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What is Real--论文代写范文精选

2016-01-22 来源: 51due教员组 类别: Essay范文

51Due论文代写网精选essay代写范文:“ What is Real” 历史也被认为是从现在的意识经验的一个构造。世界上没有一个自我的概念,世界基于直接的精神体验与其他直接经验。这篇哲学essay代写范文讲述了关于这个世界是否真实的观点。理想主义者或非物质的哲学一直批评唯我论的观点。这种批评反驳,强调主体间性科学的重要性,这篇essay代写范文通过引入集体意识经验,通过更精确的概念和集体意识经验跨越。进行全面的证据支持,对于这些概念的启发式价值。我认为理想主义者的方法会导致对自然科学一个连贯的理解。

虽然这与主流唯物主义方法相矛盾。理想主义者的方法和集体意识经验的概念也促进了跨文化研究和主体间性的理解。下面的essay代写范文讲述了这一问题。

Abstract
History is also regarded as a construct from conscious experiences in the Now. Concepts of worlds without an ego are seen to be in harmony with immediate egoless experiences. Worlds including spirituality are conceived as based on immediate spiritual experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist or immaterial philosophies have been criticized for implying solipsism or "solipsism of the present moment". This critique is countered by emphasizing the importance of intersubjectivity for science and by introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious experience and collective conscious experience across time. Comprehensive evidence supporting the heuristic value of these concepts is related.I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent comprehension of natural science including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream materialist approach entails contradictions.and other problems for a coherent understanding. The idealist approach and the notion of collective conscious experience also facilitates cross-cultural studies and the underestanding of intersubjectivity.

Introduction
Whitehead (1920, p. 69) thinks that "the ultimate terminus of awareness is a duration with temporal thickness" and that "the present is a wavering breadth of boundary" between the extremes of memory and anticipation. Denbigh (1981, p. 17) thinks that the "specious present" (or "perceptual present") gives to temporal awareness a certain degree of "spread", and he quotes William James for asserting that the perceptual present is not like a knife edge, but more like a saddle-back. More recently Varela (1999, p. 119) has stated that "the very mode of appearance of nowness is in the form of extension, and to speak of a now-point obscures this fact". Hayward (1987) writes about relations between the sciences and Buddhism, and he states that conscious experience occurs as series of moments of finite duration (p. 168).

Within the extension of the Now there is room for a rich content including both memories and anticipations, which can be seen as special modes of experience in the Now. Memories and anticipations in the Now can of course, together with the eperience of succession, form a basis for construction of concepts of time. These concepts (also conscious experiences) can then become part of the psychological Now. The philosopher Henri Bergson (1980) studied the immediate experience of successions, and found that such experiences, for instance the notes of a melody penetrate each other and form a whole (pp. 74-79). He contended that the time of science and of daily life is an abstraction from these immediate experiences. I find that Bergson's views correspond well with the description of the content of the Now by Gurwitsch and Arvidson, which is related below. Also Buddhist and other Indian psychology have found that physical time is an "abstraction", a "construction" or a "conceptual fabrication" (Hayward 1987, pp. 166,169, Inada 1991, pp. 470-471, Mahadevan, 1992, p. 578). Nicholas of Cusa (15th century) held similar views of the Now: "All time is comprised in the present or 'now'..... time is only a methodological arrangement of the present. The past and the future, in consequence, are the development of the present" (quoted in Perry 1971, p. 840).

I think that other concepts, theories and observations of science are likewise abstracted, abducted or constructed from the whole of the psychological Now. The reading of a measuring instrumant can serve as an example: usually only the position of the pointer is recorded, while its color and shape together with many other features of the perceptual whole are ignored (Marchais and Randrup 1991, p. 2).

