Investment and Financing Constraints--论文代写范文精选

有大量文献对公司投资进行概述,假设更多限制企业依靠内部融资投资，楔形的外部融资约束受益于现金流入。确定更多限制，更具约束力的融资约束。这一领域的研究一直是一个争论。下面的paper代写范文进行论述。

Abstract 
  We investigate whether the sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flows is related to financing constraints. Besides financing constraints, measurement error in Tobin's q is another competing explanation for the sensitivity, suggested in the literature. Controlling for measurement errors in Tobin's q and using a parsimonious model specification, we find that investment-cash flow sensitivities are positive and vary with financing constraints. Measurement errors in Tobin's q do not explain away the sensitivities for firms facing financing constraints. Evidence of this first-order linear relationship between investment and internal funds are consistent with the larger literature documenting the effects of financing frictions on investment.

  INTRODUCTION 
  Studying the effect of financing constraints on firms' investment behavior represents a core interest of researchers and policymakers in finance and economics. Accordingly, there is a large literature on the sensitivity of firms' investments to their internal funds.1 In their seminal paper, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) hypothesize that more-constrained firms should rely more heavily on internal cash flows to finance investment. With a wedge to financing externally, a constrained firm benefiting from cash inflows finds itself with the ability to invest more. When regressing investment-to-capital on Tobin's q and cash flow-to-capital, and identifying more-constrained firms as low-dividend payers, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find that larger investment-cash flow sensitivities indicate more binding financing constraints. 

  This area of research has been a fertile ground for debate, in part because Tobin's marginal q is not observable. In a comment to the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen's (1988) article, Poterba (1988) introduces the idea that errors in measuring Tobin's q, not financing constraints, may be responsible for the observed investment-cash flow sensitivities. If cash flow were correlated with investment opportunities not well measured by the proxy for Tobin's q, investment-cash flow sensitivities could arise. In an influential paper, Erickson and Whited (2000) directly address the issue by developing measurement error-consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. 

  In their empirical tests, investmentcash flow sensitivities are no longer statistically significant when controlling for measurement errors in Tobin's q. The irrelevance of cash flow for investment, reported in Erickson and Whited (2000), has cast doubts on the validity of extensive evidence obtained from traditional investment-cash flow sensitivity estimations in the past. Sorting out the investment-cash flow sensitivity results is important because it relates to the larger macroeconomic effects of financing frictions. It is well-known that financing frictions, through their effect on investment, can slow down economic growth and amplify business cycles. These effects are documented in Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), King and Levine (1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Obstfeld (1994), among others. 

  This study follows the approach adopted by Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and a number of subsequent empirical studies, by classifying firms according to their financing status and estimating the investment-cash flow sensitivity for different groups of firms. In our tests we employ the measurement error-consistent GMM estimators suggested by Erickson and Whited (2000). While the effect of financing constraints on investment can be detected using more sophisticated empirical strategies, investment-cash flow sensitivities nevertheless capture the linear, first-order reduced form relationship between investment and internal cash flows. Useful advantage of this approach is that it allows for direct comparison with previous studies. 

  The result, that investment-cash flow sensitivities disappear once measurement error in Tobin's q is taken into account, is obtained from an untraditional specification that restricts the coefficient on Tobin's q to be identical for firms with differential financing status. The restriction is not necessarily supported in the data and we can decrease the risk of model misspecification by adopting a more parsimonious specification allowing firms with different financing status to have different sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q. In fact, the majority of earlier studies on the sensitivity of investment to internal funds have employed more flexible specifications allowing firms with different financing status to have different sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q. We investigate whether cash flow remains irrelevant for investment when we control for measurement error in Tobin's q and allow firms with different financing status to have different sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q. 

  We find that, if we impose the restriction, we obtain Erickson and Whited's (2000) result that cash flow is irrelevant for investment regardless of the financing status of the firm. However, if we relax the restriction, investment exhibits strong positive association with cash flow for firms identified as financially more-constrained even after measurement error in Tobin's q is controlled for. These results confirm the findings in Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), and a number of subsequent studies, that investment decisions of firms facing financing frictions are sensitive to the availability of internal funds because they have a cost advantage over external financing. Another debate arose earlier in the investment-cash flow sensitivity literature because financing constraints are not observable. 

  Different proxies for financing constraints yield different conclusions on how financing constraints affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Identifying more-constrained firms using information extracted from company annual reports, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) obtain a different result: larger investment-cash flow sensitivities are associated with less binding financing constraints.2 To address this concern, we use a variety of proxies for financing constraints to test the robustness of our results. (paper代写)

  Two of the proxies, firm size and the presence of credit rating, are based on a single variable, while the other two, Cleary's (1999) financing constraints index and Whited and Wu's (2006) financing constraints index, attempt to capture multiple aspects of a firm's financing status. Having obtained investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates for firms of differential financing status, we contribute to the debate on the effect of financing constraints on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by providing evidence from measurement error-consistent estimations. We find that financially more-constrained firms exhibit larger investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms identified as financially less-constrained. These results are consistent with the findings of a number of previous studies that do not explicitly control for measurement error in Tobin's q. (paper代写)

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