Perspectives on Social Cognition--论文代写范文精选

SC通常表示社会心理学的一个分支,SC的特点是强调方法论,而社会心理学传统上是心理驱动的问题。SC寻求解决的核心问题,在多大程度上，社会的判断取决于社会知识与情感和欲望。下面的paper代写范文进行论述。

INTRODUCTION 
  No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or “culture” the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past thirty or so years. That so many disciplines now invoke the term “social cognition,” shouldn’t tempt one into thinking that these are all denoting the same idea. 

  On the contrary, with such methodologically and perspectivally diverse interests involved, there is every chance that they are talking at cross-purposes. The so-called “cognitive revolution” of the post-war period has seen the rise of cognitive anthropology, cognitive archaeology, cognitive economics, cognitive linguistics, cognitive sociology and even the cognitive science of religion, all vibrant fields of endeavor. Furthermore, there is a wealth of literature going under the label of social cognition that is concerned with several other mammalian species (for some recent surveys on SC from a life sciences perspective see Adolphs (2001), Lieberman (2005) and Saxe (2006)). Some clarification of the term social cognition is thus in order. SC typically denotes an offshoot of social psychology, an offshoot that took root thirty years ago by importing much from cognitive psychology. 

  SC came to be characterized by its emphasis on the methodological, whereas social psychology was traditionally problem driven. These days SC has both “cold” (concepts and inferences) and “hot” (goals, desires, and feelings) cognitions as its subject matter: there is now more that binds SC and SP than separates them (Kunda, 1999). A central question SC seeks to address and one that would be salient to our conception of SC is “to what extent are social judgments determined by social knowledge as opposed to feelings and desires.” Our conception of SC has some overlap and extends these broad concerns. For our purposes SC is used in a much broader sense. 

  It takes inspiration from philosophical arguments presented by Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) for the view that mental states are world-involving or that some mental states are linguistic-communityinvolving. These arguments have come to be known as arguments for externalism or antiindividualism or broad content. For us, SC involves the individual’s cognitive relationship to the social corpora (family, friends, institutions, etc.) and the ambient postulates that inform a culture, its technology, and the complex manifold of artefactual and environmental considerations that are transpersonal. 

  There are two inextricably linked aspects to this: (a) the examination of the individual mind’s processes, encoding, and storage of social information; and (b) the examination of how the individual mind is influenced by social interaction. Acknowledging this dual aspect to cognition might seem blindingly obvious but it should be remembered that traditional epistemology and classical cognitive science are highly individualistic, focusing on mental operations of cognitive agents in isolation or abstraction from other persons or other environmental considerations. Orthodox materialist-computationalism is committed to the methodological supposition that cognition can be studied independently of any consideration of the brain, the body, and the physical or social environment. 

  Sociology has of course a long tradition of theorizing group psychology and its import for the individual (Marxist “false consciousness” being a star example), but its business was never to examine the mechanics of the individual mind. As a response to this individualism there has arisen what best would be termed a “movement” and which we have termed the DEEDS literature, a loose and internally fluid philosophical and empirical coalition comprising the Dynamical-, Embodied-, Extended-, Distributed-, and Situated- approaches to knowledge and cognition. The writers that have contributed to this issue are bound by either an implicit or explicit rejection of bald individualism. This acknowledgment does not present a stark individualist/anti-individualist choice. 

  There are certainly individualistic methodological insights that one would wish to preserve and indeed enhance with anti-individualistic insights. Whatever the confluence on this broad issue, there are still vigorous internecine disagreements regarding the appropriate delimiting of the individual mind and its environment. The SC theorist addresses the question “How does one apportion the extent to which individuals’ cognitive states are dependent upon their social milieu?” She thereby recognizes that the issue is not one of a choice between an individually oriented and a socially oriented account of cognition, but rather of a grasp of the interaction between these two components. This issue’s raison d’être is to bring out the importance of this interaction, its scope and the issues it raises, as well as to examine its implications for different areas of human activity, from the cognitive functions of language and memory, to economics and science.

  As befits a multidisciplinary journal as this is, the writers (and referees) that have contributed to this issue come from the diverse backgrounds of artificial intelligence, applied linguistics, applied mathematics, communication studies, computer science, economics, engineering, philosophy, psychology, and systems analysis. SG has appeared in various guises over the years in this journal: we view this issue as being complimentary to Ron Sun’s special issue on multi-agent learning (2001); Tom Ziemke’s special issue on situated and embodied cognition (2002) and more recently, Luca Tummolini and Cristiano Castelfranchi’s special issue on collective intentionality (2006). Despite the diverse contributions, some informal groupings and a running order suggest themselves. The first grouping (Shapiro, 2007; Robbins, 2007) tackle a central problem raised by SC’s critical investigation into the boundary individual-social environment, namely that of the nature and locus of consciousness. Shapiro specifically addresses this issue through the so-called “extended mind” literature. 

  Is mind metaphysically, or should mind methodologically, be constrained by the unit that is the cranium? Thus conceived, the point of interest for Shapiro is not over what minds are but where minds are. In the service of this discussion, Shapiro takes to task the functionalist arguments typically appealed to by extended mind theorists: this, broadly speaking, is the idea that mental states should be accounted for by a functional, causal relationship, rather than the intrinsic features of a given state. For Shapiro, the functionalist perspective, the common coin for arguments for and against extended cognition, is unsuitable to make any assessment either way. Shapiro takes the view that any assessment must take place against the backdrop of non-functionalist considerations. (paper代写)

  Robbins argues that consciousness is fundamentally a social phenomenon, a claim that rests on recent empirical research that suggests that social pains (just like physical pains) share significant brain mechanisms. For Robbins, social pain denotes (a) the perception of actual or potential damage to one’s interpersonal relations, and (b) the phenomenon of affective contagion: the tendency for emotions, moods, and other affeective states to spread from person to person in social contexts. The upshot of this is that phenomenal (first-person) consciousness, traditionally viewed as not amenable to scientific (third-person) investigation, does in fact have a public dimension. Moreover, the idea that such affective states seem to be so easily transmitted between people suggests that consciousness is a socially distributed phenomenon though not in the radical extended mind sense that Shapiro considers.(paper代写)

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