Objectification--论文代写范文精选

CMT这个规则已经多次引用，体现在认知假设的抽象思维，是基于具体的物理经验,一种观点似乎逐渐形成一种共识,理解抽象的概念是基于原则概念隐喻。下面的essay代写范文进行详述。

Abstract
It has been shown in the previous chapter that the abstract/concrete distinction is both an important and neglected issue within the framework of conceptual metaphor. Researchers agree that in metaphorical expressions the abstract is usually described in terms of the concrete (Gibbs et al. 2004; Gibbs 1996). However, it is unclear where to draw the distinction between those two concept types; there is also no conclusive answer regarding the nature of the abstract-concrete spectrum on which conceptual metaphor supposedly operates. 

If understanding abstract concepts is, as CMT suggests, metaphorical then surely it is important to define the criteria on which we classify a concept into one of those two categories. Szwedek's Objectification Theory (2000a, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008) sets out to do just that. The development of metaphor and the development of abstract thinking have been compared before (Casasanto 2010; McGlone 2001). If we consider metaphor a type of categorisation during which some phenomenon is categorised in terms of an- 69 other, more concrete concept it is easy to draw parallels between metaphorical and abstract thinking. In both cases the more abstract is understood in terms of the concrete. In CMT this rule has been referenced multiple times (Gibbs 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Boroditsky 2000; Matlock et al. 2003). Embodied and situated cognition assume abstract thinking is based on concrete physical experience (Fogassi and Ferrari 2007; Semin and Smith 2007), a view that is supported by mirror-neuron accounts of language and cognition (Arbib 2006b; Fogassi and Ferrari 2007), connectionist models (Thomas and Mareschal 2001), psycholinguistic and cognitive linguistic research (Szwedek 2010; Reddy 1979; Boroditsky 2000), computational models of language (Elman 1990) and, more recently, gesture studies (Chui 2011). 

A consensus seems to be emerging that understanding abstract concepts is based on principles resembling conceptual metaphor. CMT (Lakoff 1987, 1993; Gibbs 1996) proposed a number of solutions to the abstract conceptualisation problem, but is questioned on as many issues as it purports to resolve. For instance, in light of the studies above it is reasonable to claim that an abstract concept such as LOVE is understood in terms of a concrete concept JOURNEY in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. However, this account remains plausible only until we ask on what grounds is JOURNEY considered to be more concrete than LOVE. It does not necessarily fulfil the “directly experiencec” criterion posed by Gibbs (1996) because without a very specific definition it is difficult to claim that we experience a journey more directly than any emotion. 

We also cannot intuitively claim that a journey is “more readily imagined” (Fliessbach et al. 2006) than love. All in all, journey as a concept seems rather abstract in itself. Perhaps this metaphor could be described as a less-abstract-to-more-abstract type of mapping. This perspective could have interesting consequences for conceptual metaphor theory should CMT choose to address it. Instead we are left with a vague assertion that concreteness of the source domain is greater than that of the target. In light of the evidence for the advantages of concreteness reviewed in section 2.6.3. one needs to wonder whether understanding an abstract concept like love through another abstract concept such as journey makes psychological sense. Would it not be more beneficial for humans to base their understanding of abstract concepts on the most concrete concept possible? In this sense the most useful reference in terms of concreteness is a physical object. Yet, in CMT literature the metaphor X IS AN 70 OBJECT can hardly be found among a plethora of proposed mappings resembling the one discussed above. Nevertheless, in his Objectification Theory Szwedek (2011) makes a compelling argument that the X IS AN OBJECT metaphor is the most basic and widespread conceptual mapping.

Definition of objectification In his work on Objectification Theory Szwedek insists that the term 'objectification' is applied in consonance with its meaning as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, that is “action of objectifying, or condition of being objectified; an instance of this, an external thing in which an idea, principle, etc. is expressed concretely (...) To make into, or present as, an object” (Simpson and Weiner eds. 1989). 

However, it becomes apparent that throughout his papers the term is applied specifically with reference to the ontological metaphorization from concrete to abstract domains as a fundamental type of cognitive operation. In other words, he proposes that before any other metaphorical operations can be performed, concepts are coded as belonging to the domain of physical objects, and only as a consequence can be further described in terms of ontology, orientation, and structure. This approach is contrasted to what is proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (2003) in the latest edition of their book, namely that ontological, orientational, and structural metaphors10 stand on a par with one another in that that they are applied simultaneously, and are of equal importance. Szwedek (2004) argues that orientation and structure are not independent properties in themselves. Structure and orientation are properties of objects. Therefore, "before any entity can be assigned structure or orientation, it must be objectified first" (Szwedek 2004: 121). 

As mentioned above, CMT identifies three types of metaphor: ontological, structural and orientational and puts them in a relation of equality rather than hierarchy. Objectification Theory arranges these metaphor types on a continuum because, as Szwedekpoints out, structure is a property that only physical objects can have, and orientation can only be identified in relation to objects that have certain structure. This model identifies objectification as fundamental type of metaphorization, allowing structure and orientation to be assigned in agreement with the inheritance of properties hypothesis (De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981). By proposing this solution Szwedek implicitly answers a common question regarding the status of metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon, namely whether metaphor is an online process in language understanding or rather an ontogenetic process related to concept creation (Gibbs et al. 1997). Objectification Theory clearly sways towards the latter view, although I would suggest that the way concepts are initially created must have an online influence on general comprehension, particularly in view of the dynamic representation system hypothesis (Beer 2000).

