind is peopled by the presence of self and others (Jacobson, 1954: Angyal, 1965; Bianchedi et al, 1984; Sandler & Sandler, 1998). Addressing the semantic problem precisely, Winnicott (1951) proposed a third category of what he called transitional objects, palpably modeled on the archaeologist's artifacts, taken as representatives of the culture. In view here is the principal yield of psychoanalysis after Freud, starting with Sandor Ferenczi's (1932) concern with 'confusion of tongues,' and developing in the trend known as 'object relations theory,' with special mention for the 'Middle Group' or Independents like Winnicott for their recognition of culture. There is an interesting convergence here with Lacan's (1953) view of language or more generally the Symbolic as the third psychical presence, although André Green (1983) still saw reason to leave Lacan's orbit for the middle ground.

At issue is just the problem of interpretation raised above: 'the insult' can be interpreted from the point of view of speaker, hearer, or the conventions of the language used. Lacan was arguably a conventionalist in the tradition of Poincaré, and accordingly overestimated the dialectical politics of knowledge in proportion as he underestimated the contributions of creative individuals and historical events to language. The theory I pose here as semantic containment was perhaps suggested by Wilfred Bion (1965, 1967), who drew Green's interest, and dared to propose an instinct for knowledge which then makes its own contribution to the semantic capacities of mind. Also suggestive is Jacobson's (1954) concern with the representation of others, but he remains within the confines of representational theories of mind. Here, indeed, lies the rub, for representational theories assume by default that one can represent others and their speech without semantic hazard, when Quine's (1960) analysis shows otherwise. Once mere representation gives way to semantic attribution, the texture of mind taken over uncritically from the old psychology of association must give way to coherent semantic presences, and a phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Existential Linguistics
Meeting the impasse in the philosophy of language is the recently rediscovered linguistics of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836), posing language not a weltanschauung, a display or presentation of the world, but as a weltansicht, a 'point of view' (Cassirer, 1944: 120-1), which can interestingly be parsed as an existential position or situation. This concept meets the very contemporary concern with society as a collective facing ecological hazards and constraints on resources, seeking sustainable solutions. 

Such is arguably the situation in which language must have evolved, but our grave conceptual difficulty arises from the fact that this process is conceived in terms of the expression of genes in the development of upright posture, the larynx and associated neural capacities, severed by the mind/body problem from considerations of meaning! To say that a process is situated existentially is, in the terms of neurology, to require that it is oriented (to time, place, and person, as required in a psychiatric examination). Oriention in this sense is evidently integral to the arousal and continuity consciousness (Luria, 1973); certainly, an experience that is 'disoriented' marks a discontinuity. Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) showed that the 'now' of this oriention is the moment of stimuli arriving in the cortex, significantly later than the reception of stimuli in the sense-organs. Reaction-times must be managed for optimum performance, in the arts as in sport, not to mention combat, so one cannot say these are exclusively modern concerns.

The Longest of Revolutions
I think it no coincidence that the brain was described as the seat of consciousness by Alcmaeon of Crotona, in same era in which Hippocrates registered an impact of gymnastic trainers in medicine, through their innovative ways with diet and 9 regimen. From this time medicine developed independently of philosophy, and the challenging implications have yet to register there. Not only does consciousness awareness lag behind the flow of events, any conscious intervention must be further anticipated to allow for the inevitable delay in implementing any muscular reaction. It follows directly that an organism can ill afford to simply react to what it experiences: for any fine command of process it must learn to act with or in the flow of events, by anticipation of its course. 

Fine command in just this sense becomes a matter of life or death in any encounter between predator and prey, so that there is a presumption that the requisite capacity evolved in animals as soon as there was the capacity to support it. As always in such matters, the underlying capacity is harder to analyse and explain. The strong statement of the case would be that the primary object of cognition is not the static object, but rather the impulse or momentum that moves it. There is indeed evidence that the visual cortex detects in the first instance movement rather than static form, but movement is not an impulse or momentum. To make good sense of this one must dare to look far lower on the scale of organization in life, to the coelenterates like sea anemones near the root of the Animal Kingdom. They live immersed in the sea, and are constantly buffeted by its currents, and are sensitive to touch: here sensitivity emerges already in the flow of things. Appreciating this, it is less surprising that creatures as primitive as insects are seen to fly. Looking on from natural history to natural philosophy, we have yet to make good sense of what the ancient Stoics meant by following the Way of Nature, or what inspired and informed the cryptic remarks we have preserved from Herakleitos on flow and process.

Kant, not Kantian
Against this enigmatic background we find that Kant in his Critique presented understanding in the guise of a 'transcendental unity of apperception' which draws together diverse experiences into a concept. The passage in which Kant analyzes this process (A103-110) is notably difficult, and was completely rewritten for the second edition (B130-6), despite which Norman Kemp Smith gave the original pride of place in his translation, and it is still quoted in commentary (e.g. Brook, 2004: 3.3). Turning for once to his considered position, the concept attained in understanding is presented as an identity, which interestingly touches the logical difficulty with abstracts and inclusive classes noted at the outset. 

There is good reason, then, for speaking of a transcendental unity, keeping reference to the individual experiences in a distinct register. Attending simply to the phenomena involved, one can say that a range of appearances in time is resolved into an identity grasped in a single moment. Concerning the phenomenology of time, Kant's substantial discussion came in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, where he places it as the dimension of the 'inner sense,' and wholly unsuitable for scientific analysis (Brook, 2004: 3.1). Yet for this very reason one can now suppose that this subjective time stands for the 10 unknown variable in a type-2 learning situation. I mean this directly: that the time of puzzlement ends precisely as the dimension of time is resolved into the continuity of a procedure whereby the puzzle is solved. It follows, tellingly, that solving a type-2 problem induces a discontinuity in subjective time, and indeed, the mind typically relaxes back into the perspective in which the puzzle appeared, to pick up the continuity of endevour or interest in which it arose. Here is phenomenology of the inner sense of time exceeding what Husserl (1905) achieved, specifically through admitting discontinuity, and thereby a nontrivial topological complexity in the continuity of thought.

Time and Variations
The problem was confronted earlier in science as Newton puzzled over the partial and unresolved findings of Kepler, Galileo and Descartes, and the sorely neglected fact about Newton's work is that it was not founded on calculus as now understood, but on what he called the method of fluxions, in which the physical variable of interest is always presented as a function of time. It is again not the case that Newton achieved the decisive conceptual break-through: the law of gravitation as he gave it was familiar to Hooke, Halley and Wren. Newton assumed Kepler's orbits, and derived the law from their geometry, but he did not solve the hard problem of taking the law as an hypothesis, and predicting the orbits from it: rather, he covered his weakness by refusing hypotheses! In sum, Newton did not solve the type-2 problem, because he failed to transpose the unknown variable out of the dimension of time! The difficulty lived on, of course, to become known as the 'inverse problem,' found soluble only with the calculus of variations developed by Leonard Euler. In the calculus of variations one abstracts from the function sought to a function type or functional, in which the constants specifying the function sought are replaced by variables. The desired function is then found by a procedure of variation in these parameters, whence the name of the method. It is thus correct to say that the classical model of problem solving in the more substantial sense is just the calculus of variations.（essay代写)

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