Conceptual metaphor – an Objectification based typology--论文代写范文精选

在许多方面基于记忆的隐喻对应本体隐喻,这些隐喻是基于文化的存在，建立对象之间的层次关系,在这些水平的各种特性属于其概念。下面的essay代写范文进行详述。

Abstract
It has been shown that internal inconsistencies in CMT can be resolved by postulating the existence of pre-metaphorical structure of abstract concepts. Objectification Theory proposes that the domain of physical objects is the source of this structure. Concepts would acquire structure through being objectified, a basic conceptual process where an abstract target domain is mapped onto the broadly defined domain of physical objects. Szwedek suggests that other types of metaphorical processes depend on objectification and are hierarchically related to it. Consequently, he puts forward a three level metaphor typology that includes metonymy-based, concrete-to-abstract and abstract-to-abstract metaphors (Szwedek 2011). These levels represent directionality of mappings.

Metonymy based metaphor 
The first metaphor type is metonymy-based metaphor. It accounts for mappings between two concrete concepts such as “Captain Thelwal is a perfect iceberg”. This type of mapping involves a metonymic relation rather than metaphorical one because we do not compare the whole of Captain Thelwal to an iceberg but rather his/her personality to a feature of the source domain (Szwedek 2011). According to Objectification Theory a non-metonymic concrete-to-concrete mapping would be impossible because it would boil down to the OBJECT IS ANOTHER OBJECT statement. Such a statement, Szwedek argues, not only isn't a metaphor but also cannot literally be true as objects 76 cannot be other objects. 

Thus, he infers, it is impossible for the domain of objects to become the target domain of any metaphor (2011). Metonymy-based metaphors correspond in many ways to ontological metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), which were renamed by Lakoff and Turner as The Great Chain Metaphors (1989). These metaphors are based on a cultural model of the Great Chain of Being which establishes a hierarchical relation between objects, plants, animals, humans, and (in some versions) a deity, and attributes various features to concepts at these levels. Objects are assigned structural properties and behaviour, plants – natural, animals – instinctual, humans – higher level cognition and behaviour. The Great Chain metaphors highlight specific features of concepts in a mapping (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 1997), which makes them essentially metonymic. Metaphorical expressions such as “Captain Thelwal is a perfect iceberg” and “She has an eagle eye for details” would be classified as Great Chain (ontological) metaphors in CMT and metonymy-based metaphors in Objectification. In the broader framework, metonymy-based metaphors are more complex than metonymies, which are the easiest to comprehend type of figurative language (Van Herwegen et al. 2013).

Concrete-to-abstract metaphor Next on the complexity scale are concrete-to-abstract metaphors, a key component of Objectification Theory. In fact, Szwedek (2011) defines all metaphors of this type as objectification metaphors. Concrete-to-abstract metaphors are mappings where an abstract concept is understood as an object. For instance, when talking about thoughts we usually describe them in terms reserved for physical objects: “my mind is in pieces”, “I have to gather my thoughts”, “I'll toss you an idea or two” and so on. Szwedek suggests that the reason for this should be sought in evolution. Objectification answered the human need to account for increasingly abstract phenomena. 

In other words, when humans needed to conceptualise concepts more complex and less tangible than “apple” and “branch” they used the existing mental representation system to do so. Because the system was not developed for entertaining abstract thoughts these new types of concepts were processed in the object framework. “The new abstract entities were identified, con- 77 ceptualized, and verbalized in terms of the only world that had been known to our ancestors, the world of physical objects” (Szwedek 2011: 345). Interestingly, in this respect Objectification Theory is in agreement with Casasanto's exaptation hypothesis (2010) which also states that abstract concepts are understood through a conceptual system that developed to cope with the physical world. However, while Szwedek identifies the domain of physical objects as the most basic source domain, Casasanto and many others (see Bloom ed. 1999; Gentner et al. 2002; Talmy 1983) say that ultimately conceptualisation relies on space. The space versus objects as the ultimate source domain debate will be analysed at in more detail in the following chapters on conceptual metaphor in gesture.

Abstract-to-abstract metaphors Metaphorical mappings from an abstract source to an abstract target are the most frequently discussed in cognitive literature. Papers investigating the conceptualisation of war in the media (Fabiszak 2007) or metaphoric expressions in music (Zawilinska 2013) almost exclusively focus on metaphoric mappings of this type. In CMT research these metaphors are usually classified as structural because the structure of the source domain is mapped onto the target domain in accordance with the Invariance Principle. For instance, conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR should actually be represented as STRUCTURE OF AN ARGUMENT IS STRUCTURE OF WAR (Szwedek 2011) because the mapping applies the structural properties of war to arguments. Participants in a discussion are described as opponents, arguments are weapons, beliefs are trenches that should be defended etc. (for a more detailed analysis see Lakoff and Johnson 2003). 