Explanatory value of Objectification Theory It could be claimed that proposing an additional basic step in the conceptualisation process of abstract concepts is unnecessary as there exists a broader, intuitive rule stating that "target domains tend to be more vague and incomplete than the source domains" (Gibbs 1996: 311). In other words, we already suspect that abstract concepts are understood in concrete terms, therefore an additional explanation mechanism is redundant. However, as I will try to show in this and the following chapters, Objectification Theory constitutes a valuable addition to CMT because it increases its falsifiability, introduces constraints on possible metaphorical events and helps generate testable hypotheses rather than post-hoc justifications. 

Arguments against the Conceptual Metaphor Theory have been reviewed in detail in the first chapter of this thesis. Critics of CMT have long taken issue with the apparent lack of constraints on metaphorical mappings between source and target domains. This lack of rules means that in principle CMT allows any mapping between two concepts, provided that the target domain can be considered less concrete than the source domain. This kind of freedom has far reaching consequences: because all map- 72 pings are considered equally possible CMT is unable to predict which linguistic expressions generated from a given conceptual metaphor will be judged as infelicitous by language users. 

It is also unable to explain those felicity judgements. By introducing Objectification Theory, which only allows certain mappings, and assumes that inheritance of features follows a hierarchical structure (i.e. object metaphor receives priority, then it is possible to map structural features followed by orientation) we fulfil the requirement for pre-metaphoric structure voiced by CMT critics (Vervaeke and Kennedy 2004; Glucksberg 2001). In experiments based on the Objectification-CMT paradigm it is possible to predict certain aspects of feature mapping, and test the accuracy of these predictions empirically. Objectification, as evidenced by the increased salience of object features in abstract verbal metaphors (Jelec and Jaworska 2011) could well be interpreted as the source of the type of pre-metaphorical structure that Glucksberg, Vervaeke and Kennedy found wanting in CMT. 

The first chapter of this thesis reports that the Invariance Principle (Lakoff 1990, 1993) was introduced into CMT to account for feature inheritance. In its strong version the IP states that all mappings are partial; metaphorical mapping preserves image schematic structure; and all abstract level inferences arise via the Invariance Hypothesis. Turner, who was also involved in the development of the Invariance Principle (Lakoff and Turner 1989), formulated this rule similarly in his own work, but with more emphasis on retaining target domain structure. Metaphorical mappings “(...) import as much image schematic structure from the source as is consistent with the target” (Turner 1990: 254). Invariance Principle significantly increased the explanatory power of CMT with regard to felicitous and infelicitous mappings. It also left the theory with some issues that Objectification Theory proposes to resolve. Invariance Principle relies on the assumption that structure is a property of both target and source domains. However, if we assume that structure of concepts is grounded in embodied experience, and abstract concepts relate to this experience through metaphorization, abstract target domains by definition cannot have pre-metaphoric structure. 

Therefore, CMT either needs to add another process through which abstract concepts acquire structure, or reject the notion that the structure of the target domain influences the mapping. Since Lakoff himself presented an overwhelming amount of evid- 73 ence that the structure of target domains constrains possible mappings (1993) we are left with the first choice. Objectification applies before other metaphorical processes (although, given the assumption that it is a type of metaphoric operation, retaining the original term “pre-metaphoric level” seems problematic). Objectification Theory postulates that concepts are fundamentally understood in terms of physical objects. If abstract concepts are understood in terms of concrete objects before they undergo further processing, objectification as a process can be considered the source of abstract target domain structure before metaphorization. Another set of difficulties outlined in the first chapter of this thesis is associated with CMT as an empirical research framework. 

To summarise briefly: conceptual metaphors are incomplete mappings of features between the target and the source domain (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Pérez Hernández 2011). They are considered incomplete because not every feature of the target domain can be mapped onto the source domain. Also, it is not assumed that abstract concepts are understood via one prevailing mapping, but rather constitute a part of a variety of conceptual metaphors. For instance, in the expression “I quickly fell in and out of love with him” the mapping used for describing love is LOVE IS A CONTAINER, yet it is equally acceptable to use the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor and say “we encountered some obstacles on our way to happiness”. Outside of the assertion that the structure of the target and source domains must be preserved CMT does not offer tools to predict which conceptual metaphors are useful, and which mappings within these metaphors are plausible, or considered “correct”. For instance, there is no way to predict which of the mappings generated by the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor will be considered acceptable, well structured or easy to interpret by language users and which will not. 

We intuitively know that out of the two conceptual metaphors LOVE IS A JOURNEY is acceptable while LOVE IS A POTATO (“ex. “I peeled my way into his heart”) is doubtful at best. CMT is unable to predict such judgements. Even with the addition of the Invariance Hypothesis, CMT cannot predict that “this relationship is going nowhere” is a felicitous mapping, but saying “I made the reservation for our future together” is less so. Although Objectification Theory in its current form does not make explicit predictions about mapping ac- 74 ceptability, it can be used to design testable hypotheses regarding mapping felicity in a way that CMT cannot. It is relatively easy for CMT to generate post hoc explanations of novel metaphoric expressions. Discovering a phrase that does not adhere to any known conceptual metaphor does not disprove CMT. Anomalous or novel metaphoric language can be explained away as a discovery of a new conceptual metaphor underlying the expression. This makes it effectively impossible to produce linguistic evidence against CMT. Empirically-minded sciences usually require theories to produce testable hypotheses and the theories themselves to be falsifiable, which puts CMT at a disadvantage. Objectification Theory introduces hierarchical structure of metaphor which may be used as a stepby-step verification procedure for assessing mapping validity.（essay代写)

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