The rich content and the structure of the Now has been studied extensively by Gurwitsch (1985) followed by Arvidson (2000). Arvidson states: "At each and every moment of experience, with few exceptions, there is a figure and a ground, a focus of attention and a context for that focus". At the periphery of this "thematic field" Arvidson thinks that there is the contents of "marginal consciousness" (p. 3). In the succession of moments a marginal item may move into the thematic field (p. 14). I concur with these views, and I think they help to understand the way concepts and theories are constructed from the whole of the psychological Now.

Strictly speaking the conscious content of the Now constitutes the only sure basis of all our knowledge, and if we accept that the Now contains both successions, memories, anticipations and focal or marginal awareness of many items, this basis will be sufficient for construction of concepts and theories, including theories about ontology. Concepts and theories are also experienced in the Now, in the focus or the margin. The central importance of the Now in the idealist position developed here indicates that further scientific studies of the psychology of the Now will yield information of fundamental significance. Studies by Sorenson (1998) of indigenous people living in isolated enclaves around the world have revealed a kind of consciousness focussed within a flux of sentient immediacy, where experience is not clearly subdivided into separable components. I expect that further studies of this kind of consciousness, "preconquest consciousness" will contribute significantly to the knowledge of immediate experience in the Now. The change of preconquest consciousness under foreign influence may yield material for understanding the process of extraction of separable components from the immediate experience in the Now and the formation of concepts and theories.

The Ontology of Consciousness
In the English scientific and philosophic literature the term "consciousness" is used with several very different meanings. Here are some examples showing the span of the variation:
"Consciousness is a neurological system like any other, with functions such as the long-term direction of behavior ... " (Bridgeman 1980) 
"Consciousness ... is best regarded as an aspect of the system's behaviour, the latter admitting of both overt and covert dimensions." (Cotterill 2001, p. 13)
"Consciousness is information" (Goldberg 1996, pp. 12, 32)

The universe is fundamentally a great mind. Consciousness is seen as primary, and matter as a projection of consciousness (Orme-Johnson, Zimmerman and Hawkins 1997).Wuthnow (1976, p. 60) proposes that consciousness may be defined "as the ongoing process of constructing reality out of symbols and experience." This is an example of functionalism which in general views consciousness as a brain process or mode of functioning (Velmans 1990, p. 79). Wuthnow (p. 65) also thinks that consciousness "needs to be recognized as not simply a psychological phenomenon, but as a process linked in important ways to the functioning of society."

The mind-body or mind-brain problem is now often called "the hard problem", meaning that it is hard to understand how a material brain can produce consciousness. I believe that the hardness of the problem is a direct implication of the materialist ontology, and that therefore the problem cannot be "solved" as long as this ontology is applied. Materialist realism is the problem. (Very recently Marshall (2001, p. 60) has expressed similar views on the hardness of the mind-brain problem). With the idealist ontology the mind-brain relations are relations between conscious experiences (observations) constituting the material brain (here seen as a heuristic concept) and other conscious experiences. It is readily understood that such relations are possible, and they can be studied in detail by comparing the results from neurophysiology and from attention to conscious experiences. 

In a number of non-Western cultures and belief systems we encounter conceptions of the world and the human which are very different from the dominant conceptions of contemporary Western science. Clearly those cultures have made different extractions and constructions from their immediate experiences in the psychological Now. 

Writing on East Asian thought Tu (1980) gives a clear account of such differences. He states that according to East Asian thought it is fallacious to define human nature merely in terms of biological, psychological or sociological structures and functions because, viewed holistically a more comprehensive grasp of its many-sidedness is required. The uniqueness of being human is an ethicoreligious question; Ch'an rejects the artificial dichotomy between the body and the enlightened mind (pp. 167, 172 and 173). Tu also states that human beings are thought to have the potential power and insight to penetrate the things-in-themselves (this is in direct opposition to the Kantian view of the unknowable "Ding an sich") and that humanity forms an inseparable unity with heaven, earth and the myriad things (in contrast to the view of a material world separate from the human mind) (p.169).(essay代写)

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