However, because neither war nor arguments have the properties of physical objects, they are classified as abstract concepts. Abstract concepts do not have preexisting structure, therefore for this mapping to be possible both target and source domains need to be objectified first. Szwedek also classifies orientational metaphors in the abstract-to-abstract category. Orientational metaphors are mappings between concepts that stand in some spa- 78 tial relation to each other. Again, because of their lack of physical structure orientation is not a natural property of abstract concepts (Szwedek 2011). Therefore, concepts in orientational metaphors need to undergo objectification before they can acquire spatial properties. Metaphors of states such as HAPPY IS UP in Objectification Theory are classified as abstract-to-abstract because, as Szwedek argues, the word “happy” stands for the state of happiness, and states are routinely conceptualised as objects. Fictive motion expressions such as “The line ran across the yard” are not categorised as metaphorical in this sense because movement is a natural property of physical objects.


Objectification and the resulting metaphor typology can be seen as steps towards developing a coherent account of conceptual metaphor as a cognitive process. In order to play a non-trivial role in developing an account of mental representation objectification needs to be shown as a process that is not only possible, but also plausible. It is also important to demonstrate whether Objectification provides a more complete account of categorisation than existing theories. For this purpose let me hypothesise briefly how objectification could operate as a function of the cognitive system. According to prototype theory, human beings have the capacity to identify features of the phenomena they encounter. Using those features we are able to compare newly encountered objects and assign them to one (or more) categories. 

Any time a certain phenomenon is encountered and categorised, it is stored as an exemplar of the category. We are able to form prototypical representations on the basis of these features and exemplars. These representations are basically abstractions from experience, and do not have to resemble any one exemplar of the category. For instance, we may have come in contact with a variety of dogs of different shapes and sizes, but the prototypical idea of a dog would be a mixture of their individual features. This theory regarding the structure of mental representation received support from empirical studies (Rosch 1973, 1999; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 2011) and computational mod- 79 els (Chandler 1991). Prototype theory has two consequences for conceptual metaphor. First, it reinforces the connection between concept creation and categorisation processes. Second, the model is feature-based and concepts are composed of feature sets. 

As we know, metaphorical mappings are parallels drawn between features of two (or more) concepts. One of the arguments against the classical representation theory was that it was impossible to construct sets of necessary and sufficient conditions (features) for any given category because concepts can be characterised by an infinite number of features. For instance, dogs can be described as furry (or not), barking (or not), four legged (unless they are not), heavy, subject to gravitation, alive and so on. In principle, it is possible to draw an infinite number of parallels between any two concepts. Any two things are infinitely similar. Consequently, all mappings are theoretically possible, but not all mappings occur. Because CMT alone seems unable to explain this let us look at concept creation and metaphoric processes according to Objectification Theory. Our minds developed in a way that makes us proficient in dealing with concrete concepts. 

Concrete concepts are learned faster and remembered better than abstract concepts (Casasanto et al. 2001; Fliessbach et al. 2006; Kounios and Holcomb 1994). In the embodied cognition framework understanding abstract concepts is assumed to be grounded in concrete experience. However, neuroimaging studies show that abstract concepts primarily activate the amodal (supramodal) cortex and not the unimodal (sensorimotor) cortex (Whatmough et al. 2004). The sensorimotor cortex is responsible for processing sensory and motor input (vision, touch, smell etc.), whereas the supramodal cortex is a region primarily devoted to the integration of various types of input (Kounios and Holcomb 1994). Patterns of activation recorded during comprehension tasks are different for abstract and concrete concepts, although there is some overlap (Whatmough et al. 2004). Objectification Theory explains this distinction by stating that abstract concepts are metaphorically understood in terms of physical objects. Abstract concepts do not need to be directly grounded in sensory experience because they are objectified. Thus, they are represented primarily in the supramodal cortex. I believe that the gradual metaphorization of abstract concepts reflected in Szwedek's metaphor typology resembles the notion of chained metonymies, or metonymies that require multiple conceptual shifts (Hilpert 2007: 77). In Objectification 80 Theory an abstract concept acquires the properties of a physical object including structure and orientation. The objectified concept may then undergo further abstract-to-abstract metaphorization. 

As a result, any abstract concept has physical properties like orientation and structure that permit further metaphorization. Beyond that abstract concepts may be described in terms of other concepts (both abstract and concrete), and temporarily acquire features as a result. These processes constitute additional steps in metaphorical chaining. Objectification Theory provides an interesting perspective on the development of abstract concept understanding. Rather than postulating metaphorization as a separate conceptual process, it fits in with evolutionary models (Casasanto 2010) that propose a common mechanism for conceptualisation. Objectification Theory gives a resounding “yes” as the answer to whether abstract concepts resemble dinosaur feathers in that they evolved from a general cognitive capacity through exaptation. Szwedek (2002) does not focus on providing a model or explanation of the mechanism through which abstract concepts acquire object properties. However, Objectification Theory appears to be uniquely suited to both empirical, and computational analysis which will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.（essay代写)

51Due网站原创范文除特殊说明外一切图文著作权归51Due所有；未经51Due官方授权谢绝任何用途转载或刊发于媒体。如发生侵犯著作权现象，51Due保留一切法律追诉权。
更多essay代写范文欢迎访问我们主页 www.51due.com 当然有essay代写需求可以和我们24小时在线客服 QQ:800020041 联系交流。-X（essay代写)